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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a critical examination of Charles Taylor's moral theory. Its
purpose is to understand both Taylor himself as an important contemporary Christian
thinker, as well as the ramifications his philosophy has in the realm of Christian Ethics
and Practical Theology.
Part I (chapters 1-3) discusses the development of Taylor's moral theory,
particularly as it appears in Sources of the Self. Chapter One begins by discussing
Taylor's definition of ethics which includes notions of the good and the meaningful in
our lives. This leads to his argument that the moral domain depends upon
frameworks of significance closely linked to the identity of the moral agent. Chapter
Two examines Taylor's idea of moral frameworks in terms of practical reasoning and
moral articulation. Finally, Chapter Three develops Taylor's arguments for
articulating the goods in our lives, and why this is essential for the pursuit of ethics.
Part II (chapters 4-5) investigates certain theological influences on Taylor.
Chapter Four is a discussion of Taylor and Augustine which draws certain parallels
and contrasts in the field of theological anthropology. Chapter Five examines how
Taylor's idea of the Church in modernity has largely been shaped by Yves Congar's
writings on the laity and Henry de Lubac's Catholicism. It examines Taylor's
ecclesiology with specific reference to these two theologians who have had a
significant impact on his Christian identity.
Part III (Chapters 6-8) looks more specifically at Taylor's relevancy to
Christian Ethics and Practical Theology. By way of introduction, Chapter Six argues
for a distinct role for God in Taylor's theory. Following on from this I discuss
through a brief historical argument how secular philosophy has eclipsed two
important features of Christian Ethics which Taylor asserts are indispensable for
giving the best account of the human moral domain. These two features are
transcendence and ontology, and Chapter Seven examines these particularly in
relation to the role they have in Taylor's philosophy, and what implications this has
for Christian Ethics. The final chapter develops the discussion of transcendence and
ontology through the essential good of Agape. Agape is discussed not only as a
pivotal concept in Christian Ethics, but also as a fundamental part of Taylor's own
moral framework. I conclude this chapter by arguing that Taylor's ontologically
'thick' concept of Agape as an empowering good needs to be considered in Christian
Ethics if we are to be consistent about the transcendent and ontological claims of the
discipline.
In conclusion I bring together some of the seminal features of Taylor's
philosophy as articulated in the thesis. In particular these are discussed in the light of
their valuable contribution to our understanding of Christian Ethics and Practical
Theology.




List of Illustrations ix
Acknowledgements x
Introduction xii
Part I: Taylor's Moral Ontology
1 Moral Frameworks and Personal Identity 2
A Moral Definition /Simple Naturalism: The Subjectivists
Moral Frameworks / The Mechanistic Morality
Personal Identity and the Inescapable Moral Framework
Moral Orientation /Moral Maps and Legends
Teleology and Personal Identity
2 Moral Reasoning 37
The Problem ofProjectionism / Taylor's Argument
Against Projectionism /Sophisticated Naturalism
Hypergoods /Practical Reasoning or Practically
Moral Reasoning ? / Ad Hominem Reasoning
Reasoning through Transitions / Qualitative
Distinctions in Moral Reasoning
3 Cramped Moral Views and the Point of Articulation 64
Articulation and Constitutive Goods / The Obligationist
Response /Procedural Ethics /Neo-Nietzschean
Criticism / The Necessity ofArticulation /Arbitrating
between Goods /A Hunch aboutArticulacy
Reconciliation through Articulation
Part II: Theological Webs of Interlocution
Taylor and Augustine:
Some Parallels in Theological Anthropology
Manichaeism /Being as Good/The Will and Desire
Strong and Weak Wills /The Will and Direction
God and the Natural Order / Grace and Human Limits
The Radically Reflexive Stance /Proving God's
Existence through Biography /A Shared Epistemology
From Self to God/The Ethics of Value
over Obligation / Conclusion
Taylor's Catholicism
Laikos and Klerikos in the Early Church
Congar and Laity in the Church / Congar's
Retractationes / Congar's Legacy and Taylor's Affinity
De Lubac's 'Catholicism' / Taylor's 'Catholicity' and
Spiritual Travelling / Other Religions /False Religions
Catholicity and the Pluralism ofModernity
Conclusion
Part III: Taylor and Christian Ethics
God in Taylor's Philosophy
God as Source /God as Constitutive Good /A Good
amongst goods / God as BestAccount /Proposing
a Christian Ethic / The Theological Background
to Secularity / SecularMorality on the Rise
7 Transcendence and Ontology in
Christian Moral Theory 161
The Polysemy of 'Transcendence' / Transcendence,
Art, andModernity /Art as Transcendent Epiphany
The Existential Paradox /Moral Transcendence
Taylor's Transcendence / Ontology and Theology
Being as Perfection / Ontology and Basic
Reasons / The Law and Gospel /Fact and
Value in Christian Ethics
8 The Place of Agape in Moral Ontology 193
An Etymological Diversion /A Yet More
Excellent Way /Nygren's Understanding
ofDivine Agape /Neighbour Love / 'Who is
My Neighbour?'/Love and Faith /Agape
and Self-Sacrifice /Agape as Mutuality
Love in a Different Voice /Agape and
Rule Following /De-theologising
Agape /Articulating Agape






1. Paul Gauguin: D'ou venons-nous? Que sommes-nous? Oil allons-nous?
(detail of left half), 1897, Fine Arts Museum, Boston
2. Paul Gauguin: D'oii venons-nous? Que sommes-nous? Ou allons-nous?
(detail of right half), 1897, Fine Arts Museum, Boston
3. William Blake: Elohim Creating Adam, 1795/c. 1805, Tate Gallery, London
4. William Blake: God Judging Adam, 1795, Tate Gallery, London
5. Cecil Collins: Daybreak, 1971, Private Collection
6. Cecil Collins: Landscape with Hills andRiver, 1943, Private Collection
7. Cecil Collins: Fool andAngel Entering a City, 1969, Private Collection
8. Cecil Collins: The Sleeping Fool, 1943, Tate Gallery, London
9. Jackson Pollock: Totem Lesson 1, 1944, Private Collection
10. Jackson Pollock: Autumn Rhythm: Number 30, 1950, 1950, The Metropolitan
Museum of Fine Art, New York
11. Franz Marc: Yellow Cow, 1911, The Guggenheim Museum, New York
Acknowledgements
This investigation has been a rich and rewarding experience for me. In many
ways it is just the first step in what I hope will be a continuing project in Theology.
There are many applications of Taylor's philosophy barely touched upon in this thesis
which I hope to pursue in the future. His 'politics of recognition' has immense
potential in ecumenical studies both in regards to the differences within the Church as
well as the more global perspective of inter-faith dialogue. Some of his ideas of
modern art and divine revelation I find extremely helpful, and I think they can be
fruitfully applied to the discipline of Theological Aesthetics. One of the most
straightforward applications of his moral theory that I can see is in the realm of
pastoral counselling. Understanding moral reasoning as articulating the goods in our
lives can open up new roles for the counsellor as moral interlocutor.
Charles Taylor has had a profound effect on my own world view, and I am
grateful to Michael Northcott who first introduced me to Sources of the Self. I would
also like to express my deepest appreciation for Duncan Forrester, not only for
suggesting that I investigate Taylor as a Christian thinker, but for the continuing
support and insight he has offered throughout my time at New College. I have also
gained much from the small collection of post-graduates in the 'whither theology'
circle. It has been an invaluable forum for articulating how Taylor's philosophy can
be applied to theological issues, and I particularly appreciate the leadership of Kevin
Van Hoozer and Fergus Kerr.
My deepest thanks go to Charles Taylor himself who was extremely generous
with his time in allowing me to come to McGill. During that period I came to know
Taylor, not only as a profound intellectual and enthusiastic teacher, but also as a
Christian with a deep and continuing faith. It goes without saying that without the
opportunity to study with him this thesis would not have the shape that it does today.
Finally I would thank Dido—for proof reading the text with a clarity far
beyond my own abilities and for the ongoing support for the entire enterprise, and our
new-born son Harry who has given me the biological deadline I needed to complete
this. There is nothing like a miracle to put everything into perspective.
Introduction
Charles Taylor is unique in constructing a comprehensive philosophical system
in an age that he himself recognises as heavily pluralistic. His philosophy engages with
the pluralism of modernity, but not in simplistic terms. That is, he does not come
down completely on the side of either the 'knockers' or the 'boosters' of the
Enlightenment. As such it is difficult to speak about Taylor's philosophical
commitments in a language of generalisations. Many consider him to be a 'realist'
even though he would not necessarily hold to a strict correspondence theory of truth.
He is often labelled a Communitarian, even though he wants to affirm the importance
of the individual in society.
What drives this unwillingness to be catalogued in any comprehensive way is
the intellectual integrity of one who will challenge the dogmas of an age if they do not
fit with the truth as he sees it. Isaiah Berlin has recognised this aspect of Taylor as
both a personal friend and an intellectually gifted colleague:
'He is a man of acute intelligence, total intellectual and moral sincerity,
unswerving integrity, and a remarkable insight into a variety of
philosophical traditions, their central animating ideas, uncluttered by
ingenious and sometimes highly complicated means of defence against
actual or possible objections. His view of social and political life, to
which he has devoted his thought, is imaginative, generously receptive,
deeply humane and formed by the truth as he sees it, and not as it
ought to be in accordance with dogmatically held premises or
overmastering ideology. This gives to his work an authenticity, a
concreteness, and a sense of reality which some of his less open-
minded, proselytising, not to say formula—and ideology—ridden allies
and disciples do not always show.'1
'See Philosophy in an Age ofPluralism: The philosophy ofCharles Taylor in question, ed. James
Tully (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p.l.
Some of these allies that Berlin speaks of are certainly theologians and
Christian ethicists. Taylor as a Roman Catholic has had much to say to the post¬
modern predicament in theology, albeit indirectly. He has also, however, been
criticised by a number of theologians for his 'open-mindedness' in as much as this is
interpreted as a lack of commitment to the traditional doctrines of Christianity. Some
have accused him of not coming out strongly enough against relativism or certain
Enlightenment values which they see as incompatible with any Christian position.2
Ironically enough there is a larger group of thinkers who do not sympathise
with Taylor's Christian viewpoint and continually criticise his philosophy for working
on the assumption of God's existence. Taylor in effect is caught on the fence between
those who feel he is not being explicit enough from the outset about his Christian
commitment, and those who want to disqualify his philosophical system because it
arrives finally at a belief in God.
Taylor himself has something similar to say to each party. His work in the
political and social realm is based on his understanding of truth and how that is
expressed in society. His arguments, therefore, are grounded in how he sees things to
be, not on an assumed deity. While he admits that his faith may cause him to ask
questions that secular theorists would avoid, this does not disqualify the answers. At
the same time, Taylor recognises that philosophy cannot begin with God in the way
theology does, and so he is clear about his task being one distinct from the
theologian's. In effect he is doing the work of natural theology rather than
systematics.
This of course has the advantage of speaking a language directly relevant to
the conditions of the modern world in a way that theology is often criticised for not
being able to do. Taylor's comprehensive philosophical system is ensconced in the
undeniable varieties of existence and as such has much to say to secular society about
the truth-claims of Christianity. His arguments against certain predominant views of
the human agent serve as an evangelistic programme compelling the modern to think
again.
2See for example Stanley Hauerwas and David Matzko, 'The Sources of Charles Taylor', Religious
Studies Review, 18, 1992, pp.286-289.
Approaching his moral theory with the understanding that it is a formulation
which speaks to the central issues of our time means that it can have a considerable
impact on the shape of Christian ethics. As an argument against certain features of
secularism, it can act as a moral map steering us clear of often unseen dangers. As a
position which does not condemn modernity in blanket terms, however, it can serve as
a foundation for dialogue, and has much to teach us in terms of our assumed moral
positions in Christian ethics.
In this way, while Taylor's philosophical theory is undergirded with a
sophisticated and abstract metaphysics and epistemology, it nevertheless is directly
relevant to 'applied ethics'. He himself ensures this in his own philosophical
formulations, and has often been praised for taking the inaccessibility of philosophical
inquiry and bringing it down to the level of application in the day to day world. Jiirgen
Habermas remarks that Taylor is unique as a philosopher in this way:
'Legal experts have the advantage of discussing normative questions in
connection with cases to be decided. Their thinking is oriented to
application. Philosophers avoid this decisionist pressure; as
contemporaries of classical ideas extending over more than two
thousand years, they are not embarrassed to consider themselves
participants in a conversation that will go on forever. Hence it is all the
more fascinating when someone like Charles Taylor attempts to grasp
his own times in ideas and to show the relevance of philosophical
insights to the pressing political questions of the day.3
Habermas goes on to say that Taylor's work is brilliant and inspiring,
'...although, or rather because, he does not follow the fashionable path of an "applied
ethics".'4 In not following this path, Taylor bridges a gap between theory and praxis.
His metaphysical inquiries naturally lead to actual applications in the social and the
political life. Describing Taylor's methodology in these overly-linear terms, however,
is misleading. For it is not that theory leads to the goal of praxis, but rather that the
two are intricately interdependent.
The stark bifurcation of theory and praxis which is prevalent in theology can
gain a great deal from the way Taylor brings these two together under the heading of
3See Jiirgen Habermas, 'The Struggle for Recognition' in Multiculturalism: examining the politics of
recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) p.135.
4Ibid., p.135.
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moral articulation.5 In the realm of systematics this prevents the theologian from
becoming an obsolete and irrelevant theoretician by joining theological questions
concerning the nature of God with our understanding of how this affects our
existence. More specifically relevant to this thesis is the way this understanding of
theory and praxis relates to Christian ethics. The reahn of 'practical know-how and
ministerial skills' has been severed from the theology of 'contemplation' and is studied
in isolation.6
Taylor's methodology, however, can help us to understand how important it is
to anchor a practical formulation within a theoretical framework which both explains
the formulation and helps to encourage it. This must be understood as a mutual
compatibility between theory and praxis rather than one upholding the other. As Peter
Hodgson indicates, the purpose of bringing together theory and praxis is not
'deducing one tiling lioin another (as though one thing were foundational and aiiothei
derivative), but of showing that truth occurs in terms of mutually interdependent
relations.'7
Furthermore, there is a specific application of Taylor's methodology to
Christian ethics in the way he understands the good and articulating the good in our
lives. This is not merely equated with discovering the theological import and
motivation of our ethical policies, though it includes this important dimension. The
way that the good functions in Taylor's moral ontology can help us realise that
Christian ethics extends beyond the boundaries of good acts to the very meaning of
our lives, and as such cannot be segregated from any theoretical articulations. This
may make those who are insistent upon some cut and dried schema of ethical
formalisation very uneasy, for they may see Taylor's lack of dogmatism as a lack of
any significant focus. This thesis prepares to argue against such a position. Taylor as a
Christian thinker can be seen as a 'great fertilising force'. His rich moral ontology and
5For a discussion of this split see Peter Hodgson, Winds of the Spirit (Louisville, KY: Westminster
John Knox Press, 1994).
interestingly enough, the split is reminiscent of the dichotomy of Aristotle's good life: phronesis
(praxis) and theoria (theory). For the development of these two disciplines in theology see Edward
Farely, Theologia: The Fragmentation and Unity ofTheological Education (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1983).
7See Peter Hodgson, Winds of the Spirit, p. 16.
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his own personal Christian vision gives new insight to the very methodological








Sources of the Self is at one and the same time the most thorough and succinct
articulation of Charles Taylor's moral theory.1 This volume not only offers an
extraordinary breadth of philosophical engagement, but also brings together many of
the seminal investigations of Taylor's earlier philosophy. Through this one can detect
his earlier work in metaphysics, political theory, and philosophical anthropology
surfacing within an ethical framework. This monograph, therefore, will be the
primary text in this thesis. I will begin by drawing out the main components of his
definition of morality. Building upon this definition Taylor constructs a moral
realism which makes claims against most of the moral philosophies espoused in
contemporary thought. He argues that there is a need to work within necessary moral
frameworks, but he also explains how it is that the modern individual comes to
'Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989).
2For Taylor's work in metaphysics see his book Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1975), and more recently his collections of essays Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1995). For his work in political theory see Patterns of Politics (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1970), Hegel and modern society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979), Multiculturalism: examining the politics of recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1994), and Rapprocher les solitudes: ecrits sur le federalisme et le
nationalisme au Canada, ed. Guy Laforest (Quebec: Les Presses de l'Universite Laval, 1992). The
majority of his work in philosophical anthropology can be found in the two volume collection of
essays Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers, Volume One and Philosophy and the
Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, Volume Two (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985). A comprehensive bibliography of Taylor's writings can be found in Philosophy in an Age of
Pluralism, pp.258-264.
ignore these frameworks. In this explanation Taylor identifies several coherent
reasons for this denial. By critiquing the objections from various modern theories that
would contest Taylor's moral realism, the first part of this examination traces
Taylor's formulations through a dialectical process. This eventually brings to the
surface what lies behind our moral intuitions in modern society. It will then be clear
how Taylor's moral theory evolves and whether it can stand against the tide of
modern philosophical scepticism.
A Moral Definition
The first problem that Taylor addresses in Sources of the Self is the modern
limits to the term 'moral'. Modern moral theory has focused on what it is right to do,
what one's obligations are to oneself and society. The questions of philosophy are
thereby limited to terms of action. In this narrow definition we talk about whether it
is right to sacrifice the good of the one for the many, or what our obligations are
concerning the government, a community, or other individuals. This kind ofmorality
investigates how one should act in certain situations, and what decisions one should
make based on the ramifications of certain consequences. While Taylor does not
want to argue that this kind of moral calculating is insignificant, he does cogently
point out that treating this as comprehensive means that certain aspects of our lives
which affect us, and which really matter to us, do not come into play in the moral
realm. This way of addressing the moral, for example, does not see questions in
terms of what it is good to be. It does not speak to the issues involved in formulating
the nature of the good life, yet this is essentially a moral matter. The primary reason
that 'narrow' moral theories ignore these kinds of questions is that they have no room
for any notion of the good as an object of love, or as what Iris Murdoch calls a
'privileged focus of attention or will'.3 Taylor argues that in so doing they represent a
skewed perception ofmorality, one which needs to be adjusted.
'Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge, 1970), see also her more recent work
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (London: Penguin, 1992).
3
There are several reasons why our concept of morality needs to be broadened,
and all of these have to do with the way we react in various situations. In order to
justify the inclusion of these other spheres of the moral we must investigate our
moral intuitions and reactions and come to understand what lies behind these
'feelings'. If one wants to include in a definition of the moral not only notions of
justice, equality, etc., but broader concepts involving what underlies worth and value
for the human agent, his dignity, or a fulfilling and meaningful life, one must show
that the questions involved in these latter issues are of the same type as the former.
The problem then involves whether there is a difference of kind between
something we could easily recognise as a moral dilemma, such as whether or not one
should condone capital punishment, and those more extensive issues such as life
goals, feelings of worth, concepts of benevolence and universal dignity. Taylor points
out that there is a common factor which underlies the reason why both kinds of
questions should be labelled 'spiritual' terms since both involve what he identifies as
'strong evaluations'.4
In other words the more general kind of moral issues are similar to those
focusing on action terms in that they too involve discriminating between right and
wrong, higher and lower, good and bad. Unlike what Taylor calls 'weak evaluations'
these judgements are not rendered acceptable based merely on our inclinations or
feelings. In fact they can often go against what we 'desire' to do. So for example, I
may want to seek revenge on someone even though I know it is not right. Likewise, I
may have a desire to live a reclusive life because it is a peaceful and less complicated
existence, yet I understand that interaction with others is more in tune with the kinds
of values that I consider make life worth living.
Strong evaluations of this kind involve qualitative distinctions. In a
qualitative distinction one's desires are classified 'in such categories as higher and
lower, virtuous and vicious, more and less fulfilling, and more and less refined,
profound and superficial, noble and base. They are judged as belonging to
qualitatively different modes of life: fragmented or integrated, alienated or free,
4Charles Taylor, 'What is Human Agency?', in Human Agency and Language (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985).
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saintly, or merely human, courageous or pusillanimous ... ,'5 Where weak
evaluations are concerned primarily with the results, strong ones are concerned with
the 'qualitative worth of different desires.'
A good example Taylor gives of a weak evaluation is deciding between a
holiday in the north or the south. There is a choice between the rugged beauty of the
north, the pleasure of the landscape untainted by human civilisation, and the warmth
of the south, the feeling of well-being, the joy of swimming in the ocean. One
holiday is more 'exhilarating' the other more 'relaxing'. Taylor describes the choice
here as a weak evaluation because there are different characteristics of each holiday
which make them desirable, but there is no distinguishing between the desires in any
sense of worthiness. 'I ultimately opt for the south over the north not because there is
something more worthy about relaxing than being exhilarated, but just because "I feel
like it".'6 The language which can eventually explain this choice is inarticulable. A
strong evaluation, however, is precisely capable of expression. 'The strong evaluator
can articulate superiority just because he has a language of contrastive
characterisation.'7
In a strong evaluation a choice is necessarily contrasted, it is not a contingent
choice depending upon the circumstances of the moment. Being a certain kind of
person which includes choosing dignity over baseness does not depend upon
circumstances. It is never the case that baseness and dignity may at times be
compatible in the same way that one may holiday both in the north and the south if
one were to split the holiday between both places. 'For in strong evaluations, where
we deploy a language of evaluative distinctions, the rejected desire is not so rejected
because of some mere contingent or circumstantial conflict with another goal. Being
cowardly does not compete with other goals by taking up the time or energy I need to







Furthermore, the strong evaluator chooses the virtue based on the kind of
quality of life which it expresses and sustains. 'I eschew the cowardly act ... because
I want to be a courageous and honourable human being.'9 A good way of determining
whether an evaluation is a 'strong' one by Taylor's definition is whether it can be the
basis for attitudes of respect and admiration. Thus we might call someone
'courageous' if their act of rushing the enemy in battle aligns itself with a particular
concept that we admire. This would not be an object of respect, however, if one were
doing this same deed because one had a sense that living was no longer worthwhile
and danger was not an issue.
Virtues such as prudence and wisdom seem to play an important role in
refereeing between our strong moral evaluations and our instinctual feelings. On the
other hand our feelings often may uncover some 'hidden' moral agenda which we
would not necessarily articulate and which we would even want to deny. A
conceptual comparison may prove to make this point more clearly.
There is an incident in Mark Twain's Pudd'nhead Wilson where a servant
named Roxana has been accused of stealing money from her employer. On this
occasion, however, she is not guilty as she had 'been saved in the nick of time by a
revival ... a fortnight before,' where she 'got religion'. On seeing the money her boss
had left unprotected on his desk, she grows resentful towards this new morality
which is impinging on her opportunity of acquiring dishonest wealth. She curses her
conversion saying, 'Dad blame that revival, I wish'd it had 'a' be'n put off 'til
tomorrow.' Twain then goes on to explain that this sudden spurt of honesty was due
to religious etiquette, something by no means 'to be wrestled with into a precedent.'10
Roxana thinks that morality is something with which one can choose to
involve oneself depending on what one desires. At the time of seeing the money she
wanted the pleasure of the pious feelings, but she also wanted the money and
therefore wished to be freed from the former desire. In expressing this wish that her
conversion could have been 'put off'til tomorrow', Roxana seems to assume that one
can only apply moral judgements to one's own or others' actions if one is willing to
9Ibid„ p.25.
I0I owe this example to R. W. Beardsmore, Art and Morality (London: Macmillan, 1971).
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take part in moral reasoning. If this were true, then someone may reasonably wish
that he no longer feel remorse so that he might enjoy the full pleasures of
wrongdoing.
Kierkegaard, however, makes a significant claim when he describes remorse
as 'so wonderful a power ... so sincere is its friendship, that to escape it entirely is
the most terrible thing of all.'11 He is making a conceptual point about morality with
this statement. In effect he is saying that if one has a concern for the good, if one
cares about doing what is right, then one cannot at the same time wish to be freed
from this concern. This is what Taylor describes as a strong evaluation. Roxana's
wish that she be free from a concern for the good simply indicates that she has no
such concern. A real concern would lead her to condemn such a wish, but her
feelings in this situation have uncovered a hidden agenda which shows no concern
for a strong evaluation of honesty.
In this way morality is quite unlike any other form of activity. There is no
contradiction, for example, in wishing to be freed from one's preoccupation with art
or in saying that art has no value for you. If someone were to say, however, that one
no longer wants to be concerned with morality, we can still make the moral
judgement that he ought to be concerned with it. It should be noted here that the man
who claims not to care about art may meet with a similar objection, 'Well, you ought
to care.' This possibility proves rather than disproves that such pronouncements
about an individual's willingness to engage in certain activities, or to hold to certain
general formulations of what is worthwhile, are within the moral. The paradox here
can be alleviated by recognising that the judgement in question is a judgement made
from within morality, a judgement made about the moral significance of art. It has as
a fundamental feature a strong evaluation concerning what ought to be worthwhile.
The 'ought' used is not the kind of hypothetical obligation one would use, for
example, in the sentence, 'If you want to learn how to croon like Frank Sinatra, you
ought to take singing lessons.' It is rather the compelling ought which suggests a
moral agenda. To say one ought to care about art is to make a moral statement about
the value of art in one's life. There are various terms which can be substituted in the
1 'Soren Kierkegaard, Purity ofHeart, trans. Douglas Steere (New York: Fontana Books, 1966) p.35.
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place of art here and this, of course, leads quite clearly to Taylor's wider definition of
the moral. Questions concerning the value of X in one's life are questions with a
moral agenda. They are compelling in that they involve a strong evaluation. One can
argue for one over another in a way that is different from speaking about taste or
certain inconsequential preferences—Granny Smith apples are better than Golden
Delicious. This is the point that Swift makes in Gulliver's Travels about the absurdity
of the Lilliputian's war with the 'big-enders'. Choosing between breaking open a
hard-boiled egg from the big end or the little end is morally inconsequential. It is
utterly inane to consider fighting a war over such an issue.
With this key common denominator unveiled many of the similarities
between what we take to be our moral obligations and what we look for as important
in our life also come to the surface. The moral reactions we have in both cases deal
with the questions in a similar way and it is primarily for this reason that we should
broaden our moral horizon.
Taylor observes that one of the most powerful clusters of strong evaluations
in modern society involves our respect for others. This, however, is so deeply
ingrained as a moral reaction that it seems instinctual. Contrasted with this are other
moral reactions such as the condemnation of drug abuse or obedience to authority
which have been instilled upon us through education or cultural conditioning. In the
past this respect for others has been articulated in various cultures in specific ways
which lend an explanation to the intuitional simulation. So, for example, in the
Judeo-Christian realm we come to understand respect for humans as God's creatures,
made in his image. As Kant understood respect, its uniqueness depended on humans
• • • 19 , t
being rational agents worthy of dignity. These various reasons tell us what human
beings are and therefore we should respect them.
Like all moral reactions of this kind there are two distinct facets involved.
First, our respect for humans seems to be instinctual, intuitive, strongly based on
feelings we have, comparable to others such as those of fear, love, happiness, or even
nausea. Secondly, these moral reactions seem to involve claims about the human
l2See Immanuel Kant, Critique ofPractical Reason and Other Works on the Theory ofEthics, trans. T.
K. Abbott (London: Longmans, 1973; 6th ed., 1909).
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person. In the example above we are given two reasons why we should respect
others, viz. as creatures made in God's image or as rational beings. These are both
based on the nature of the human individual. This second strand is an important
affirmation of a given ontology of the human, and it is something which most
modern philosophers do not hold to.
Simple Naturalism: The Subjectivists
In this distinction between the two facets of a moral reaction Taylor comes up
against his first opponent to his moral realism, or posited moral ontology. The moral
subjectivist would want to argue that there is nothing behind our moral reactions, that
they are merely intuitions and nothing else. The motivation behind such assertions
are many and complex. They form an important feature of Taylor's argument against
what he calls 'naturalist' theories.13 For the moment, however, it will suffice to point
out that many of the subjectivist theories assume some socio-biological explanation
concerning moral reactions, so that they are explained in terms of evolutionary utility
and the modern scientific concept offunction.'4
The subjectivist, rather than seeing our moral positions as grounded in reason
or the nature of things, sees them ultimately as adopted just because we are drawn to
them. They are based on feelings or Humean sentiments. Nothing of substance lies
behind them to offer us any further explanation of their nature. Any talk concerning
some sort of ontology which gives rational articulation to these reactions is nothing
but metaphysical froth. According to the subjectivist we are to treat these moral
intuitions like any other feeling. They are on a par with melancholia or warm
contentment.
l3Taylor uses this word, not to connote the view that man can be seen as part of nature, but that the
nature of which humans are a part is to be understood according to the canons which emerged in the
17th century revolution in the natural sciences. In other words the understanding of human life and
actions is to be modelled on the natural sciences. So, for example, one should avoid anthropocentric or
what Taylor calls 'subjective' properties and explain the behaviour of the human agent in 'absolute'
terms (Human Agency and Language, pp.2ff. and 45-76).
l4For more on this concept, which differs greatly from Aristotle's idea of ergon, see Larry Wright,
'Function', Philosophical Review, 82, 1973, pp. 139-168.
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The first argument Taylor has against this view investigates whether we really
do equate these moral reactions with feelings. Are there any features of our moral
reactions which mark them as distinct? As an example of how we are to distinguish
or segregate the moral intuitions we have, Taylor examines the idea of nausea. It has
already been noted that unlike feelings, moral intuitions involve strong evaluations.
We could not say that feeling nauseous about something demanded our respect or
admiration in the way a certain moral inclination would. The distinction, however,
can be taken much further than this.
Both moral feelings and sentiments like nausea are due to responding to
certain properties in an object. In the case of the former, however, the properties
mark the object as one meriting this response. We can argue that this object should
have these properties above and beyond other objects. In other words we can defend
and argue for certain moral responses in a way that would seem absurd if they were
mere feelings. We can insist on someone being consistent in their moral reactions
where we cannot with feelings such as nausea. Even philosophers who do not hold to
a moral ontology often critique our moral reactions according to such a consistency.
Furthermore, moral reactions are goals and purposes such that, were we to
lose them, we would feel diminished. Looking at this from another angle, one can say
about such reactions that 'If I were different in this regard, I would be a much better
person.' We could not say the same about a simple preference for chocolate over
strawberry ice-cream. This is not a moral point, and there is no strong evaluation
involved.
One interpretation of Plato's Republic is to see it as Plato arguing to get
strong evaluations back into the debate about the nature of things. Thrasymachus
represents the younger highly educated Athenian who is challenging the traditional
assumptions of his predecessors by arguing that obeying the law does not involve
qualitative distinctions. It is just de facto that one conforms to power.15 Plato argues
against this relativist position by saying that it is because of our ontology that we
obey the law and seek justice, not because we simply feel like doing it. It is not just a
matter of happenstance. We as rational beings seek the good, which means we seek
l5See Republic, trans. Francis Cornford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1941) Bk.I.
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to grasp the nature of things. In this pursuit strong evaluations are inescapable and
distinct.16
Taylor does point out that there could be a case for seeing a sentiment such as
nausea as advantageous in some instances and not others, and through training one
might be able to condition oneself, for survival etc., to feel nausea in certain
instances, and to avoid it in others. But one could not then articulate what the
nauseating would be in terms of properties and then use this to invalidate some
response of nausea that you or anyone else had. It seems laughable to suggest that we
could have invalid objects of nausea in this way.17 Conversely, it does seem cogent to
argue for certain objects commanding our respect by virtue of what they are and what
they represent. Such a moral reaction can be reinforced through various reasons, or
alternatively a reaction like this can be criticised.
To attempt to assimilate the response involving strong evaluations with
sentiments such as nausea is in effect to admit that our talk of fit objects of moral
response is illusory. J. L. Mackie argues this point in his 'error-theory', which insists
that there is no real discrimination between actual properties with criteria
independent of our responses when we have moral reactions.18 Of course, this
assertion can be applied to a socio-biological explanation of these reactions so that
we find some reactions having a higher survival value than others, but it still does not
explain the view that certain things and not others, simply by virtue of their nature,
are fit objects of respect. In other words, Mackie's error-theory has a hard time
dealing with the special status ofmorality as an activity we cannot simply choose to
disengage from. It does not explain the difference between not feeling like
contributing to Oxfam and not feeling like strawberry ice-cream.
As Taylor points out, this socio-biological explanation is completely disparate
from the way we live our lives. We do not feel that it is right to respect certain things
merely because it is useful to do so. We do not decide that based on the predicament
of the human race at this particular point in history, we should be universally
benevolent, in order to survive. It is truer to say that we have these 'gut' feelings
l6l owe this example to Charles Taylor.
l7See Sources ofthe Self, pp.6f.
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because we think it would be wrong not to have them. This is the difference which
distinguishes the compelling ought from the hypothetical.
Another important way of looking at the moral subjectivist can be found in
Taylor's later work The Ethics ofAuthenticity}9 By attacking the neglect of reason in
such a thesis he makes the simple point that if our moral reactions were really merely
feelings, not only could we make no sense of them, but they would then thereby have
no power to move us. In a subjectivist moral theory things have value because people
deem them to have it, not because of any property that the object may have in and of
itself. But this way of thinking about moral intuition is incoherent. For it assumes
that value can be placed on anything willy-nilly, regardless of its nature. It claims that
we can consider things to be of significance by mere fiat, even perhaps unwittingly.
The world of moral reaction, however, does not work in this way. I cannot simply
decide that the most important action in my life is going to be jumping out of an
aeroplane with a parachute on. This does not make any sense for anyone, there must
be a stronger explanation. Perhaps I am overcoming a crippling phobia, or my fiancee
and I are in a parachute club together, and we are getting married on the way down.
Either way there is some reason which lies behind my feelings. Sentiments in this
way can never be all there is to moral intuitions, and feelings can never determine
what is significant. Only when these feelings are reinforced by significant reasons
qua values do they make any sense both to us and to others. Moral reactions are
constantly pointing us to these further explanations, something which makes sense of
the reactions. In other words there must be something of value existing beyond the
personal immanent 'me' of the Rouseauian inner voice and sentiment, for me to find
anything of worth.20
l8See J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977).
l9This is essentially a more succinct articulation of the ongoing argument in Sources ofthe Self.
:oSee The Ethics ofAuthenticity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991) pp.35ff.
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Moral Frameworks
Ontological accounts, i.e., those based on the nature of human agents, have
the status of articulating these moral reactions. Ifwe leave them out, we ignore a vital
ingredient of our moral dimension. There are several difficulties in this articulating
process, however. The specific agent experiencing the moral reactions may not be the
best authority to identify his or her moral background, at least not initially. One
reason for this is that the ontology behind a person's views can remain largely
implicit unless it is challenged. Furthermore, exploration of the background may be
resisted for one reason or another. In this way there may be an inconsistency between
what people admit to believing and what they, on the other hand, need in order to
make sense of their moral reactions. For example, someone may not wish to admit to
a racial prejudice, indeed may even deny such a belief, even though his moral
reactions, if properly articulated, would suggest otherwise. Taylor is constantly
exposing these cases in his argument against the naturalists where there is a lack of
fit between the reaction and the background (or a denial of such background).21
A third reason why this moral ontology may be difficult to articulate has to do
with the tentative nature of the experience. Particularly in the modem predicament
we feel an uncertainty about many of our moral beliefs. There is a sense in which we
are still groping to discover them. We may want to affirm our belief in such a
background concerning our moral intuition, but are uncertain as to what this really is.
Even in the realm of Christian ethics, which has traditionally held up a specific
background against which we explain our values, there is still this uncertainty.
This third reason relates specifically to Christian ethics in a way the others do
not. For Christian ethics is not necessarily a formulation of what people already
implicitly believe, nor is it simply a matter of bringing to the surface what some
2'it is a unique feature of Taylor's methodology that he does not merely dismiss those who are
opposing his philosophy. Rather he argues that their views, if properly understood, would lead either
to some internal conflict or to a position that is very similar to his own. He demonstrates a tremendous
confidence in the power of truth in our shared experiences: 'Experiences are shared so if we bring
them out we can ideally convince them [those opposing us] that there is something missing. There I
agree with Plato, we all have this tendency in us and it's a matter of finding the forms it takes .... Any
situation has built into it a negation so you can get inside it and say, "well what's this doing here?"'
(Appendix C).
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would want to deny, yet must admit to in practice. Rather, it seeks to show that a
certain ontology is in fact the only adequate basis for our moral responses, whether
we can recognise this or not. In the case of Christianity we are dealing with the
ontology of the Gospel in various manifestations. In doing so we insist upon this
specific background against which we can make sense of our moral reactions.
Taylor identifies two important features of our modern, universal, moral
concept which are linked to the notion of respect discussed above. The first
observation is that there seems to be a universal consensus in modern society to
avoid suffering.22 This is an intricate part of what we consider respect to be today
(pace Nietzsche). Certain features of our legal code can give us an indication of how
this is instilled into the framework of our lives. For example, legal executions are no
longer 'public' as they were for centuries. They are kept quietly contained within the
walls of the prison. Many of the forms of execution have also been done away with
on grounds of unnecessary suffering or inhumane treatment of the condemned.23
This stress on human welfare has as one of its sources certain religious
ideologies. It springs particularly from the New Testament focus of the early Church
in living out Christ's Gospel. In a secular guise utilitarianism has taken up some of
this content in modern society. Taylor sees many of the features of this universal
beneficence falling under the rubric of what he calls the 'affirmation of everyday
life'. This refers to the life goods of production and the family which became more
and more emphasised in society after the Reformation.24
Contrary to some interpretations of the Aristotelian system of ethics, there
grew up in Christendom, and particularly post-Reformation modernity, the idea that
'the good life' was not to be described exclusively in terms of the life of
contemplation (theoria) and on.'s activity as a citizen (phronesis). Rather, the
::See Sources ofthe Self pp. 12f.
: ,What is interesting to note, however, is that although most states in the United States have eradicated
capital punishment, there is a strong movement from the conservative right to reinstate this form of
'justice'. In many respects this can be interpreted as a shift back to an older order of the cosmos
whereby the convicted are punished in order to redress the balance that has been thrown off with their
crime. Society is seen as ritually undoing the terrible crime with an equally terrible punishment. In
such an ethos the victims of murder see the execution of the murderer as 'justice being done'. Michel
Foucault has analysed this in Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977).
24See Sources ofthe Self Pt.III.
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ordinary became the centre of a good life, and how life was lived out in the day to
day was of utmost importance. The life of the God-fearing individual was
substantiated in marriage, raising a family, and an ethic of hard work. God was to be
found in the everyday and these qualities of the ordinary became a kind of calling.
The 'higher' forms of the good were in a sense dethroned. Taylor believes that this
affirmation of the ordinary life has become one of the most powerful ideas in modern
civilisation, and while he wishes to embrace this ethical vantage point, he does not
concur with many of the misconceived ramifications it has instilled.
The discussion above has dealt with only one strand of moral intuitions, those
beliefs which cluster around our sense that human life ought to be respected. Taylor
argues that if one leaves morality at this point, there are still many features in our
lives which remain outside the moral, particularly those which are concerned with
how one is to live a life to make it fulfilling. What is it that constitutes a rich and
meaningful existence? Because this question deals with strong evaluations it must
also be addressed within the moral sphere. There is a sense in which 'to understand
our moral world we have to see not only what ideas and pictures underlie our sense
of respect for others but also those which underpin our notions of a full life.'25
For Taylor, concepts of the full life should not be separated from those
addressing issues of respect. On the contrary, he wishes to argue for a complex
relation between the two, particularly in the realm of the affirmation of everyday life.
A third axis which he links to these ideas is the need to feel respected by others. This
is not 'respect' in the sense of the word used above, as in having respect for
someone's rights, but rather thinking well of someone. He calls this 'attitudinaf
respect and it concerns certain concepts of dignity. 'Dignity', as Taylor uses the term,
is the sense of ourselves as commanding attitudinal respect, the idea that we are
thought well of by others. From the very beginning, the way we move, gesture, and
speak is shaped by the fact that we are aware of other people and what they think of
us. 'Our style of movement expresses how we see ourselves as enjoying respect or
~)f\
lacking it, as commanding it or failing to do so.' There is a natural desire not only
5Sources ofthe Self, p. 14.
26Ibid., p.15.
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to be liked by others, but to be liked for the right reasons. So we hear people say, 'If
only I were more attractive, or quick-witted or funny ... then people would like me.'
Of course some of these reasons for not being liked one could argue against as not
being suitable frameworks within the realm of dignity on which to base our moral
reactions. They may seem counter-intuitive to what we value (being 'liked' by others
because I am feared), or they may simply be shallow (being liked because I have
blond hair or a fast car).
From the articulation of these three axes Taylor develops the notion of moral
'frameworks' or 'horizons'. This is precisely the set of questions within these axes
that we as human agents exist amidst and against which we can make sense of our
life. It is a horizon of meaning by which we see ourselves defined, a set of values
which instil meaning to our lives quite independently of our own desires,
inclinations, or choices.
Certain frameworks may already be existing in our lives through tradition or
social norms. For example, growing up in a Christian home should give me a certain
framework which includes the Bible and its tradition as a value in my life. There may
be certain frameworks which one holds against one's compatriots. Jesus Christ is an
example of someone who lived within such a framework. The values within his own
life conflicted with those of the established hierarchy of his society.
In so far as we depend upon these frameworks for meaning in our lives they
help to define our identity. For our identity is inextricably linked to what is
significant in our lives. Who we are, and where we are coming from is 'the
background against which our tastes and desires and opinions and aspirations make
97 . . •
sense.' Taylor does not think this is merely a contingent fact about the
psychological make-up of the human agent. Rather he claims that 'living within such
strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency, that stepping outside
these limits would be tantamount to stepping outside what we would recognise as
28
integral, that is, undamaged human personhood.'
27 The Ethics ofAuthenticity, p.34.
28Sources of the Self p.27.
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When Taylor speaks of identity he is referring to those things that are of
crucial importance to us:
'To know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand. My
identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which
provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from
case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or
what I endorse or oppose. In other words, it is the horizon within
which I am capable of taking a stand.'29
As suggested above, identifying these frameworks, i.e., this moral ontology
which lies behind our reactions, is often difficult. It is something that Alasdair
Maclntyre describes as a moral 'quest'.30 One can hope that these quests will lead to
moral legitimacy and comfort, that articulating these ontologies will reconfirm our
moral reactions. We may, for example, feel that it was wrong for the government to
tax the domestic fuel of pensioners, and in articulating the moral framework within
which this reaction occurs, we come to find certain beliefs concerning equality and
justice to be confirmed and even strengthened.
In as much as these articulations can be considered a quest, however, one can
see the possibility of failure. Consequently, if the quest is one for meaning, then
failing would lead to a sense ofmeaninglessness. In such a situation we would not be
able to make sense of our lives. We would be 'spiritually senseless.' In this respect
the term 'quest' implies a great deal about our moral frameworks and their
formulation.
The dynamics of moral formulations are extremely important in Taylor's
theory for reasons which become clear if we understand the way that language and
meaning interact in our lives. Meaning here has two definitions. First it refers to
coherency, that of which we can make sense. Secondly, it refers to purpose and value,
that which is worth doing or acting upon. The problems concerning the meaning of
life are addressed when one creates meaning in the sense of coherency. Language is
the primary channel for this creative process. Discovering what is important in our
lives is interwoven with our ability to express this meaning.
29Ibid., p.27.
30See Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue, 2nd. ed. (London: Duckworth, 1985) pp.218-219.
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Johann Herder, a major theoretician of the Sturm unci Drang reacting against
the Enlightenment, was one of the first proponents of what Taylor refers to here as
expressivism,31 This describes a particular way of seeing human development
whereby the self is defined in the act of its expression. There is a dynamic theory of
language accorded to this view which focuses on the creative powers of our
communicative skills in interaction. We depend upon language for our thoughts, and
to use language in this way is to use it creatively. It is only through language that we
can create, and in such terms we create ourselves in interactions with others in a
community. While emphasising the importance of this idea in Hegel, Taylor brings to
bear the moral ramifications of this way of thought in Sources of the Self and The
Ethics of Authenticity by arguing that Herder's expressivism is vital for our
understanding of a self-satisfaction and self-completion necessitated by a community
in terms of self-articulacy and formation in dialogue. Thus to articulate one's moral
framework is in a sense to create this framework or one's reason for establishing a
moral ontology. This becomes extremely important when Taylor later examines the
• 32
point of this articulation.
Frameworks incorporate a crucial set of 'qualitative distinctions'. As
discussed above, qualitative distinctions for Taylor mean those concerned with issues
of higher and lower, better and worse, i.e., those kinds of distinctions which involve
strong evaluations.
'To think, feel, judge within such a framework is to function with the
sense that some action, or mode of life, or mode of feeling is
incomparably higher than the others which are more readily available
to us. ... The sense of what the difference consists in may take
different forms. One form of life may be seen as fuller, another way of
feeling and acting as purer, a mode of feeling or living as deeper, a
style of life as more admirable, a given demand as making an absolute
claim against other merely relative ones, and so on.'33
J,This term is borrowed from Isaiah Berlin, to whom Taylor attributes the rescue of Herder from the
relative neglect of philosophers. See Charles Taylor, Hegel, p. 13, and 'The Importance of Herder' in
Taylor's Philosophical Arguments.
32See Chapter 3.
JJSources of the Self, pp. 19-20.
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Taylor uses the word 'incomparable' here to make an important distinction.
His point is that within a framework of higher goods there are ends or goods which
are worthy in a way that is distinct from all the others. They cannot be measured on
the same scale. It is not that they are merely quantitatively higher, they are not simply
more good than the average desirabilia. 'Because of their special status they
command our awe, respect, or admiration.'34 These are the goods in our lives which
function as moral standards.
The Mechanistic Morality
The naturalists whom Taylor addresses above, those who would want to deny
any sort of ontological explanation of morality, would also not want to accept the
existence of anything like a framework. Taylor points out several reasons why this is
the case, which also helps to explain why he himself is in a minority for adhering to a
concept of moral realism in the discipline of moral philosophy.
In the introduction to the collection of essays Human Agency and Language
Taylor describes himself as a monomaniac, or what Isaiah Berlin has called a
'hedgehog'.35 The reason for this is that there is a singularity about his agenda. He is
concerned primarily with arguing against the model of studying the human agent
based on the natural sciences.36 This agenda is carried over in Sources of the Self,
particularly when discussing some of the impetus for the naturalist persuasions. As
Taylor explains this parallel between the human and natural sciences, it has two key
points in history: Plato and Descartes.
Plato's metaphysics sets up a scheme whereby both the physical phenomena
of the universe and the human condition are explained by the same ultimate source,
viz. the Ideas. The Platonic Idea is a self-manifesting reality. Things in the world are
the way they are in order to conform to a rational order, an order involving an 'ontic
34Ibi<±, p.20.
j5See Human Agency and Language, p. 1.
36See fn. 13.
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logos'. Thus natural laws such as gravity and the moral dimension of human beings
are both explained according to the nature of ultimate reality.
When these Ideas lose their role in the sciences because we can better explain
the cosmos through cause and effect, it is naturally tempting to assume that such
Ideas (or any analogous feature) should be replaced in explaining human behaviour.
Taylor argues that this is essentially what has happened since the 17th century,
largely due to the philosophy of Descartes and his successors:
'Descartes utterly rejected this teleological mode of thinking and
abandoned any theory of ontic logos. The universe was to be
understood mechanistically, by the resolutive/compositive method
pioneered by Galileo. This shift in scientific theory ... involved a
radical change in anthropology as well. Plato's theory of the Ideas
involved a very close relation between scientific explanation and
moral vision. One has the correct understanding of both together, one
might say, or of neither. If we destroy this vision of the ontic logos
and substitute a very different theory of scientific explanation, the
entire account of moral virtue and self-mastery has to be transformed
as well.'37
The scientific revolution brought with it the notion of 'objective observation'.
By this it is meant that the best account of the physical world is one where the subject
is disengaged and thereby unbiased. It was thought that approaching the universe in
this way would enable the observer to see the world as it really was. Prior to this
point the cosmos was considered to have an underlying unity which explained its
nature. This was prescinded, however, for a vantage point which sought to study the
world without such a 'bias', as it was revealed to the objective agent. It is this kind of
scientific examination which sought to explain the world in mechanistic terms,
observing various laws ofNewtonian physics.
Applying this theory to the realm of human behaviour is what Taylor sees as
-> o
one of the great errors of modern epistemology. Locke was one of the
j7Sources ofthe Self p. 144.
•,8It is interesting to note that Richard Rorty, for example, interprets Locke and Descartes in a similar
way, but draws a completely different conclusion (R. Rorty, Philosophy and the mirror of nature,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). His position is more relativistic in that he would argue
that our modern scientific view is one which just happened to take over from the Aristotelian
cosmology. In other words not only is there no argument for not seeing the human agent through the
eyes of scientific explanation, but there can be no final argument for even understanding the physical
universe in this way as getting a better grip on the world. It is not necessarily a superior explanation,
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first major proponents of what can be called the transapplication of scientific
explanation (TSE), which more fully developed Descartes' idea of the disengaged
self. This principle underpins the mechanistic treatment of the human sciences in its
modern derivatives. The premise is that an understanding of the human can best be
accounted for through an objective observer. In the same way that one could explain
more thoroughly the intricacies of physical nature by disengaging from any
anthropocentric vantage point, so too the individual could account for the various
behavioural patterns of the human subject more adequately from the point of view of
the 'punctual self.39 Thus just as the physicist has 'translated' various muthoi from
Aristotelian cosmology, so too the behavioural scientist has taken features like the
realm of the psyche or anima, and attempted to describe them purely in terms of
action, and external events which can be objectively observed. In so doing they deny
the role of any descriptive language which would be limited to our 'internal'
constitution. We can therefore no longer use the terms falling in this category such as
'courage' or 'generosity'.
The mechanistic account of the human person would completely decry
Taylor's notion of background meaning and ontology. His theory does not fit with a
view of the human subject as explained in behaviourism or most modern day
philosophical psychologies. Mechanistic explanations and moral ontology are two
views that are mutually exclusive. The question is which stance is more convincing
and how can we know this?
Much of our modern culture points to a lack ofmoral frameworks. This could
be considered a justifiable defence for the mechanistic explanation of our moral
behaviour. Particularly relevant is the modern value of pluralism based on our
conception of freedom such that everyone has the right to choose what he or she
just an alternative one. What Taylor argues, however, particularly in 'Explanation and Practical
Reason', in Philosophical Arguments, is that there are very cogent reasons for seeing the Galilean
model as better than the Aristotelian model of the universe, since the former explains some of the
difficulties and self-contradictions of the latter, and also helps us to 'deal with the world' more
adequately in the sense of moving about our physical environment. Conversely, such a mechanistic
explanation does not have the same purchase when it comes to understanding the human moral agent
and so should be challenged. See also Taylor's essay 'Rorty in the epistemological tradition', in Ready
Rorty, ed. Alan Malachowski (Oxford: Blackwell's, 1990).
j9Taylor uses this term particularly in reference to Locke's understanding that the individual gains
rational control of a situation by disengaging from it. SeeSources ofthe Self, Chp.9.
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wants to be. Taylor argues that this is one of the reasons why utilitarians today are so
quick to embrace the affirmation of everyday life, for it seems to counter-act the
traditional societal features of clearly defined moral frameworks.40 What utilitarians
do not realise, however, is that even in this embrace there is a framework implied
(though not articulated). The utilitarian may want to escape from moral frameworks
by thinking that he can equate this with dethroning the more traditional 'higher'
goods, but he has merely superseded these goods with others, concerning everyday
values—spending time with family members, providing for those we love, etc. The
various theories posited today concerning our human predicament in moral situations
are all similar to the mechanistic explanations of behaviour in that they make claims
about unpacking the intricacies of our intuitions and strong evaluations, but find that
they cannot avoid frameworks and qualitative distinctions.
One of the most condemning criticisms Taylor has against any form of
mechanistic explanation is that it does not help us to make sense of the world in
which we live, nor does it coincide with the way we talk about moral evaluations.
Mechanistic theories such as the stimulus-response models of human behaviour held
by behaviourists reduce human intentions to mechanical levels. In doing so they try
and abstract certain virtue words such as 'generosity' and replace these with what
they consider to be a physicalist explanation of equal value. In Norman Malcolm's
words, they make 'no provision for desires, aims, goals, purposes, motives, or
intentions. In explaining such an occurrence as a man's walking across a room, it will
be a matter of indifference to the theory whether the man's purpose, intention, or
desire was to open a window, or even whether his walking across the room was
intentional.'41
In other words mechanisti'. explanations are 'non-purposive' systems. They
can be said to assume the following form:
Whenever an organism of structure S is in neurophysiological state q it will
emit movement m.
40See Sources ofthe Self, pp.22-24.
4lSee Norman Malcolm, 'The Conceivability of Mechanism', in Free Will, ed. Gary Watson (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1982) p. 128.
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Organism O of structure S was in neurophysiological state q.
Therefore O emitted m 42
In such a formula someone's actions which I would describe as motivated by
courage would be reduced to a neurophysiological phenomenon such as a reactive
instinct for survival. Such explanations have two difficulties: they do not describe the
value-intrinsic notion of a word like 'courage', and they do not help to explain how
we interact in our everyday life. In fact they are very much estranged from any notion
of the real world.
Taylor is concise and particular in his definition of what is 'real'. He asserts
that reality is that which we have to deal with. In other words the real is that which
will not go away just because it does not fit with our premonitions and prejudices.43
Thus the languages involved in these mechanistic descriptions do not play a valid
part in describing our reality. For if we must use the method of explanation which
best fits our reality, and if that reality is that which we must deal with everyday
regardless of premonitions, then, if a mechanistic explanation based on the TSE
principle seems not to fit with our reality, it should not be adhered to in this form and
we should look for another way of explaining our human phenomena. This indicates
that Taylor's critique is valid and that modern epistemology has made an erroneous
assumption in developing the TSE principle. For between the physical and human
sciences there can be no assumed ecumenicity, 'to assume from the superiority of
Galilean principles in the sciences of inanimate nature that they must provide the
model for the science of animate behaviour is to make a speculative leap, not to
enunciate a necessary conclusion.'44
42lbid., p. 129.
43See Sources ofthe Self, p.59.
44This early statement was made in the context of arguing for teleological explanations in human
behaviour in The Explanation ofBehaviour (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964)
p.25. It should be noted that Taylor does not want to assume that there is never any case for seeing
human behaviour in scientific terms. He argues, for example, in 'Peaceful Coexistence in Psychology'
in Human Agency and Language, p. 129, that in the domain of physiological psychology which studies
the psycho-physical boundaries of the individual, the classical model of science is the appropriate one.
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Personal Identity and the Inescapable Moral Framework
It has been mentioned above that most modern moral hypotheses (the great
majority ofwhich are derived from utilitarianism) would censure the frameworks that
Taylor uses in establishing a moral ontology. Taylor, on the other hand, must show
not only that these frameworks exist, but that they are undeniably linked to human
agency. In an attempt to establish this, he argues for a necessary link between our
moral frameworks and our personal identities. This argument makes three claims, or,
approaching it from another angle, there are three facets to linking the self with the
good according to Taylor: as an individual person who sees himself placed in some
respect to the good, as a self among other selves, and as one who lives through a
narrative.
Contrary to this view, a reductivist position, i.e., one which reduces any talk
of 'frameworks' to a physical-mechanical level, is quite a cogent position to hold
given the modern 'disenchantment' with established moral norms. There is no longer
any need to subscribe to any definitive institutionalised morality such as could be
found in Christendom. The reductivist may even want to use this observation in an
argument against Taylor. In previous eras there existed an impervious moral
framework in an external order which was so strongly conceived that it was quite
natural for people to see the moral framework as independent of themselves. Yet this
has now faded and become obsolete so that the key question is not 'can I live up to
this standard?' (in fear of condemnation), but 'is there any standard at all?'. It could
be argued that the very fact that something so strongly posited has been rejected
indicates that we are dealing with a concept not grounded in the nature of things, but
one subject to human interpretation.
Contrary to this persuasive claim, Taylor argues that it is utterly impossible
for us to do away with moral frameworks which incorporate qualitative distinctions.
Furthermore, this is not a mere contingent fact, but depends ultimately on who we are
as human beings. His claim, as cited above, is that 'living within such strongly
qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency, that stepping outside these limits
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would be tantamount to stepping outside what we would recognise as integral, that is,
A £
undamaged human personhood.'
It is clear from this that Taylor's moral theory is intricately related to his
philosophy of mind, and more specifically to his concept of the person. In this
concept he distances himself from most of the modem philosophical positions in the
philosophy of mind. In one sense Taylor refuses to accept the issues voiced in the
modem discussion of identity as they are articulated in philosophy. Modem
philosophical thought promotes three fundamental stances towards the person's
identity: materialism, dualism, or idealism. The materialist holds that there is nothing
constitutive of the person outside of the physical body, that thoughts are equal to
brain states, and that the mind is to be identified with the body (and more basically,
the brain matter).46 The dualist would hold that there are two separate entities, the
body and the soul, and that in some way these interact, but are conceptually
independent of one another.47 The idealist would hold that everything is immaterial
• • 48
formulations of the mind or, in the case the panpsychic, that everything is mind.
Taylor denies the legitimacy of defining a person in these kind of 'objective'
terms.49 If we say that a person is merely his brain functions, we ignore a great deal
of what is implicit to his identity in terms of values and intentions. With idealism we
do the same by neglecting the important aspects of the physical realm.
Cartesian dualism may seem a way of embracing both extremes, and a great
majority of Christian thinkers from Descartes onwards have clung to this
presupposition. One need only look as far as Koestler's universally recognised catch-
phrase 'The Ghost in the machine' to understand the pervasiveness of this concept in
theology.50 Dualism is practically indoctrinated into our idea of the immaterial soul,
so much so that when philosophers discussing the issue of personal identity in
45Sources ofthe Self p. 27.
46For materialist arguments see D. Davidson, Essays on Action and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1980), esp. 'Mental Events', pp. 207-225.
47For the classic articulation of dualism see Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans.
John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) 1& 2.
48See particularly Timothy Sprigge, The Vindication of Absolute Idealism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1983).
49See his early article 'Mind-body identity, a side issue?', Philosophical Review, 26:2, 1967,
pp.201-213.
50See Arthur Koestler, The Ghost in the Machine (London: Hutchinson, 1967).
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dualistic terms want to throw some conceptual light on the subject, they often take
the example of the Christian soul surviving the body after death.'1 Fergus Kerr,
writing about the impact of Wittgenstein's philosophy on theology, has pointed out
that even with the tremendous challenges Wittgenstein makes to our traditional
concepts of identity, there is still this tendency to value the dualist theory of a person,
particularly in writers like Karl Rahner who build Cartesian epistemologies into their
very systematics.52
Contrary to most Christian thinkers, Taylor sees Cartesian metaphysical
dualism as a sham illusion which is responsible for many of the modern
misconceptions of sociology and the human sciences. He argues that Descartes, in
positing a mental state which would stand up against the rigour of his method of
doubt when all material things around him had fallen, established a skewed
dichotomy which has been the burden of philosophical investigation ever since. This
led not only to the notion of the mind becoming 'disengaged' from the body in some
objective realm, but it can also be seen as responsible for the monist materialism
which identifies the mind with brain states. Taylor argues for a more complete
picture of the person, one which is more comprehensively engaging. He refuses to
see the identity of the individual in terms of the self-contained soul or body, but
instead argues for an explanation which will include the self as an experiencing,
social agent.
Taylor aligns himself with philosophers like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty
who have challenged the concept of a completely objectified and disparate realm of
the self (or pure reason) as compatible with the way we understand the world.53
Alongside this challenge is the Wittgenstein of Philosophical Investigations who
argues against the dualistic notion of action which seeks to construct an internal act
ofwill causing an external movement.54
5'See for example, Antony Flew, ed,,Body, Mind, and Death (London: Macmillan, 1964).
"See Fergus Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein (Oxford: Blackwell's, 1986). See also Karl Rahner,
Foundations ofChristian Faith (London: Darton Longmand & Todd, 1978).
"See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London:
SCM Press, 1962) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, La Phenomenologie de la perception (Paris:
Gallimard, 1945).
54See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell's,
1958).
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So in one very important sense, Taylor refuses to play by the rules set up by
the reputable philosophers engaged in the question of personal identity, those like
Ryle, Kripke, Putnam, or Davidson. Even the Anglican Professor of Christian
Philosophy, Richard Swinburne, famous for his well-argued scientific defences of the
Christian faith, holds to an unbending Cartesian Dualism.55 Rejection of this dualism
colours Taylor's epistemology, philosophy of action, and certainly his ethics. In
establishing his argument for moral frameworks, Taylor's philosophy of mind
describes the human person in terms which are relevant to the way we experience our
lives in our moral frameworks.
To answer the question 'who am I?' is not to describe myself in certain
physical terms and subsequently certain mental terms or even vice versa. Borrowing
a phrase from Timothy Sprigge, Thomas Nagel points out that even if we had all the
facts that existed about a certain creature, such as a bat, we would still not know
'what it is like to be' a bat.56 We would merely have the information, not the
experience. Beyond scientific, objective information there is in Sprigge's dictum
something about the individual that tells us 'what it is like to be' that individual.57
To answer the question 'who am I?' involves understanding what is important
for me. Rousseau calls this dimension of the self the inner moral voice. Taylor refers
to it as our moral horizons or frameworks. The true 'sentiment de Texistence' is in
co
_
intimate contact with this voice. As mentioned above, Taylor describes personal
identity as tantamount to knowing where I stand in relation to certain things within
my framework or horizon. Knowing who I am means knowing what my
commitments are.59
"It should be interesting to note that Richard Swinburne's background is in the Philosophy of Science
and the bias in scientific investigation towards objectification and disengaged reason may go some
way towards accounting for this viewpoint of the person. See Richard Swinburne, The Existence of
God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).
'6See Thomas Nagel, "What is it like to be a Bat?', Philosophical Review, 1974, 83, pp.435-450.
57See Timothy Sprigge, 'The Importance of Subjectivity', Inaugural Address for Accepting Chair of
Logic and Metaphysics Professorship, Edinburgh University, Spring, 1978. See also his The
Vindication ofAbsolute Idealism.
58J. J. Rousseau, Les Reveries du Promeneur Solitaire, Ve Promenade, in Oeuvres Completes, vol.1
(Paris: Gallimard, 1959) p. 1047.
59See Sources of the Self, p.27.
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Moral Orientation
Here the link that Taylor establishes between identity and morality is quite
clear. What we value in our lives creates for us a horizon of meaning within which
we can define ourselves. Orientation within this horizon is a particularly important
feature of our identity inasmuch as our identity depends upon knowing where we
stand. To have a personal identity is to be situated in a moral space. To be situated in
a moral space is to be able to answer questions which arise about the good. So in
some sense my identity, who I am as a person, is tied to my beliefs, but also the
expression of these beliefs.
Clearly the Herderian approach to language as expressive and creative is
undergirding this formulation of personal identity. As an intricate part of determining
my own personal values, the creative process involved in forming my moral
backdrop can be seen as vitally linked to the concept of discovering my 'self as in
some sense a creative process. To put it another way, in seeing what I am, I am
simultaneously defining what it is to be 'me'.
This leads quite distinctly to the second way Taylor sees the self being linked
to the good—through interaction with other people in a community. The idea that the
human agent exists in a space of moral questions, that the person is constitutively
linked to a moral framework which provides the necessary answers to these moral
questions is one that is incontrovertible for Taylor. The formulation of these
frameworks is what is referred to as 'moral reasoning', and this always happens
dialogically. For Taylor, it is important to understand the moral agent as
interlocutor—'One is a self only among other selves. A self can never be described
without reference to those who surround it.'60
The reason for this depends upon the nature of language. We first learn our
language from others. We take up their language and use it, so that when we speak in
dialogue the objects we refer to become for us 'public' or 'common'.61 When I talk to
60Ibid„ p.35.
6lSee Charles Taylor, 'Theories of Meaning', in Human Agency and Language .
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someone else about the weather I do not begin with a reference to my weather and let
her respond with references to her own. Our common language creates for us a public
space. In this way the public feature of the self amidst other selves cannot be just a
contingent matter, for we are introduced into personhood by being initiated into such
a language. In moral reasoning I can learn what things like anger, hope, love, peace,
etc. are through the experience I have of these being objects for us in some common
space. Even as adults it is sometimes important for us to articulate what we are
thinking to someone else in order to clarify what it is we mean, or what may be
implicit within our thought process. The self, while an individual, cannot be a self on
its own.
Herder, while accentuating the individual 'measure' (eigenes Mafi) of each
person, and while emphasising the endowed qualities of each to develop a specific
type of Humanitat, nevertheless understood the importance of the self s dependence
upon others: 'just as there is no such thing as an isolated faculty of reason, so there is
no man who has become all he is entirely by his own efforts ... he, and the
philosopher, cannot but recognise that the whole chain of human development is
characterised by man's dependence on his fellows.'62
There is a paradox here which one can trace back to Rousseau and Kant. Both
philosophers stress the importance of the individual moral self being responsible for
his own development, while also recognising a significant, social-universal whole to
which we all belong. Rousseau, while advocating the guidance of the inner voice of
an individual, also argues that there is a general will of the community and stresses
f\~\
the importance of this collectivist idea in moral decisions and development. Kant,
who gained much from Rousseau, also sees the individual as morally significant in
his own right, but postulates a categorical imperative to which all men are bound.64
Self-determination, then, is balanced by a recognised dependency on other moral
agents as one understands oneself as part of a cohesive social order.
62J. G. Herder, Ideen, vii.I. in Herders Sdmtliche Werke, vol. XIII, ed. Bernard Suphan, 15 vols.
(Berlin: Weidmann, 1877-1913). See also F. M. Barnard, ed., J. G. Herder on Social and Political
Culture, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969) p.311.
'"See Rousseau, Les Reveries du Promeneur solitaire, Ve Promenade, p. 1045.
64See Kant, Critique ofPractical Reason, pp. 105-130.
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The modern value of freedom and individuality underpins one of the
objections to Taylor's assertion that the self must exist among other selves. Taylor
spends a significant amount of time in Sources of the Self outlining the evolution of
this value, and like much of the content of modernity he applauds the ideal, yet
rejects the misguided ramifications. So, for example, he argues that the fact that our
identity as selves depends upon others in no way infringes on our freedom as
individuals in the way that a libertarian may want to assert.6"
As indicated above, Taylor makes his point clear by highlighting certain
inescapable features of language. We develop as selves through dialogue with others,
in what Taylor refers to as 'webs of interlocution'. Those whom we interact with in
our lives are the people George Herbert Mead has called the 'significant others'.66
They are those whose 'roles' we pick up in developing the individual self. In this way
human life is fundamentally dialogical in nature.
Someone who comes closer to Taylor's own beliefs (Mead is too much of a
behaviourist) is Wilhelm von Humboldt. He sees a balance in language between on
the one hand a created and recreated phenomenon issuing forth in conversation, and
on the other hand a concrete form of communication anchored to individuals and
their different perspectives. So we do not have a conversation as merely 'causally
related monologues', but at the same time we cannot shift too far in the other
direction and insist that a conversation is merely an unfolding of a cohesive
superstructure which takes no account of the specific persons.67
In this balance we define our selves as human agents, both in orientating
ourselves in a moral space, and in formulating this space with other selves. So we are
persons in so far as we know where we stand, and we know those around us who
63Or for that matter, the way Habermas would argue that this infringes upon individual freedom. See
Stanley RafFel, Habermas, Lyotard, and the Concept of Justice (London: Macmillan, 1992) and
Michael Sandel, Justice and the Limits ofLiberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
66See G. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, ed. Charles Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1934) pp. 156ff.
'"See W. Humboldt, Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues, cited in Charles
Taylor, 'Theories of Meaning', in Human Agency and Language. See in this same volume 'Language
and Human Nature', also, Jerome Bruner, 'The Transactional Self in Actual Minds, Possible Worlds
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).
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share this space. There is a third facet to how we exist as persons in a moral space
and this has to do with the dynamics of time and experience.
MoralMaps and Legends
Taylor points out that there are two ways that we can see ourselves as
orientated, as knowing where we are. This follows clearly from the inverse
observation that there are two ways that we can be lost in our surroundings. The first
way is as a stranger, completely unfamiliar with the environment. This sort of
disorientation can easily be remedied with a map. So for example, if I am in the city
of Florence where my surroundings are unfamiliar to me and I want to find the
Duomo, in order to do so I could ask a Florentine where the cathedral is and they
would give me directions (hopefully) to get there. This brings up an important point
about orientating myself in this way. For the Florentine must give me directions with
reference to where I am at the time that he is giving me these directions. If we are
standing in front of the Ponte Vecchio, his 'map' must begin there and take me from
that point to the Duomo. As Taylor points out, it would do me no good whatsoever to
have this person blindfold me, take me up into a helicopter and as we pass the
cathedral say, 'there it is,' while ripping off the blindfold. In one sense I know where
I am at that moment, but not in any meaningful way. I still cannot place the Duomo
in relation to other objects in the known world—I would still be lost.
The second way of being lost is as a native of the territory which is already
familiar to you. So to take the Florence example again, a native of the city may know
it quite well, may have lived there all her life, yet may suddenly find herself on an
unfamiliar street, so that in the distance she can see the Duomo, yet she is uncertain
from which direction she is approaching it. So, in the first instance the foreigner has a
good description of where he is (at least from his aerial perspective) but lacks a map
to orientate himself. In the second instance the native has the map to orientate herself,
viz. the familiarity of the area, yet lacks the knowledge of where she is situated on
this map.
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By analogy Taylor argues that placing ourselves in relation to the good
requires orientation in both of these ways. Not only do we need to know the
surrounding moral countryside which shapes our concepts of the qualitatively higher,
but we also need to know where we stand in relation to the ultimate moral landmarks.
In combination these two ways of being orientated in moral space indicate that one of
the most fundamental aspirations for human beings is the need to be in touch with
what they think has value. This is simply another way of formulating Taylor's
original premise that human identity is intricately connected with what one sees as
meaningful, viz., the good. It is this good which will define spiritual orientation and
thus by which one measures the 'meaning' and worth of one's life. This is a crucial
amalgamation for Taylor since he takes the second axis of strong evaluation which
concerns questions about the meaningful values of life, and speaks of it as
indissolubly linked to spiritual and moral positioning so that in the end any questions
we have about what gives meaning to our lives are going to be questions about how
we are 'placed' or 'situated' with relation to the good.
Underlying this spiritual orientation is the absolute question of whether we
are moving towards or away from the good in our moral space. Understanding this
movement means getting a sense of either approaching the good or moving away
from it. We can affirm or disaffirm this movement—'yes, I am moving closer', 'no, I
am not.'
This brings into play the third facet of the self s connection with the good,
that of experiencing life as a narrative. Given that we are faced with this inevitable
yes/no question because of the direction of our lives, we must understand our identity
as dynamic—our lives move. We are constantly changing and becoming, and thus
our lives can never be defined by what we are in isolation from what we were and
what we shall be. Paul Gauguin's enigmatic masterpiece frames the predicament:
D 'oil venons-nous? Que sommes-nous? Ou allons-nous? (figs. 1 and 2). As such we
do not see our lives as disjointed events, but as an unfolding story.68 Here the
analogue from topographical orientation is fully recognised. The stranger needs to fit
the location of the Duomo into his life as a narrative and for this reason having the
68See Sources ofthe Self p.47.
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1. Paul Gauguin, D'oii venons-nous? Que sommes-nous? Oil allons-nous? (detail of left half),
1897, Fine Arts Museum, Boston
2. Paul Gauguin, D 'oil venons-nous? Que sommes-nous? Ou allons-nous? (detail of right half), 1897,
Fine Arts Museum, Boston
Duomo instantaneously appear before his eyes does him no good whatsoever. For the
issue becomes for us not only where we are, but where we are going as well as where
we have been. Just as we need this information to find the Duomo of Florence, so we
need to understand this moral information about ourselves in order to find the good.
Taylor notes that it has been argued by many (particularly Ricouer and
Maclntyre) that making sense of one's life as a narrative is not a contingent optional
extra, but a fundamental necessity, that to understand who we are we have to have a
notion of how we have become and where we are going.69 I project the direction of
my life in terms of possible destinations, and look to proceed towards the good. So I
understand my life both in terms ofwhat I am now and also what I intend to become.
Teleology and Personal Identity
There is an implicit function of the teleological explanation here which
accounts for why it was such an important point to establish in Taylor's early work,
The Explanation ofBehaviour. For if part of the way we understand our lives must be
in terms of where we are going and what good we are projecting ourselves towards,
there must be involved in this a notion of the telos. It is interesting to note that both
Plato and Aristotle use the term to zeXog to connote the good so often that it
eventually became synonymous with to ayadov, the chief good.70 In Latin this idea
was carried over by Cicero's finis bonorum,71 Aristotle saw the function (to ipyov)
of the human agent in terms of the teleological explanation of 'well-being'
(evSaipovta). It is clear in this context how Taylor's previously articulated
philosophy of action, which argues against any stimulus-response theory of
behaviour, aligns itself with his more fully developed moral theory that understands
human beings as defined by the goods of a moral horizon.
69See P. Ricouer, Time and Narrative, 2 vols., trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1984), and Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue. Another important
source for this is Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959).
70See particularly Nicomachean Ethics, Bk.I.
7'See Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum, trans. H. Rackham, 2nd ed. (London: Heinemann Press,
1951) 1.12, III.7.
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Knowing who we are also involves knowing where we have come from.
There is in the sense of becoming also the orientating aspect of how we got where we
are. This seems clear from the first example of orientation where being presented
with the Duomo would be meaningless without the experience of having arrived. Or,
using an example from Taylor, if, after coming out of a local store, I suddenly find
myself in front of the Taj Mahal, I would not conclude that I have been transported to
the city of Agra, but would look for an explanation which better fit with the narrative
of my life at that point, i.e., how I got to where I was at that moment.72 In other
words, part of the sense of this being the genuine Taj Mahal would depend upon how
it was that I arrived there.
So with the less trivial instances in our lives, when we are not merely
shopping for our weekly groceries, but are striving towards some life goal, we are set
in a narrative of understanding, both of how we got there and where we are going,
what Heidegger calls the past and future 'ekstaseis '.73 This implies an important
philosophical truth about the unity of our lives. Philosophers like Derek Parfit deny
any sort of a priori unity to human existence.74 Parfit insists that it is perfectly
feasible to view as a separate person myself when I was eight and myselfwhen I was
eighteen. Joseph Butler, in an attempt to critique Locke's theory of personal identity,
(which is what Parfit is building upon) describes it thus:
'personality is not a permanent, but a transient thing: that it lives and
dies, begins and ends continually: that no one can any more remain
one and the same person two moments together, than two successive
moments can be one and the same moment: that our substance is
indeed continually changing ... '75
Contrary to the traditional suppositions and understandings of the Philosophy
of Mind, however, we cannot picture the self as a studied 'object' in the way we
would go about examining something scientifically, and hope to give a full and
adequate account of the person. There is no sense in the self being understood as an
object to be known through this type of investigation, and in so far as Parfit posits an
72See Sources ofthe Self, p.48.
7jSee Being and Time, div. II, chps.3&4.
74See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
75Joseph Butler, 'Of Personal Identity' as cited in Antony Flew, ed,,Body, Mind, and Death, p. 167
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objective, disengaged self, his argument is flawed. The self that is defined by Parfit,
and originally by Locke's criterion of self-awareness, is what Taylor calls the
■punctual' or 'neutral' self. He uses this term to distinguish it as a self which is
defined in abstraction from any constitutive concerns, and therefore completely
different from any identity in the sense in which he himself is using the concept. This
is the self that Hume could not find when he writes T never can catch myself at any
time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception.'
Eventually he is resigned to seeing the self as a bundle of experiences.76
From his discussion of frameworks and moral orientation, the building
crescendo of Taylor's argument moves into a new position. Before discussing this it
would prove helpful if the thesis as formulated thus far could be summarised.
Initially, Taylor took the argument through several dialectical steps exploring the
underlying presumptions of our moral intuitions. Emerging from this was an
established moral ontology which grounds and makes sense of these intuitions. A
further expression of the argument came to view this ontology in terms of 'exploring
the frameworks which articulate our sense of orientation in the space of questions
about the good.'77 While this progressive dialectical interpretation of moral ontology
fleshes out the various features of the qualitative distinctions which make sense of
our moral reactions, and helps to critique the naturalist viewpoint which has no room
for any sort of moral realism, it still does not indicate how indispensable moral
frameworks are to us. Thus from this stage Taylor argues for establishing these
qualitative distinctions as definitive in terms of orientating the self in a moral space.
Who we are is somehow defined by our relation to the good, and Taylor points to
three ways that this is true: the individual self as defined by the good, the self as
defined by other selves in the dialogical nature of life (and particularly human moral
reasoning), and finally, the self as defined teleologically by the good in life as an
76David Hume, 'Of Personal Identity', A Treatise on Human Nature, Bk. 1, Pt. iv, sect, vi (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1888).
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unfolding story. As Taylor, himself, sums up where he is at this point in his
argument, he explains that:
'
... because we cannot but orient ourselves to the good, and thus
determine our place relative to it, and hence determine the direction of
our lives, we must inescapably understand our lives in narrative form
as a 'quest'. But one could perhaps start from another point: because
we have to determine our place in relation to the good, therefore we
cannot be without an orientation to it, and hence must see our life in
story. From whichever direction, I see these conditions as connected







The essential point that Taylor has established thus far is that there is an
undeniable link between the good and how we define our lives as human agents.
Moving on from this he then wants to apply this concept of the good to commonplace
moral beliefs and judgements. He seeks an answer to the question 'what role in moral
reasoning can we give those qualitative distinctions which define ourselves?'. Iris
Murdoch, in her work The Sovereignty ofGood was the first to distinguish between
general, more abstract moral terms such as 'the good' and concrete descriptives such
as 'bravery', 'chastity', 'benevolence' etc.1 Bernard Williams makes the same
i • • • • 2distinction between the 'moral' and the 'ethical' respectively. In wanting to find a
place for qualitative distinctions in moral reasoning Taylor is concerned to apply
them to the sphere of ethics as Williams understands it—the 'undivided category of
considerations which we employ to answer questions about how we should live.''' In
other words he wants to understand how our concept of the good relates to our
everyday moral considerations.
His initial answer to this query is that qualitative distinctions underpin our
beliefs by giving reasons for these beliefs. Value terms such as courage or freedom
'See I. Murdoch, The Sovereignty ofGood, pp.77ff.
2See B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits ofPhilosophy (London: Fontana, 1985).
JSources ofthe Self p.53.
give reasons for certain moral tenets we hold to be true. The difficulty is that this is
not an extremely helpful answer (even if it is true) unless an account can be given of
what it means to give a reason for a certain moral value. At this point there is a
problem with 'thick' virtue terms which stems from much of the criticism lobbied
against what G. E. Moore called the 'naturalistic fallacy'.4 According to these
criticisms, when we are using thick virtue terms we are 'projecting' values onto a
reality which is in effect neutral. In this sense these values which help us to make
sense of how we live our lives should not be considered substantive features of the
'real' world, but merely pragmatic functioning qualities of our own human make-up.
Most naturalism that Taylor is confronting adheres to some kind of
projectionism (which is slightly confusing since projectionism arises out of the
criticism of the 'naturalistic fallacy'), and he points out two specific ways that
projectionists can understand these thick terms. First, one can see the value as a
voluntary projection which can subsequently be reinterpreted in a purely descriptive
manner. This is prominent for example in R. M. Flare's prescriptivism/ According to
Hare we can segregate two levels of meaning—the descriptive and the prescriptive—
given the logic of our value terms. Ethical language is a subset of prescriptive
language. Thus these values can be interpreted on a level of meaning, viz. actions,
situations, qualities, in purely non-prescriptive terms. Essentially, this is also what
lies behind the emotivist concept of meaning—when we say that something is the
'right' thing to do we are in effect saying that it is the desired thing to do. Thus the
statement, 'that was a very brave thing she did,' can presumably be translated so that
the virtue of bravery becomes synonymous with some or other physical, descriptive
explanation. In fact this same reduction exercise occurs in most behavioural theories
where the scientific observer translates any evaluative (or teleological) term into a
purely non-prescriptive vocabulary.
Taylor of course cannot sympathise with such a view since it is incompatible
with our understanding of human experience. Like so much of his philosophy, this
4See G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903).
3See R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) and Taylor's The
Explanation ofBehaviour.
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line is predetermined by more fundamental issues of philosophical anthropology. For
if we are arguing against the ideas promoted by behavioural scientists and cognitive
functional materialists which consider explanations to be isolatable and interpretable
in a purely physicalist schema, how then can we allow such a prescriptivist assertion
as Hare's to go unchallenged?6
The second way that morality could be a projection is in an involuntary way
which involves seeing virtue terms as analogous to secondary properties of the world.
For example, we can see the truth possibility of the statement 'the grass is green' but
realise that if there were no such thing as sighted beings there would be no such
things as colours. Colours are in one sense a projection onto an external neutral
world. In the same way we can understand that values such as freedom could be
projections, which, if there were no such beings as moral agents in the universe,
would not exist. We as humans place this value on the neutral universe in order to
function within it.
Seeing thick value terms as projections is appealing in that it supposedly
gives the individual a clearer vantage point from which to assess his or her moral
predicament. It brings them out of the subjective, mismangageable realm of a specific
perspective and places them, in some way, in a 'God's-eye-view'. From this point
they can be 'maximally reflective and rational' about their value system. In the first
case this would entail translating certain terms into strictly descriptive meanings. It
would be a more objective and logical way of approaching what we really mean
when we use thick value terms. In the second way of projection this would mean
encapsulating the underlying reality of causally necessary and sufficient criteria
which we are attempting to describe when we use such thick terms—when we have
these 'coloured' experiences of value. This would mean describing virtues such as
generosity in a way which would flesh out the underlying survival purchase of the
action.71 give generously ofmy time to my children both because they are part ofmy
''It should be noted that Hare at least does allow for certain irreducible imperatives in his logic of
language. Others such as Peter Geach thought that 'good' could be translated into descriptive terms in
all contexts. See the discourse between Geach and Hare in Geach's 'Good and Evil\Analysis, 17,
1956, pp.33-42 and Hare's 'Geach: Good and Evil', Analysis, 18, 1957, pp.103-112.
7See Sources ofthe Self pp.54f.
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flesh and blood (ensuring my own genetic survival) but also possibly so that they will
return the favour to me when I am old and frail. Causally descriptive thick virtue
terms such as 'love' or 'compassion' are replaced here by a description of the
underlying 'reality'.
As mentioned above, these projectionist theories have been popular with most
naturalists where there is a denial of any 'real' moral realm apart from the human
agent. There are, however, some devastating arguments against this view, most
relying on the difficulty in understanding how we could derive any ethical conclusion
from premises which are non-ethical. Bridging the gap between 'fact' on one side
and 'value' on the other has proved to be an impossible task for the naturalist who
would want to project values onto a neutral backdrop. Hume describes this
conundrum in his Treatise:
'In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I
have always remarked that the author proceeds for some time in
the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God,
or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a
sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual
compilations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no
proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.
This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last
consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new
relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed
and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given,
for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation
can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from
it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall
presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that
this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of
morality, and let us see that the distinction of vice and virtue is not
founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by
reason.'9
Hume's famous distinction of is and ought recognises that fact cannot be
translated into value without some sort of external qualification. Turning this on its
head we can see that it is just as confusing to attempt a leap from the prescriptive
Tor an articulation of this in the biological sciences see Richard Dawkins' The Blind Watchmaker
(London: Penguin, 1988).
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ought or ought not to the descriptive is or is not. Iris Murdoch and more
systematically John McDowell have shown that for certain moral terms, particularly
these 'thick' description values, there does not seem to be any equivalent non-
evaluative term available.10
Returning to Taylor's initial question of what it means to give a reason for a
belief, it becomes clear that purely descriptive terms fall short when one attempts to
apply them in moral reasoning. For if I try to describe my respect for courage in
purely neutral language two things will happen: first I will be unable to communicate
why it is that courage is good and desirable as a virtue term, and secondly, the
individual who I am describing this virtue to (who must in this instance be a neutral
person, i.e., having no preconceived notion of linking the virtue with the good in any
way) will be unable to reapply the virtue term in new situations based solely on my
description. He or she would not be able to take my description of courage and apply
it in a completely new context so that he or she can then identify this virtue in
someone else. This problem of the 'neutral man' has been cogently argued by
Bernard Williams in his book Ethics and the Limits ofPhilosophy, someone Taylor
relies on in his argument against the projectionists. As Taylor notes, this
indispensable feature of the thick value term (what he calls qualitative distinctions),
means that in so far as the first order of projection is concerned, the dry language of
pure description does not encapsulate the entire meaning of the term. The descriptive
cannot be separated from the evaluative. Hare's two levels of meaning are co-
dependent in this way. As far as the second approach to projectionism is concerned,
what this means is that we cannot take value terms to be analogous to secondary
properties. They are not necessarily separate and distinct from the neutral world in
the same way that colour, for example, may be argued to be.
9Book III, pt. ii, sect. i.
l0See Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty ofGood, and John McDowell, 'Virtue and Reason', The Monist,
62, 1979, pp.331-50. See also Taylor's own exposition of this view in 'Neutrality in Political Science',
in Philosophy and the Human Sciences.
41
Taylor's Argument Against Projectionism
How then do we function as moral agents? Going back to the beginning of
this chapter it is still not clear what it means to use reason to arrive at or affirm moral
stances. All that Taylor has established is that value terms cannot be deconstructed
down to a more 'objective' level of description. To re-engage with this question he
focuses a final assault on the projectionist theories collectively and makes two
important qualifying assertions which any moral theory must live up to:
'1. You cannot help having recourse to these strongly
valued goods for the purposes of life: deliberating, judging
situations, deciding how you feel about people, and the like. The
'cannot help' here is not like the inability to stop blinking when
someone waves a fist in your face ... It means rather that you need
these terms to make the best sense of what you're doing. By the
same token these terms are indispensable to the kind of
explanation and understanding of self and others that is
interwoven with these life uses: assessing his conduct, grasping
her motivation, coming to see what you were really about all these
years, etc.
2. What is real is what you have to deal with, what won't
go away just because it doesn't fit with your prejudices. By this
token, what you can't help having recourse to in life is real, or as
near to reality as you can get a grasp of at present. Your general
metaphysical picture of 'values' and their place in 'reality' ought
to be based on what you find real in this way. It couldn't
conceivably be the basis of an objection to its reality.'11
As far as the first point is concerned, any theory which purports to describe
our experiences and situations, our ethical motivations and expressions, in terms
which exclude strongly valued goods is missing a vital ingredient which is essential
if we are to make any sense of what has meaning for us. Thus projectionist theories
which attempt to reduce our language to non-evaluative terms impale themselves on
the first horn of this argument, for they ignore certain terms which we need in our
lives in order to understand certain situations or assess possible courses of action or
determine how we really feel about certain people.
11Sources ofthe Self p.59.
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What is partially to blame for the naturalist presuppositions is the post-
Galilean scientific system in conspiracy with Platonism. Since Plato understood the
ultimate explanation of both Ethics and Science to lie in the Ideas, it became easy to
see these Ideas as affirming the objective, ontological status of each of these
disciplines. Thus when modern scientific explanation prescinded this status in the
sciences, it naturally followed suit that the same status should be dropped in Ethics.
But as Taylor points out, this is an unsubstantiated prejudice, and impales
itself on the second horn of his argument. For in these thick description terms lies a
kind of reality that will not go away for the naturalists even though they attempt to
dismiss it as not fitting in with their preconceived hypotheses of how things should
be. Of course this reality will not be part of any physical theory of the universe. This
does not mean, however, that it is any less 'real'. Rather it implies that making sense
of our lives in human reality should not be explained in terms which are appropriate
for physics.
So one can see from his criticism of projectionist theories that Taylor wants
to affirm a dynamic role for terms such as 'freedom' and 'dignity' in so much as they
are necessary for understanding reality. He lays this out very clearly when he asks the
rhetorical question: 'What better measure of reality do we have in human affairs than
those terms which on critical reflection and after correction of the errors we can
• 12detect make the best sense of our lives?' The point of this probing question is that
until we have a collection of terms which can replace these value terms by giving a
better explanation of who we are as human moral agents and how we live our lives,
these terms give the best account we have, and no epistemological or metaphysical
bias should trump this account. This is what Taylor calls the BA (best account)
principle—what it means to 'make sense' of our lives entails giving the best account
we can at any given time in the terms which are indispensable for this account. If it




With this argument Taylor not only addresses those projectionists such as
Hare or Mackie who see values projected in the two ways discussed in this chapter,
but it also critiques those forms of naturalism mentioned in chapter one: the 'simple
naturalism' or subjectivism which sees our moral reactions as identical to purely
visceral ones, and those theories which would see our notion of the good as opinions
on an issue which is ultimately optional (such as the character of Roxana described
by Mark Twain). It seems that all of these theories which attempt to see our moral
judgements as projections fall afoul of this BA principle. Thus, if non-realism of this
kind cannot be supported by our moral experience, there is no reason to embrace it.
The BA principle goes part of the way to answering what it means to give a
reason for something. For in given situations this is exactly how practical reasoning
works. The moral agent takes whatever makes the best sense of the matter at any
given time and clings to this. There may come a point of what Maclntyre calls
'epistemological crisis' when this belief is shown to be false, or can be replaced by
I ^
something which makes more sense of more of the data. In this case the agent
moves from his old view to a more tenable one. Thus one can understand moral
reasoning as fundamentally transitional. In order to discern how one can use moral
terms in making judgements about things Taylor asserts two normative conditions
which form a background to any such term. First one must understand the general
social mechanics of the particular culture—the common purposes, mutual needs,
'how things can go well or badly between people', etc. Secondly, one must have
some grasp of the perceptions of the good that others using this moral language have,
i.e., one must understand what he calls 'qualitative distinctions in the society.'14
Some terms may coincide with certain socially defined obligations, such as
the forbidding of murder, and in such cases it is not necessary to understand both
features of this background. Killing, stealing, etc. 'are shaped in part by the
functional requirements of any human society.'15 Hence we do not need to
understand the negation of these as a common purpose of the society in order to
1 See Alasdair Maclntyre, 'Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of
Science', Monist, 60, 1977, p.453.
14Sources ofthe Self, pp.54f.
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desire a social life which seeks to minimise violence. Most of the terms we use,
however, require both forms of consideration. Words like 'freedom' and
'benevolence' are defined both in terms of social consideration as well as individual
understandings of the good.
Sophisticated Naturalism
Once this is said there is still room for a certain kind of subjectivism in the
guise of relativism, and it is exactly this position that Bernard Williams tries to argue
in Ethics and the Limits ofPhilosophy. Some would classify Williams as a realist, or
at least not an anti-realist; however, he still maintains that there must be a distinction
between 'fact' and 'value' in ethics. Williams, unlike most naturalists, does not want
to deny that ethical statements like 'murder is wrong' have a truth value, but what he
does want to deny is that they have one non-perspectivally. Human societies differ
greatly in culture and values. They each express a unique way of being human, and it
may be possible that when the values expressed in these different cultures clash there
is no way of arbitrating between them. Since our language of the good and the right
makes sense only against a background of social interchange and its perceptions of
the good in that culture, it seems clear to Williams that these goods are merely
relative.16 So, for example, he thinks that it would be wrong for us to condemn the
human sacrifices of the Aztec people, since we are not part of their culture. The
goods and values do not need to be seen as projections in such a theory as much as
culturally bound and limited. They can be real, but they are relative.17
In order to analyse the possibility of 'relativism' one must understand that
there are two ways to define the term. First, there could be a value in a certain culture
l5lbid., p.55.
I6As mentioned above, Rorty holds a similar position to this, see hisPhilosophy and the Mirror of
Nature.
l7Williams, himself, does not think they are real in the way that science is real, but here his argument is
condemned by Taylor's definition of reality. Even if he did believe in some moral ontology, it would
be of a relativistic nature, which is what Taylor is addressing.
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which is relative to the point of being completely incomprehensible to those outside
that culture. It may be possible that there are different kinds of human realisation
which are totally incommensurable. This means that as far as moral reasoning is
concerned there is no way of getting from the one view to the other with a clear
transition. Taylor believes that this predicament is possible, but he does not think
that it is true. In other words he believes de dicto that such a state of affairs could
exist, but there is no de re possibility this could refer to.18
From a theological point of view this could be further strengthened by
resorting back to Taylor's denial of any 'fact/value' distinction. For if there is such a
denial to relativism, then William's neutral man, although logically possible, is
incredible. With the doctrine of creation we can assert a fortiori that there is an
ontological precedent or fact in humanity which negates any chance of neutrality.
Regardless of our stance on total depravity this must be seen to be true if we are to
understand man as having any kind of relationship with God. For if there is a
relationship, there is some kind of communicating understanding whereby each being
is somewhat intelligent to the other. In a neutral man scenario this would be logically
impossible. The only alternative is to make God himself neutral and this would
cancel out his own existence. For in a neutral universe, what relationships and
agreements there are between individuals is merely de facto, it becomes irrelevant to
morals of any kind. We cannot say anything true about God which is not self-
involving.19
Secondly, there is the kind of relativism which is prominent in our world of
varying cultures. From our cultural vantage point we can peer into a foreign society,
learn and understand their value system, but insist that it does not relate to our own,
that in certain instances it clashes with what we consider to be the good. On the other
hand there may be certain goods in this other society which we would want to affirm,
but do not see in our own culture. A westerner visiting Iran may object to the way
ISA claim of de re possibility is a claim concerning a particular thing. These kinds of claims are
distinguished from statements ofde dicto possibilities which refer to no particular thing when asserting
the truth of some proposition, but are made on conceptual grounds. For example, it is conceptually
possible that life exists on Jupiter, even though infact it does not.
'"'This is discussed further in Chapter 7.
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women are treated in the country, but would want to affirm the importance placed in
family values by the Islamic tradition. As Taylor notes, some moderns view this
predicament not in terms of cultural disparity, but in relation to our own specific
society and its history. They discern that the modern age is progressing in terms of
scientific advancement in a way that allows us to see ourselves as more self-
deterministic, while at the same time they lament the loss of community or
attunement to our natural surroundings that has been displaced in this process.
This second predicament, however, should not be considered a relativistic
attitude towards other cultural values. This is because it assumes some sort of
universalisability of goods, in so much as it sees the goods of other cultures (or
atavistic societies) as goods for all persons. The point Taylor makes here is that just
because these goods may not be combinable with the 'home-grown' goods of our
everyday life, that does not make them relativistic. Stanley Hauerwas and David
Matzko have criticised Taylor's moral theory for being one which only considers the
20Western view of morality. They argue that Taylor's theory is too parochial in its
application. But if Taylor's critiques of relativism are true, there is no sense of
inapplicability here, as there is no such thing as the 'non-we' individual who stands
apart from our cultural base completely disparate from any understanding ofwho we
are. Even if their value systems are completely different, it is important to see that
there is no 'guarantee that universally valid goods should be perfectly combinable,
••21and certainly not in all situations.'
Another way of seeing that this relativism is mistaken is by understanding the
transitions which occur from one value system to the next. This is a more cosmic
reflection of what happens in an individual's belief system when engaging in
practical reasoning. We understand the range of goods that we hold to as somehow
better than those that it comes into conflict with. We see it as gaining some purchase
on past societies. It is more enlightened, closer to the truth. In this way we cannot say
that these values are relative. For if we did, there would be no sense of strong
evaluation involved whereby we judge certain goods to be higher than others, or
20See Stanley Hauerwas and David Matzko, 'The Sources of Charles Taylor', pp.286-289.
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gaining epistemological ground in terms of the best account of what is good. There is
a parallel here with both how we determine the goods within our own society (as
well as cross-culturally) and how we engage in moral reasoning with others in the
99
microcosm of our individual relationships.
Hypergoods
The cogency of this argument against relativism, particularly of the second
order, does not necessarily mean that there are moral absolutes. We have in our own
experience the phenomenon of conflicting goods, so that while we may affirm, for
example, the right of free expression, we may also want to affirm the right to censor
some expressions particularly if they trespass on other individuals' rights of property
or dignity. In our society there is a plethora of goods which are recognised. We see as
worthwhile our commitment to freedom, justice, equality, the family life, the
avoidance of suffering, the worship of God, etc. But some may hold one of these
goods to be higher than the others, so that there is a ranking of the various goods in
the individual's life. I may see job satisfaction and my work in the community as
worthy pursuits, yet place above these the worship of God and my relationship with
Him. This means that this good above all others orientates my life. It provides the
landmark which allows me to understand where my life is heading. It is the one good
which comes closest to defining my identity.
Answering the question as to whether I am approaching or retreating from
this good is essential for meaning in my life. If I am close to this good I will feel a
unity of spirit, a sense that my life is making sense. Conversely, if I am distanced
from this good, 1 will tend to feel a deep despair about my predicament. For people
21Sources ofthe Self p.61.
"Engaging in moral reasoning with others in this way is more specifically spelled out by Taylor in
'Understanding and ethnocentricity' in Philosophy and the Human Sciences, and Multiculturalism. It
is discussed in this thesis in relation to moral articulation in Christian ethics. See particularly Chapter 5
and Chapter 9.
48
who understand their lives in this way there is a discontinuity between this good and
other goods which they affirm, it is incomparably higher than these lesser goods.
Taylor calls these kinds of goods 'hypergoods'. Not only are they
incomparably higher than others, but they act as a vantage point from which to see all
other goods in one's life. We all tend to recognise such hypergoods in so much as we
all have established in our lives a moral hierarchy. Modern philosophy has tended to
categorise morality in such a way that each philosopher has stressed his or her own
hierarchical system with their own hypergood at the pinnacle. Kant places the moral
imperative in this position, Iris Murdoch, some kind of transcendent Good,
Habermas less obtrusively looks to a universal norm developed in discourse ethics.
Aristotle's system, the greatest of comprehensive moral theories, ranks his goods
according to the supreme good (teleion agathon). The difficulty here is how to
determine which hypergood to affirm as ultimate.
One of the reasons that most naturalists would want to deny hypergoods is
that they can come into conflict with each other. Hypergoods in our civilisation have
arisen as supercessions of other previous ones. Taylor gives the example of universal
rights, which now affirm such features of our society as equal opportunities for
women, but which have also prescinded past hypergoods which have tended to
condemn such features. We see our hypergoods as somehow better than these
previous ones, as replacing a less adequate view. This is what Nietzsche called 'a
transvaluation of values.'24 Furthermore, not only do our hypergoods replace other
past goods, they can challenge and contest the lesser goods existing in our own
society.
As Taylor points out this could be seen as grist for the reductivist mill.
Williams could agree that such hypergood values were as real as any other value, but
whatever truth we find in these goods would ultimately turn out to be relative to our
given culture. Thus when a hypergood of another culture appears to us to be wrong
or even evil, there is no way of adjudicating between the two views. We can,
2,See Sources ofthe Self pp.62f.
24See ibid., pp.64-65, and Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, trans. Richard Hollingdale (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1979), sect. 1.
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according to this way of thinking, no more criticise the Aztec nation for their blood-
sacrifices, than they can condemn our belief in universal rights. There is an
epistemological malaise. We must part company and 'agree to disagree', since there
is no neutral third-party who could arbitrate.25
This is the first kind of relativity discussed above, which sees two cultures as
'incommensurable'. However, it has been argued that there is no actual example of
this in existence. As Taylor points out, the kind of naturalism embraced here would
make cultural relativity a fatality, an 'in-principle limit'. 'It conceives the
"objectivity" of our valuations entirely in terms of their embedding in our different
ways of life, it allows in principle no purchase from which the goods enshrined in a
given way of life can be shown as wrong or inadequate.'26 The critical supercession
of such hypergoods involves something very dissimilar to this. When we hold to a
certain hypergood, say of the belief in universal rights, we do not consider this to be
a mere expression of our way of life. We consider it to be that which is true and
believable. By their very nature, moral claims reach beyond cultural boundaries. We
do react to the Aztec sacrifices with repulsion and condemnation. It is only at a
reflective distance that we can see this as an expression of their culture and take an
interest in it in that way. By their make-up hypergoods resist the 'live and let live'
• • 27
mentality which Williams and other reductivists would want to affirm.
The naturalists have a great difficulty in the way these hypergoods challenge
and displace each other with no neutrally moral agent refereeing the situation, even
within the monocultural context. Conversely, in the Christian tradition a relationship
with God involves sharing His love with the world, and it 'tints' our entire moral
25In the realm of the social sciences Taylor sees this view leading to what he calls 'the incorrigibility
thesis', which essentially argues that 'in requiring that we explain each culture or society in its own
terms, it [the incorrigibility thesis] rules out an account which shows them up as wrong, confused or
deluded. Each culture on this view is incorrigible,' ('Understanding and ethnocentricity', in
Philosophy and the Human Sciences, p. 123). He argues that this is a 'false ally' to his own verstehen
view of understanding other cultures.
2hSources ofthe Self, p.67.
:7IronicalIy, this could be considered a hypergood that Williams holds against any culture-relative
value system. For a reductivist in the sociological realm that Taylor argues with see Peter Winch,The
Idea ofa Social Science (New York: Humanities Press, 1958), and for a persuasive argument for 'the
incorrigibility thesis' see Winch's 'Understanding a primitive society',American Philosophical
Quarterly, 1, 1964, pp.307-324.
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outlook so that we view our relationship with others and our life goals differently. In
most cases, many of our goods are challenged by this new hypergood, but there is no
consensus as to which should be replaced. Who is to say which goods are right,
especially in a pluralist modern world which affirms the many goods of ordinary
life? The Christian would want to say 'God is the arbitrator', but most moderns
would not be happy with this answer unless we could somehow establish God as a
neutral agent. The difficulty with this of course is that we would no longer be
relating to God as we understand Him, i.e., the source of all goodness.28
The question is can these hypergoods be saved as objective, cross-cultural
claims, in the way Taylor would want to picture them? This does not mean to
question whether we can prove that they are all true, for many of them on closer
inspection could be seen as illusory. What is meant is can any of them be seen to be
valid? On the other hand, it is just as important to note that when we do determine
some of these hypergoods to be false, this does not set up any a priori argument
against the objective existence of all such hypergoods. We can no more assert this
than we can make any universal claim from a particular induction tout court.
The way Taylor sets about this challenge is to redirect our attention back to
the BA principle.29 To see the world of ethics as the reductivist would, through the
eyes of a scientific examiner, presupposes that our moral values ought to follow the
rules of physics. As mentioned above Platonism and post-17th century naturalism
have conspired to bring about this premise which has remained largely unchallenged
in modern epistemology. This, however, begs the question. For how are we to know
that we can use these scientific principles to examine human beings until we can
actually explain how these beings live their lives by these principles? We cannot
explain this by using these principles, since we must rely on what gives us the best
account at a certain point of time, rather than assuming that science or any other
discipline can a priori explain human behaviour. As was argued above, this means
that if certain terms such as 'dignity' or 'freedom' are essential for us in order to
2sIt should also be clear that even within the Church the 'Good' ofGod has the potential for endless
interpretation.
29See p.43.
make sense of our lives, they cannot be extracted from the formula of explanation.
'How else to determine what is real or objective, or part of the furniture of things,
than by seeing what properties or entities or features our best account of things has to
invoke?'30
This also applies to the realm of hypergoods. If naturalism and the Platonic
precedent of Ideas should not frighten us away from using such thick virtue terms, it
should also not bully us into denying the existence of hypergoods if they turn out to
be ineliminable in terms of describing the domain of human affairs. These
hypergoods tend to be more difficult to adhere to in modern society for several
reasons. The first, already discussed, is that they often challenge and displace one
another. Who is to say that the protagonists of the 'higher' morality are correct in
affirming their hypergoods against other 'ordinary' life goods? The affirmation of
everyday life that we see in modern society over and against either citizen
participation (phronesis) or monastic contemplation (theoria) has led many to reject
the very religious source responsible for us seeing such goods as the family life or
marriage as meaningful. This is a detail that Taylor develops very carefully in part III
of Sources ofthe Self.
Nietzsche, of course, took this a step further and tried to break out of the
entire 'moral' order as set up by Christianity. The affirmation of freedom for him
meant that we develop our own values so that for the superior man, like the character
of Rupert in Hitchcock's Rope, crimes such as murder are permissible. Nietzsche
also claimed that Science destroys faith. In so far as science seeks reality, it cancels
out religious dogmas. But this is exactly the misconception that Taylor is addressing
when he argues that morality and the domain of human affairs should not necessarily
come under the authority of scientific, 'objective' observation. Furthermore, simply
by seeing, either from the critique of those like Nietzsche or the benefit of historical
reflection, that some of the hypergoods once affirmed are now recognised as
disreputable, does not necessarily mean that hypergoods in general have no part to
play in giving the best account of our moral situation. Indeed, they might be
'"Sources ofthe Self p.68.
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justifiably eliminable, but in order to find this out we must look and see what makes
the best sense according to the BA principle.
Practical Reasoning or Practically Moral Reasoning?
Taylor, however, sees an objection here. It is not merely a matter of looking,
but of arguing, establishing through reason, that something is true, that one view is
better than another. Here we are once again faced with the question 'what does it
mean to give a reason for a moral position?'.31 When we are given two individuals A
and B with conflicting hypergoods, it is not clear how A goes about convincing B
that his hypergood is superior. And if he cannot do this, it is impossible to see how A
could even convince himself. Or are these beliefs mere opinions, 'sub-rational
hunches and feelings', as the naturalist has been asserting all along?
Naturalist epistemology has prejudiced our thinking in this respect by
focusing on the natural science model whereby we neutralise our anthropocentric
approach to knowledge thus disregarding moral reactions and intuitions. It assumes
that we ought to be able to convince another person who shares none of our
inclinations, and that if we cannot, then moral reasoning is of no avail. Taylor
disputes the perennial claims of this foundationalist approach: ' ... if our moral
ontology springs from the best account of the human domain we can arrive at, and if
this account must be in anthropocentric terms, terms which relate to the meanings
things have for us, then the demand to start outside of all such meanings, not to rely
on our moral intuitions or on what we find morally moving, is in fact a proposal to
change the subject.'32
The following syllogism puts the argument more succinctly:
1. If something is the best account then it must relate to all the meanings
things have for us.
2. One of the ways things have meaning for us is through moral intuition.
31 See p.38.
''Sources ofthe Self p.72. See also Donald Davidson, 'Mental Events' in Essays on Action and
Events, p.216.
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3. A de-anthropocentric examination does not relate to moral intuitions.
4. Therefore a de-anthropocentric examination is not the best account.33
If practical reasoning does not proceed through this scientific method, how
then do we reason?34 Modern concepts of practical reason are held captive by the
primacy of the epistemological: we determine what something is by how it is known.
Coupled with this is the foundationalist method of knowledge which has become
canon law in modern epistemology. By this model our knowledge claims are to be
checked by deconstructing them to their basic elements, their ultimate foundations,
and this is to be distinct from the inferences which build from these foundations
towards our original unreflecting beliefs. This can often be confused with reason
itself. This method of reasoning can only come about through the type of practice
Taylor calls apodictic reasoning. " This reasoning method starts from no assumptions
and works through a logical progression to prove a point of view correct. In such a
system we are faced with an opposing moral stance which is clear and whose
foundations are well articulated and share no common ground with our own. In
arbitrating between two such views people work with 'criteria' so that the position
will have certain inbuilt conditions. Criteria usually entail externally defined
standards by which to measure each view, but who can act as the source and authority
of such criteria? The whole purpose of the apodictic mode of reasoning is to distance
ourselves from any parochial vantage point. But in this attempt to negate such
prejudices it sets itself a challenge which cannot be met.
The assumption is that we ought to be able to convince someone from a
standing start who does not share any of our basic moral intuitions. We should be
"Seeing this with predicate logic terms may help to clarify the validity of this argument:
B = Best Account
P = all the meanings things have for us
Q = moral intuition
R = deanthropocentric examination
V means 'not equal'.
We can first assert that in order for B to be true it must relate to P. Following on from this all Q's are
part of P and so for B to be true it must relate to Q. R does not relate to Q and therefore it does not
satisfy the particular predicate of relating to P. Therefore, R^ B.




able to present them with facts or principles which they cannot but accept, and which
are sufficient to disprove their position. This model, however, falls into the rift
between fact and value, the very same hazard that Mill stumbled into when he
attempted to assert that just because we do desire something, we ought to.36 With two
clearly defined opposing views it is difficult to see where to begin.
Furthermore, even if two individuals do reach an agreement, this does not
really say anything about the final position's moral value. It is just a 'happy fact' that
they agree. In other words their agreement is based on weak rather than strong
37 • • i • 4 i •evaluations. Nothing in this resolution has fixed onto the value of the outcome. Just
because there is consensus on the issue of killing people it does not mean that the
position is correct, there is no hypergood involved. The position must be asserted as a
strong evaluation in order for it to have moral weight. In the naturalist world where
the line between strong and weak evaluations is fudged, this will never occur. For 'in
a neutral universe what agreement there is between attitudes seems merely a brute
fact, irrelevant to morals, and disagreement seems utterly inarbitrable by reason,
bridgeable only by propaganda, arm-twisting, or emotional manipulation.'
Taylor thinks that this has been one of the leading contributors to moral
scepticism in modernity. If individuals see moral reasoning in an apodictic fashion
they will tend to despair, for morality then becomes a matter of one's own individual
preferences, feelings, and opinions. Reason is powerless, and if reason is powerless,
we cannot stop people from believing anything. How does one argue against
someone within this model who happens to think that it is permissible to kill
innocent people? This is a scepticism that leads to subjectivism—the view that we
see things as right or valuable because we feel predisposed to them.
'''See J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government, ed. H.
B. Acton (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1972) p.36.
'7See Chapter 1, pp.2ff.
'sSee 'Explanation and Practical Reason', in Philosophical Arguments, pp.39-40.
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Ad Hominem Reasoning
There have been several attempts to combat the sceptics who point out the
weakness of this model of reasoning, but the real question is do we need to adhere to
this model at all? Taylor suggests that its role as prototype should be challenged. To
think of a reason does not necessarily entail thinking in terms of apodictic reasoning.
There is another form of reasoning which challenges this naturalist, objective
perception. This is reasoning from a vantage point, what Taylor calls ad hominem
39
reasoning. Most moral arguments begin from the premise that my opponent shares
some of my basic assumptions, so that the task is not to disprove some radically
opposed foundational assertion such as killing innocent people is permissible. The
object rather is to untangle some moral confusion by showing the interlocutor that
moving from X to Y constitutes an epistemic gain: it resolves a conflict in position
X, or it acknowledges the importance of some factor which X did not include, etc. In
this way changing someone's moral view always entails increasing his own self-
understanding.
The ad hominem form of argument is vindicated by the BA principle in so
much as it is an attempt to do justice to human thought, action, and feelings by
focusing on the actual practices of moral deliberation, debate, and understanding.
Underlying these is the perennial foundation of strong evaluations. Inescapable
commitments or strong evaluations are the very essence of the ad hominem way of
reasoning. They are those parts of ourselves which make up our moral horizon, which
are ineliminable in terms of our personal identity. These are the assumptions that we
build upon in moral reasoning. By definition the ad hominem form of reasoning
begins from the vantage point of the interlocutor, what she or he is already committed
to.
This method has been strongly criticised, not only for its inability to live up to
the canonised form of foundationalist epistemology, but moral critics have argued
that such a view foils all attempts to make a radical moral shift in one's position. The
,9See Ibid., p.36.
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foundationalist model of reasoning is meant to break free from the parochialisms of
individual view points. The radical moral critic would assert that any ad hominem
attempt at moral reasoning holds onto these parochialisms, thereby suppressing any
moral shift. He would argue that there must be some criteria outside of the individual
which will allow him to make such moral shifts.40
These criteria are difficult to establish. Even in the realm of scientific
explanation the assumption that rational arbitration of differences requires criteria
has become problematic. Philosophers such as Thomas Kuhn have demonstrated the
lack of universal working criteria in the various scientific fields.41 Nevertheless,
Alasdair Maclntyre has persuasively argued that we can see advancement in scientific
terms without criteria.42 The apodictic method in scientific reasoning is just as weak
as it is in ethics. What is needed is a readjustment of our metatheory regarding the
reasoning process. Maclntyre's solution, which Taylor applies to moral reasoning, is
to understand not the 'absolute' criteria of any one theory, but the passage from one
position to another as representing a gain. 'We can give a convincing narrative
account of the passage from the first to the second as an advance in knowledge, a step
from a less good to a better understanding of the phenomena in question.'4"' There
exists an ameliorating situation whereby the transition from X to Y is asymmetrical.
A transition from Y to X would not constitute the same epistemic gain. Taylor argues
that we can arbitrate between moral positions by portraying transitions as gains or
losses, even when no criteria—qua external arbitrating factors—exist.
We can do this in a number ofways moving from position X to position Y:
'What may convince us that a given transition from X to Y is a gain is
not only or even so much how X and Y deal with the facts, but how
they deal with each other. It may be that from the standpoint of Y, not
just the phenomena in dispute, but also the history of X and its
40Taylor argues against this kind of meta-ethical polemic in his essay 'Justice after Virtue', inAfter
Maclntyre: critical perspectives on the work ofAlasdair Maclntyre, eds. John Horton and Susan
Mendus (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).
4'See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure ofScientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1970).
4:See Alasdair Maclntyre, 'Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of
Science'.
4 See 'Explanation and Practical Reason', p.42
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particular pattern of anomalies, difficulties, makeshifts, and
breakdowns can be greatly illuminated. In adopting Y, we make better
sense not just of the world, but of our history of trying to explain the
world, part of which has been played out in terms of X.'44
So by adopting Y we not only get a better picture of the world, but also of X.
Furthermore, Y may uncover a certain moral development which X had neglected to
take into consideration. So for example, I may want to argue for my present moral
outlook over and against a more patriarchal society by showing that we both may
hold to the dignity of humans, but the patriarchal view does not deal with the
development of women's rights. I can show the interlocutor here that given what he
already accepts, he cannot help but attribute to the policy of equal rights for women
the significance I am arguing for.
Reasoning through Transitions
In these two forms of argument the loser had to acknowledge some
considerations which was a gain on his system. In this sense there did exist a criterion
of sorts, viz. the recognition of some error-reducing gain. But what about
circumstances which do not permit of such criteria? A situation can be conceived
whereby the transition from X to Y is not seen as a gain by virtue of it being the only
way ofmaking sense of the considerations. Rather it is shown to be a gain directly, as
identified as overcoming an error. This reverses the foundationalist approach. Instead
of concluding that Y is a gain over X because of the superior performance of Y, we
would be confident of the superior performance of Y because we know that Y is a
gain over X. This is the 'criterionless' argument of Maclntyre which Taylor applies
to moral theory.
Taylor argues that analogues of this can be seen in everyday life. If I open my
front door and I think I see a snake curled up on the mat at my feet, I may suddenly
jump back, but then come to realise that it is not a snake at all, but a coil of rope. The
44Ibid., p.43.
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act of coming to realise that what is in front of me is not a snake, but a piece of rope
is one whereby my perception is improved by virtue of the transition being an error-
reducing transition. Identifying the object as a harmless coil of rope instead of a
dangerous snake is a better viewpoint by the mere fact that I have gone through an
ameliorating transition. In other words I do not come to the superior epistemological
position of 'this is a coil of rope', by stepping outside the situation and attempting to
ground this epistemological gain in some underlying indisputable index of
knowledge before I will believe it. There are no such criteria involved. I do not take a
survey or do a scientific experiment to determine whether or not what is in front of
me really is a snake. 'It is my direct sense of the transition as an error-reducing one
which grounds my confidence that my perceptual performance will improve.'4"
In the same way Taylor argues that one does not need to go outside one's own
experience in order to engage in moral reasoning. I do not need to step back and
make a calculation, apart from any beliefs that I have, in order to come to the right
answer. There are no criteria involved whereby I decide on the basis of these
indisputable foundations that B is a better thing to do than A. By going from A to B it
just is the case that B shows up an error-reducing move, that some contradiction is
ironed out, or that I get a better epistemological take on the issue. In this way moral
reasoning should be consider as akin to our perception. Just as seeing something
strange causes us to take a closer look—attending to it and scrutinising more
closely—so too our moral reasoning should be a kind of engaged exploration. In
dialogue this means getting others to 'an interpretation of themselves which identifies
these confused feelings as confused and which thus, if accepted, will bring about the
self-justifying transition.'46 The inverse of this can also be true where our
interlocutors get us to recognise our own confusions and inconsistencies.
45Ibid„ p.52.
""'Ibid., p.53. NB: Taylor can apply this theory of perception to moral reasoning because of the
epistemological assumptions undergirding both. In moving from an inferior to a superior moral
position an epistemological gain is involved. It is getting a better grip on reality that is analogous to
clearing away a perceived illusion. For a more in-depth discussion on Taylor's epistemology see
Chapter 4.
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Taylor thinks that this is the most common form of practical reasoning in our
lives, and it is here that the ad hominem mode of argument is at its most intense and
its most fruitful. Whenever we propose to an interlocutor transitions which are in and
of themselves error-reducing moves—freeing a contradiction, clearing up a
confusion, embracing a consideration, which the interlocutor cannot help but identify
as significant—any appeal to criteria such as a basic reason or some external
consideration is quite beside the point. The transition is justified by the very nature of
the move which effects it.
Practical reasoning in this way is reasoning in transition. The narrative which
involves the history of X and the history of Y is essential to understanding the
ultimate outcome of the argument. While the epistemological tradition has wanted to
condemn such transitional arguments, the fact cannot be avoided that my perspective
is defined by my moral intuitions or strong evaluations, and to abstract from this
vantage point would mean I would no longer be able to make any sense of moral
arguments. One can only be convinced to change one's moral view by changing the
reading of one's moral experience, and particularly one's reading of one's life story,
the narrative of one's moral transitions. Hypergoods evolve in a similar way. We
understand their value through reasoning, and this reasoning is a matter of transition
from one hypergood to another. In this way the conviction that a hypergood carries
relies to a great extent upon its origin. As Taylor describes it: 'Our acceptance of any
hypergood is connected in a complex way with our being moved by it.'47
Qualitative Distinctions in Moral Reasoning
The discussion here has come full circle in the investigation of the role
qualitative distinctions play in our moral thinking. Taylor first suggests that these
kinds of discriminations give us reasons for our moral beliefs and then goes on to
discuss the intricacies of this assertion. Qualitative distinctions as reasons do not
A1
Sources ofthe Self p.73.
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mean external considerations or criteria as in the apodictic form of practical
reasoning. They are not the kind of reasons called upon by naturalists to convince
someone who was completely unmoved by a certain vision of the good that he ought
to adopt it.
Nor are they the kind of reasons which would attempt to show that a certain
act is enjoined to some crucial property. An example of this reasoning might be
arguing against dumping toxic waste into the ocean on the grounds that it is
detrimental to human existence. The problem with this argument is that when
dumping toxic waste no longer affects human welfare, it ipso facto ceases to be a
moral issue. These 'basic reasons' occur in situations where we would say you ought
to do A, because A = B, and you are morally committed to B. This may seem quite
straightforward and unproblematic, yet in certain circumstances where B is not a
moral commitment or when A no longer equals B, we are no longer obligated to do
48A. It ceases to be a good.
Qualitative distinctions as definitions of the good are reasons in an entirely
different way. They do not depend upon any external criteria or basic reason, as the
most fruitful examples of the ad hominem mode of reasoning demonstrate. Rather
qualitative distinctions based on strong evaluations are by their very nature what we
hold to be good. They offer reasons in the sense that articulating them means
articulating what underlies our ethical choices, leanings, intuitions. In this way moral
reasons pinpoint exactly that which I have only a dim grasp of when I say X is wrong
or Y is right, or Z is worth preserving.
So, as Taylor has been formulating this argument, qualitative distinctions
have two important functions in our ethical life. First 'prearticulately' they ground
our moral intuitions, orientate our sense of what is valuable and meaningful in our
lives. Secondly, articulating these distinctions means setting out the moral point of
our actions and feelings. 'They have this place both in the broader domain of goods
that we pursue across the whole range or our lives, as well as the more special
4sThis point is made in relation to the command of God as a 'basic reason' in Chapter 7.
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domain of hypergoods, which claim a status of incomparably greater importance and
urgency in our lives.'49
The idea of articulation, from moving from what is implicit to what is explicit
in moral reasoning, is something that Taylor is unique in stressing as a modern
philosopher. It finds a parallel in the moral psychology of both Plato and Aristotle,
particularly as these philosophers understand the concept of logos. Plato interprets
the term logistikon not simply as a feature of our thinking, but as that in us which is
capable of grasping the Ideas in general, and grasping the way in which these Ideas
all fit together. The logos in us is what enables us to speak and give account of things
surrounding us. The metaphysical and ontological connotations of this way of
thinking for Plato are that giving an account of something in this way is tantamount
to articulating it correctly, of revealing what reality actually looks like (Republic,
534B). In order to be rational we have to give accounts in this way. The Greek is
Aoyov SiSopai, to give a logon of something. So according to Plato it is a
characteristic of human beings that we be rational in a way as to give (through
speech) this logos.
Alternatively Taylor's idea of articulation can be seen as resembling
Aristotle's view of language. In the Politics Aristotle argues that Nature does nothing
without purpose, and humans are distinct as animals possessing logon (1253A10ff).
Lower animals can only distinguish pleasure and pain, whereas humans see right and
wrong, good and bad. This power of distinction is thought by Aristotle just to be their
possessing of logos. Only beings that can bring these distinctions out through speech
can have the worthwhile or not worthwhile in their world.
Alongside this is the idea that the operative capacity of our discernment is not
just as individuals, but that speech exists between us—the koinonia or community.
Aristotle relates speech in terms of the fullness of human life. It is not monological
reflection, but the medium of interchange between people. If it did not have this
primary site of exchange, none of us could get to the point where it had a reflective,
monological feature whereby we go off on our own and think in solitude. Nature
49Sources ofthe Self p.78.
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gave humans logos because that is the means by which they discern good and bad,
advantageous, harmful, etc. Therefore, the primary locus of this discernment is
dialogical, and so we must have koinonia: the family (oikia) and the civic
community (polls). Thus there is an inextricable link for Aristotle between being
speech animals and being political animals. Speech discerns the good, and the locus
of speech is between two individuals, so we need this dialogical relationship, and the
primary locus of this is the polls.
Articulating with moral interlocutors for Taylor has similar features: our
interchange should be a gregariousness marked by discourse and deliberation of the
good and the bad. In the same way that Aristotle locates the speech act between
individuals so too Taylor sees moral reasoning as fundamentally dialogical. This free
intercourse is to be pursued against a mode of life where we take orders from Big
Brother or a dictatorial regime. Within this exchange the implicit is vocalised and our
moral frameworks are given form through the dynamics of language. The importance
that Taylor places on this idea of articulating our moral frameworks and qualitative




and the Point ofArticulation
Articulation ancl Constitutive Goods
If articulating these distinctions means setting out the moral point of our
actions and feelings, then we can ask what is the use of such an articulation. Why is it
important for Taylor that we get clear about our moral sources? Perhaps this seems
like a truism to some, yet others have felt a need for silence in the matter.
Wittgenstein, for example, avoids pinning down the good in such a way.
One obvious answer would be to point to the expressive nature of language.
In some sense articulating the good behind moral intuitions entails creating that good
in so far as this expression is a constitutional part of what that good is eventually
identified as. In other words various goods are only identified in some form of
language. Belief in God, for example, is only a possibility because He has been
talked about and talked to in prayer.
Of course language here is meant as a very broadly defined term not to be
restricted to vocal gestures, utterances, words, symbols, or specific syntaxes. Art can
be a powerful language which communicates some form of the good. Thus the Early
Church policy championed by Gregory the Great set about formulating a language for
the illiterate so that they could see the good of God and His history with His people
articulated through the visual images of mosaics, frescoes and sculpture.
Taylor questions whether such a broad definition of language can help us
understand the benefit of the equally broad definition of articulation, and whether
there is really any need to focus on the narrower, more concise definition of language
as speech. Must we try and say what the underlying sense of the good is? From the
discussion at the end of the last chapter it is clear that Plato and Aristotle would
consider speech essential simply because it is a feature that is inescapably linked to the
human agent qua rational being. Because we are logov possessing animals it is to our
own good to articulate reason in such a way. We must give an account through
speech, and, as Aristotle argues, the speech situation is not monological, it is
necessarily grounded in the articulation between moral agents.
As a Christian Taylor sees this ontological notion of language taking purchase
from the relationship between man and God. As a philosopher, however, he wants to
investigate more particular reasons for articulating the good. What specific benefits
can come about through this articulation other than any general sense of meaning and
direction?
One of the most important answers to this question for Taylor is that
articulating the good empowers us to do the good. It brings us closer to the good, and
by doing so articulation can act as a catalyst towards accomplishing good. In order to
argue for this advantage of articulation Taylor makes an important distinction
between certain goods which is fundamental to understanding the transcendent nature
of his moral theory.
Up until this point Taylor has been speaking of the good in a general sense to
mean that which we consider valuable or meaningful for us. Some of these goods
have a special status so that they are incomparably higher than others, and these are
what he has called 'hypergoods'. In some of these distinctions, however, the term
seems to merit the attribution of value in a fuller sense. For example Plato's theory of
Ideas, particularly in the Republic and the Phaedrus, sees a higher and a lower order
of things which depends upon the hegemony between reason and desire. Reason in
this theory, however, has an authentic ontological status. Because it is understood
substantively rather than procedurally, to be rational is to have a vision of the order
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of reason and to love this order. The principle underlying the order is the Idea of the
Good. This Idea is such that to grasp the good is a good itself, and to see it is to be
moved by it and to understand it as worthy of love.1 The term 'eidog' metaphorically
underlies the deeper, general feature that various things in the world are the way they
• 2
are because they are striving to realise this standard.
Thus the difference in certain actions must be explained in terms of a cosmic
order of things, an external reality. This way of speaking of the good introduces a
much fuller concept into Taylor's moral argument. What this entails is the
dependency of our actions as moral agents on the Idea of the Good, or something
substantively similar to this. The kind of good that Taylor is describing, because of
its rich ontological status, substantiates the lower goods in our lives. For obvious
reasons Taylor calls these kinds of goods 'constitutive goods'. 'Their relation to this
[good] is what makes certain of our actions or aspirations good; it is what constitutes
the goodness of these actions or motives.' 3 Furthermore, not only do constitutive
goods define the goods in our lives, but the love of such goods empower us to do
good. As such they are important moral sources for Taylor:
'The constitutive good does more than just define the content of the
moral theory. Love of it is what empowers us to be good. And hence
also loving it is part of what it is to be a good human being. This is
now part of the content of the moral theory as well, which includes
injunctions not only to act in certain ways and to exhibit certain moral
qualities but also to love what is good.'4
This strong ontological claim is extremely controversial. Up until this point
Taylor was restricting his theory to those 'life goods' which are qualitative
distinctions between certain actions and feelings (or modes of life). The goods that
these define are facets or components of the good life. Here, however, Taylor
'See Republic, Bk.VII.
2See Plato's Phaedo, trans. R. Hackforth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972) 75A.
Sources ofthe Self p.92.
4Ibid., p.93. Taylor points out that the love foi the good in this way cannot be considered a contingent
aid to doing the good. It cannot be viewed in strictly instrumental terms, since doing good actions
always includes the dimension of motive. 'To love the constitutive good (however conceived) is to be
strongly motivated in just that way which is defined as part of doing the good (on that conception).
That is why being good involves loving something and not just doing something.' (Ibid., p.534).
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introduces the concept of transcendent reality. One sees life goods as part of a cosmic
measuring system. These refer to some feature of the way things are in something
resembling a correspondence theory of truth.5 In the realm of Christianity one can see
a clear application of this idea. The appeal of neo-Platonism to the early Church
Fathers seems natural if one understands God as a constitutive good both defining
what lesser goods are by virtue of their position to Him, and empowering us to do the
good through our love for Him.
The Obligationist Response
This of course is far beyond the boundaries of offering basic reasons for
moral decisions and intuitions. Most modern moral theories have no place for
qualitative distinctions, let alone a moral realism of constitutive goods. They can
make no sense of a place for the incomparably higher at all in our lives. Their
philosophical position has been motivated by naturalism, partly in the
epistemological assumptions that allow the natural sciences to act as a paradigm for
explaining the domain of human experience. There has been another way that
naturalist influences have brought modern moral philosophy to a point where there is
no longer any concept of qualitative distinctions, and that is in promoting the focus of
action rather than being in ethics. As mentioned in chapter one, the moral theories of
our day tend to picture ethics as certain obligations. Such theories run into difficulties
when they attempt to involve qualitative distinctions.
Most of the theories that are functioning in this way are some form of
utilitarianism or (as in the case of Habermas) a legacy of Kant's moral framework.
Utilitarianism is perhaps the most striking case because while it does not admit to
any qualitative distinctions, it does recognise the good of'happiness'. This good does
5The term 'correspondence theory' often sets off alarm bells in the minds of philosophers since they
equate it with 'raving Platonism'. Taylor, however, does not want to be satisfied with the categories
'realism' and 'anti-realism' in his metaphysics and tries to invoke qualities of both in his moral theory
(see his reply to Rorty in Philosophy in an Age ofPluralism, pp.219-222). Yet clearly he is attempting
to establish an ontologically grounded moral framework similar to Plato's or Augustine's.
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not claim any incomparably higher status, however, as there is no higher or lower in a
utilitarian system, only desire. But it is quite clear from most of these theories that
they do unconscionably rank certain goods, such as rationality or benevolence as
higher than others, even if these goods are not articulated as having such a status.6
Taylor points to several reasons why modern theories of utilitarianism seem
to contradict themselves in this way. Part of the reason lies in the naturalist
temperament. Not only does this effect morality by setting a scientific explanation
whereby higher goods do not seem to make any sense, but there is also the more
pervasive problem of the narrow focus of morality spotlighting obligations. A deontic
emphasis on action, what one ought to do, means that one excludes not only what it
is good to he, but also what it is good to love. Thus in this conception there is no
room for notions of the good life or the good as the object of our allegiance. These
two ways that the good is able to play a role in our moral life are discounted since
they fall outside the boundaries of what one is obliged to act upon. Strictly speaking
the good life and loving the good lie within the realm of supererogation.
Utilitarianism and Kantian theories are strictly concerned with determining
what our obligations are in certain situations. Coming to formulate these obligations
usually means having recourse to a set of criteria to judge whether or not a certain
action will promote the most happiness, or be truest to the idea of treating other
people's prescriptions as one's own, etc. The difference between these theories and
what Taylor wants to defend is that obligationists are in the business of giving 'basic
reasons' for certain actions. Taylor, on the other hand, gives qualitative distinctions
as reasons in an entirely different sense of the word. His reasons are the underlying
meaning of his moral reactions which make sense of the good life. Not only do
obligationists have no need for such reasons, but there is, as we have seen, a tendency
to deny any legitimate place for them. Most of them cannot understand qualitative
distinctions as real entities, and thus reduce them to the status of projections.7
('See J. J. C. Smart and B. Williams, Utilitarianism For andAgainst (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1973).
7See 'The Problem of Projectionism', in Chapter 2.
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Taylor points out several motives for this exclusion including the sway of
naturalism. He argues that articulating our qualitative distinctions means setting out
the point of our moral beliefs, but there can be cases where we know that a certain act
is forbidden, and yet do not really understand the reason behind it. For example, a
child might be told not to stick his tongue out at the stranger on the bus, but only
understand later, after he had matured, that it was because he was demonstrating a
lack of respect for the other person, which was not right. The distinction here
between actions and reasons is a distinction that naturalism strives to avoid. For as
they are attempting to explain the human condition in scientific terms, i.e., in terms
which extrapolate us from the anthropocentric point of view to a more 'absolute'
vantage point, they describe our affairs solely as external stipulations, focusing on
action. This has helped to establish obligation-centred theories of morality as
prominent in our culture.8
Alongside this lie several moral motives for emphasising actions over
qualitative distinctions. One reason for this, mentioned above, is the eclipsing of
higher goods by the affirmation of everyday life in society. The modern can see the
rejection of higher goods such as citizen participation or moral meditation as a
liberation from a stifling archaic system of order. They are then free to embrace
'lesser' goods such as the family or production at work.
Furthermore, because of the nature ofmorality, a person may feel condemned
by a certain good, particularly if it is one that he cannot possibly live up to.
Understanding Christianity without the concept of Grace is the prime example of
such a good in Christian ethics. In such cases, breaking the allegiance of such a good
can seem like a liberating experience. The real question, however, is whether such a
break is the only solution. Understanding the good in another light may make all the
difference. Living up to the standards set by God in Christianity will seem a hopeless
task if God's grace and love were not a part of this moral system.
8See, for example, Mary Warnock's discussion of this inEthics since 1900 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1960).
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Alongside the affirmation of ordinary life, the modern concept of freedom
tends to promote an obligationist theory of morality. Ancient moral theories, such as
Plato's Forms or Aristotle's function of man, set up a teleological ideal which was
outside of the individual. There was some notion of reality which man had to live up
to in order to be moral. The Enlightenment challenged such a concept with the idea
of modern freedom being the freedom of the subject to self-determination. External
authorities such as God or Ideal Forms became incompatible with the self-
determining individual.
Ironically, this was first conceived in theological terms through medieval
nominalism. In an attempt to save the sovereignty of God nominalists refuted any
idea of an external order of nature which would determine good and bad. This
eventually lead to a mechanistic interpretation of reality, seeing the universe in terms
of cause and effect, void of any intrinsic purpose.9 This 'theological decisionism'
already had a role to play in formulating early utilitarian thought, such as Hobbes'
political atomism, which argued that 'whatsoever is the object of a man's appetite or
desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good.'10 Freedom was emphasised in
mature utilitarianism as a liberation from an external order of paternalism. So
qualitative distinctions are discredited as morally suspicious, since they exist as
external orders which utilitarians see as an infringement upon the modern freedom of
self-determinism.11
Although Kant wanted to take a stance against the utilitarian concept of
identifying duty with desire for happiness, he, nevertheless, shares the emphasis on
freeing oneself from nature. The moral law emanates from our will, and we are fdled
with awe (Achtung) by this law because of its author, the rational agent. Nothing in
the universe has an equal status. We as rational creatures demand dignity by our very
reason. So, moral obligation owes nothing to any external nature for Kant. Taylor
argues, however, that like utilitarianism, Kant's theory attempts to reject something
that he cannot work without. For although both of these philosophies claim to deny
9See Robert Lenoble, Mersenne et la naissance du mecanisme (Paris: J. Vrin, 1943).
"'Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. M. Oakeshott (Oxford: Blackwell's, 1946) chp.6, p.32.
"See Sources ofthe Self, Chapter 16.
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qualitative distinctions, they are still assuming some kind of moral hierarchy. In the
case of utilitarianism it is the goods of happiness and benevolence above others. In
12Kant's theory it is the dignity of the rational agent.
A common slogan used by modern Kantians, such as John Rawls in A Theory
13
ofJustice, is the principle of the priority of the right over the good. Originally, as a
counter-attack to utilitarianism, this was merely meant to assert that morality could
not be seen strictly in terms of outcomes, but must in some way be deontic. This, of
course, can be applied not only against the good of desire-fulfilment, but any good, as
Rawls tries to do. His theory is an attempt to establish a notion of justice based on a
'thin' description of the good. He manages to establish such a theory, but can only
justify his concepts of the good as ones which coincide with our intuitions. As Taylor
notes, if we were to start spelling out these intuitions we would soon be in the
business of articulating our qualitative distinctions which underlie these moral
reactions and would have to start using 'thick' descriptions of moral language.14
This modern conception of freedom, combined with the metaphysical and
epistemological preconceptions of naturalism, highlight the overall drive behind a
narrow focus ofmorality whereby we see it in terms of obligations and basic reasons.
Alongside these motivations is another feature of the Enlightenment, namely
practical benevolence. This was particularly emphasised by Francis Bacon, who felt
that scientific advancement was to function as a humanitarian aid to relieving the
suffering of mankind.15 We are urged therefore through science to the action of
charity. Modern society has taken up Bacon's ideal and set about to improve the
human condition by overcoming poverty, famine, world hunger, disease, and general
suffering. The sentiment is that 'we should strive to leave the world a more
prosperous place than we found it.'16
12See Taylor's 'Kant's Theory of Freedom', in Philosophy and the Human Sciences.
''See John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972) chp.7, sect.60.
14See Taylor's 'The Nature and Scope of Distributive Justice' in Philosophy and the Human Sciences,
and Michael Sandel's critique of Rawls in Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice.
"See Francis Bacon, Novum Organum Scientiarum, I. 75; translated from Francis Bacon: A Selection
ofHis Works, ed. Sidney Warhaft (London: Macmillan, 1965).
Sources ofthe Self p.85.
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Considering such an emphasis it is not difficult to see how most would side
with a morality which tended towards action. What is preferred is a system that will
get things done, not one which will lead us into some self-absorbed state of concerns
about contemplating the good. An individual could be seen as justified in turning
from such a metaphysical concept of the good to a more Kantian line simply because
he saw too much suffering in the world and needed to feel as if he were actively
engaging with an attempt to relieve this. Arguably, this kind of reasoning is a
powerful engine in the development of modern Christian ethics which has aligned
itself more with the 'practical ethics' involved in sociology rather than the moral
theory of philosophy.17
Procedural Ethics
The kinds of motivations that led people to concentrate on obligations and
deontological features when considering a moral position bring together the Kantians
and the utilitarians under the common banner of 'procedural' ethics. Procedural is
distinguished from substantive by Taylor in so much as these ethics tend to focus not
so much on the end product as how one arrives there. This distinction can be clarified
if we take the example of a moral theory such as Plato's. In such a framework
practical reason was understood substantively, as coinciding with a correspondence
theory of truth. There existed some goal, some substantive, external reality which
was to be grasped. Constitutive Goods are such a reality. They are understood
substantively both by having an independent ontological status, and by determining
the quality of the goods in our lives. Once we deny ourselves such a vision of the
good to seek after, however, we are faced with a procedural conception of morality.
We no longer have a teleion agathon to follow. Clearly such a procedural approach is
bound up with the modern concept of freedom. In as much as we wish to affirm our
self-determination by denying external boundaries and limits on our morality, we are
l7This is discussed further in Part III.
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faced with concentrating on the procedural. Taylor regards this idea of freedom as the
strongest motive for the massive shift in moral philosophy from the substantive to the
procedural.
There are several problems that Taylor argues leave 'perplexing gaps' in any
procedural attempt to systematise a working theory of ethics. First, because of the
focus on action and obligation, a procedural ethic cannot capture the background
understanding of any moral position. It fails to give a reason in the way a qualitative
distinction professes to do concerning what lies behind our initial moral reactions.
We have a sense in our intuitions that in the realm of morality something
incomparably higher is being dealt with. Thus we cannot merely switch off and
disengage from moral reasoning. But a procedural account does not explain why this
is the case. Along these same lines, the procedural moral theorist cannot explain why
moral reasoning should be given a status over and above other forms of reasoning.
Flare thinks that the answer to this lies in the logical. Having such a status is just
18what is meant by the moral. Habermas, on the other hand, takes the priority from
the maturation of the discourse ethic.19 Neither of these views, however, can explain
why it is that moral reasoning's superiority is to be analytically equated with the
moral, or why it is that it is a result of maturing in the history of culture or
ontogenetically. In other words they cannot answer the question 'Why be moral?' in
the same way that a qualitative distinction could. The only answer that Hare can give
90
is that it is a matter of prudence. It is within someone's interest to act morally. But
of course this does not give a reason for the action. It does not tell us what is uniquely
valuable about the moral: ' ... the implication of these theories is that we have
nothing to say which can impart insight. We can wax rhetorical and propagandise,
l8See R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, 9.3
l9Jiirgen Habermas, Moral consciousness and communicative action, trans. Christian Lenhardt and
Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992) chp.4; See also his Theories of
Communicative Action Volume One: Reason and the rationalisation ofsociety, trans. Thomas
McCarthy (London: Heinemann Press, 1984) and Volume Two: Lifeworld and system: a critique of
functionalist reason, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989).
2(IR. M. Hare, MoraI Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) chp.l 1.
73
but we can't say what's good or valuable about them, or why they command
assent.'21
The fact of the matter is that while a procedural ethic cannot explain the
particular emphasis on the moral over and above other forms of reasoning and
intuition, neither can it choose to do away with the distinction altogether. For in
doing so it would be denying itself the notion of certain qualitative distinctions which
are intrinsic, yet unarticulated, distinctions such as Flare's altruism or Habermas'
mutual, universal consent in the ideal speech situation. The more one scrutinises the
motives of procedural ethics, (what Nietzsche called the 'genealogy' of morals), the
more self-contradictory they seem. They are all guided by some unarticulated, moral
good such as freedom, altruism, or universalism, while at the same time rejecting any
privileged conception of these goods. Like Rawls, such procedural ethicists need to
come clean about their deeper moral sources, rather than assuming that they can build
a theory upon 'thin' concepts alone.
Neo-Nietzschean Criticism
The procedural position of unarticulated qualitative distinctions has invited
polemical attacks from several sides, including others who also would not want to
affirm any realist concept of the good. Taylor identifies one such group as the 'neo-
Nietzscheans' and discusses the philosophy of the late Michel Foucault as the most
influential of these thinkers. Foucault, like Nietzsche, attends closely to the
genealogy of moral frameworks. In doing so he criticises obligational theories in
much the same vein of attack as Taylor. Fie spots the inconsistencies in their implicit
moral genealogies such as the conception of freedom as a hypergood, or the
undeniable, yet repressed moral motivations in these theories where claims of pure
epistemology are made. Flowever similar to Taylor's criticism, Foucault does not
conclude from this that qualitative distinctions or constitutive goods exist. He uses
21Sources ofthe Self p. 87.
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his criticism to debunk obligationist theories, but neglects to add any positive
contribution in their place. What he does argue, however, is that our modern moral
theories, like our epistemological ones, are merely institutions imposed on reality.
99
There is no proclaimed position which is more or less justified.
Taylor, criticises Foucault's view as self-contradictory and indefensible since
it assumes some pre-eminent objectification in a world of relativity and projection.
Foucault, while critiquing various epistemologies as defined by particular epochs,
nevertheless wants to argue that there can be no adjudicating between these epistemic
vantage points. With such a claim, however, he is setting himself up as one outside of
the relativism of'savoir' and making an absolute discernment, viz. that each era has
its own understanding of the rational and as such there can be no question of one
being superior to another. It is not clear from his own admission—that one can only
think in terms of one's own episteme—how he concludes that his own particular
structure is the one to give credence to.
Approaching this from another angle, the neo-Nietzschean theory opens itself
up to the same kind of criticism that it lobbies against the obligationists. There is an
assumed, yet unarticulated moral source, a reliance on, yet denial of qualitative
distinctions. Unlike the proceduralists, the neo-Nietzscheans do not deny any moral
genealogy, yet they do make the fundamental error of giving their own moral sources
a unique objectivism. This particular vantage point simply is not open to the human
experience. For what is to say that this one view is absolute in a way that others are
not? If all are relative, then so are they:
'The point of view from which we might constate that all orders are
equally arbitrary, in particular that all moral views are equally so, is
just not available to us humans. It is a form of self-delusion to think
that we do not speak from a moral orientation which we take to be
right. This is a condition of being a functioning self, not a
metaphysical view we can put on or off. So the meta-construal of the
neo-Nietzschean philosopher—"in holding my moral position, I am
imposing (or collaborating in the imposition of) a regime of truth on
22See for example his early argument in Les Mots et les Choses: une archeologie des sciences
humaines (Paris: Gallimard, 1966). See also Taylor's critique of Foucault's later writings in 'Foucault
on Freedom and Truth' in Philosophy and the Human Sciences.
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the chaos, and so does everyone"-—-is just as impossible as the meta-
construal of the empiricist—"in holding my moral position, I am
projecting values on a neutral world of facts, and so does everyone".
Both are incompatible with the way we cannot but understand
ourselves in the actual practices which constitute holding that
position: our deliberations, our serious assessments of ourselves and
others. They are not construals you could actually make of your life
while living it. They clash ... with the best available account of our
moral life ... The neo-Nietzschean position falls afoul of the BA
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principle, just as the crasser forms of naturalism do.'
The neo-Nietzscheans, like the obligationists, have an intricate genealogy of
epistemological and moral motivations. One of the most important is the connection
that Foucault makes between certain visions of the good and forms of domination. As
Friedrich Schiller points out in Letters on the Aesthetic Education ofMan, certain
hypergoods have been used to suppress the true 'nature' of man in the Romantic era,
and this in turn introduces relations of dominations within us.24 There is much to be
said for Foucault's criticisms. Contemporary thinkers such as Carol Gilligan have
brought to the fore the neglected and suppressed female moral formulations in a field
9 S
dominated by a patriarchal system a la Kohlberg. It is confusion, however, to
conclude as Foucault does, that all such moral formulations are flawed, and that all
theories of the good involve some form of domination. For if we allow that certain
views are arbitrarily chosen, we are faced with the hopeless consequence of being
unable to determine how it is that our views or anyone else's are empowered by a
vision of the good.
The Necessity ofArticulation
This leads back to the original question of our need to articulate the good. For
both these theories, the obligationist and the neo-Nietzschean, demonstrate a hidden
2jSources of the Self p.99.
:4See Friedrich Schiller, Letters on the Aesthetic Education ofMan, bilingual ed., ed. and trans.
E. Wilkinson and C. A. Willoughby (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967),particularly letter VI.
23See Carol Gilligan's In a Different Voice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).
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agenda for the good, which needs to be exposed. Apart from the empowering effect
articulation of the good has, it can also help to clarify some of the underlying
assumptions of many of our contemporary meta-theories which propose to deal with
ethics in a way which denies any moral source whatsoever. Articulation in this way
would help us to see our way clear in the modern debate.
Such a clarification is essential in terms of understanding various views in
moral reasoning superseding one another. For to the extent that moral reasoning is a
matter of one view replacing another as an error-reducing move, we can argue that
there is a need to articulate the good, even if it is for no other purpose than to find
such moral realist theories as inadequate and thereby move beyond them.
Articulation in this sense would find the various contemporary theories coming out
purged of this confusion about reality in a way that would make them stronger and
more coherent.
There is indeed an impoverished state of affairs in regards to articulating the
good in modern society. We are in many ways less capable of pointing to the moral
sources of our beliefs than our forebears were. What is it that underpins our notion of
universal respect, benevolence, or the rights of the individual? Traditional
frameworks have to some extent become problematic, and in a society built on a
bedrock of pluralism, where freedom is often associated with individual choice, we
tend to avoid any attempt at reconciling views through moral reasoning and the
authority of constitutive goods. It must be recognised, however, as Taylor clearly
does, that there are incidents where the results of some past moral source still
empower us today. For example, Iris Murdoch insists that while we may not hold to
Plato's explanation of the cosmos, we can still nevertheless keep his picture of the
sun as an analogue for some empowering source of the absolute.26 The importance of
many of the narrative traditions in our society is due to the moral weight these stories
have which is a direct result of them being grounded in some religious or theological
27
context, however crude. The story of the Exodus from Egypt, for example, has been
an inspiration to those in this century who see it as a forceful message of liberation
2<'See Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty ofGood, p.74.
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from oppression. Shrugging off the religious and transcendental trappings of the
Exodus story still leaves them with an inspiring narrative regardless of their
theological commitments.
Many of these empowering moral sources remain inarticulate in our society,
and they are indeed difficult to bring to the surface. This, however, is not a
persuasive reason for denying the importance of our moral sources, yet it does warn
against articulating certain kinds of constitutive goods. It may perhaps lead us to look
more discerningly on the kinds of goods that we would want to affirm.
Because as an empowering action articulation cannot be isolated from the
whole speech act, it must be of a specific nature. The most powerful cases of
articulation are those where the speaker, the formulation, and the act of delivering the
message all line up together to reveal the good. For Taylor one of the most obvious
examples of this is the Gospel narratives of Jesus Christ's life and teaching. They
combine in such a harmony that the revelation of the good seems all-pervasive. The
moral source of agape is so manifest in the Gospel that one is overwhelmed with the
force of this articulation as it is released. The teachings of Jesus and the accounts of
29his life, this is precisely how 'words have power' for Taylor.
An imbalance of word or act or formulation distorts our picture of the good.
Some may discount or distrust an articulation of the good as being counterfeit in this
way. The speaker may utter words that are true, yet these may be contextualised in
such a way as to connote the advocating of a disreputable status quo. 'Trite formulae
may combine with the historical sham to weave a cocoon of moral assurance around
us which actually insulates us from the energy of true moral sources.'30
Many have reacted to this by insisting on silence. They argue that it is better
not to engage in moral articulation at all. But categorical silence is not the answer.
For Taylor argues, as Aristotle does, that if we were to stop articulating we would
cease to be human. 'Without any articulation at all, we would lose all contact with
27See Northrop Fry, The Great Code (Toronto: Academic Press, 1982).
2sSee Michael Waltzer, Exodus and Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1985).
'See Sources ofthe Self p.96, and Appendix E.
Sources ofthe Self p.97.
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the good, however conceived.'31 The issue involves which sorts of articulation are
valid. Silence is promoted particularly with regards to qualitative distinctions. It is
promoted by the philosophical stance of naturalism which Taylor has been addressing
up to this point: metaphysical reasons issuing from a mechanistic concept of the
cosmos, epistemological reasons involving foundational assumptions, and the moral
emphasis on freedom and ordinary life goods.
Charles Taylor wants to hold on to these values of freedom and affirming
ordinary life, but not in this system, and not without them being more fully
articulated. He asks the question 'Should we try to recover [qualitative distinctions]
32for moral thought, or are they best left in implicit limbo?'
As we have seen, those who embrace these values of freedom and the
affirmation of ordinary life, yet claim no need for qualitative distinctions concerning
these, live an inconsistency, and articulation helps to reveal this point. These values
themselves are constitutive goods, they are moral sources for philosophers such as
Foucault or Habermas. Inarticulacy and silence keeps this from being realised.
Furthermore, when such systems are inspired by constitutive goods in this assumed,
yet inexplicit manner, it confuses the way we engage in moral reasoning. It drives a
wedge between two related features of morality, the 'ethical' considerations of action
and those concerned with the 'good life'. The devastating consequence is that we are
then left with this narrow focus on the ethical which prevents us from asking
questions which would link the two.
Arbitrating between Goods
Finally, Taylor sees articulation of the good, particularly constitutive goods,
as a way of relieving tension between certain goods. On the one hand modern society
is committed to certain hypergoods, in particular the demands of universal and equal
respect and of modern self-determining freedom. On the other hand there is a concept
■"ibid., p.97.
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of what must be sacrificed in their name, for example the goods of appetite and
sensuality. I may want the good of sexual gratification, but deny it because of the
hypergood of God's calling me to chastity.
Taylor first makes a distinction between the conflict between any
incompatible goods, where a 'trade-off is recognised and nothing of grave
consequence occurs, and the tension between an established hypergood and the view
that sees the sacrifice of the lower 'life' good as unacceptable. In the latter case the
example of chastity and sexual gratification may not be as relevant as the example of
family commitment and religious devotion. It may be that in order to devote myself
further to prayer, I would need to sacrifice time spent with my children, and this I
would consider unacceptable.
The unacceptability of such sacrifices, Taylor argues, arises from the modern
affirmation of ordinary life. It has taken on many forms from the Romantic notion of
harmony with 'nature' to the Nietzschean attacks on morality as a self-destructive
force. The sides that have lined up against each other in modernity seem to be on the
one hand the demands for reason, disengaged freedom, equality and universality, and
on the other hand the right to fulfilment, self-expression, intimacy, and particularity.
As Taylor formulates this picture coming out of the 18th century, we have on the
former side the rationalist of the Enlightenment and on the latter side the
33
expressivists such as Herder and the Romantics.
Taylor's fundamental argument is that the mainstream theories of morality
which want to deny any legitimacy to the articulation of qualitative distinctions
cannot get clear on the issues involved in this debate, even though they are caught in
the middle of it. They cannot come to any real understanding about the conflict
between hypergoods and other 'lower' goods. The obligationists concentrate on
action and thereby cannot really conceive of the diversity of goods in a way that
would recognise hypergoods as anything more than a logical property of moral
language. The neo-Nietzscheans on the other hand deny their own hypergood by
32Ibid., p.98.
"This dichotomy that Taylor formulates at the end of Part 1 ofSources ofthe Self is outlined in various
earlier works. See most notably, Hegel, clips. 1&2.
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seeing all morality as something imposed on reality. 'The articulation of goods,
which both these popular philosophies hamper owing to their ultimately confused
meta-construals of our moral thinking, is an essential condition of seeing clearly in
this whole range of disputes.'34
Apart from these theories occluding the goods that they themselves implicitly
embrace, they also contribute to a profound myopia in the modern moral debate
about our extra-human ethics. The goods that they embrace are all anthropocentric,
grounded in human concepts of freedom, benevolence, universal rights. Another
debate which is active in our culture is whether we need to consider claims from non-
human realms. In terms of human goods we either transfer some kind of human
quality on the non-human form, something Timothy Sprigge or Peter Singer would
promote, or we look at it in the light of prudence and long-term human purchase.
We do not see the deforestation of certain areas as wrong in and of itself, we see it as
detrimental to human existence. But can there be a claim for certain environmental
goods which do not have any human ramifications or consequences? Articulation of
goods can help to clarify these questions, simply because it will reveal the human-
centred prejudice of certain goods such as freedom and benevolence which modern
theories inarticulately are inspired by:
'This is another one of those cramps which philosophies of obligatory
action, and I would also claim neo-Nietzschean theories, put in our
moral thinking ... they are blinkers which prevent us from
acknowledging the force of goods, leave us unmoved by them, or, if
we are moved, induce us to misidentify this as some non-moral
emotion. The negative focus on the good as a source of crushing guilt
or, alternatively, of a smug sense of superiority ends up making us
unwilling to admit how a constitutive good can interpellate us, move
us, empower us. All this speaks strongly in favour of the attempt to
articulate the good in some kind of philosophical prose.'36
,4Sources ofthe Self p. 102.
''See for example Timothy Sprigge's "Are there Intrinsic Values in Nature?', mApplied Philosophy:
morals and metaphysics in contemporary debate, eds. Brenda Almond and Donald Hill (London:
Routledge, 1991), and Peter Singer's Animal Liberation, 2nd ed. (London: Thorsons, 1991).
'6Sources ofthe Self, p. 103.
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Articulating these goods not only reveals what modern moral theories are
committed to and yet deny, but furthermore, placing such articulations in an
historical context can help to clarify how it came about that such goods were
eventually suppressed. This is important in two senses. First it traces concepts such
as freedom or respect back to earlier religious or metaphysical views and thus gives
us a clearer idea of what kind of transformation has occurred in the modern moral
theory. Secondly, such an exercise of back-tracking to an earlier form of the good
may help clarify the implicit character of this modern good which was openly
avowed then, but may be suppressed today. For example, Taylor thinks that the
modern hostility of the utilitarian to what he calls 'hypergoods' stems from an
affirmation of ordinary life goods. The origin of such goods is theological. It involves
a positive vision of life's activities as ordained goods granted by God. Our working
life, our family relationships, are all incidences of holiness. Modern naturalism,
however, not only refuses to accept this explanation, but it has divested itself of the
37
language surrounding this origin. But Taylor argues that some sense of this origin
still characterises the affirmation of ordinary life today, and by articulating this good
we turn to its predecessor and ask to what extent it is still relying on the
presumptions of this spiritual explanation which it allegedly reputes. As Taylor
points out, it cannot be denied that naturalism draws on a similar spiritual energy, of
which it cannot give an account, or at least not fully.
A Hunch aboutArticulacy
Taylor concludes his moral argument with a hunch, a prediction about the
outcome of articulacy, which in effect is the final argument for such articulations. He
believes that in engaging in philosophical reasoning whereby we articulate the goods
which frame our moral beliefs, we will find ourselves caught on both sides of the
,7See Jean Bethke Elshtain, 'The risks and responsibilities of affirming ordinary life', mPhilosophy in
an Age ofPluralism.
82
divide. We will embrace both the rationalist and expressivist commitments and
thereby come up against a particularly daunting inconsistency in our lives.
This assertion is well sustained in Taylor's developments of Sources of the
Selfwhich follow on from Part I. The modern self affirms the right for dignity of all
humankind, yet wants to assert his own individualism and inwardness. He puts a
great deal of credence into the affirmation of everyday life, yet also implicitly
understands certain hypergoods as sources for moral intuitions. The modern cannot
deny such moral sources, as Taylor argues, since these play an intricate role in
defining one's personal identity. We are selves partly in light of the fact that we have
defined moral horizons which are developed in narrative and in community. There is
a connection here between four main features which are intertwined in Taylor's
historical outline: our notion of the good, our understanding of the self, the kinds of
narratives we have to make sense of our lives, and conceptions of society. These
features have developed through history together and Taylor understands them
collectively as giving us a clue to the divisions of the modern self. So for example we
affirm the side of the Enlightenment rationalism in modern society by seeing its
make-up as individual persons in consent, living as free bearers of individual rights.
On the other hand we see modern society as a unified nation, 'drawn together by
similar expressive roots' which demonstrates our debt to expressivist values of self-
understanding.38
Because the modern condition is no longer admitting to any important role for
the good, it cannot understand our selves as needing to be grounded in some moral
framework. Thus it cannot come to grips with the deeply-rooted tension between
Enlightenment rationalism and Romantic expressivism, since it is 'quite unaware of
the way in which our modern sense of the self is bound up with and depends on what
one can call a "moral topography".'39
"I he political ramifications of this are forcefully expounded mMulticulturalism.
~'9Sources ofthe Self, p. 106. See also Taylor's 'Moral Topography of the Self, in Hermeneutics and
Psychological Theory, eds. Stanley Messer, Louis Sass, and Robert Woolfolk (New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press, 1988).
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Reconciliation through Articulation
Here there is a problem by Taylor's own admission. For if we in our modern
society are embracing certain moral goods which will ultimately conflict with one
another, and if these goods help to define who we are as persons, then choosing one
kind of good over another will lead to self-abnegation. We are denying something
that will ultimately prove to be self-defining.
Some have chosen to remain inarticulate about one side or the other for
reasons connected with this dilemma, but Taylor makes a bold claim and purposes
that articulating such goods will not lead to division, but to reconciliation through
greater lucidity. Reconciliation of this sort is the 'goal and fruit' of articulating.
Taylor believes that this is possible, but the ultimate requirement is that we must hold
ourselves to the goods that we cannot escape from—those that make the best sense of
the way we live our lives and explain most those things we find valuable. Here, as
before, the BA principle can function as a test for genuineness.
A good example to raise in conclusion is the conflict Taylor deals with in The
Ethics ofAuthenticity. The modern has a desire to self-fulfilment, to obtain the ideal
of 'authenticity', yet this is often seen as selfishness, and criticised by thinkers such
as Alan Bloom as harmful to modern society. Taylor, however, argues that in
articulating what is involved in the need for authenticity we can come to see that it
requires certain features which bring it into harmony with a development in
community. First, the moral development of an individual must be understood in
terms of how that individual is living with other individuals. The ideal of authenticity
incorporates some notion of society, but it also places a great deal of emphasis on
relationships. We need others in order to be fulfilled. This comes into play in
understanding the affirmation of ordinary life, where we stress fulfilment through our
friendships, and familial relationships. As Taylor argues, this is the prime locus of
our self-exploration and discovery. Secondly, we need moral horizons in order to
understand ourselves and fulfil our lives, and in building these we are bringing into
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play those around us. So by articulating what it really means to have an ideal of
authenticity, Taylor points out that it is not incompatible with other 'higher' goods
such as moral demands beyond the self, or unconditional relationships based on love.
Rather, this ideal actually requires these other goods in some form if it is to be truly
realised. Articulation both releases us from the suppressed and eschewed moral
positions that we hold, and defines more clearly in our lives the empowering goods
we seek.
For Christian ethics the ramifications of such a moral ontology which argues
for articulating implicit moral sources are great. Both practically and theoretically
Taylor's argument can be brought to bear on the shape of theology, and the pragmatic
application of theology in the world. This is discussed in Part III, primarily in the
context of examining the character of Christian ethics. Before this investigation,
however, it would help to look at Christian thinkers who have had a significant
impact on Taylor. As a Roman Catholic Taylor has found an important philosophical
sounding board in Augustine, but he has also felt a strong affinity towards two
modern Jesuit theologians, Yves Congar and Henri de Lubac, who have played an
instrumental role in shaping the structure of modern Catholic thought. Part II of this
thesis begins by comparing Taylor with Augustine, and follows with an examination
of these modern Jesuit theologians and their influence on Taylor's Christianity.
Through this the importance of Taylor as a Christian thinker will become clearer.
What will arise is an understanding of Taylor as a philosopher concerned with








Some Parallels in Theological Anthropology
This chapter will examine some of the significant theological links between
Charles Taylor and Augustine. It should be pointed out, however, that since
Augustine's philosophical theology has had a tremendous impact on the development
ofWestern thought as a whole, it may sometimes be difficult to distinguish the direct
influence he has had on Taylor. In some respects Augustine's ideas can be seen as a
watershed pervading all of Christendom with its flood of neo-Platonism. So it may be
argued that to the extent that Taylor sympathises with Plato, he aligns himself with
Augustine. Taylor, however, would be the first to point out the important
developments away from Plato that Augustine had achieved. Augustine's idea of the
will, for example is seminal in understanding the development of moral psychology
in the West and Taylor pays it great tribute in Sources of the Self. On the other hand
there are some aspects of Augustinianism which Taylor finds difficult to embrace.
Where this occurs one can see Taylor working to articulate his own alternative
theological commitments. Overall however, Augustine is an important wellspring for
Taylor both through his influence in Western thought generally and because of his
particular theological pronouncements regarding the self, the natural order, and
man's relationship to God.
Manichaeism
To understand Augustine's philosophical theology it is best to see it
developing in the context of his early religious belief and the move away from that to
orthodox Christianity. Augustine's conversion from Manichaeism was a dramatic
event in his life, and one that became a major factor in the evolution of his moral
theology. Within his pursuit of 'Wisdom' as a Manichee 'hearer' the most difficult
philosophical problem was the existence of evil in the world. Mani, taking an
ideological stance half-way between his own Persian background and the popular
Gnostic beliefs of the day, had developed a religion which saw man as a mixture of
two opposing forces. The Manichees, however, went a step beyond their Gnostic
progenitors and took on a picture of the universe as a cosmic struggle between the
forces of good and evil. As Peter Brown has remarked, 'Mani was a religious genius
... No religious system, indeed, had ever treated the visible world so drastically, and
with such literalism, as an externalisation of an inner, spiritual conflict.'1
The picture of the universe that emerged was not one to which the educated
Roman would have been accustomed. The kind of fierce struggle between good and
evil in the universe was foreign to most of the Greek philosophers that were read at
the time, since the large majority of them owed their origins to Socrates and Plato in
one form or another, and a key feature of their metaphysics was an ultimate ordered
cosmos as a holistic reality. According to them, when one rises to this cosmic order,
the struggle disappears.
The idea was more at home, however, in the Jewish tradition. One can see a
similar struggle in the history of Israel in the Old Testament whereby one was either
aligned with God or His enemy. This condition affected the people of Israel both
collectively and individually. King David's life, for example, can be described in
exactly these terms where one sees this tension existing as a result of his relationship
'Peter Brown, Augustine ofHippo: A Biography (London: Faber and Faber, 1967) p.56.
2See for example Plotinus' Enneads, trans. Stephen MacKenna, abridged ed. (London: Penguin,
1991). Plotinus was the most influential Greek philosopher coming out of the Platonic tradition for
Augustine. The ninth Tractate of the second Ennead directly addresses the issue of cosmic evil.
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with Jehovah. The Manichaeism of Augustine's early years took up this cosmic
struggle from the Jewish tradition, but espoused in their concept of Dualism was the
idea that there was a tremendously powerful force of evil in the world opposing the
force of good.
It is interesting to see this link with Judaism since in other respects
Manichaeism sought to distance itself from the theology of the Old Testament. This
was most obviously seen in the idea of the deity. According to Mani, the creator of
the Old Testament was distinct from the God of the New Testament. The former was
an evil being bent on destruction and oppression who had imprisoned spiritual beings
in this material creation on earth.3 Running through this doctrine was a strong
mind/body or spirit/material dualism whereby the former is imprisoned in the latter.
Thus there is a notion that humans are prisoners of the material world which
surrounds them as a force of evil. The Redeemer of the New Testament came to save
humankind from sin, but this sin is intricately and inextricably linked to the physical
body. As a force of good the Redeemer can lead us out of this world of
imprisonment—lead us, in effect out of us. The hope was to arrive at the elevated
state described by the Manichaean Psalmist who writes, 'the vain garment of this
flesh I put off, safe and pure; I caused the clean feet ofmy soul to trample confidently
upon it.'4 Thus it is important to note that this early theology that Augustine had been
following as a student was one where the idea of evil was something extremely (and
quite literally) tangible and rooted in reality itself.
Being as Good
Reading Plato became one of the most compelling reasons for Augustine to
convert to orthodox Christianity. This was due mainly to the Greek philosopher's
ontology. Augustine approached Plato through the philosophy of Plotinus whom he
'This idea is picked up by William Blake in an interesting way at the end of the 18th century with the
character of Elohim. See for example his colour print Elohim Creating Adam (fig. 3) or the many
versions ofGod Judging Adam, a composition dominated by God's 'flames of eternal fury' (fig. 4).
4See C. R. C. Allberry, A Manichaean Psalmbook, Part II, Manichaean Manuscripts in the Chester
Beatty Collection, vol. ii, 1938, p.97.
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3. William Blake, Elohim Creating Adam, 1795/c. 1805, Tate Gallery, London
4. William Blake, God Judging Adam, 1795, Tate Gallery, London
felt was so close to the ancient master that in him Plato seemed to live again.? His
sympathy for the Platonists was at times unequivocal, particularly in terms of moral
theory, so that in the Civitas Dei he argues that Platonism is morally superior in its
treatment of values to any other philosophy.6 Several of the key features of
Augustine's theology were formulated from the raw material offered him in this
philosophical system, but in choosing to take the route of orthodox Christianity over
Manichaeism the compelling factor which Platonism shared with the former, and
which convinced Augustine, was the very idea of being.
Plato and orthodox Christianity have in common the important principle that
being is in itself good. Whatever is there and whatever exists is fundamentally
blameless. It may be that something has deviated from its proper form and thus has
become evil, but evil is nothing more than a perversion of good, a privation of true
being. Plato understood that the things that are most real, that exist in the greatest
sense of the word, were the Forms (ideal) and these are clearly good. When we see
the nature of things we will see that these Ideas form a kind of whole, an order in
which they all fit. This order has a principle underlying it, namely the idea of the
Good (to ayaOov). This means that there is a good involved in order, but also a good
involved in the ontology of this order. Those objects in the flux that imitate Forms
are less than real, but to that extent they are also less than good. So being is in direct
ratio to goodness for Plato.7
This same basic idea is central to the kind of mainstream Christianity
o
emerging from Judaism. From the beginning in Genesis there is a picture of God
creating the universe—light, water, vegetation, creatures—and seeing them as good.
There is a rich celebration of being in this creation, of seeing ontology as a gift from
God.9 Here Plato and mainline Christianity unite. Contrasted to this is the Gnostic
^Contra Academicos, in The Works ofSt. Augustine, trans, and ed. M. Dods, 15 vols. (Edinburgh,
1871-1876) III, xviii, 41.
6Civitas Dei, in The Works ofSt. Augustine, trans, and ed. M. Dods, 15 vols. (Edinburgh, 1871-1876)
VIII. viii-x.
7See Republic Bk.VII.
sThat the orthodox tradition was established contrary to and against the Gnostic ideology reveals the
truth of this point.
This undergirds Taylor's idea of agape as 'seeing good' in an extremely important way. See
Chapter 8.
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attitude to the Hebrew Bible whereby the creator was seen as an evil deity and the
key for Gnostic Christianity was to break out of this Hebrew tradition.
One of the significant differences between these two stances was the attitude
to evil in the world. In the Manichaean tradition there was a simple solution to the
problem of evil. Because of their doctrine of the duality of God, they could off-load
the responsibility of evil from the good god (as well as the human agent) onto this
evil force in the nature of the universe. The orthodox stance, on the other hand,
generated the problem of theodicy which Boethius has articulated: Si Deus justus—
unde malum? If God is good and all powerful, then why is there suffering and evil in
the world?10 This is taken off the agenda by the line of thinking Mani had adopted
from the Gnostics. The cause of evil for Manichees was simply found in the nature of
things.
Orthodox Christianity developing out of Judaism had completely different
variables to work with. Instead of a limited God, they had an omnipotent creator who
was benevolent. But if a good God who is all powerful exists, and things are still
going wrong then one of the important reasons for them going wrong has to do with
human agency. We are in some way at odds with, estranged from God, and this has
an important responsibility for evil in the world according to the orthodox tradition.
So where the move to Gnosticism or Manichaeism relieves this tension, the mainline
Christian view that Augustine eventually embraced had this central dilemma of evil
in the world and the responsibility ofman for this evil."
Augustine saw the possibility of synthesising Platonic thought and
Christianity along the axis of what the two had in common—being as something
intrinsically good. At the same time, however, this brought up the problem of evil. As
a result of rejecting Manichaeism, Augustine becomes one of the most important
l0See Boethius, Consolations ofPhilosophy, trans. V. E. Watts (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969)
Bk.IV. This is still one of the crucial questions in the Philosophy of Religion today. See for example
the volume The Problem ofEvil, eds. Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1990).
"it is interesting to note that the philosopher and economist Eric Voegelin has reintroduced the term
'Gnostic' for a whole variety of modern thinkers who are off-loading the responsibilities and
consequences of human action onto historical forces. See particularly W\sScience, Politics and
Gnosticism (Chicago: Regnery, 1968) and Order and History Volume Two: The World ofthe Polis
(Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1957).
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articulators of the view that what is of ultimate importance is not simply the
continuing cosmic order, but the issue of how one stands to this order. The way he
does this is in a theory of the will.
The Will and Desire
No strong concept of the will exists in Greek moral philosophy, though it
does begin to develop in the Stoics, as can be seen in Epictetus' use of the term
12 • •
npocapecng in the Discourses. For Augustine, however, it becomes of central
importance to understanding moral action and intent. The question could be asked
why we need a further concept of will, beyond our understanding of simple desires.
One reason is because in one sense what we 'desire' to do, is not always what we
want to do. For example, I want to drink a glass of wine in the afternoon, but this will
make me drowsy and keep me from concentrating on my work, and so I abstain. In
one sense I 'desire' that glass of wine, but in another sense I weigh up the
consequences and my obligations, and come to a decision not to drink the wine. So in
this respect one can talk about deciding between desires. The desire to have a glass of
wine is in some way negated by the intention linked to the other desire to concentrate
and get my work done.
Approaching this from another angle the word 'will' becomes a useful
concept. Instead of us thinking in terms of desires and reflections of what is good
(Aristotle's use of the word npoaipeaig) one can speak of an 'all things considered'
desire. This is in a sense what I am doing when I resist the glass of wine. I am
looking at everything together, thinking about the effects of the wine, my
responsibility, the good of working and finishing a project, of fulfilling my potential
in this way, and so I resist the temptation.
l2See Epictetus, Discourses andManual: together with fragments ofhis writing, 2 vols., trans. P. E.
Matheson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1916) 1:17.23; 111:3.14, 7.5,18.1. For a helpful discussion of the
'will' in the history of moral psychology see Charles Kahn, 'Discovery of the Will: From Aristotle to
Augustine', in The Question ofEclecticism, ed. J. M. Dillon and A. A. Long (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1988).
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This kind of desire, unlike the desire of the first sense, is extracted from the
whole process and can be called 'will'. This is the concept developed by the Stoics.
Their sole concern was the condition of this element, whether it was correct, good
and void of passion. Taking a radically extreme view of self-determination, they
argued that this was all that could be considered to be under the subject's control.13
For they believed that once a decision has been made to do something good, whether
or not you can then go on to the next stage and produce this action is something that
does not depend on you, and therefore does not matter. What is important is the
notion of ultimate intention, moving from initial desire to will, as Epictetus
indictates in this famous passage from the Discourses:
'I must die. But must I die groaning? I must be imprisoned. But must I
whine as well? I must suffer exile. Can any one then hinder me from
going with a smile, and a good courage, and at peace? "Tell the
secret." I refuse to tell, for this is in my power. "But I will chain you."
What say you, fellow? Chain me? My leg you will chain—yes, but my
will (proairesis)—no, not even Zeus can conquer that. ... These are
the thoughts that those who pursue philosophy should ponder, these
are the lessons they should write down day by day, in these they
should exercise themselves.'14
This is one reason to introduce the concept of will, one which did not really
exist with Plato and Aristotle. In contrast to the Stoics, the Greeks focused primarily
on good action. Of course, from time to time good action would be frustrated and
good intention was important. Likewise a good person is one who does good action
out of good intentions, willingly not fighting against himself. Yet the whole focus of
this process was on eupraxia. Thus there is no important role for the concept we
would be tempted to translate as 'will'. Aristotle, however, does use a term which is
often translated this way, but it refers to something earlier in the process of
deliberation. This is /3ovAr/cng. BovXr/atg is the desire that one has which is
informed by some sense of the good. If on one level I have a desire for the glass of
wine (emdvpia) I have on another level an Aristotelian PovAtjcrtg to do whatever is
best to keep my mind focused on my work, since this is the good. I would then go
L'See W. J. Oates, The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers, quoted in Bertrand Russell, History of
Western Philosophy, 2nd ed. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1961) p. 270.
l4Ibid„ p. 270.
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through a process that tells me that drinking the wine would cloud my judgement,
and make it impossible to carry out this fSovXijcnq. So there exist two initial desires,
one of which cancels out the other. At the end of the process it is my 'all things
considered' will which wins out. The English translation of this today is often 'wish',
which itself is misguiding since it carries with it the connotation of impotence. If I
say 'I wish she would tell me what was wrong,' it seems I am in no position to affect
the outcome, but simply have this great desire that it would happen. The wish in this
sense is sealed off from the action, but this is exactly not what f3ovXriaig is. It is
directly informed by the good and directly relevant to deliberation and action. It
would not be povXtjcng if it did not have this capacity to influence the chain of
events. The translation of 'will' in this sense would also be a mistake. When a ruler
says 'my will is that ... ' he does not mean 'I have a sudden desire for this', but
rather, 'All things considered, this is what I want to happen.'
Strong and Weak Wills
One development arising from this is the notion of the will as strong or weak,
a distinction which Aristotle does not make. What has come to play an important role
in certain moral psychologies is the idea that there are individuals with strong wills,
and individuals with weak wills, and there is a crucial difference between the two
kinds of people. In the former case the 'all things considered' will is very finely
developed and actually has an effect on the way the person acts. In the latter case,
weak-willed people go through the process of determining what the 'all things
considered' desire would be, and decide that that would be the best thing to do, but
they just cannot stop themselves from drinking the wine. They know it is the wrong
thing to do, but they do not have the 'will power' to resist. Despite having understood
what is the best thing to do, this weakness of will nevertheless ends up short-
circuiting the whole process. Aristotle discusses this in Book VII of Nicomachean
Ethics as an absence of force, a/cpacria. He has a great deal of difficulty coming to
terms with this weakness of the human agent, since he is fundamentally under the
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influence of the powerful set of framework concepts that Socrates has laid down
where once someone sees that something is the right thing to do, normally he ought
to be motivated to do it. Seeing the good ought to be sufficient to motivate one to do
the good. People who do not do good are people who really do not see these things as
good. Aristotle, in order to fit this with the obvious inconsistencies in human nature,
describes a picture of someone who sees the good, yet his vision is then eclipsed at a
certain point and he fails to carry out this good—he reaches out and grabs the glass of
wine. Akrasia for Aristotle is a kind of temporary insanity or temporary eclipse of
one's rational grasp of the situation.
There is a very different reading of the situation in Paul's Epistle to the
Romans. 'We know that the law is spiritual, but I am unspiritual, sold as a slave to
sin. I do not understand what I do. For what I want (GeAco) to do 1 do not do, but what
I hate I do' (Romans 7.14-16).1=1 C. H. Dodd describes Paul's situation as an 'intense
experience of divided personality':
'So complete is the separation between the will to do and the deed,
that the man feels that some alien power in him is actually performing
his actions. Paul is not meaning to shuffle out of responsibility for his
actions by ascribing them to the alien power. What he wishes to show
is how completely he is under the thraldom of sin—so completely that
he sins against his wish.'16
This is the idea of the will taken up by Augustine: it is quite possible for
• 17.
humans to see clearly what the good is to be done and yet not do it. It is also an
important reason for talking of a 'will' in a moral context which does not exist in
Plato and Aristotle, but which has become an essential part of our modern moral
psychology. We believe that it is important to have 'will power' to carry something
out, to be able to 'steel your will' against opposition, etc.
'"All Biblical citations in this thesis are taken from the New International Version.
K'C. H. Dodd, The Epistle ofPaul to the Romans (London: Fontana, 1959) p.131.
l7This comes out quite clearly in Augustine's early arguments inDe libero arbitrio, in The Works of
St. Augustine, trans, and ed. M. Dods, 15 vols. (Edinburgh, 1871-1876). For the significance of this
Pauline text to Augustine as he was addressing the objections of the Manichees and later Pelagius see
Peter Brown, Augustine, pp. 148-157.
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The Will and Direction
Another dimension of talking about the will that is particularly important for
Augustine has to do with the way one turns either towards God or away from Him.
Here the will is placed in the context of the human's relationship to the God of the
cosmic order. As indicated earlier, the orthodox Christian view in counter-distinction
to the Gnostic, did not see evil as part of the natural order of things, but saw it as a
result of man's relationship to this natural order of things. So the Jewish tradition,
and the orthodox Christianity which arose out of that tradition stands in direct
conflict with the Greek idea of cosmos.
Cosmos has semantically built into it the notion of order. For Plato and
Socrates the order of the universe had an important normative role in cosmology. The
ultimate reference point in Jewish tradition, however, is not order but Jehovah's
action. He is a God who establishes a covenant with his people. He calls them out of
Egypt, and raises up leaders such as Joshua and David. In these actions He is
establishing a relationship with the Israelite nation. Thus how the Jewish people
stood in relation to God, whether they were turned towards Him or away from Him,
was paramount.18
It follows from this that in the Judeo-Christian tradition the ultimate
understanding of the human is through history—that relationship between God and
man whereby God is acting in the world. While the cosmos is ever present, God's
action in history is the normative framework which is continuously changing.19 Thus
the Jews had the notion of a Messiah before the turn of the millennium as Christians
lsIn addition to the history of the Israelites, the metaphors of creation in the Old Testament re-
emphasise the dependency ofman as creature on Jehovah the creator. This dependency establishes all
the more clearly the normative stance of this relational experience. See for example, Ronald Simkins,
Creator and Creation: Nature in the Worldview ofAncient Israel (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994)
esp. chps.3&4.
' 'Nowhere is this more evident than in the Old Testament where the true character of Jehovah is
unveiled not primarily through monological discourses, but through thehistory of His chosen people.
Neither is this simply a contingent truth, for God has meaning in our lives as He is understood in the
historical, narrative framework of our existence. So this history between usmust be the locus for our
understanding.
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have a concept of Christ as the Messiah who will come again. We are orientated in
history, set up against a telos and underlying this is the sovereignty of God.20
This explains why the idea of conversion was so important to Augustine. The
will for him was not simply strong or weak, but good or evil. The fundamental
difference is the direction that it is turning. While this is analogous to the way Plato
talks about the eye of the soul (turning towards the light or away from the light),
introducing the concept of the will completely alters Plato's understanding of what it
means to be drawn to the good. The twist Augustine gives to this turning is that one's
direction—towards God or away from Him—is a question of the will. Built into his
framework is the idea that a perversion of the will could take place which would
resist the insight to turn towards the Good. In the case of being restored, the person,
even before he truly sees God's greatness, has a desire to turn towards Him. For
Plato, people either see the good and want to turn to it or they fail to see it and do not
turn. With Augustine, however, there is something independent of the level of insight
which is directing the will one way or another.
One need only think of the figure of Lucifer in Milton's poem Paradise Lost
in order to see a perfect example of the Augustinian will. Lucifer as the highest of the
angels was the closest to God. Nevertheless, he turned against Him and was cast out
of heaven to work against God forever. The moral psychology implicit here indicates
that Lucifer exercises something like this kind of Augustinian will. He was
completely aware of the greatness of God, and by definition was not someone whose
weak will was dragging him into situations against an 'all things considered' will.
Nevertheless this angel, with total knowledge of God's glory, was able to turn against
Him. In this decision there was something more at work than simply whether he
could see the good clearly or not. If Lucifer were a Platonic figure he would have to
be in some way blinded. Yet there is something about Milton's Lucifer which
involuntarily commands our respect—he is a noble figure. This greatness is not
because Milton was siding with evil in his poem, but implicit in the whole picture of
2"lt is of interest to note that the most powerful objection to Aquinas by William ofOckham and the
Nominalists was that he was abandoning the sovereignty of God as a defining characteristic and
buying into the Aristotelian idea of ultimacy of nature. See Gordon Leff,Heresy in the Later Middle
Ages, 2 vols. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1967) and more specifically his William of
Ockham (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975).
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this rebellion is Lucifer as a figure completely in control of the situation (Baudelaire
describes Milton's character as 'que le plus parfait type de Beaute virile').21 It is not a
rebellion mitigated by the circumstances, but one taken up by an extremely powerful
will.22
This brings up another important dimension to moral psychology which
Augustine had developed, and that is the unhealthiness of souls as a consequence of
Original Sin. The spiritual healthiness of a person, again, depended upon his or her
relationship to God. If people had remained in their originally created condition, they
would have healthy souls. Because of the Fall, however, this crucial link with God is
broken. Our wills are now unhealthy and only through God's intervention, through
His grace, can we be turned again and healed.
This, of course, became a major issue in the western legacy from Augustine.
Augustine had set the agenda for the Reformation whereby one's stand on this
question to a certain extent defined one as a Reformer or Catholic. Furthermore, in
the Enlightenment this doctrine was systematically negated. The very idea of original
sin, that there was something fundamentally wrong or distorted about human beings
and their desires, was vehemently challenged.
Augustine's theory of the will can be seen as part of his emphasis on
inwardness, that quality of the self which Taylor discusses in Chapter 7 of Sources of
the Selfwhich devoted to the Church Father. This inwardness is not, however, that
characteristic of the modern culture which philosophers such as Alan Bloom have
criticised so heavily as leading to a selfish and self-destructing individualism.23
Augustine's inwardness leads eventually upwards to God, and this is an important
feature which Taylor himself attempts to keep hold of in his modern moral theory.
Because the importance for Augustine is not ultimately the order of nature, but the
sovereignty of God and mankind's relationship to God, the focus of inward reflection
will finally reflect this higher relationship.
2lQuoted from Pascal Pia, Baudelaire (Paris: Sevil, 1952) p.88.
221 owe this example to Charles Taylor.
"'See Alan Bloom, The Closing ofthe American Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987) p.61.
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God and the Natural Order
Augustine did, however, believe in a natural order of things, but one that was
ultimately controlled by God. To have a vision of this order amounts to a vision of
reason, and the good for humans is to see and love this order which reveals God
through His thoughts.24 One can see here the marked parallels between Augustine's
metaphysics and Plato's Theory of the Forms. In addition, one can also see the
tremendous influence Augustine's theory of the will as linked to a rational order has
had on thinkers such as Rousseau, Kant and Baudelaire.2"
Taylor is reluctant to follow Augustine in believing in an absolute order for
several reasons. For one thing the limits of human understanding preclude the
possibility that we could, given enough wisdom, come to see this order fully. While
recognising that history has developed important frameworks of order and what the
ordered life should be, he contends that the ultimate vocation of human beings is
beyond all of these.26 The idea of putting a formula to our absolute purpose in life
seems misplaced since ' ... our best constructed analysis always has this principle of
• ... 27disturbance and therefore there is an act of faith involved.'
Here Taylor is not as far from Augustine as it might at first appear. He sees
certain indications of order, e.g., intuitions of what it is like to be a good human
being, and as such these are impressions similar to the kind that were important for
Augustine in arguing for the existence of God. The danger Taylor sees, however, is
setting these up as self-sufficient. He wants to allow for the fact that there may be
demands upon one as a human agent beyond what she or he intuitively sees as good,
as fulfilling. These demands may even cancel out other goods, may lead to the
renunciation of fulfilment. There is the possibility of ' ... bringing myself and my
humanity closer to God in the very act of failure, or suffering—something very
important might be happening, which just gets beyond your horizon if you think that
'See Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy ofSaint Augustine (London: Gollancz, 1961).





that's all there is to say in your conception of the human life.' Shutting out these
possibilities for Taylor is not only wrong, but can be terribly destructive.
The belief in some comprehensive order which answers all our questions
entails an extremely cramped view of God's character. While wanting to say that
there is an important place for the doctrine of creation whereby a loving God has
made this world as a gift to us and set it up in such a way that is for our good, Taylor
nevertheless feels that breaking the bounds of these earlier notions of cosmos was a
very positive move in the Enlightenment. This is primarily due to the problems that
existed in the propositions of providence of the Leibnizian kind whereby one
understands the cosmos as something designed ultimately for the human good:
'We can't understand in just human terms the kinds of things we
grapple at as human beings. In these terms providence can't be
understood, and will always subvert if you think that it's there to
produce a harmonious happy world in that sense; and we are
struggling very much to understand that providence, and the condition
to understanding it is such a transition from being absolutely
anthropocentric to being 'theocentric', to use this expression. We have
• on
trouble until this is totally achieved.'
This is one of the ways that Taylor can approach the problem of evil. To see
the incongruity between a loving creator and evil in the world is in some sense
looking from a jaundiced view. What we need to ask is 'Are the goods of God first
and foremost necessarily the goods of mankind?' An alternative is to see the
relationship between God and man as analogous to a feudal order. The nobleman
does not exist to benefit the peasants, but he does so from time to time. We have
become used to thinking of higher goods as being in the end better for human beings
than even what human beings themselves understand as good. But what if the
situation were closer to the polytheism of the Greeks than we would want to
imagine? It could be that like the gods ofOlympus, certain purposes ofGod are good,
but do not even purport to be good for humans.
The Greek poet Euripides explored this dilemma in the tragedy Hippolytus.




chooses the latter, becoming fanatically chaste, and enraging the Goddess of Love.
One of the points of Euripides' play is that the gods were following a different moral
order, and that in such an order imbalances of the kind Hippolytus was guilty of were
permissible and good. Thus a goddess like Artemis could be completely devoted to
chastity, but a human was meant for an entirely different realm, and was considered
to be transgressing his moral framework in such a whole-hearted devotion as
Hippolytus was displaying.
In the Judeo-Christian tradition a similar idea has been best articulated by the
prophet Isaiah. 'For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my
ways, declares the Lord. As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways
higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts' (Isaiah 55.8-9). In this
sense divine and human good cannot fit together without an alteration in human
goods. In the beginning of their relationship God's favouring Israel is expressed in
terms of human goods—the fruitfulness of Abraham, the promised land of the exiled
people flowing with milk and honey, etc. But in the story of Job an entirely different
set of questions about what the human good entails comes into play, and what is
developed is the notion of a self-transcendence to a higher good.
Taylor sees that the acts of God can be interpreted as either single and
coherent, or multiple and disparate. If one thinks that they incorporate the human
good, then he will think of them as coherent. Once one has established that the goods
of God are to conform to human goods, however, there is an inconsistency in the
world. This Taylor sees as one of the biggest reasons why people in the modern
world cannot believe in God. Everything in our modern experience from quantum
physics to the Holocaust has demolished the notion that a good creator has
established a providence which is ultimately concerned with human good. The option
taken in modern history has been to drop God from the equation. For exactly ' ... to
the extent that people are still hanging onto those older views, to that extent there is a
tremendous inclination to unbelief, to despair, to turning off the whole thing, which
• • TO
is one of the very powerful engines of unbelief.'
30Ibid.
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Grace and Human Limits
Another way of approaching this for Taylor is from the standpoint of
limitations. On the one hand there is a high degree of confidence in our powers of
human creation since the 18th century. The limits of what had to be taken as the
natural order of things have been pushed aside since the Enlightenment and the
predominance of science. Taylor sees problems with this in so much as it negates the
Christian sense of limit, and fails to include the possibility of goods beyond our
control.'1 On the other hand he notes with caution that ' ... to the extent that the
sense of limit was founded just on a lack of imagination, conservative structures and
so on, getting rid of that is something very important.'
Freeing ourselves from these limits in another sense for Taylor can also
include freeing ourselves from human limitations. It is a criticism he finds in
33
Dostoyevsky which he discusses at the end of Sources of the Self. The limitations
here are those of the modern demands of universal beneficence. He asks the question
'What is the motor which allows you to go on and on putting demands on yourself to
help others?' The answer usually is a sense of human dignity, but there are severe
limitations to the reliability of this ideal:
'The vision of Dostoyevsky ... is what you need in order to carry
through on this [set of modern moral demands] is an acute sense of
human beings as objects of love, objects of God's love that you can
participate in. That empowers you in a way that the ordinary human
secular sources cannot, because at a certain point ... the sense of your
own dignity has certain limits ... and how far it can carry you. A sense
of general human dignity is an extremely dangerous double edged
thing, because you've also got to take into account why people never
live up to that. So if you're moved by the sense of human beings
having a wonderfully great potential, faced with actual human
material we keep dealing with—that has over and over again flipped
over into a sense of anger and contempt for these actual human beings
''See Appendix C.
32Ibid.
"See Sources of the Self, pp.516ff.
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... that is part of what motivates us to take over and get it done,
control it, treat these people like human raw material.'34
What is needed to break out of these bounds is a vision of others which
transcends secular beneficence. When Maria Theresa was asked 'How can you
manage to deal with these kinds of people lying in the gutter?', she replied, 'They are
the image of God.' Taylor admits that is a banal answer, but the difference is that she
really felt it, and what it is to feel that is something that takes us beyond the
boundaries of the normal motivations of secular beneficence. So in this way there is a
need to break the limitations not of the idea of providence, but of the antithesis to
this: the notion of secularism that arose out of this providential order.j:i
This can be seen in some respects as a doctrine of Grace. For Augustine we
need the strength of God through his grace to enable us to do good. For Taylor we
need these strong moral sources to empower us to ideals such as beneficence,
otherwise we are doomed by our own failings, and are simply running on fumes. The
idea of the tainted will developed by Augustine also comes into play. Taylor
recognises that by ourselves we are in an extremely vulnerable position if we attempt
to be motivated merely on the naturalist ideologies of human dignity. Grace in this
way is a gift from God, but not one which is external to ourselves, it is intricately
involved in our identity as moral agents. In so far as grace entails God giving himself
to men so that they can know him and love him, we can understand Taylor's need for
something beyond the bounds of secular, 'thin' virtue descriptions as a need for
something like the grace of God.
The Radically Reflexive Stance
Following on from this Taylor can recognise an affinity to Augustine in as
much as Augustine felt that it was impossible to see God directly. We must catch
reflections of Him through the sensual world which point to His Ideas. Taylor is less
,4See Appendix D.
°The transition from Providence to Deism and beyond is discussed by Taylor in Part III ofSources of
the Self.
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of a 'Raving Platonist' on this point, but it nevertheless comes across in his
reluctance to set up any order as definitive or final. The realm ofNature, however, is
less important for Augustine than the realm of the self. Nature does not provide us
with direct access to God except in cases of theophany such as Saul's vision on the
road to Damascus. Far more than Taylor, Augustine down-plays the role of the senses
and the sensual world in seeking after God. This is contrasted with the obvious
sympathy that Taylor has with the Romantics who embraced Nature as an important
path to reality.36 Augustine's claim is that although we apprehend things through our
bodily senses, we make judgements on them within ourselves. 'For we have another
sense, far more important than any bodily sense, the sense of the inner man, by which
we apprehend what is just and what is unjust, the just by means of the 'idea' which is
• T 7
presented to the intellect, the unjust by the absence of it.' So for Augustine then, the
principle way to God is not through creation, but 'in' our own selves.
Essentially, Augustine's turn inwards here depends entirely upon God's
relationship to man. Augustine was primarily concerned with his own destiny and
this was the impetus behind his theology. Striving for self-knowledge was of utmost
importance for him. For by seeking the truth within ourselves we find our true self,
and it is only in finding our true self that we can find God. Finding our true self
means finding our moral purpose, and finding our moral purpose means finding, as
Taylor would call it, our 'constitutive good', i.e., God. 'It is in the mind that we
discover God as the source of truth which he teaches us there, and which we
contemplate there.' God in this respect is our 'inner master' and the source of our
true being. Unlike the Manichaean view Augustine sees this being as good, and the
author and creator of this being is a supremely benevolent God. Our relationship to
Him through our will and by His grace is one that we find within ourselves.
Augustine gets to this point by arguing from the existence of the self to the
existence of some higher truth above and beyond himself. In doing so he establishes
the proto-cogito arguments that later became so important to Descartes' method of
'6See Sources ofthe Self Part IV.
'7Civitas Dei, XI, xxvii.
"'De Trinitate, in The Works ofSt. Augustine, trans, and ed. M. Dods, 15 vols. (Edinburgh, 1871-
1876) IX, iii,3.
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doubt, and indeed to the whole development of modern epistemology. Because it was
clear to Augustine that something as ever-changing and finite as the human mind
could not have created eternal, unchanging truths on its own, it seemed quite rational
to posit an unchanging, eternal being as the origin of these truths. Taylor puts the
Augustinian demarche in this way: 'I can only understand myself in the light of a
perfection that goes far beyond my powers. How is it that this light is cast upon my
OQ
thought? It is beyond my powers to have produced it myself.'
Through our minds we have conceptions of these truths through the
intimations of the Ideas of God which are God, the master within us. Not only is He
responsible as the source of eternal truth which our soul ascertains through the mind,
but He is also the empowering source of illumination whereby our minds are capable
of seeing these truths. 'There is one light which we perceive through the eye, another
by which the eye itself is enabled to perceive.'40
The act of turning inward in such a way that we perceive a truth beyond
ourselves, and thereby understand our true self involves what Taylor calls a 'radical
reflexive stance'.41 This is distinct from the self-consciousness of merely thinking
about our own well being or a preoccupation with 'me'. It is radical in that the first-
person standpoint is unavoidable. When Augustine speaks of knowing himself, his
experiences are inseparable from him being the agent of those experiences. A radical
reflexive stance has as a main issue 'what it is like to be me'. There can in no
circumstances be a disengaging from the intimacy of our own self to a 'view from
nowhere.' Something like Heidegger's Lichtung is being invoked. In arguing that this
is the kind of stance Augustine was taking, Taylor says that 'the inner light is the one
which shines in our presence to ourselves; it is the one inseparable from our being
creatures with a first-person standpoint.'42
,9See Sources ofthe Self p. 141.
"'Quoted from Etienne Gilson, Saint Augustine, p.65.
4'See Sources of the Self pp. 13Of.
42Ibid„ p. 131.
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Proving God's Existence through Biography
There are two important features of this inwardness that appeal to Taylor.
First the idea of Augustine's 'interiore homine' promotes a way of proving God's
existence which is largely dependent upon the experiences of the human agent.
Secondly, there are certain epistemological assumptions that Augustine's methods
entail which Taylor finds very convincing.
Taylor sees the Confessions as an extremely meaningful way of talking about
God. What is compelling is that Augustine's theology is one where he understands
his relationship with God through time. There is a diachronic sense in the
Confessions of trusting the ameliorating circumstances of his experiences. How this
plays out in relation to God in Augustine's life is that he understands where he has
come from, and what he has become as getting a firmer grip on reality. In one sense
his conversion is what Taylor would call 'an error-reducing move'43
Augustine does not deconstruct his belief in Christianity in the way a modern
rationalist would. He does not seek to find undeniable clues which in turn he can
argue are trust-worthy, and which can then be isolated as a defence for the truth claim
of believing in a god. This exercise would defeat the purpose of a biography since
essential for this kind of foundationalist argument is that it be taken out of time and
isolated as an instance. What attracts Taylor is that for Augustine the lived
experience, with all its background assumptions, is itself testimony to the truth of
where he has come to, and how he stands in relation to reality. Taylor's comment on
the Confessions is that the story 'has built into it the understanding that these
transitions were ... "error-reducing" transitions.'44
This kind of 'proof for God's existence is a valuable one for Taylor, but
more as a testimonial than an irrefutable syllogism. In this sense it is not meant to
answer the same questions. The value of such an articulation as Augustine's is
analogous, for example, to the stories the accomplished doctor shares with the novice
intern. The proof of one's experience on the road to God could be valuable for others
4jSee particularly, 'Explanation and Practical Reason'.
44See Appendix A.
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who are searching their way along, moving in the same direction. These experiences
would have the ring of a kind of lived truth which was not meant to take the sceptic
from a standing start and convince him, but was meant to benefit and encourage the
ones further away from the goal of the truth. One of the most straightforward
applications of this in the community of the Church would be a discipling
relationship where the lessons and valued insights are located in the shared
experiences of a moral dialogue.
A Shared Epistemology
Secondly, what is important to understand are the epistemological
commitments of this kind of belief. In an attempt to 'overcome' epistemology as it
has been laid out since Descartes, Taylor develops a view of knowledge whereby one
knows reality by being in direct contact with it. He calls this a 'contact' theory (c-
theory) of knowledge over and against what he calls a 'representational' theory (r-
theory) of knowledge.4'^ An r-theory of knowledge claims that a description of what
the subject is aware of can be given without any commitment concerning the object
that is known. In other words I should be able to stand back from a belief such as 'I
see an elephant in front of me' and describe what I am believing without actually
committing myself to the experienced-based belief. For a c-theory, this condition
does not hold. Because c-theories construe knowledge in terms of contact with
reality, the experience itself is authenticating. R-theories require some kind of neutral
criteria gained apart from such immediacy and mistrust such self-authentication.
What this means is that we define our epistemic condition not in terms of
contact/noncontact with reality, but as our having representations bearing on reality.
This requires a stance of disengagement.
4'A summary idea of his argument can be found in Taylor, 'Overcoming Epistemology', \Mfter
Philosophy, eds., Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman, and Thomas McCarthy (Boston: MIT Press, 1987),
reprinted in Taylor's Philosophical Arguments. Taylor does not use the specific terms 'Contact theory'
and 'Representational theory' in this essay. He has utilised them, however, in teaching. For a fuller
explanation of the two theories see Appendix H.
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The most famous proponent of this is Descartes. In his method of doubt he
deconstructs the assumptions of his reality down to the point of its (alleged)
foundations. He disinvests himself of all that he considers external to the world of the
inner self. Arising out of this is the modern belief in foundational epistemology
whereby one goes through a rigorous discipline of checking all the credentials of
one's truth claims.46
Taylor vehemently challenges the legitimacy of this method. In understanding
how we know ourselves and the world, we must recognise that we cannot bring
ourselves to a punctual moment and reflect outside of our experiences on whether
certain things are true or not. Taylor allows for such reflection in certain instances,
but always within a broader framework of space-time continuum, a background of
assumed knowledge. He argues that when I say, for example, 'here is an elephant in
front of me,' the point of information that I am grasping has the shape that it does
only within the context ofmy whole surroundings. This setting is in turn inseparable
from my lived experience which includes how I got where 1 am and how I am
positioning myself within this context. Against this background the elephant can
stand out as such. This is Kant's point which Hegel picked up on: things show up as
objects, only against the background of a coherent relatedness among other
'representations'.47
The contact view focuses on the foreground-background nature of experience.
Some things in our experiences are objects of attention, others are not. Using Michael
Polanyi's terms, there are some things that are 'focal' such as seeing an elephant,
40
others are 'subsidiary'. The explicitly known thing can be treated like a definite
piece of information, and as such can usually be captured in a representation, e.g., in
a linguistic formulation such as a sentence—'I see an elephant'. The tacit information
does not phenomenologically have this form. If need be, however, we can redirect
our attention and draw out of this tacit understanding further definite pieces of
information, but these neither define nor exhaust this background. For example, I
46This is discussed in more depth in Chapter 2 as it is related to moral reasoning.
,7See Immanuel Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, A1 11, A112.
48See Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a post-critical philosophy (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1962) and The Tacit Dimension (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967).
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could step back from the situation where I am looking at an elephant and reflect that I
am in the Kruger National Park, and I got there by a safari jeep, and have been there
for about two days. I could go even further and consider that I am a human being, that
I am on holiday, on the Planet Earth during the year 1996. I am, in Polanyi's term,
'dwelling' in all of these experiences and 'attend from' them to the elephant. This
does not, however, tell me everything that I am understanding of my experience at
the time.49
One of the biggest differences between a contact theory and a representational
or Cartesian theory of knowledge is that for the former the significance of things is
often primary, what Heidegger calls ursprunglich or primordial. What is meant by
significance here is first, the place elements of our field of awareness have in a
broader whole that they help to define, such as the significance of an elephant which
tells me I am on the plains of Africa and not working at my desk. Secondly, it has
significance for our purposes or well/ill-being. It is significant that this elephant is
harmful to me if he becomes angry and charges.
For an r-theorist these significances are to be understood as inferred from a
more primitive or fundamental point of knowledge, i.e., from some 'inner' idea. The
more 'direct' data are always going to be neutral in these cases. If it looks as though
experience is primordially significant, this is because we are distorted in our
reasoning, and we are failing to break things down to their foundational clues. For the
contact construal, however, the supposed breakdown of significant objects into a
smaller, more basic neutral index is itself an illusion.
One important facet of Taylor's contact theory is a first-person awareness
whereby part of the background understanding is that this is an awareness of my
world. It is what Heidegger refers to as the 'Jemeinigkeif of experience. Inherent to
the sense of where I am, and how I got here, and how I am placed in a situation is the
idea that these experiences are mine. This in effect is Augustine's radically reflexive
''Wittgenstein's examples in On Certainty, eds. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (London:
Harper and Row, 1969), make this same point. In leaning on the understanding that my surroundings
are stable I am assuming some kind of background consistency. For example, I take it for granted that
the world did not begin at my birth, or five minutes ago, etc. At one level this idea is nonsense, but at
another level my background understanding implicitly counted this as incompatible with my
experience. This background understanding is inexhaustible—the world did not start five minutes ago,
but neither did it start five minutes and thirty seconds ago,ad infinitum.
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stance.50 The person at the centre is me, the agent. Here is where we can see the
common ground between Taylor and Augustine in terms of knowing God and
knowing ourselves. For both thinkers the significance of God in our lives is primary
in that He helps to define the broader picture of our surroundings, and plays a vital
role in determining our purposes as moral agents.
There is a parallel here in the role faith has in the Christian life. Because of
the epistemological predicament that Taylor recognises in a contact theory, one can
never assume absolute certainty about any particular position. Alasdair Maclntyre,
holding a similar view, remarks that 'we are never in a position to claim that now we
possess the truth or now we are fully rational. The most that we can claim is that this
is the best account which anyone has been able to give so far, and that our beliefs
about what the marks of "a best account so far" are will themselves change in what
are at present unpredictable ways.'51 Given this situation there is a strong role for
52faith to play; however, it is a faith that is essentially 'unconsummated'.
From Self to God
The Inward path of Augustine leads him to God, and to the idea of God as
transcendent but also as immanent. The notion is one of understanding God through
understanding oneself and one's placement in contact with reality. So Augustine has
a contact theory of his relation to the self, and a contact theory of his relation to God.
This plays an absolutely crucial role in the justification of everything else. Everything
else is mediated.
This becomes clearer if one remembers that Augustine was first convinced of
God's existence not by taking his experiences down to a bedrock of neutral formulae,
but by how he understood himself in relation to the reality of perfection. This reality
is not only transcendent, but is in direct, unmediated contact with his own self. His
MISee Sources of the Self p. 137.
"Alasdair Maclntyre, 'Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of Science',
p.455.
'
See Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge.
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argument surrounding this is an inference to the best explanation of things. We
would not be able to exist in this whole dimension where the issue of perfection
occurs, if it were not there as a reality. The notion of ourselves as imperfect points to
the notion of our having a relationship with perfection. We place ourselves in the
whole dimension of this. In Taylor's reading of Augustine he sees that the saint's
concern was 'to show that God is to be found not just in the world but also and more
importantly at the very foundations of the person (to use modern language); God is to
be found in the intimacy of self-presence.'53
Understanding God as ultimately significant is very compelling for Taylor.
Scientific method which involves finding criteria and breaking them down to their
basic neutral index is, he feels, metaphysically futile. Ironically, this is the practice
that most philosophers of religion such as Alvin Plantinga and Richard Swinburne
engage themselves in when they attempt to create neutral, amoral formulae for the
proof of the existence of God through conceptual analysis.""14 The epistemological
framework that Taylor is working within is not answering the same kinds of
questions: ' ... if you want to know how to take somebody from a standing start, in
this case someone with no concept of God, to what you want to prove—the existence
ofGod, or a relation to God, then the answer might be, "it can't be done".'36 The idea
that you can take someone from any point, regardless of their presuppositions, and
lead them by undeniable, unarguable systematic steps to God, is implausible for
Taylor. This is entirely consistent with the way he sees us reasoning morally.56 We all
have background significances which cannot be broken down. There is a contact
point with reality which in itself is loaded with non-neutral meanings.
In terms of God and the good, these are facts which by their very nature
cannot be neutral, they can only be understood if one takes them as read. If seen as
just purely neutral they will not be grasped at all. Augustine understood that to be in
contact with God was to be in contact with the good, and as such it meant being in
contact with a morally charged reality. Taylor contrasts this with Aquinas' Five-ways
5''Sources ofthe Self, p. 134.
'4See for example, Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1974),




which in some sense all pass through the cosmos, the nature of things. Augustine's
proof for the existence of God depends upon his relationship to this cosmos, not on
the cosmos itself. In Taylor's own words:
'
... the argument of Augustine passes through the sense of perfection.
... the experience of perfection is not coming from me, and therefore
something higher exists. That in a way is clearer to me as an
articulation of this very strong sense of God, and you articulate that
and show why it is so blazingly evident having got there. Why it is so
• S7
blazingly evident that there is a God.'"
An important feature of this for Taylor as he expounds Augustine's theology
ro
in Sources of the Self is the moving from the inner self to beyond the self.
This transcendent quality is something that Taylor advocates in his own moral theory.
He produces a similar hypothesis to Augustine's at the end of Sources of the Self by
arguing that implicit in our understanding of the good and our relation to that good is
some sense of transcendence, that we need something like God in order to be
empowered to do good and to understand our relationship to the good."79
Augustine makes the inward step, the first-person dimension, a crucial move
towards a higher condition—'it is a step on our road back to God.'60 Introduced with
this is a new understanding of our moral sources which Taylor finds significant. This
attitude is implicit in arguing for a moral ontology in the first section of Sources of
the Self and is brought out more fully in The Ethics of Authenticity. By arguing
against critics such as Bloom, who claim that the modern notion of inwardness and
the need for self-authentication is nothing more than a destructive selfish impulse,
Taylor convincingly puts forward a case whereby the self s identity needs this
radically reflexive stance. The 'malaise of modernity' lies in thinking that it can all
stop at this point. It is important for Taylor to bring in Augustine, for Augustine
stresses the need for this reflexive stance in order to get beyond the individual. As
Etienne Gilson has described the Augustinian soul, it' ... passes through itself, so to
'7See Appendix A.
'sSee Sources ofthe Self pp. 134f.
M,See Chapter 7 for a detailed account of Taylor's idea of transcendence.
60See Sources ofthe Self p. 132.
112
speak, on its way to meet the divine master and thus passes through itself only to go
beyond.'61
Using Augustine's notion of inwardness to explain the powerful nature of his
biographical account John Milbank comes very close to pinpointing the importance
of Augustine for Taylor:
'Unlike the stoic inwardness, which does indeed concern pure
"attitude", Christian inwardness is opened up by a revisability that
accompanies all external modes of expression. Thus, the "depth"
revealed in Augustine's Confessions ... is the effect of reflections on
past actions, of the realisation that they might have been different, that
they can be totally re-read in the context of the more general story of
the Church, and that he can transform himself in the future.'62
For Taylor there is also a rational progression from the self to a transcendent
moral source, which he believes is God. The difference for Taylor lies in the fact that
he lays a greater amount of stress on the interaction with other selves in society. So
for him there is not merely a single path from the self to God, but from the self to
other selves. Interaction in the social sphere does not simply mean one mind
communicating with another. There are numerous facets which must be taken into
account. We have in common not only our source of the good, but in our society our
identities are defined partially by this interaction. This is inescapable for Taylor. It
points to the important truth of transcendence, not only divine, but inter-human.
What also surfaces at this point is the substantial difference between
Augustine's and Taylor's understanding of how the good exists in society. According
to Augustine, while the Civitas Dei can endure alongside the Civitas terrena, the
goods as the Ideas of God are to be found ensconced in the former, not in the latter.
Taylor, on the other hand, has more faith not only in the activity of claiming goods
from a secular system (for these are often laced with theological implications), but in
the philosophical disposition of modernity as a whole.6j In many respects Taylor's
6lEtienne Gilson, Saint Augustine, p.76.
62John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory (Oxford: Blackwell's, 1990) p.291.
' "This is a point where Taylor sees himself opposing Alasdair Maclntyre. Maclntyre, in Taylor's view,
is of the opinion that we as moderns have been spiralling down since Aquinas into this quagmire of
irreconcilabilities. Politically, Taylor sees Maclntyre as having shifted from an early Trotskian view to
one completely void of any hope for political improvement. The value for Maclntyre is in the
microcosms of communities. Others have noted this difference—see for example Frances S. Adeney,
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political convictions are closer to Aristotle's who sees the polis as necessary to
substantiating the good.64 For example, throughout his activity in the October '95
Referendum in Quebec he was engaged not simply as a member of the City of God,
but as a citizen of an earthly polis attempting to bring to fruition certain goods within
the society of the Canadian people. The pessimism of political Augustinianism is not
part of his agenda, nor is the idea of being a peregrino, a resident alien longing for
the perfect government in the life beyond.
The Ethics of Value over Obligation
While Taylor's political optimism does not have a great deal in common with
Augustine or what Taylor has called 'hyper-Augustinianism', some of his
metaphysical notions of the good certainly do. Both philosophers, for example, share
the conviction that moral theory needs to be firmly grounded in values rather than
obligation. Augustine, like Taylor builds his moral theory on a substantive base of
values and virtues. His attention to deontic obligations is secondary, and as such is
almost always qualified by bringing it to bear upon some higher value.
In arguing against the Kantian/utilitarian versions of modern moral theory,
Taylor too argues for a substantive ethic over and above a procedural one. Only then
can we understand any notion of the good as intelligible, and see the constitutive
good as an empowering source. Augustine, like Taylor, reasons that it is more
important to understand what kind of person it is best to be and what things are to be
considered good or valuable than to live under a code of obligations. Persons who
truly live by the good, and can get close to it, do not even need laws.65
'Review ofSources ofthe Self. The Making ofthe Modern IdentityTheology Today, 48:2, 1991,
pp.204-210. See also Appendix G.
64See Aristotle's Politics, Bk. I.
biDe libero arbitrio, I, xv, 31.
114
It may be argued that in certain cases, such as in the text On Lying, Augustine
is focusing on a strict set of policies.66 This, however, must be understood in the
context of the ecclesiastical situation. In both On Lying and in the later Against Lying
Augustine is dealing with a specific problem within orthodox Christianity. In the
latter text he is facing the infiltration of Priscillianists into the Church who were
converting Catholics to that heresy. It called for concrete formulations, just as any
policy that Taylor would suggest in the realm of Quebec politics would. Augustine
seems to be laying down strict legislation when he says that all lying is sin, but he
does not do this for the same reason that Kant, for example, makes that claim. For
Kant there is a moral imperative, deontically established, against the very act of
lying. For Augustine lying is wrong because it goes against the nature of God. He
appeals in this apparent obligationist stance to a higher moral standard than man's
framework of reason. It is dependent not on the obligation of not lying, but on the
very nature of the good. So the issue of lying and falsehood in these texts (as in the
Enchiridion) is not deontic, but finally ontological.
In one sense while Taylor and Augustine reach an agreement about anchoring
our ethical claims in the nature of the good, they nevertheless arrive at this
conclusion from opposite directions. Taylor looks to the way we interact,
understanding the human agent within modernity. He is of an age of post-Cartesian
scepticism when one must study the self because we are taught that this may be all
one can be certain about. Augustine never doubted the possibility of a transcendence.
He begins with God and then understands from this that we must have an ethic of
virtues (what it is good to be) and values (what the goods are in our life). Only by
positing a moral ontology can we be consistent with what we know about God from
His revealed Word. After all, the first step for Augustine along the path leading the
mind to God is to accept revelation by faith. From this one is lead to the inner
person, and beyond, to the 'inner master', that source 'which is more intimate to us
than our own inner selves.'68
"'See particularly, Frederick Carney, 'The Structure of St. Augustine's Ethics', in The Ethics ofSt.
Augustine, ed. W. Babcock (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991).
67See F. Cayre, La contemplation augustinienne, (Paris: Blot, 1927) pp.216-233.
h8Gilson, Saint Augustine, p.76.
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Conclusion
Love and attention are two very important features involved in knowing the
good for Augustine. First we must concentrate our focus on the good in order to draw
near to it, as we are steered by a light on the horizon. Within his theory of the will
Augustine had developed the idea of two loves: the higher love of charity and the
lower of concupiscence. Humans have the capacity to either love what is good or
love what is evil. In this development one can see Augustine embracing the Platonic
idea of turning one's gaze either in the direction of the good or away from it;
however, the important dimension of the will has been added. Because of the Fall, the
human agent is perfectly capable of knowing what the good is, of seeing it as good,
and yet turning away and loving evil. Maclntyre remarks that for Augustine 'Evil is
somehow or other such and the human will is somehow or other such that the will
can delight in evil.'69 So unlike Plato, for Augustine what is important is not simply
one's knowing and attending to the good, but one's love of that good. We may
'know' what the good entails and still turn away, just as we may know what the right
thing to do is, but still choose to do otherwise.
Turning in the direction of the good for Augustine fulfils the order of the soul.
It is the direction of reason, the rational choice to make. In so turning we take our
proper place in the cosmic order, under God and above the body, {sub illo a quo regi
debet, supra ea quae regere debet).10 Thus if the soul only seeks the good and the
beautiful in God, and is good and beautiful itself by resembling the divine ideas
which govern it, it will have achieved its proper relationship to the cosmos.
Taylor is much more reluctant to spell this out systematically. At least he is
very cautious about attempting to articulate an entire order of the cosmos.
Nevertheless, there are echoes of this in his argument for a moral ontology. The
stress on teleology is particularly important for him. Inescapable for us as human
6,See Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue, p. 175.
7"Quoted in Gilson, Saint Augustine, p.99.
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agents is orientating ourselves to a final good. Taylor stresses this kind of moral
orientation much in the same way that Augustine stresses knowing our place relative
to the good (although without the idea of treating the body as inferior). We cannot
deny the existence of certain moral horizons within which we must place ourselves
and understand our lives. Knowing where we are in relation to a 'hypergood' affects
how we feel about ourselves and our situation: whether we despair because we are far
from a good that is meaningful to us, or whether we are encouraged and enriched
because we are getting nearer and nearer. Our lives have a sense of proper orientation
only in conjunction with some type of good. In our modern society the Good of God
has been replaced by various other goods, some traditionally lower, which Augustine
himselfwould have placed under the soul. Taylor, while wanting to embrace many of
these goods as legitimate expressions of our moral ontology, still takes the essential
characteristics of the spatial metaphor Augustine uses and fleshes out the
fundamental truths apparent within this framework.
This emphasis on knowing where we are in relation to the good and seeing
ourselves as getting nearer or further away from it can also be traced back to Plato.
As was mentioned above, however, Augustine shifts the emphasis in his moral
theory. More than simply attending to the good, we must also concentrate on loving
it. This feature is crucial for Taylor in understanding the nature of what he calls
'constitutive goods'. For it is by loving these goods that they empower us to do good.
Only in our love for God are we able to do good, for He is the source of all goodness.
Taylor in fact defines a constitutive good as one the love of which empowers
us to do good. While it is true that we need to attend to the goods in our life, and
place ourselves in a moral space with certain goods on the horizon, incomparably
higher are certain constitutive goods which by their very ontology are empowering
sources. Similarly, God as a Good by His very essence empowers us to do good. This
is echoed in the suggestion that 'we love because He first loved us' (I John 4.19).
Attending to the good is not enough for either Augustine or Taylor. For we could
easily focus on the good and yet despair because of the distance we are from it. We
need an empowering grace to propel us towards that good. Equally so we could
acknowledge this good and still not love it. James says as much when he writes 'you
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believe that there is one God. Good! Even the demons believe that—and shudder'
(James 2.19).
Combining this with the idea of inwardness we can see that for both
Augustine and Taylor a turn to the self must also involve situating our identity in
relation to the good. At the very root of our person lies God, constituting its nature.
He is the 'master within'. Turning to find our self we find God as its source. To
understand who we are, we must understand how we are related to the good, and
ultimately the constitutive good of God. In finding our true selves, we are finding
God. This occurs in what Taylor has called radical reflexivity, whereby we have
direct contact with the reality of God. 'For it is in this paradigmatically first-person
activity, where I strive to make myself more fully present to myself, to realise to the
full the potential which resides in the fact that knower and known are one, that I
come most tellingly and convincingly to the awareness that God stands above me.'71
Here the paradox of inward to upward truly comes together. By seeking our own
authentication we are led beyond ourselves into the transcendent realm of the divine.
'Know Thyself (Nosce te ipsum) has the implicit ingredient of knowing God and
knowing one's place in relation to God.72 For Taylor as for Augustine this is
inescapable ifwe are truly to make sense of the domain ofmoral agency.
71Sources ofthe Self, p. 135.




While the parallels between Augustine and Taylor discussed in the last
chapter indicate the extent to which Taylor aligns himself with this important
Christian thinker of the past, thus reflecting a thoroughly Christian viewpoint in his
own philosophy, this same viewpoint can also be discussed at another level. Taylor as
a confessing Christian in the Roman Catholic tradition has a personal vision that
remains in the background of much of his philosophy. Yet his personal beliefs and
how these have been shaped and influenced remain largely unarticulated in his
philosophical writings, and are only alluded to indeterminately. The vitality and
profound depth of his own deliberations in the Christian faith, and the theologians he
considers to be seminal in this regard, reveal that Taylor has the potential to bring a
wealth of significant insight to many of the theological questions concerning the
Church in the world.
Taylor acknowledges a theological debt to a certain strand of French
Catholicism of the mid 20th century. It is a group which traces its origin to the anti-
Jansenist Jesuit line coming from the tradition of St. Francis de Sales, the
seventeenth century bishop of Geneva.1 The two most important thinkers in this
respect for Taylor are Yves Congar and Henri de Lubac. It is perhaps significant for
Taylor that these two French theologians were challenging the status quo of the
'See A. Ravier, Francis de Sales: Sage and Saint (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988). See also
Lucien Ceyssens, 'Que penser finalement de l'histoire du jansenisme et de l'antijansenisme?' Revue
d'Histoire Ecclesiastique, 88, 1993, pp.108-130.
2See Appendix B.
Catholic Church in a radical way within the movement of 'la nouvelle theologie'.3
Both were concerned with the Church extant in the world, and the hierarchical
structure of the Church as promoting certain ideological values which they felt were
running against the central message of Christianity.
Laikos and Klerikos in the Early Church
Particularly compelling for Taylor in this respect was Congar's
groundbreaking work Lay People in the Church, first published in 1951.4 The
purpose of Congar's work was to carve out a role for the laity in a structure that he
argued had traditionally either ignored this group or defined it as inferior. What he
wanted to see in the modern Church was a role for the laity as participating in
Christ's priesthood by virtue of their baptismal character.5
The history of the laity, particularly in the Early Church, reveals a great deal
about the criticisms Congar has to make. A recent investigation of this development
entitled Les laics aux origines de I'Eglise, by the historian Alexandre Faivre, gives an
interesting synopsis of how the distinction between layman and clergy came to be
formulated.6 The term 'lay' or Taity' is significantly absent from the New Testament
writings. Rather, there is the concept of the 'People ofGod' (Aaog Oeov) to which all
members belong in view of the same choice (KXtjpog) made of them by God.7 There
is a sense of God calling His people 'out of darkness into His marvellous light.'8 As
Faivre notes, 'Le Nouveau Testament ne connait pas de lai'cat mais un peuple, un
""See Joseph Komonchak, 'Theology and Culture at Mid-century: the example of Henri de Lubac',
Theological Studies, 51, 1990, pp.579-602.
4See Yves Congar, Lay People in the Church: A Study for a Theology of the Laity, trans. D. Attwater
(London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1985).
5I have gained much from the lucid literature review of recent themes concerning Lay People in the
Church by Jacques Dupuis. See his 'Lay People in Church and World', Gregorianum, 68:1-2, 1987,
pp.347-390.
6See Alexandre Faivre, Les laics aux origines de I'Eglise (Paris: Centurion, 1984).
7See for example, Colossians 1.12.
8I Peter, 2.10.
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peuple saint, un peuple elu, un peuple mis a part, un kleros qui exerce tout entier un
sacerdoce royal ... .'9
St. Clement is the first Christian writer to use the term 'laikos' in his Letter to
the Corinthians.'° The term in this context, however, is not given any particular
function. Clement is not establishing with the designation Taikos anthropos' any
bipolar or antinomic relation between those who were ministering and others in the
community at Corinth. There is no sense that laity here is meant to refer to the
theological counterpart of the 'clergy' as it has come to signify today. Only at the
beginning of the 3rd century does the distinction laikos-kleros signify a cordoning off
of certain roles in the church community, the former term referring to those who are
not ministers. The layperson then begins to be described negatively as non-clerics.
Faivre argues that before this time such a distinction was not really in existence:
'il est vain ... de demander au Christianisme des origines quel doit
etre le role d'un laic. Pour les premieres communautes chretiennes,
tous les fideles constituent le lot choisi par Dieu ... tous sont egaux en
dignite ... .La difference de fonction ne passe pas entre les liturges et
les non-liturges .... Chez les Chretiens chacun est liturge a sa maniere.
Pour cette raison il n'existe pas de veritable laic. C'est un
anachronisme de penser que les services rendus par de simples fideles
en dehors du culte sont des "ministeres laiques". ... il est impossible
de trouver des laics dependant d'un clerge. II y a seulement des
Chretiens et des disciples se reclamant du Christ comme maitre.'11
In the 3rd century Tertullian is primarily responsible for bringing about a shift
in the laity/clergy distinction. The term Taikos' in his work is meant to refer to those
distinct from the clergy. The laity are assimilated to plebs as those other than priests,
bishops, and the pope. This is not to assume, however, that the laity was allocated an
inferior role in the Church by Tertullian. Their priestly dignity was equal to that of
the clergy, and furthermore, they at times could claim identical tasks.12
9See Alexandre Faivre, Les laics awe origines de I'Eglise, p.19.
l0See St. Clement of Rome, The Letter to the Corinthians, in The Epistles ofSt. Clement ofRome and
St. Ignatius ofAntioch, trans. J. A. Kleist (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1946) 40,5.
1 'Alexandre Faivre, Les laics aux origines de I'Eglise, pp.56-57.
l2See particularly Exhortatione Castitatis, in Opera (Turnholti : Typographi Brepols Editores
Pontificii, 1954). Two important secondary sources are Robert Roberts, The Theology of Tertullian
(London: Epworth Press, 1924) pp. 188ff., and R. Braun, Deus christianorum: Recherches sur le
vocabulaire doctrinal de Tertullien, 2nd ed. (Paris: Augustiniennes, 1977).
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Following on from this, however, the general trend of the 3rd century became
one which understood the laikos as those men (not women) of the Church who were
neither bishops, presbyters or deacons. They were conceived as inferior to clerics,
their function being to relieve the cleric from all material preoccupations, allowing
them to dedicate themselves totally to the service of the altar. At the beginning of the
century there were still learned laymen who taught in catechetical schools, but even
this ceased progressively after Origen and these functions were henceforth reserved
to clerics.
While this remained a distinction of roles, the fact is that it led to a
marginalisation of the laity. What developed from the 3rd century was a
dispossessing of the People of God through a patriarchal emphasis on the Church's
hierarchic structure. Up to the death of Gregory the Great there was a cementing of
this ecclesiastical structure separating the laity and the clergy. It is precisely this
segregation and marginalising of the laity that Congar attempts to address in Lay
People in the Church.
Congar and Laity in the Church
One of the most influential articulations made by Congar on the issue of the
laity is that an adequate theology of the laity can only be secured in the context of a
'total ecclesiology'. From the beginning Congar recognises that the clergy and laity
have too often been set in opposition: the spiritual and the temporal realms. Rather
than understanding the Church in this way he proposes that an ecclesiology of the
People of God is necessary to undergird any internal unification and reconciliation in
the Church.
The two poles of hierarchy and community need to be combined in the
priesthood of the Church. This is to be seen in the double modality of participation in
Christ the Priest. Ministerial priesthood essentially comes from Christ and not the
community, but it nevertheless is ordained to the community. At the same time the
'spiritual' priesthood of the laymen is not merely metaphorical. It is a real priesthood
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and participation in the priesthood of Christ himself. It is important to see both titles
of priesthood 'as being within the one unique priesthood of the Church or of the
Body of Christ, which is wholly sacerdotal, and not to lose sight of the organic
character of the priesthood.' Furthermore 'the three sacramental characters of
baptism, confirmation and order are participations in one same reality.'13
In such a relationship, 'the Church's hierarchical principle is of necessity
accompanied by a communal principle.'14 In comparing this complementary unity to
a building task Congar argues that 'all do not take part in the laying of the
foundations and in directing the building, but all share in the dignity of the whole, in
the functions that compose it and in the activities of its life.'15 Both the functions of
the clergy and the laity are vital to the thriving of the Church body. The Church
constitutes an organism 'in which certain functions ensure the existence of the
institution and others ensure its perfection, in accordance with the will of God who
bestows his gifts and his vocations as he pleases' and the latter two are necessary 'not
that the Church as institution may exit, but that she may fulfil her mission to the
uttermost and fully carry out her work as the Body of Christ.'16
In his conclusion Congar's emphasis is on the necessary association and
complementarity in the Church's life of communal and hierarchical principles:
'That is a truth that we came upon at the end of all our inquiries, and
principally under two forms, namely, the idea that the faithful are the
pleroma of the hierarchy, and the idea of an association of communal
principle with hierarchical principle .... There we find both duality
and unity of subject. Duality, since the hierarchical priesthood and the
magisterium are not at all a delegation by the people ... and yet there
is a priesthood of the faithful, an infallibility of the believing Church,
and an apostolic mission of all. Unity, since ... there is a sense in
which the faithful with their clergy form one single subject of
worship, of infallible faith and witness, and of apostleship. There is
• • • 17
but one Lord, one Spirit, one Body (Ephesians iv, 4-6).'
What is needed for this to be realised in the Church is a total ecclesiology.







Congar's vision of the Church is not without criticism. He himself addresses
some of the shortcomings of his work in the 2nd edition of Lay People in the Church
published in 1964. Specifically, his insistence that the Church's overarching
constitution is fundamentally hierarchical, and not democratic, as well as his
emphasis on the authoritarian role of the clergy led him to question whether he had
clung too much to the recognised categories of classical ecclesiology when writing
I o
Lay People in the Church.
This is an issue that Congar took up later in two essays entitled, 'Mon
cheminement dans la theologie du lai'cat et des ministeres' and 'Ministeres et
structuration de 1'Eglise.'19 The first study is a critical self-examination of his own
contribution to the theology of laity and clergy. Congar expresses here that he sees
merit in the way the term 'laity' was described in Lay People in the Church, since
they are characterised positively as the People of God. His criticism or caveat with
his earlier work, however, is that it ran the risk of distinguishing too neatly between
laity and clergy. It tended to define ministerial priesthood too much 'in itself, failing
to do justice to its functional character and essential relatedness between clergy and
laity.20
The point at issue is the structure of the Church in a 'total ecclesiology'.
Schematically the Catholic Church has stressed Christ hierarchy Church as the
community of faithful. The point that Congar wishes to make, however, is that the
Church is not built strictly through priestly actions or 'ministries'. As a reaction to
this one-sided scheme the Reformation formulated another which was equally one¬
sided: Christ Church as priestly community of the faithful ministry. The
advantage of this scheme is that it stresses the community dimension of the Church,
l8Ibid., p.xxi.




yet it loses the significant meaning of the priesthood as sacrament distinct from
baptism.
Congar wants to abandon the distinction between clergy and laity and replace
it with one of community-ministries. This formulation takes into account the fact that
notwithstanding the specificity of the priestly ministry, ministries in general extend
far beyond this specific vocation. To indicate this it is necessary to start with the
Church as community which avoids the danger of hierarchy interceding between God
and the People. The two alternative linear schemes above are replaced by Congar
with one where the community will appear as 'the all-embracing reality within which
the ministries, even those instituted and sacramental, take their position as services of
precisely that which the community is called to be and to do.'21
In Congar's structural formulations the community originates from Christ and
his Spirit and clearly stands out as the enveloping reality within which all the
ministries are at once shown to be contained and for which they are destined. Lay
ministries and priestly ministries are no longer defined in isolation or in
contradistinction from each other. Instead they are 'viewed organically within the
reality of the community.' In such a scheme it is no longer the layperson that needs to
be defined, but the priest. In other words the meaning of the priestly order must be
discovered, not by starting from the hierarchy but from the reality of the People of
God.22
Congar's second study 'Ministeres et structuration de TEglise,' returns to the
same themes, particularly the inadequacy of the traditional emphasis on the
hierarchical infrastructure as 'instrumental cause' of the Church. This is a concept
that Congar, himself, felt he gave too much support in the past. Such an emphasis he
claims can lead to the notion that the ecclesial hierarchy is an autonomous body, a
reality prior to and above the community of the actual ecclesia. The danger of this is
that this kind of absolutising of the clerical ministries lends grist to the mill of a
clerico-centric conception of the Church. The priest is sometimes considered as a




Congar thinks that the remedy to this is to look to the New Testament
description of the Church where there existed a variety of ministries built upon the
common reality of the Christian community under the inspiration of Christ and the
Spirit. What must exist in the Church in order for her to fulfil God's design are
services and ministries which the Spirit raises within the midst of a particular
community in order that she may fulfil her mission as Church sent out to serve.23 In
the retrospective essay Congar contributed to Vatican II by Those who were There, he
asks the question whether the concept of societas inaequalis, hierarchica, has been
superseded by the Council.24 The conclusion he comes to is that the hierarchy is still
present in the Council and post-conciliar Church, but it is no longer pivotal to the
whole ecclesiology. Instead it is in the context of communion. Thus the hierarchy
falls into perspective.
Congar's Legacy and Taylor's Affinity
Congar's influence in Catholic theology has been monumental. As Fergus
Kerr remarked, 'his contribution to the Church is already a matter of history.'25 The
role of the laity that he has articulated has found a place in many of the important
movements of modern theology from the Community of the People of God to the
grassroots movements in Liberation Theology. Leonard Doohan in The Lay-Centered
Church, picks up Congar's emphasis on the variety of spiritual manifestations in the
Church:
'
... There is no such thing as a spirituality of the laity. There is only
the one unique Christian spirituality; but, just as this was lived out in a
variety of ways over history, so it is lived out in a variety of ways
today by laity, priests, and religious .... The concept of vocational
23Ibid„ pp. 48-50.
24See Yves Congar, 'Moving Towards a Pilgrim Church', in Vatican II by Those who were There, ed.
Alberic Stacpoole (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1986) p. 141.
25See Fergus Kerr, 'Review oil Believe in the Holy Spirit', The Tablet, 238:7488, 1984, pp.41-42.
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spirituality is good and should be maintained, but the vocations are
many, and the spiritualities will be varied.'26
Basic Church Communities (BCCs) and Basic Ecclesial Communities (BECs)
movements have looked to Congar's conception of the laity with the intention of
applying this concept to grassroots liberation theologies in an attempt at redefining
the Church. The theologians Leonardo Boff and Marcello de Carvalho who are
involved in these respective movements quote Congar at length in regards to the
structured community Jesus instituted as the initial community of Christians:
'Jesus instituted a structured community, a community in its entirety
holy, priestly, prophetic, missionary, and apostolic, with ministries at
its interior: some freely aroused by the Spirit, others bound by the
imposition of hands to the institution and mission of the Twelve. A
linear diagram, then, must be replaced by one in which the community
appears as the all-embracing reality within which the ministries, even
those that are instituted and sacramental, take their position as services
of precisely that which the community is called to be and to do.'27
Like Doohan, the theologian David Powers has concentrated on the diversity
of the first Church community, but with the specific desire to apply this plurality to
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our own predicament. There are in Africa and Latin America different ways of
being in Christian Community, ways which call for a change in the approach to
ministry. 'Community self-identity decides the way ministry develops.'29 'Today also
we have to look to the community's experience ofChrist and of the kingdom in order
to discern the charisms and ministries of the Church.'30
This of course brings to mind the priority in Congar's work of the community
as that Body ushering from Christ and the Spirit. For if the life in Christ is expressed
in concrete relations with others, then the Church does indeed need a great number of
diverse expressions. These diverse ministries do not, however, spring from the
26See Leonard Doohan, The Lay-Centered Church (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Winston Press, 1984)
p.123.
27See Yves Congar, Ministeres et communion ecclesiale, p. 19. See also Leonardo Boff,
Ecclesiogenesis. The Base Communities Reinvent the Church (New York: Orbis Books, 1986), and
Marcello de Carvalho Azevedo, Basic Ecclesial Communities. Scope and Challenge ofa New Way of
Being Church (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1987).





hierarchical structure of the Church, but from the variety of experiences and contexts
involved in the community. Thus in order for the Church to fully realise its potential
it must embrace a kind of universality. It must stitch into its pattern an inter-ecclesial
multiculturalism.
This articulation of the Church as an all-embracing universal Body is very
compelling to Charles Taylor. Congar's theology has been influential in Taylor's own
personal vision of the Church as community. The idea of taking away the boundary
between the bishop and the layman, that which eventually came to be a vital part of
Vatican II, has contributed to Taylor's own ideas of universality and unity in the
Church.31 Like Congar, Taylor views the schematic formulation of the Catholic
Church emerging from Christendom as constricting. This sets up boundaries which
he feels denies much of the richness of Christian potential. Likewise, however, he
sympathises with Congar's critique of the Reformation structure as being equally
one-sided. It too denies features of Christianity such as the monastic orders or the
Sacraments, which should be allowed to co-exist with other doctrines of the Church.
Taylor, looking to Congar, desires that both 'Catholic' and Reformation traditions be
embraced under one Christianity. He seeks an ecumenical unity which will erode the
established hierarchy of Christendom, yet still remain in communion. With such a
vision the influence ofHenri de Lubac's seminal work Catholicism is clear.32
De Lubac's 'Catholicism'
Both Congar and de Lubac hold to a view which understands a multiplicity of
spiritualities communing together in the Church. Taylor in reading both of these
theologians embraces this idea with great sympathy, 'catholicity,' he says, 'is the
attempt towards a church in which the whole range of Christian spiritualities—those
that we now imagine, those that we have not yet imagined—can coexist.'33 This
3'See Appendix G.
32See Henri de Lubac, Catholicism (London: Burns & Oates, 1950).
33See Appendix B.
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notion of 'Catholicism' Taylor has developed most succinctly through his reading of
de Lubac.
Catholicism was a milestone in the circle of la nouvelle theologie. This
movement was specifically addressing what de Lubac saw as the twofold failure of
the Church: contentment with a habitual, traditional, conservative faith, without
spontaneous creative dimensions, and the restriction of Christianity to the merely
private realm. Thus he introduces Catholicism by saying that there are two kinds of
Christians—those who withdraw from the social sphere, and those who, in the
modern world, work within the world and its laws seeking to extract the good they
contain.34
Pere de Lubac's argument begins by establishing the premise that we as
human beings are united in nature. This is posited theologically rather than
sociologically or anthropologically. Images of the New Testament (Christ's Body, the
Bridegroom) as well as the doctrine of creation leads de Lubac to conclude that 'the
same mysterious participation in God which causes the soul to exist effects at one
and the same time the unity of spirits among themselves.' Following on from that he
quotes Gregory of Nyssa who argues that 'the whole of human nature from the first
man to the last is but one image of Him who is.'35
For de Lubac the unity of humankind does not spring from genetic
similarities, nor does it derive from a psychological make-up that we all share to
some degree. What it depends upon is the concept of God. Unity of the human race
both spiritually and socially is established by the fact of the Incarnation. Christ as the
needle sews up the gaping tear in humanity. Two ideas follow from this. First, unity
as that which stems from God is a good to be highly valued and pursued. Secondly, if
unity ultimately happens in God and through God, disunity is a result of not being in
God. This is not restricted to the unity of individual and God, but refers also to the
unity of mankind as a whole. Being unfaithful to God is at the same time a disruption
of the unity of mankind.
34See Henri de Lubac, Catholicism, p.xiv.
35Ibid„ pp.2-3.
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Thus redemption for de Lubac entails being unified once more with God and
our fellow humans. It is a redemption that he stresses is not exclusive, it is for the
whole world. Just as Christ was the whole man, so he came for the entire human race.
As Clement of Alexandria comments, 'the whole Christ, if we may be allowed the
phrase, the total Christ, is not divided: for he is neither barbarian, nor Jew, nor Greek,
nor man, nor woman, but the new Man, wholly transformed by the Spirit.'36
In one sense the Church represents this unification. KadoXucog means exactly
that: universal or all-embracing. Pere de Lubac is quick to point out, however, that
this universalism is not a geographically stipulated one. It is not that the Church has
followers throughout the world, or that so much of the earth's population is an
official member. Fundamentally, the Catholicism of the Church has nothing to do
with geography or statistics. 'Like sanctity, catholicity is primarily an intrinsic feature
of the Church.'37
In the fullest meaning of the word the Church brings beings into existence
and gathers them as a Whole. 'Humanity is one, organically one by its divine
structure; it is the Church's mission to reveal to men that pristine unity that they have
lost, to restore and complete it.' The unity of the Church implies a universalism
with two dimensions: it is a cosmopolitanism and a Catholicism. There is a great
diversity in the Church all gathered into one polis. Within this community the very
structure of the institution is the mysterious union brought about by Christ.
There is present in this concept a paradoxical dualism which is related to the
term 'Church'. On the one hand this refers to the visible institution with its present
congregational members. On the other hand it connotes the invisible Body of Christ.
Pere de Lubac wants to stress that the Church is not merely the former. That is, it is
not simply a confederacy of assemblies or a group accepting a particular ideology,
which was only brought into existence after the community of the first believers. The
traditional idea of the Church is linked with the Hebrew concept of 'Qahaf which in
the Septuagint is translated E/acArjcria, i.e., a general assembly of all citizens. This is
36See Clement of Alexandria, Protreptic, XI, 112, 3, ed. Claude Mondesert (Paris: Editions du Cerf,
1949).
37See Henri de Lubac, Catholicism, p. 14.
38Ibid„ p. 16.
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not the de facto number of people in the Church at any given time. On the contrary, it
is a transcendent reality, that which Congar alludes to as the enveloping reality out of
which all ministries develop.
On the other hand, this is not to be interpreted as equating the Church with
the invisible mystery and ignoring the sociological phenomenon of the People of
God. This 'worldly' physical dimension is equally important. The 'reality' involves
the paradoxical union of visible and invisible Church. It is to be seen as a group of
people with a common purpose which can be studied and whose practices can to
some respect be explained sociologically. At the same time, however, the Church is a
vast spiritual organisation, unseen even by those who are members. It is known fully
only to God. This has eschatological intonations attached to it even though it is not
referring to the future exclusively. The way John Milbank has expressed this idea in
de Lubac is that the 'narratological dimension insists on the tension between history
and eschatology.'39 The Church viewed soteriologically is not merely a means, but a
goal as well. It is a goal, however, that is not to be realised within this earthly history.
Pere de Lubac is not attempting to argue for a Utopian solution, yet he is still taking
very seriously the historical progression of the Christian Church as it is lived out. So
the Church is 'at the same time both the way and the goal; at the same time visible
and invisible; in time and in eternity ... .'40
Taylor's 'Catholicity' and Spiritual Travelling
Taylor in his own articulation of the Church finds this notion of 'Catholicism'
very compelling. This is particularly true when faced with the difficulty of dogma in
a Church which is supposed to be all-embracing. The problem of dogma is one where
the denial of some particular idea or opinion excludes the holder of this opinion from
participating in the Church. Alternatively, certain people may strongly argue for
39See John Milbank, 'An Essay against Secular OrderJournal ofReligious Ethics, 15, 1987, p. 204.
40See Henri de Lubac, Catholicism, p. 27.
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convictions contrary to the dogma that the Church considers necessary, and in order
to be embraced by the Church they must deny their own beliefs.
This is certainly one way of approaching the issue of dogma versus
ecumenism; however, Taylor understands it from an alternative angle. The criterion
he sees to be relevant in such a situation is catholicity as he understands it from de
Lubac and Congar.41 If by catholicity we mean an attempt by the Church to embrace
the whole rainbow of spiritualities, even those not yet imagined, as well as those
traditionally considered 'orthodox', then Taylor argues there is a need to 'reframe the
issues', as it were, so that conflicts within the Church are not necessarily put into
opposition to each other in any kind of either/or scenario.
One example he calls on to illustrate how this should not be done is his own
definition of 'heresy', which, he points out, originally meant nothing more than
*
choice. The choice in an heretical situation, however, is the kind of absolute choice
of two diametrically opposed positions:
'In a way I think the reformers, Luther, Calvin and so on (this may
sound sectarian) are paradigm examples of heretics, because they had
something very valid, a certain spirituality of the Bible for instance
which is tremendously valid. But they felt they had to present that in a
way that put a torch to the monastic vocations, understanding of the
Mass, The Sacraments. They sort of torched the house down in order
to have this room, and they are not by any means alone in this kind of
error. The Catholic Church itself tends to do the same thing the other
way around. It tends to torch out the Biblical spirituality in order to
preserve its other stuff, and the goal of catholicity is the goal of
continually understanding how these things properly really are.'42
Taylor's idea of heresy brings to mind Paulo Freire's description of political
dogmatism. Both the Liberal and the Conservative set up an absolute choice of either
their own position or one which is diametrically opposed to it:
'Each ... as he revolves about "his" truth, feels threatened if that truth
is questioned. Thus, each considers anything that is not "his" truth a
lie. As the journalist Marcio Moreira Alves once told me: "they both
suffer from an absence of doubt." The radical, committed to human
liberation, does not become the prisoner of a "circle of certainty"




radical he is, the more fully he enters into reality so that, knowing it
better, he can better transform it. He is not afraid to confront, to
listen, to see the world unveiled. He is not afraid to meet the people
or to enter into dialogue with them. He does not consider himself the
proprietor of history or of men, or the liberator of the oppressed; but
he does commit himself, within history, to fight at their side.'43
Meeting the people and entering into dialogue with them beyond the 'circle of
certainty' is incorporated in Taylor's 'catholicity'. How we go about achieving this is
not clear, nor does Taylor want to say that it should be. It 'takes a great deal of
spiritual maturity, of growth and prayer, and not just trusting one's first-off logic. ...
,' if we are to succeed in this endeavour.44 In a situation of mutual understanding the
correct role for dogma is not one which rigidly defines the borders of Christianity.
Rather, Taylor thinks dogma is important as an over-arching protection against
conflict. 'What dogma does is keep the doors open, in that there are Catholic dogmas
like the Sacrament of the Mass which are very important if the issue is closing that
chapter by simply taking an extreme Calvinist [view of it] as some kind of
commemorative rite.'45 The aim of dogma is to ensure that the rich breadth of
Christianity can thrive in the Church. The Church must protect 'certain definitions in
order to keep the whole gamut of spiritualities alive and that also must be very
careful about not foreclosing on others.'46
Taylor envisions a Church where the Evangelical can live with the Trappist
monk in respect and love, where the former does not say to the monastic order 'You
must believe X, Y, and Z in order to be truly Christian', and where the latter does not
say to the former, 'You must adhere to the strict discipline of our way in order to
follow God.' The People of God as a unified body must at the same time embrace
their own spirituality while recognising the differences in others, so that they can
understand that though a particular path is their way, it is not other people's way.
Concerning the Trappist order Taylor remarks that:
'
... they're not saying there isn't anything good in talking, but there
are certain temptations and certain difficulties and certain distractions





for their spiritual path that they need to cut out. So they accept this
very rigid discipline in which these things are cut out. And that is how
it should be. I do not think ... it's not like the reformer's attitude,
because it's not my way ... I do not think that one would knock that
aside. At the same time what's interesting and what's good is that
they're not saying that it would be unchristian not to do this, and if
you don't do this you're a heretic. They're saying this is a very
important way and it's really important for us and if anyone wants to
join us fine; but it's not for everybody and we will pray for and offer
our spiritual guidance for anyone who wants to follow another path.
It's that kind of coexistence which I think is real catholicity, where
one can recognise that this is a way but not necessarily the way ... and
there is a sense of the Gospel that is not narrowed into that form
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It is within this kind of catholicity that one gets a full experience of the
Gospel, of recognising the other as truly valuable and acknowledging their way as
important. One way that Taylor thinks we can promote this catholicity is
familiarising ourselves with other Christian spiritualities through a process of
spiritual travelling. Stepping outside the cramped view of our own experiences opens
us up to the vast number of ways of 'being Christian'. Travelling both through space
and time in this spiritual journey can acquaint us with the large swatch of Christian
spiritualities that are in the world:
'The more you have a feel for a larger number of these spiritualities
the more you can recognise new ones or not fail to recognise them, or
misrecognise them, or just shut them out. And the more we narrow
ourselves into a certain set, that we develop in our particular bit of the
Church, the more we are likely to take the shotgun and just shoot from
the hip at whatever comes along and looks even mildly different, and
shoot it out of the water.'48
The advantage Taylor sees in our modern situation is that we are more in tune
with the experiences of other societies and peoples, simply by technological
advances. It is no longer the case that we are isolated in a tiny community whose
insularity promotes a single line of thinking. The disadvantage of this 'global'
opportunity is that in exploring other spiritualities it may be much easier than before




boundaries of our own faith, it can also include a degree of unfamiliarity. Exploring
in this way can lead to anxiety through disorientation. This is, nevertheless, no
argument not to pursue this journey. It merely points out the need for faith. Faith both
looks ahead to seek understanding and anchors us to where we have been.
Other Religions
What comes to the fore in this investigation is the question about other
religions. It is one thing to advocate a healthy acceptance with regards to other
Christians who share some fundamental belief which enables them all to live in the
community of Christ. It is something completely different to consider such a spiritual
travelling as an inter-faith dialogue. With this issue Taylor and de Lubac seem to part
ways.
With de Lubac's emphasis on the Church comes a certain undeniable
prejudice against other religions. It may be the case that de Lubac is wanting to unify
the entire human race through the Incarnation of Christ, and it may also be the case
that he acknowledges the importance of the uniqueness of all in this process, yet the
approach he has towards Buddhism, Islam, etc. is fundamentally distinct from how
Taylor thinks we should as Christians approach them.
Initially it must be said that de Lubac's formulation of Catholicism with
regards to other faiths seems to be truly all-embracing. He acknowledges that the
religion of others is not like an outer garment that they can simply discard in order to
pick up Christianity. All of their customs, social practices, intellectual pursuits, and
traditions are coloured by their religious belief. One should not expect them to
jettison all of this as no longer valuable. In a moment of true insight for the regard of
the other de Lubac argues that 'it is not possible that what has lasted so long as the
life-blood of whole races should not be worthy of respect from some point of view.'49
In this credo de Lubac demonstrates the need to be willing to learn from those
around us who do not share in our faith. In such a way he is convinced that the
49See Henri de Lubac, Catholicism, p. 147.
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Church is able to grow spontaneously, eliminating whatever is unwholesome without
stamping out the individual human contribution to this faith. There is a twofold
desire present: to 'entertain whatever can be assimilated and to prescribe nothing that
is not of faith.' The way to proceed in this is not through intellectual, instrumental
reason which sets about determining the most successful way of saving the lost.
Rather Love alone makes this possible.50
Advocating such a response out of love is something Taylor finds immensely
compelling. He, like de Lubac, uses the example of the modern Jesuits going into
China. In this situation a group of Christian's travelled to a place completely off the
map of their own spiritual experiences and immediately admitted their own
incomprehensions and misgivings. In this way they were able to educate themselves
to become, in effect, Chinese. Taylor, unlike de Lubac, however, does not think that
it is necessary to work with the ulterior goal of conversion in mind, at least not in
every situation. He does agree that God's revelation through Christ is a particularly
special situation and that the Gospel should be preached; however, it is not clear in
his mind that all should be included in 'the Church' in the same way that Henri de
Lubac argues.
False Religions
While respecting traditions and alternative cultures and beliefs, Pere de Lubac
nevertheless is much more focused on bringing the other into the Body of the Church.
The difference between this and Taylor's idea is made plain in their individual
concepts of false religions. For de Lubac a false religion is one which may have some
kernel of the truth in it. It may simply have strayed from the truth, and as such it is
not a system of beliefs which is necessarily completely wrong. In this category he
would place Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam as great faiths which are nevertheless
false religions since they have not quite hit the mark of the truth.31
50Ibid„ p. 151.
51 Ibid., pp. 147ff.
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Taylor on the other hand wants to be far more empirical about the process.
His notion of false religions does not include the idea that anything that is not
Christianity is ipso facto a false religion. Approaching another faith empirically in
Taylor's mind means noting whether it tends to nourish a certain kind of 'spiritual
fullness'. He does not think, necessarily that there should even be a clear indication
of this: 'We shouldn't say "If we can't solve this problem we've made a terrible
mistake.'" Rather what is needed is a spirit of humility and faith: 'It's not clear
exactly what God's doing. He's not relating it to us, but maybe we are not expected
to understand it.' On the other hand if we understand it and disagree, if we
recognise the essence of the other faith and oppose it, Taylor still feels that there is
something to be gained, namely that we have recognised that there is something
'spiritually great there that isn't our way.'53
The immense benefit from this kind of approach for Taylor is that it wards off
a dangerous kind of prejudice which affirms our own spiritual bias through a
superficial and destructive method:
'
... there's a lot of very facile affirmation of one's own tradition
which is based simply on negative judgements about others. So for
years people who believed in God thought that people who didn't
must be somehow morally questionable, and Christians thought that
Jews were just simply fixated on the Law, and that Buddhist and
Hindus were just totally 'other-worldly'. We all have these stories
whereby our own faith, our own position, is shored out by what turns
out in examination to be ludicrously uncomplementary. And when you
liberate yourself from those crutches, then the way to carry on with
one's own faith is for it to be a live one for itself, as against one of
these contrasting moves. So I think it's a very important enlivening
and liberating move to liberate ourselves from these denigrating
stories that we've told about others.'54
For Taylor the false religions are ones which do not fit with the idea of the
Gospel as he understands it in terms of the Christian message of love. The cult of
Jones at Jonestown is a supreme example. The lack of spiritual depth and greatness





is distinct from de Lubac's assertion that the Church is the only 'holy ark of
salvation' and to hold the truth is tantamount to being Christian. Anything else is
false.
Taylor wants to advocate a humble agnosticism when approaching other
religions. The way he sees a distinction between his own view and Pere de Lubac's is
clear when he says,
'naturally as a Christian I want to share that kind of corporate view of
de Lubac and others, but there's something absolutely indispensable
being done in God's name by the Buddhist. But it would appear that
there are other elements of that that I don't understand, and I would
just respect without believing that I have to understand them all ... .
We need an agnosticism at this point, and I think honestly, in spiritual
humility, we have to accept and articulate that that's where we are.'33
Catholicity and the Pluralism ofModernity
It is not clear from this how far de Lubac would agree with Taylor. Certainly
in terms of the history of the Church's oppression and the need to break out of this
Taylor seems to indulge a lot of the ideas of both Congar and de Lubac. Pere de
Lubac insists that in so far as we equate Catholicism with Christendom we cannot
help but see it as an imperialist force which has for centuries silenced the spiritual
voices of other nations and cultures. This is a judgement with which Taylor whole¬
heartedly concurs.
As a Christian Taylor testifies to a love/hate relationship with modernity.
There is a paradox of conflicting values when it comes to the modern situation of the
'post-Christian' era and how we as Christians ought to live within it. Moving beyond
the realm of Christendom in one respect means that individuals no longer
acknowledge the importance of our spiritual potential, and the need for a
transcendent dimension. Contrasted with this, however, Taylor argues that in some
55Ibid.
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respects the move away from Christendom has been an emancipation. It has opened
up for us new ways of realising the good, even new ways of being Christian.
One quite evident way that this manifests itself is the freedom which comes
through the break-up of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. This not only affected the
structure of the Church leading to the Reformation, but running parallel to this was
the injection of the sacred into the secular realm, the affirmation of everyday life.56
Suddenly vocations and callings arose quite distinct from the monastic order and the
ministries of the Church. Congar's concern for a theology of the laity naturally comes
to mind. For he considers the metier of the laymen to be caring for created things. In
their care for the created they discover the uncreated. Paul Loeffler has summed up
Congar's view as follows:
'the world in the sense of things themselves is not only taken
seriously, as a reality in its own right, but it is regarded as a part of
God's realm in which He can be served as well and certainly not less
than in the Church. The lay vocation is no longer subordinate to that
of the priest. Rather it attains its own theological meaning, relevance
and glory.'37
Taylor understands this 'breaking open of Christendom' as an emancipation
in so far as Christendom is understood as a restrictive society involving the use of
force. It is not simply a matter of clergy controlling laity, but of Church controlling
belief. Two of the goods of modernity that Taylor wants to support unreservedly are
authenticity (the idea that one must be true to one's self) and the politics of
58
recognition (the idea that everyone should demonstrate equal respect to all). One
interpretation of the end of Christendom that he thinks is plausible is to see it as a
move towards a universalism of a kind which promotes such modern goods as the
unconditionality of human rights:
'
... the rejection of religion allowed the development of certain
understandings of human rights as universal and unconditional way
beyond what they ever could have achieved in the context of
Christendom. So in wrenching them out there are gains and there are
losses. There's gains because the idea went through a development
56See Sources ofthe Self pp.211-302.
57See Paul Loeffler, ' Bonhoeffer versus Congar', Frontier, 7, 1964, p. 130.
58See The Ethics ofAuthenticity, and also Multiculturalism.
139
that we have to approve of, that we have to consider plausible. On the
other hand, in taking it out of that context, you lose a whole vision of
why it's so important, and nothing I think as good has been substituted
The fact that Taylor sees gains as well as losses in this historical process is
important, for he is still very critical of much of the 'lousy fruit' which modernity has
yielded. One of the losses that he sees in this process of embracing a more universal
concept of human rights, which includes ideas such as the relief of suffering and the
preservation of life, is that in moving beyond Christendom, modernists have left
behind not only the dead skins of the hierarchical structure, but also the tremendous
wealth of spiritual understanding. The strength of this impoverishment is clearly
detected in our modern predicament.
Taylor's stance towards modernity is one that is manifestly in line with the
way he understands the dynamics of the Christian Church. The Christian's approach
to the ideologies of modernity should correspond to the way he travels on his
spiritual journey. Indeed, this should be considered a significant part of the journey
itself (something both Congar and de Lubac are advocating). On the one hand we
cannot appear triumphalist and say 'The whole escape from our tradition of
Christendom was a mistake.' By doing so we are completely disregarding an entire
realm of goods that we as Christians should instead be advocating. On the other
hand, we cannot approach modernity uncritically and refuse to recognise where it
fails to speak the truth.
For example, Taylor notes that the modern misunderstanding of authenticity
leads to certain inconsistencies. Without any transcendent dimension, the concept of
being one's self as a true individualist is impossible. What one notices about those
individuals who are trying to be 'themselves' in any kind of non-conformist fashion
is that they all look terribly similar. Saints, on the other hand, are not similar at all
'because there is something working in their lives which is much bigger than they
are.'60 The critique that Taylor makes is that 'the world goes dead if you only believe




Y ... just disappear.'61 In discussing Taylor's work, Stanley Hauerwas expounds this
point in regards to the extreme emphasis on the affirmation of everyday life in
modern culture. He argues that when we create societies in which the value of each
individual is thought to be equal, the extraordinary disappears. The desperate
problem with this is that 'the extraordinary comes in the form of extraordinary people
as well as events.'62 So that with the case of Christianity, in cancelling these out we
are cancelling out the central figure of our faith and the event of the Incarnation.
Conclusion
Clearly there is a strong affinity that Taylor feels towards both of these
theologians who were challenging certain assumptions of the Catholic Church during
the post-war period. Not only have they had an impact on his own personal
conception of the Church and Christianity, but Taylor has also found the challenges
that Congar and de Lubac make to the Catholic Church particularly relevant to the
political and moral arenas as well. Congar's theology of the laity finds a voice in
Taylor's formulations on modernity and the goods of universal equality. Henri de
Lubac's idea of Catholicism has profoundly affected not only Taylor's faith in finding
a need for pluralism within the Christian community (something he also picks up
from Congar), but also the conviction that we as Christians must approach other
faiths humbly, with a certain amount of critical agnosticism, in an attempt to learn
from their ways. This too he applies to modernity—learning to understand it as the
Jesuits understood the people of China.
There is no criterion for this except 'catholicity'. Taylor is clear in suggesting
that we should not expect our spiritual journeys to be easily laid out. The comfortable
and facile affirmation of a provincial faith is a temptation that he thinks we should
avoid. There is the danger of losing our bearings in such a spiritual exploration of
other faiths in the sea of modernity, but any other kind of Christianity would not be
6lSee ibid., and Multiculturalism.
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as deep nor as rich. We must finally come alongside Taylor as he navigates with the
tradition of Congar and de Lubac and ask the question, 'What is the purpose of this
spiritual journey—is it to be comfortable, or is it to travel some way towards ultimate
truth?'
At the same time it is clear that for Taylor we cannot accept the signposts of
another religion without critical interpretation. While one should not be tempted to
judge with pre-established criteria, the 'story ... in the New Testament is the one that
is normative.'63 In our faith and our tradition the Gospel gives us an indication of
what truth is about. If a tradition or belief goes against the message of love in the
Gospels it must be questioned. Finally, it is important to establish a balance of
humility and integrity; ' ... we're not left without guidelines, but you can't reduce it
to some exact type of criteria. There are going to be new kinds of calling all the time,
which may sound in some ways strange in relation to the previous system.'64
62See Stanley Hauerwas, Dispatches from the Front: Theological engagements with the secular









Taylor's moral theory has sought to combat much of what can be
labelled 'secular' philosophy emerging from the Enlightenment. Through his
formulations he has shown how detrimental, and even impossible it is to work
with a naturalist or projectionist theory of morality. Furthermore, he has argued
against procedural ethics and opted instead for a moral ontology which sees us as
agents in some relationship to the good. By breaking open the wall of naturalism
and secular morality which has been hemming moderns in for so long, Taylor has
in effect created a gap that many would want to run through including the
Christian theologian. We have also seen that Taylor himself has very strong
theological ties, not only in his philosophical articulations coming from
Augustine, but in his affinity to the anti-Jansenist current of theology which
understands the importance of diversity in the Church, and which seeks to
emphasise the role of the laity within the community of God. Taylor, both as
philosopher and Christian thinker, indicates that certain theological influences are
seminal in his own perusals. He insists, however, that though he may have
theological inclinations which spur him on in his arguments, he is nevertheless
meticulously careful to ground his moral theory in philosophy rather than a
presumption of God or anything like transcendence. We are left to determine
whether there is in fact room for God in Taylor's moral theory, and if so whether
his theory can be considered a 'Christian ethic'. In pursuing this question it
becomes clear that there are certain aspects of Taylor's theory that correspond
with a Christian ethic, and certain ideas evoked in his work that are vital for
proceeding in moral formulations as a Christian.
God as Source
It cannot, however, be assumed unquestionably that Taylor's theory has room
for God. Taylor comes to this conclusion in Sources of the Self and certainly as a
confessing Christian he would have reason to. But merely because Taylor submits
that there is a need for God does not mean that God has a place in his moral theory.
Nor does it indicate that one can interpret his theory sympathetically, in the light of
Christianity. The assertion, after all, may be unfounded. Taylor has been criticised by
theologians for not putting God into his theory as a central player. The theological
ethicist William Schweiker in his critique of Sources of the Selfmaintains that there
is a gap between the way Taylor has propounded our modern moral predicament, and
the situation as it concerns theologians and those involved in Christian ethics. He
argues that while Taylor discusses what is entailed in our moral reactions, he does
not seem to talk about what or whom we are reacting against. This he sees as crucial
in the theological arena since he argues that theological ethics is concerned with the
reactions to and dependence on God in the midst of our moral lives.1
The objection by Schweiker is not a strong one. Indeed, he later seems to
have changed his mind about Taylor and his significance in this realm.2 It does,
'See William Schweiker, 'The Good and Moral Identity: A Theological Ethical Response to Charles
Taylor's Sources ofthe Self, Journal ofReligion, 72:4, 1992, pp.560-572.
2In William Schweiker, 'Radical Interpretation and Moral Responsibility: A proposal for Theological
Ethics' Journal ofReligion, 13:4, 1993, pp.613-637, he makes the point that what he calls 'radical
interpretation' in moral responsibility is something that is necessary for moral self-understanding, and
furthermore in order to do it correctly this entails theological claims. He sees Taylor as an important
voice in the philosophical arena confirming this truth.
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however, offer a point of reference from which one can begin to understand how it is
that God plays an important role in Taylor's theory. Taylor certainly does not
explicitly argue that God should have a place in our lives. What he does show is how
God could have such a place in the moral sphere. If by having a reaction to God in
our moral lives Schweiker means moral intuitions which arise from scripture or
experience, then Taylor does have something to say about this. As far as dependence
on God is concerned, Taylor finishes Sources of the Selfby raising this very issue as
a hunch that he has concerning God as a source. He is clear in submitting that God is
the most cogent way of understanding the good in our lives. For Taylor God is the
Best Account. Thus dependence on God is crucial for Taylor's theory as a
constitutive moral source. At the same time, Schweiker recognises that Taylor is not
attempting in Sources ofthe Selfor in any of his philosophy to prove the existence of
God. Nor is he giving a completely rational argument for the necessity of theistic
ethics, since the nature of the human moral agent as constantly self-interpreting
forbids this kind of epistemological exercise.4
During the development of the 'historical' argument in Sources of the Self
Taylor reveals distinct ways that God plays an important role as such a source. Most
apparent is the fact that God is the beginning of our history as selves. We in the West
are theistically grounded in that many of the goods in our lives originate in the
developmental narrative of theology and the Judeo-Christian sphere of values. It is
Taylor's claim that secular humanism 'arises from a mutation out of a form of that
[Judaeo-Christian] faith.'3 So that to the extent that we can still trace the origins of
our moral sources, historically at least, there is a need for God in the equation.
One might want to counter this by saying that such a place for God is far from
the central role that Christian ethics would want to allot to Him. For as such a source,
God can be brought under the umbrella of sociological explanation and 'naturalised'
as a mere event in the history of ideas. Put another way, Taylor in one sense is saying
that we cannot understand our selves without reference to our religious history.
While this is a claim that many would see as contentious, it is also one that can be
'See Philosophy in an Age ofPluralism, p.226. For an explanation of Best Account see Chapter 2.
4See William Schweiker, 'The Good and Moral Identity'.
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interpreted in one of two ways. If we take a weak interpretation of this we come up
with the same objection as above. That is, our religious history is based on
happenstance. A transcendent being of divine nature is involved, yet it is merely
accidental that we have developed ideas around and nurtured this being as a source of
many of our modern goods. If Taylor is simply to be understood in this way, we can
translate what he is saying about moral sources into the reductive language of
sociological explanations. By doing so the transcendent dimension of our religious
past can be explained away while we cling to the various goods coming out of
Christendom. Many attempt to neutralise the history of our moral sources unwittingly
or not, but we need to question whether in fact Taylor does this.
God as Constitutive Good
It is clear that this is exactly what Taylor is not saying. The interpretation of
religious history must be in the 'thick' sense for it is this 'thinner' interpretation that
he argues against. Not only is secular humanism linked to the theology of the past by
developing from it, but he wants to argue that modernity is still utterly dependent
upon it even now.6 Many have recognised that this is what Taylor argues for in
Sources of the Self and have attacked him for it, accusing him of being dogmatic,
n
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naive and over-confident. Critics realise that this leads to the deeper, more
indispensable role that God has to play as a moral source. For not only is He a player
in history, but throughout history He is a constitutive good from which strong
evaluations concerning the human originate.
Through his moral argument Taylor has shown how the goods in our lives act
as moral sources. The roles that goods play in our lives are of two kinds: they show
us what it is good to be and what it is good to love. Some of these goods are
'See Sources ofthe Self p.319.
('See ibid., Chapter 25.
7See for example Jonathan Glover, 'God Loveth Adverbs', London Review ofBooks, 12
(22 November, 1990) pp. 12-13; Bernard Williams, 'Republican and Galilean',New York Review of
Books, 37 (8 November, 1990) pp.45-47; Quentin Skinner, 'Who are "we"?: ambiguities of the
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incomparably higher than other goods. They are those hypergoods which help to
define the more common life goods. In this sense God can clearly be seen as a good
helping to define other goods. His being, His character can show us what such goods
as justice, mercy, and benevolence mean.
At the same time, Taylor points to three important goods which are sources in
a way beyond merely giving meaning to other goods. They are constitutive in as
much as they by their very nature are good. Here we come to the truly 'thick' picture
of God as a moral source for which Taylor wishes to argue: the God of creation who
not only saw that what He had created was good, but in seeing it as good, He at the
same time was constituting its goodness. This way of understanding God as a
constitutive good means that as a moral source He effects what He sees. Taylor
describes such goods as 'features of some reality—it can be God, or the universe or
human nature—which make sense of the goodness of the goals and norms we adopt,
and the better understanding of which may inspire us to encompass these goals, or
fulfil these norms, more fully and heartily.'8
Taylor's historical assessment comes up with three important constitutive
goods: God, Nature, and the inner self. When Taylor is criticised, for example by
David Braybrooke, for only allowing just one moral source (God), Taylor strongly
reacts insisting that this is a complete misinterpretation of the entire work. 'Wow!' he
exclaims, T thought the entire book [Sources of the Self], and much of what I have
written in recent years, fairly cries out against the enterprise of reducing ethics to a
single track, whether we are talking of criteria or sources.'9 The influence and
attraction of Aristotle's ethics can be seen coming into play in advocating a plurality
of goods, but for the Christian this raises a difficult issue. This could be construed as
Taylor being overly ambivalent, indeed secular about our moral sources. To embrace
many goods, among them God, indicates that there is a danger of seeing God on a par
with other values in our lives as part of an evolutionary process. Particularly in
modern self, Inquiry, 34, 1991, pp.133-153; Martha Nussbaum, 'Our pasts, ourselves', The New
Republic (9 April, 1990), pp.27-34.
Nee Taylor's ' Reply to Commentators', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54:1, 1994,
pp.211-212.
Nee 'Reply to Braybrooke and de Sousa', Dialogue, 33, 1994, pp. 125-131. See also Taylor's essay
'The Diversity ofGoods' in Philosophy and the Human Sciences.
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Taylor's historical development, one could envision God with no real moral import
and claim that before the 18th century it just happened to be the case that this
external deity was important for the self and in defining who we are. This ceased to
be so when the moral agent turned inward and claimed reason as a source during the
Enlightenment or Nature during the Romantic movement. A reality which was very
much part of our lives up until the Scientific Revolution has been prescinded by the
rational mind and the creative imagination, and there is no question concerning one
being better than the others.
A Good amongst goods
An alternative way of approaching this objection is to examine Taylor's
assertion that there are certain constitutive goods with no theological import
whatsoever. For example, Camus' La Peste is clearly a constitutive good for Taylor.
It is an inspiring narrative where the main character shows a way of responding with
courage to the human condition outlined in the plague he is fighting against. The
novel gives us an account of an empowering good which helps us to better
understand the values in human existence without having recourse to anything
beyond the human condition. There is an 'ultimately lucid solidarity with human
beings in their suffering unsupported by any of the comforting illusions of religion or
teleological history."10
The way Taylor expounds this as an unqualified constitutive good brings into
question for the Christian ethicist the uniqueness of God as a source. Taylor is vague
concerning this, and it may be that he goes to extremes in dialoguing with critics to
bend over backwards for the atheist, where elsewhere he remains quite lucid and
convicted about the necessity of a theological dimension." One must look for
l0See Taylor's 'Reply to Commentators', loc. cit.
"See for example, Sources of the Self p.342 where Taylor asserts that 'it is a question of fact
(a) whether our best, most illusion-free interpretation does involve an acknowledgement of the
significance of human life, and (b) whether this significance is best explained in a quite non-theistic,
non-cosmic, purely immanent-human fashion. The answer to (a) seems to me unquestionably 'yes', but
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reasons behind the words in order to understand what Taylor is trying to
communicate by embracing many different goods while at the same time attempting
to hold a unique position for God.
Looking carefully at some of Taylor's distinctions will indicate that there is
no inconsistency at work here. Taylor is essentially a Christian who acknowledges a
plurality of world beliefs. Unlike the era of Christendom, we live in a period where
atheists really do exist and must be brought into the dialogue. Their moral sources
must be accounted for. Taking one line of interpretation one could argue that when
Taylor says he does not want to streamline our ethics into a single source, he is
coming from a standpoint which is very critical of those Christians who seek to re¬
establish some kind of Christian world order akin to that of the Middle Ages.12 This
is certainly one of the real dangers he sees in the Christian Church of modernity—
once one commits oneself to the belief that we need to return to Christendom, there is
no other alternative but to jettison all the goods which were not ensconced in that
ideology.
At another level, and perhaps he would say a higher level, Taylor sees the
naturalist sources of ethics as inadequate, as attempting to do good works without the
motivation. If one is serious about moral virtues and doing good, then one must have
recourse to something like God who can empower us through His being Good. So in
some sense he is speaking of God on two different levels. Firstly, there is the God as
a source equated with Christendom and the hierarchy of goods established therein.
This is the tradition of the Church which so much of the Enlightenment efforts have
fought to overthrow. This Taylor clearly does not want to encourage, and in many
ways he sees the move away from this as an emancipation. On the other hand,
however, there is the God as mysterious creator, as Divine Love, the constitutor of
goods such as dignity and respect, without which Taylor thinks modern individuals
cannot do good, or at least sustain the good. This is the God of whom so little is
known for Taylor, of whom so little can be said. He avoids systematic theology in his
work, and perhaps one of the reasons he does not call himself a theologian is the
my hunch is that the answer to (b) is 'no'. It all depends on what the most illusion-free moral sources
are, and they seem to me to involve a God.'
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anchored belief in the utter mystery of God. His task as he sees it is not to attempt to
propound the depths of the character of God, and as such God is something utterly
unfathomable, one has inklings, rare insights into His character from what we know
of this world and from what we experience in our prayer lives and observing the lives
of saints.
As such Taylor sees all kind of possibilities for the good and for self-
fulfilment outside of the traditional orthodoxy of the Church. This is his idea of
'Catholicism'. At times he suggests an eschatological approach to this plurality of
goods, that goods in our lifetime which seem to clash because of sin in the world
will, in the perfect actualisation of God, be reconciled: 'In the restored order that God
is conferring, good doesn't need to be sacrificed for good. The eschatological
promise in both Judaism and Christianity is that God will restore the integrity of the
good.'13 What Taylor finds peculiar and inconsistent in certain atheist critics,
however, is the lack of understanding they are willing to put forward in relating to
thinkers like himself who are Christians holding to the value of certain spiritual
beliefs.14
God as Best Account
Another way of reinforcing the inescapability of God in Taylor's theory is to
examine a particular criticism made by Stanley Hauerwas and David Matzko.13 They
argue that Taylor is separating moral standards and the higher goods in his theory,
and while most moderns agree about the standards, they do not agree about the
sources. These, as has been noted, vary: God, Man, Reason, Nature, etc. The
shortcoming of Taylor's explanation according to Hauerwas and Matzko is that he
'does not entertain the question whether a standard like dignity is actually a different
i:See Chapter 5 and Appendix G.
Sources ofthe Self p.219.
l4See particularly his reply to Quentin Skinner in Inquiry, 34, 1991, pp.237-254, where Taylor laments
that, 'The paradox is that the last members of the educated community in the West who have to learn
some lesson of ecumenical humility are (some) unbelievers.'
l5See Stanley Hauerwas and David Matzko, 'The Sources of Charles Taylor'.
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standard depending upon whether the source to which you appeal is Reason or
God.'16 In answering this criticism one can see just how fundamental God is for
Taylor's theory.
For Taylor does argue for a distinction of goods in this way. In fact the
relations they hold to various moral standards as such indicates for him that there are
significant shortcomings in constitutive goods which do not have some theological
reference. Reason alone, as an anthropocentric good will not do. There is no
relationship between reason and the human agent whereby we can say that the former
is being empowered by the latter to do what is good. One has recourse to the notion
of dignity, or universal justice, etc., but finally there is no motor which propels us to
seek these goods in our lives. Because of the nature of God, however, we can find a
source for our self through which, and by virtue of being loved by that source, we are
empowered to love the good and seek the good.
In one sense there is a space in Taylor's moral theory which needs a
constitutive good. This is the whole purpose of describing it as a moral ontology. He
recognises that the contemporary unbelieving and 'post-metaphysical' world has such
constitutive goods, only now they are products and features of the human condition,
of human potentiality. His argument is that moderns need to own up to the fact that
there is this void. Michael Morgan sees this as theologically significant in itself:
'
... Taylor's account of articulacy, historical examination and
practical reasoning serves as a vehicle of retrieval for religious
discourse and religious commitment. For articulation makes an issue
of human-centredness, of any suppression of objective sources of
value, and of any form of reductionism to human capacities, beliefs
and so on. It retrieves a receptivity to non-human goods and moral
sources. Insofar as God is one such good, indeed the supreme one
among those of Western culture, Taylor's account re-establishes the
plausibility of the divine-human relationship as primary for our moral
experience.'17
While Taylor admits that the naturalistic constitutive goods will fit this gap,
God fits it better in the long run, in the same way that a temporary plug in a radiator
l6Ibid., p.287.
l7See Michael Morgan, 'Religion, History, and Moral Discourse' in Philosophy in an Age of
Pluralism, p. 54.
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will work for a while, but is not the best solution. A more permanent remedy is
needed. God is essential for us to live by our deepest convictions. This feature of the
relation between morality and human well-being is one of the most compelling
theological imports of his theory. 'High standards need strong sources. This is
because there is something morally corrupting, even dangerous, in sustaining the
demand simply on the feeling of undischarged obligation, on guilt, or its obverse,
18self-satisfaction.' Without such strong sources, morality can quickly spiral into
hatred and contempt for those one wants to help. It is Taylor's conviction that one
needs the 'acute sense of human beings as objects of love, objects of God's love that
you can participate in. That empowers you in a way that the ordinary human secular
, 19
sources cannot....
Proposing a Christian Ethic
Here one can see a clear place for God in Taylor's theory, not merely as an
historical source closely tied to our moral narrative, but also as an empowering and
inescapable Being who by loving us empowers us to love the good and seek what is
good. Finding this place for God in Taylor's philosophy is the first step in
determining how this theory can be applied to Christian ethics. It develops a space in
which one can explore the possible contributions that Taylor as a Christian thinker
has to make to this discipline. One way to continue with this examination is to
understand more clearly what one means by proposing a 'Christian ethic'.
It is not the intention here to give a full account of what it means to be
involved in an ethic that is Christian or to attempt an exhaustive definition of a
Christian moral theory. Epistemological limitations and sympathy for a critically
pluralistic stance dictates that one cannot hope to give an ostensive definition of the
phrase 'Christian ethic' in the same way that one cannot expect to create a list of
necessary and sufficient criteria. Certainly one factor which effects this endeavour is
18Sources ofthe Self, p.516.
l9See Appendix D.
153
the nature of God himself. For as Christian ethics is in some way linked to God, and
as God is impossible to define exhaustively, so one cannot hope to give an account of
Christian ethics completely and unreservedly if this theistic dimension is to play a
part in any interpretation.
With this assertion I am arguing as James Gustafson does that 'for theological
ethics the base point that ought to be most decisive is the interpretation of God and
• • 20God's relations to the world, including human beings.' For my purposes it is more
fruitful to attempt to find some inescapable features of Christian ethics—those
characteristics which I would argue the Christian needs in order to develop a moral
theory with room for God. This is not meant as a definitive list of attributes, but
rather a springboard into discussing how Taylor's moral theory can contribute to our
modern understanding of Christian ethics. Two very important features of Taylor's
moral critique which (I would argue) are essential for any Christian ethic are (a) the
need for some kind of transcendent claims on the self, and following on from this (b)
the grounding of our moral intuitions in an ontological reality which goes beyond the
distinction of fact and value. A brief historical argument will help to articulate this
further by revealing how these features came to be eclipsed in modern critical
thinking.
B ■ ■
The Theological Background to Secularity
2(,See James M. Gustafson, Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1984) 11:144.
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Philosophical moral theory today seeks to suppress much of what the
Christian cannot deny has a place in our moral order. The realm of the spiritual, the
transcendent, and an understanding of humanity as defined by God are features of a
theological anthropology which have been upstaged by a secularism emerging from
the 18th century. Ironically enough, this development can be traced back to a period
before the Enlightenment when certain theological values were closely linked to the
• 91
rise of modern scientific thought.
Puritan Reformers in the 17th century sought to redress what they saw as the
imbalance of the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Catholic Church by emphasising the
spiritual dimensions of the common life. Developing out of this is what Taylor calls
the 'affirmation of everyday life', which sought to embrace the goods ofwork, family
99
and production. As Taylor outlines the development of the self in society from the
pre-Socratic honour ethic to the Platonic hierarchy of goods adapted in Christendom,
the emphasis on production, work, and the family
'flies in the face of what were originally the dominant distinctions of
our civilisation. For both the warrior ethic and the Platonic, ordinary
life in this sense is part of the lower range, part of what contrasts with
the incomparably higher. The affirmation of ordinary life therefore
involves a polemical stance towards these traditional views and their
implied elitism. This was true of the Reformation theologies, which
• • . 99
are the main source of the drive to this affirmation in modern times.'
Thus the sacred is not found in a specific activity which is segregated from
everyday life. Rather it is to be found in the vocation of living an ordinary existence.
'The highest life can no longer be defined by an exalted kind of activity; it all turns
on the spirit in which one lives whatever one lives, even the most mundane
existence.'24 The ordinary life is to be hallowed not by linking it to the sacramental
life as in the Catholic tradition, but by living it out in a certain way. So the Protestant
2lJohn Milbank gives an exhaustive account of the development of secular thought arising from
Christendom in Theology and Social Theory.




Reformer Joseph Hall argues that 'God loveth adverbs; and cares not how good, but
9S ... •
how well.' William Perkins makes the same point:
'Now the works of every calling, when they are performed in an holy
manner, are done in faith and obedience, and serve notably for God's
glory, be the calling never so base .... The meaneness of the calling,
doth not abase the goodnesse of the worke: For God looketh not at the
excellence of the worke, but at the heart of the worker. And the action
of a sheepheard in keeping sheep, performed as I have said, in his
kind, is as good a worke before God, as in the action of a Judge, in
giving sentence or a Magistrate in ruling, or a Minister in
preaching.'26
This emphasis on seeing the sacred in the everyday world of creation became
a powerful catalyst for the Scientific Revolution. Francis Bacon, for example, came
to the Philosophy of Science from a Puritan background which understood the world
as a realm given to the human agent for his own gain. From this assumption the
Baconian programme established a theme whereby science was considered to be a
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tool for the benefit of mankind. In so doing Bacon had shifted the emphasis in
science from the Aristotelian notion of contemplation to that of productive efficacy.
The Puritan doctrine of humans as stewards in God's creation played a major role in
providing a hospitable environment for this shift.
With this in mind one can understand the theological impetus, however
questionable, that eventually grew into a mechanistic interpretation of the universe.
First came the idea, biblically grounded in the creation story, that God had made us
stewards in the world and we were to tend and dominate this realm as part of his
plan. Scientific probing in such a light can be seen as an essential part of discovering
how we should be using this creation properly. In the wake of this doctrine came the
idea that instrumental reasoning was tantamount to following the will of God. A shift
occurred in our understanding of the cosmic order of things from one where unity lay
in the ultimate nature of reality to one which was set in motion by God through
providential order. The strong doctrine of Providence adopted by thinkers such as
^Quoted in Catherine George and Charles George, The Protestant Mind ofthe English Reformation
1570-1640 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961) p.l39n.
26Ibid., p. 138.
27See Francis Bacon, Novum Organum Scientiarum, I. 73. See also Christopher Hill, Intellectual
Origins ofthe English Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965).
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Locke and most famously enunciated by Leibnitz eventually squeezed God out of the
cosmic picture, first as an impersonal Deity acting in the world (17th century Deism)
and finally as a variable which in scientific terms was deemed unnecessary to explain
the cosmos.
Because the Scientific Revolution for thinkers like Locke was also primarily
concerned with the nature of epistemology and the function of knowledge, this came
to have a critical effect on the moral predicament of the human agent. Locke's idea of
'knowledge claims' developed from Descartes' disengaged self. Like the French
philosopher of the early 17th century, Locke adhered to the primacy of knowledge
obtained from removing one's consciousness out of the sphere controlled by the
unreliable flux of experience. His 'punctual' self could be extracted from the natural
world through thought experiments to a point of certain, foundational knowledge.28
SecularMorality on the Rise
The importance that this has for moral thinking is primarily related to the
question of where morality is grounded in the realm of human experience. In the
move from Locke to his successors of the Scottish Enlightenment, there is a further
push to internalise reality, i.e., to find knowledge and the rational within ourselves
rather than beyond in some Aristotelian concept of the cosmos. Furthermore, there is
a parallel agenda in the moral realm to locate the essence and origins of morality
within. Building on the moral theory of Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson understood
29moral intuitions as sentiments. Rather than anchoring what we understand to be
moral thoughts and judgements in something beyond ourselves, something
transcendent, Hutcheson argued that such thoughts were feelings stemming from our
28See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1975) and J. L. Mackie, Problems from Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1976).
2,See Francis Hutcheson, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with
Illustrations upon the Moral Sense, facsimile reproduction of the third edition, 1742 (Gainesville, FA:
Scholars Facsimile Reprints, 1969). See also Shaftesbury,^/? Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit, in
Characteristics ofMen, Manners, Opinions, and Times (London, 1711; New York: Bobbs-Merrill,
1964).
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own benevolent nature. There is a special moral faculty—a moral sense—which
apprehends sui generis moral values or duties. Thus in effect by internalising our
moral sources Hutcheson had naturalised morality. The questions of good and evil
were seen as dependent upon desires and aspirations.
Once this internalisation takes place there is a clear temptation to
projectivism. We see the world as pregnant with meaning and values only because
we are projecting our feelings of values onto the tabula resa of a neutral cosmos. The
dividing line is drawn here between the realist who understands some kind of
transcendent reality, and the internalist, or what Taylor would call naturalist, who
would seek to explain various phenomena such as moral intuitions in reductivist
terms of cause and effect.
The naturalist can have no truck with any kind of theological ethic since God
as a moral source has been deflated, explained away in scientific terms. Furthermore,
we as human moral agents in the mechanical universe are seen as microcosmic
instruments or machines. Paul Tillich sums this up by saying that 'Knowledge either
has resigned itself to failure or has transformed the world, aside from the knowing
subject, into a vast machine of which all living beings, including man's body, are
TO • •
mere parts.' Naturalist theories attempt to place us in relation to other processes in
this larger system thus defining the self as part of a holistic mechanism. Even to ask
the question 'What are our moral sources?' is invalid, for it assumes that there is
some kind of external, ontological relevancy. What we are left to work with are
desires which can be indexed to even more basic impulses or psychological motives
which subsequently 'explain' why we value certain ways of living and certain
features of human existence. Such explanations depend primarily upon instrumental
reason. What has emerged in the discipline of secular moral theory is a circle of
beliefs which focus on the right procedures in ethics. Morality has become an
exercise in calculation: determining what action would bring about the greatest
happiness to the greatest number of individuals (utilitarianism) or deciding what
maxim could be universally applied in every situation (Kant).
'"See Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951) 1:168.
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One can see in this development how far history has carried moral philosophy
away from any notion of a theocentric morality. There is a clear parallel here between
the forces that have been suppressing any articulation of a Christian ethic in modern
philosophy, and the epistemological catalyst that Taylor clearly sees as responsible
for modern naturalist theories ofmorality coming out of the 17th century. Taylor, by
arguing against such an approach to knowledge and our understanding of the world
and experiences, brings to the surface many inescapable features of what it means to
live a morally significant life. We cannot explain human agency—our value-spheres
or life's fulfilment—with an Enlightenment vocabulary without leaving undefined
many of the dimensions of reality that we take for granted. There are unavoidable
features of our constitutional make-up beyond the reach of scientific accountability
and foundationalist epistemology.
These arguments by Taylor have brought mixed reactions in the philosophical
arena. Some, like Bernard Williams, are quick to point out these fundamental flaws
in any kind of naturalist account of ethics, but do not follow Taylor in advocating a
moral theory which gives a place to God. Others, like Quentin Skinner, are convinced
that Taylor's Christianity is clouding his judgement and that his arguments must
therefore somehow be invalid. Certainly Taylor's philosophy has had a significant
impact on theology. His ideas about identity in community, for example, which
invoke the necessity of the other, even the other from outside, have contributed
greatly towards our modern understanding of ecumenical religious life.31 For the
Christian seeking to develop a moral theory, however, it is evident that many of the
positive elements in Taylor's argument, such as seeing a need for transcendence or
anchoring our moral sources in an ontological dimension, are ones which can give us
significant insight into some the fundamental issues of Christian ethics. William
Schweiker is clearly one who recognises this and sees in Taylor an opportunity to
articulate further what it means to have a theological ethic, one in which 'the self and
moral space are reinterpreted through the articulation of the divine claim on life as
''For example, although he himself does not like to be identified as a Communitarian, it is quite a
prominent peg-hole for Taylor to be fitted into, and it is certainly apparent that he has a great deal of
sympathy for many of the Communitarian ideals. See Taylor's 'Replies and Rearticulations' in
Philosophy in an Age ofPluralism, p.250.
159
that which constitutes the moral space in which we live.' Schweiker goes on to agree
with Taylor that this kind of relationship with God 'empowers and also radicalises
the intentionality of the moral life, for it means apprehending all of existence not only
as good but also as holy ground.' What this means in the realm of Christian ethics
is that we must look first to the divine for the definition of humankind, so that
ultimately it is a theological and not a philosophical anthropology that the project is
building upon. Defining the realm of the human moral agent in such terms naturally
implies a need for transcending the self and grounding our moral sources in God as
the ontic logos, whose very being constitutes our moral dimension and breaks down
the barrier between fact and value.






Two key metaphysical concepts of Taylor's moral theory which are
particularly relevant to Christian Ethics are transcendence and ontology. These two
ideas are intricately linked to each other particularly in the way Taylor understands
the moral agent as defined by the transcendent. There are other ways of
understanding transcendence, however, and it is not necessarily a theologically
loaded term. While this chapter begins with an examination of these more 'secular'
and less controversial interpretations, it soon becomes clear that for Taylor's moral
ontology, transcendence is a radical concept in a post-Enlightenment ethos.
Furthermore, his understanding of ontology and defining the moral agent through a
transcendent source is one of the most cogent formulations for Christian ethics in
modernity.
The Polysemy of'Transcendence'
'Transcendence' is a difficult term to define. Although in a theological
context and certainly in the realm of this investigation it has metaphysical
connotations, this is not always the case. So arguing that there must be room for
transcendence in Christian ethics is not necessarily a contentious claim in a secular
academy. There is, for example, the notion of transcendence of the self to an
objective standpoint, moving beyond to a 'view from nowhere'. This has become a
powerful idea in today's scientific civilisation. Knowledge obtained foundationally
from a disengaged viewpoint is a standing aspiration in many disciplines, including
some theologies.
Similarly one can understand transcendence in terms of meaning 'beyond the
everyday'. This is particularly the case in Aesthetics. Philosophers such as Arthur
Danto ask the question 'What is it that makes a work of art thrust itself beyond the
categories of the mundane?'.1 The concepts surrounding representation take issue
with the idea of transcendent meaning. So Nelson Goodman in Languages ofArt asks
one to compare the curve of an electrocardiogram with the identical gradient in a
print depicting Mount Fujiyama by Hiroshige. One of these is a work of art which has
a transcendent meaning, the other is a simple graph. Goodman and others analyse this
meaning in art in an attempt to pin down the specific characteristics of this
transcendence.
This is not, however, what Taylor means by transcendence, nor is it the only
way of understanding transcendence in art. Art as a vehicle for transcendence can
refer to the capacity that art has for spiritual import. Theological Aesthetics as a
subcategory in Theology is gaining wide recognition as an important pursuit in the
study of transcendence.1 Ronald Hepburn, for example, has often written about the
significant relationship between the aesthetic and religious experience. His
investigations are primarily an attempt to define some underlying common
characteristics between these 'kinds' of phenomena.4
While this understanding of transcendence points to a metaphysical
dimension in art, it has often been championed by atheist and agnostic thinkers who
'See Arthur Danto, The Transfiguration ofthe Commonplace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1981).
2See Nelson Goodman, Languages ofArt (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968) p.229.
'See for example, George Pattison, Art, Modernity, and Faith (London: Macmillan, 1991), John
Dillenberger, A Theology ofArtistic Sensibilities: The Visual Arts and the Church (London:
SCM Press, 1986), and Diane Apostolos-Cappadona, ed., Art, Creativity and the Sacred (New York:
Crossroad, 1984).
4See for example, Ronald Hepburn, 'Time-Transcendence and Some Related Phenomena in the Arts'
in Wonder and Other Essays (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1984).
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nevertheless remain convinced that art has tremendous power to affect the human
agent in ways not available in other experiences. Anthony O'Hear argues that art has
the potential to give insight into the 'real' behind our encounters with phenomena. In
taking issue with Proust's essay Chardin and Rembrandt, he asserts that there is a
kind of transcendence in Chardin's still lives which is immensely evocative, yet
paradoxically immanent. The reality in these 'mundane' paintings is the value of
human existence. Proust on the other hand, distinguishes between the beauty of
Chardin's work and the transcendence of Rembrandt's: 'from Chardin we had learnt
that a pear is as alive as a woman, that common crockery is as beautiful as a precious
stone.' But Rembrandt's reality is something beyond this. His work is at times a
signpost to a higher plane of being. O'Hear is agnostic about this kind of reality and
wary of this kind of transcendence. 'Religion,' he warns, 'would take us all too
quickly from the human to something we cannot envisage or articulate at all. In so
doing, it all too easily downgrades and wipes away the human.'5
Perhaps the most articulate atheist on this subject in recent history has been
Peter Fuller. After moving beyond a Marxist philosophy, heavily influenced by John
Berger, he began to realise that art without any spiritual dimension was fundamentally
doomed.6 As transcendence was seen to be lacking in most modern British painting,
Fuller argued that it was characterised as mediocre and nonsensical. In Theoria and
his last collection of essays, Peter Fuller's Modern Painters, he gives us the picture
of someone who is unable to come to terms with the materialism and secularism of
modernity.7 His friend and art critic Hilton Kramer eulogises his journey in this way:
'The vision of a world without grace was almost unbearable to him,
and, in lieu of the religious faith that he had lost, he looked more and
more to art for some spiritual equivalent of the transcendence he still
5See Anthony O'Hear, 'The real or the Real: Chardin or Rothko?', Modem Painters, 5:1, 1992,
pp.58-62.
6In his philosophy Fuller had taken up Ruskin's formulations as they were pronounced in the latter's
defence of Turner and the spirituality of Nature. See Ruskin's Modern Painters, 5 vols., in The
Library Edition of the Works ofJohn Ruskin, eds. E. T. Cook and Alexander Wedderbum, 39 vols.
(London: G. Allen, 1903-12) vols.III-VII. See also Peter Fuller, Theoria: Art and the Absence of
Grace (London: Chatto & Windus, 1988).
7See Peter Fuller, Theoria, and Peter Fuller's Modern Painters: reflections on British art, ed. John
MacDonald (London: Methuen, 1993).
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hungered for. When the Marxist view of art proved sterile in this
respect, he floundered for a time until he found in Ruskin's special
combination of aestheticism, social idealism, and unorthodox
spirituality, the foundation upon which he could launch a revisionist
approach to the problems of art and life.'
One modern visionary whom Fuller felt had something important to
communicate in his work was the artist Cecil Collins. Collins, working as a neo-
Romantic heir to Blake and Palmer, had built into his definition of art the idea of
metaphysical transcendence. Art must be related to the absolute and the only absolute
is God.9 Through art we can reach a reality beyond, a source through nature and God,
(figs. 5 and 6). 'Art sets free an instant of vision, things seen in their archetypal
essence in the sacrament of image and colour.'10 This is a transcendence in art that
Charles Taylor also sees as essential both as a way of understanding our true selves
and as a way of arguing against a naturalist interpretation ofmoral sources.
Transcendence, Art, andModernity
In tracing the links between the development of the self and certain
movements in art, Taylor finds an important ally in the epiphany of modernism. He
sees many of the artists of the 20th century reacting negatively to the limitations of
instrumental reason, the break-down of community and the encroachments of
scientific thought. In their work there is a striving to overcome this view of the
world, to see behind it the spiritual significance of our creative imagination. Within
this is a tension which Taylor is quick to expose. For while the modernist lives in a
world entirely determined mechanistically, he nevertheless wants to have recourse to
the good, or the true, or the beautiful. Taylor argues that this leads to an internalising
of one's epiphany." The artist seeks the transcendent good, but within himself. There
is a turn to subjectivism, yet a paradoxical longing for the transcendent, a turn away
8See Hilton Kramer, 'The Importance of Peter Fuller', Modern Painters, 6:2, 1993, pp.48-50.
'See Cecil Collins, The Vision ofthe Fool and Other Writings, ed. Brian Keeble (Ipswich: Golgonooza
Press, 1994) p. 14.
l0See Judith Collins, Cecil Collins: A Retrospective Exhibition (London: Tate Publishing, 1989) p.37.
11Sources of the Self, pp.456ff.
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6. Cecil Collins, Landscape with Hills and River, 1943, Private Collection
from the self to something higher. ' So where the original Romantics turned to nature
and unadorned feeling, we find many moderns turning to a retrieval of experience or
• • 12
interiority.'
This explains the move away from instrumental reason, but it does not
necessarily lead to the transcendence—or 'anti-subjectivism'—that Taylor finds in
writers like Pound, Eliot, Rilke and Proust. Where this emerged was in the reaction
modernists had against the Romantics' view of the self as an inner nature. They
rejected the idea that harmony with nature brings restoration and redemption. Instead
their turn inward was not to find an inner subjective nature to relate to Nature as a
whole. Rather, the turn was to take them beyond the individual self as it is usually
understood. Indeed, Taylor argues that we are shown fragments of experience which
call into question our ordinary notions of identity. They challenge what we assume to
be normative human characteristics. This kind of epiphany challenges the
mechanistic determinism of the world by challenging the kind of unity of the self
which this ideology implies.
'The ideals of disengaged reason and of Romantic fulfilment both rely
in different ways on a notion of the unitary self. The first requires a
tight centre of control which dominates experience and is capable of
constructing the orders of reason by which we can direct thought and
life. The second sees the originally divided self come to unity in the
alignment of sensibility and reason. Now to the extent that both of
these come to be seen as facets of a world and an outlook whose
claims to embrace everything we want to escape ... the liberation of
experience can seem to require that we step outside the circle of the
single, unitary identity, and that we open ourselves to the flux which
n
moves beyond the scope of control or integration.'
Taylor notes that another characteristic of this movement is a reinterpretation
of time and lived experience. There is a modernist attack levelled at the modes of
narrativity and time-consciousness associated with disengaged instrumental reason.
Philosophers like Bergson and Heidegger, as well as poets like Proust and Eliot, give
us alternative views to the spatialisation of time. 'The modernist retrieval of




and a series of reorderings of a strange and unfamiliar kind.'14 Taylor thinks that as a
result of these two changes, the language of art has become even 'subtler' in the 20th
century. No longer are we merely dealing with symbols which can translate our
experience to a more meaningful complement. Thus Cecil Collins writes that
'Symbols are not things representing something else, they are actual emotions of the
reality of existence, realised in concrete form, that can be experienced.'15 In the
language of poetry and art the epiphany is now to be found between the lines.
In one sense we can still understand what a poem is 'about'. Taylor gives the
example of 'The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock' which he thinks concerns the
'etiolated, pusillanimous life of contemporary man, or one such.'16 But even this is
never fully articulated in the work. Likewise, Cecil Collins' series entitled the Vision
of the Fool (figs. 7 and 8), evokes a sense of man's predicament, his limitations and
desires, his need for grace, but this is no where spelled out for us through the
symbolic efforts of his figures.17
This point can be made even stronger with reference to the abstract painters
of modernity. Jackson Pollock, originally captivated by the power of American
Indian symbolism, moved beyond this, first in works clearly derived from this
heritage such as his Totem series (fig. 9)(where he invokes the mysticism of ritual
like an artistic shaman), and finally to his celebrated drip paintings of complete
abstraction (fig. 10). The Abstract Expressionism of the 1940's and 50's was a
language so subtle it left many people convinced it was communicating nothing at
all.
The epiphany in such an instance is indirect. The movement from
Impressionism to the kinds of Conceptual Art which are being created today reveals
l4Ibid., p.465.
"Cecil Collins, The Vision ofthe Fool, p.66.
l6See Sources ofthe Self p.466.
l7Collins' particular iconography is powerfully relevant given his image of the Fool as one in whom
the saint, the artist and the poet all find their place . The Fool is 'the purity of consciousness'. He is the
humblest of creatures who the world rejects and despises. Not surprisingly, Collins thinks that the
greatest Fool in history was Christ. 'This great Fool was crucified by the commercial pharisees, by the
authority of the respectable, and by the mediocre official culture of the philistines. And has not the
church crucified Christ more deeply and subtly by its hypocrisy, than any pagan? This Divine Fool,
whose immortal compassion and holy folly placed a light in the dark hands of the world.' Vision of
the Fool, p.74).
166
7. Cecil Collins, Fool andAngel Entering a City, 1969, Private Collection
8. Cecil Collins, The Sleeping Fool, 1943, Tate Gallery, London
9. Jackson Pollock, Totem Lesson 1, 1944, Private Collection
10. Jackson Pollock, Autumn Rhythm: Number 30, 1950, 1950, The Metropolitan Museum of Fine
Art, New York
1 1. Franz Marc, Yellow Cow, 1911, The Guggenheim Museum, New York
an important evolution regarding various ways of seeing the world. Paul Tillich, for
example, greatly admired the Expressionists for their truthfulness to a reality beyond
the surface representations of boating parties on the Seine or superficial portraits of
beautiful children. Their message for Tillich was one which attempted to come to
grips with the condition of humanity:
'As an art movement, Expressionism originally referred to
developments in Germany and France in which the natural, self-
contained finite world was rejected in favour of a view of the world in
which depth and ultimacy were affirmed beneath the surface of reality
as then perceived by society ... the art world to be overcome was that
of a naturalistic realism. Here the world is represented in terms of
itself, as if what one saw around one was the real. This involved a
beautifying naturalism, a facile art without depth, which Tillich
18characterised with the German word Kitsch.'
There was never any purport in the art of Roualt and other German
Expressionists to represent figures one would actually see in everyday life. Their
work broke through the surface of'naturalism' to a more 'ultimate' reality. In this the
paintings transformed the spectator's way of seeing. There is a vision involved which
does not belong to this world. The evocative work of Franz Marc, for example, sets
as its task the transformation of our everyday experience into flat, vibrant colours.
The objects (notably animals) are still recognisable, yet it is as if we are seeing them
in an altogether different visionary scheme (fig. 11).
Taylor focuses on the duality involved here in the truly epiphanic art of
modernity. There is an 'uncollapsible distance between agent and world, between
thinker and instinctual depths.'19 The artists of modernism recognised that there was
no such thing as unmediated experience. In visual arts this manifested itself most
clearly in the post-Impressionist preoccupation with form. In poetry, writers like
Pound with his theory of the ideogram indicate the same understanding. As Taylor
enunciates Pound's vision, he explains that the poet found the mediation of form in
l8See Paul Tillich, On Art and Architecture, eds. John Dillenberger and Jane Dillenberger (New York:
Crossroad, 1989) p.xvi. Tillich not only criticises the Impressionists, but any type of facile
'naturalism'. I Ic describes Dali's Christ in theSacrament ofthe Last Suppei as 'a sentimental but very
good athlete in an American baseball team. ... The technique is a beautifying naturalism of the worst
kind. I am horrified by it. [It is] simply junk.' (Time Magazine, 19, 1965, p.46, quoted in Paul Tillich,
On Art andArchitecture, p.xvi.).
'See Sources ofthe Self, p. 172.
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works like 'In a Station of the Metro' to be a vehicle for poetic vision between the
90
lines and thus beyond them. Essentially Pound's notion ofmetaphor partakes of the
Japanese haiku structure which sees objects juxtaposed against each other as
'interpretive' not just 'ornamental'.
Art as Transcendent Epiphany
Taylor asks an important question for Christian ethics: 'Where does epiphany
stand in relation to this new subjective vision?'. If the point of this poetry is, as
Pound himself has suggested, merely capturing a true emotion, or the 'expression of
emotional values', then there is nothing necessarily higher involved, there is no
transcendent epiphanic vision entailed. Taylor argues that this is not a justified
interpretation of Pound (or for that matter T. S. Eliot). For Pound, 'the reality we are
meant to report accurately on is not the bare scene, but the scene transfigured by
emotion.' More importantly, Taylor asserts that, 'the emotion, in turn, is not simply
personal or subjective; it is a response to a pattern in things which rightly commands
this feeling. It is this pattern which is the "thing which has been clearly seen", and
• 91
which the "precise interpretive metaphor" captures.' So the accuracy in Pound's
poetry is not simply mimetic, it is liberating us from the constraints of conventional
ways of seeing.
Something like this is called to mind in Walter Pater's famous dictum that 'all
• • • 22 *
art constantly aspires towards the condition of music.' It is a transfiguring of the
world in a language which both describes and substantiates. Taylor understand these
kinds of epiphanies as 'framing' epiphanies whereby a vortex or void is created
within which the revelation can occur. He places this in direct antithesis to the




22See Walter Pater, The Renaissance, ed. D. L. Hill, 4th ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press, 1980) p. 106.
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some symbolic language a transfiguration of Nature and our inner selves in harmony
with that source.
Taylor is quick to argue, however, that there are certain key features in both
Modern and Romantic kinds of epiphanic art. The most crucial is that they both resist
any understanding of themselves in subjectivist terms. Neither are willing to see art
as mere expressions of feeling. Taylor sees the progression from the Romantics to the
Modernists as a continual retrieval of lost contact with moral and spiritual sources
'through the exercise of creative imagination.' He goes on to say that
'These sources may be divine, or in the world, or in the powers of the
self. They may be seen as new, hitherto untouched, or as in the case of
Pound and Eliot, the aim may be to restore the power of old ones
which have been lost. The aspiration, however conceived, is usually
made more urgent by the sense that our modern fragmented,
instrumentalist society has narrowed and impoverished our lives. This
also is in striking continuity with the Romantics, for all the reversals
modernism brought.'23
This is why Taylor sees the epiphanic characteristics of modern art as a
significant example of transcendence. It is also where he understands the poets and
painters of our time to be speaking a moral language, for they are striving to
articulate constitutive goods be they God, Nature, or the Inner self. This is powerfully
evoked in William Stafford's poem 'Epiphany':
You thinkers, prisoners ofwhat will work:
a dog ran by me in the street one night,
its path met by its feet in quick unthought,
and I stooped in a sudden Christmas, purposeless,
a miracle without a proof, soon lost.
But I still call, 'Here, Other, Other,' in the dark.24
Stafford's endeavour is to understand the human condition. We are
pejoratively addressed as 'thinkers, prisoners of what will work'. Yet he describes a
'sudden Christmas' which reaches beyond this predicament of instrumental
reasoning, and in doing so engages in a moral exercise about meaningfulness.
3Sources of the Self p.490.
34WiIliam Stafford, 'Epiphany', in Allegiances (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).
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Ill this way the artists of our time (and arguably any era) do not fit into the
value categories defined by Kant and re-interpreted by Habermas.22 They do not
attend merely to the subjectivist realm of emotion. Rather, they seek something
beyond mere feelings. Their interpretations indicate that they are striving to
understand a particular order beyond human experience, something akin to an
Aristotelian cosmos if not a Divine structure. By seeking such sources they are no
longer playing by Kant's rules. For they are not interested primarily in subjective
freedom as the most significant way of understanding knowledge. There is a
substantive claim to 'the way things are' which allows someone like Pound to speak
of truth and accuracy in his depictions. The difference in these subtler languages of
art, Taylor argues, is that 'the metaphysics or theology comes indexed to a personal
vision, or refracted through a particular sensibility.'26
So unlike the public belief in God that was so apparent in the Middle Ages,
where everyone was leaning on an assumed transcendence, there is nothing in the
domain of theology or metaphysics today which is publicly available background .
Taylor talks about this background as analogous to the assumed beliefs which
27
Wittgenstein analyses in On Certainty. We take it for granted, for example, that the
earth will remain solid under our feet, not because we have purposefully set out to
prove this and thus believe it to be true, but because we are too busy relying on the
belief even to think about it. Taylor pictures a pre-18th century belief in God in this
light, as something so real, public and apparent, that one did not even stop to
question it. 'In our public and private life of prayer, penance, devotion, religious
discipline, we lean on God's existence, use it as the pivot of our action, even when
25In Theories ofCommunicative Action Habermas describes three categories—science, morality, and
aesthetics—deriving from Kant. The sphere of science deals with issues of truth and the task of
mapping reality, the sphere ofmorals is concerned with questions of right and wrong with a Kantian
criteria of normative validity (only more dialogical). Finally, the aesthetic sphere deals with questions
of beauty, but is something which is centred around the self. In one sense the sphere of the aesthetic is
seen as self-expressive, i.e., art is a subjective concern for Habermas. The artists ofmodernity that
Taylor discusses, however, indicate that there are those creating within the sphere of the aesthetic who
think of themselves and their work not as either expressing the self (or in terms of the deconstruction
of the self), but as concerned with something which transcends this realm. It seems that Habermas is
being unjustifiably dogmatic when he tries to force artists into the Procrustean bed of the subjective
self. Clearly many of them are working beyond these boundaries.
lbSources ofthe Self p.491.
27Ibid„ p.491.
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we aren't formulating our belief, as I use the stairs or the banister in the course ofmy
• • 28focal action of getting down to the kitchen to cook a meal.' The lack of this public
belief, however, does not for Taylor exclude the artist from having recourse to these
transcendent domains. On the contrary even though the 'nugget of transcendent truth'
is indexed to a personal vision, it is still a move beyond the self. Taylor would no
doubt find the words of Cecil Collins compelling:
'The idea of a source means that the source is greater than that which
comes from the source, it is something higher than that which needs to
feed from the source, something more potent than our potency. True
personal happiness comes from superpersonal happiness. When we
pray and worship God, we open up our nature and receive that which
is higher than our nature, that which is wiser than our nature, that
which is happier than our nature; we open up our nature to receive a
9Q
portion of the happiness of all Happiness.'
The Existential Paradox
One way of approaching Taylor's idea of transcendence in modernity is to see
it as a kind of paradox. On the one hand there is, in the articulation of these sources, a
movement beyond the self. The moral order which is the grounding of things is to be
found in the spiritual. On the other hand, what is important is not this truth taken out
of context, but the self s access to this truth. So modern epiphanies must be read as
subjective, but at the same time objective.
The theological relevance for this reading of the modern epiphany has been
linked to thinkers such as Bultmann, Tillich and Buber who have been developing
TO
existential theologies around this paradox. Most notably these theologians have
demonstrated a critical stance towards mechanistic, secularist ideologies, and have
28Ibid„ p.491.
29See Cecil Collins, The Vision ofthe Fool, p.35.
,0See for example, Rudolf Bultmann, 'Jesus Christ and Mythology' mKerygma and Myth, ed. H. W.
Bartsch (London: SPCK, 1953), Paul Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant
Theology (London: SCM, 1967), and Martin Buber, 1 and Thou (Edinburgh, T.& T. Clark, 1937). See
also Schubert Ogden, Christ without myth (New York: Harper and Row, 1961) and Hans W. Frei,
'Niebuhr's theological background', in Faith and ethics, ed. Paul Ramsey (New York: Harper, 1957).
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focused on the primacy of human freedom. Central to an existential theology is the
belief that the route to the divine lies within the self, and like the modernist poet and
painter, it sees the divine (or ultimate reality) inextricably linked to a personal vision.
This association of artist and theologian is convincingly developed by Michael
Morgan as it relates to Taylor's moral theory.31
Morgan believes that Taylor's demonstration of a possible transcendence
which is nevertheless indexed to a personal vision can go a long way towards
recovering a place for religion in a world where notions of transcendence rarely even
get off the ground. 'In Buber, Rosenzweig, as in Kierkegaard, Barth and other
'modernist' theologians, this tension is expressed as the conflict between human
• • TO
freedom and divine power ... .' The way of accommodating this conflict usually
entails anchoring the meaning and content of revelation in the human subject. 'The
content is a human articulation of the meaning of the relation to God.'33 Morgan
obviously has great sympathy for this stance and believes that Taylor's articulation of
the modern epiphany helps to affirm this. For he argues that one of the great
difficulties with religious belief in modernity is the divine-human relationship based
on the dichotomy of king-servant, master-slave. The problem with this theology,
according to Morgan, is that it rules out any possibility of human freedom. Only in a
modern existential theology can this obstacle be surmounted, and Morgan considers
this to be Taylor's only possible course of action.
Taylor's concept of transcendence, however, is more orthodox than Morgan
would want to admit. While Taylor acknowledges that his treatment of religious
belief is and must be modern in terms ofmethodology, it does not exclude traditional
contents or doctrines. The epistemological foreground in Taylor's view must be
given to our moral and spiritual experiences. In other words, we must rely on these
premonitions in order to give our best account of our religious belief. In the age of
Christendom, however, this was not necessarily the case. The belief in a transcendent
God was assumed as a background and as such was much less problematic. Taylor





asserts, however, that in modern culture we cannot argue for God as an obvious
object in the universe the way one would argue for the existence of rocks and trees.
In so doing, he approaches religious belief, and the belief in the transcendent, from an
entirely different vantage point. Nevertheless this modern account of belief does not
(as Morgan wants to suggest) exclude any pre-modern objects of faith. Just because
we cannot help but ground a visionary revelation in some personal experience does
not mean that the reality of that is completely subjective or non-other. Therefore
Taylor does not think that his account of religious faith 'rules out any substantive
view, up to the most 'transcendent' and non-human-centred.' He follows this by
admitting that, 'Indeed, I don't think my view is all that human-centred ... ,'34
Moral Transcendence
This is a much stronger notion of transcendence than most modernists are
comfortable with. Martha Nussbaum, for example, sees transcendence as in some
way living up to one's absolute potential. In a sense she sees it as substantiating the
Nietzschean iibermensch. Giving this an Aristotelian twist, Nussbaum is intent on
developing a moral theory which incorporates the kind ofmean articulated in Book II
of the Nicomachean Ethics. She argues that there are a variety of different ways of
failing to achieve moral perfection, but only one targeted mean, and transcending in
this regard is defined by getting it right viz. living the good life as a virtuous person.
By doing so we transcend the normal, even dysfunctional examples of being human
or
and obtain the moral middle ground.
Another moral philosopher who has a specific idea of transcendence, but one
which is closer to Taylor's, and in fact has influenced Taylor's own thinking on this
subject, is Iris Murdoch. In The Sovereignty ofGood, Murdoch gives a brief synopsis
of modern philosophy and scientific thought in which she accuses these disciplines of
internalising the human agent to a point beyond any possible reference to the
'4See 'Reply and re-articulation', in Philosophy in an Age ofPluralism. My italics.
°See Martha Nussbaum, 'Transcending Humanity' in Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and
Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) pp.365-391.
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transcendent. Like Taylor she exposes the inconsistencies of naturalist, mechanistic
explanations of human behaviour, and following on from this she sees the neo-
Kantian and utilitarian modes of thinking as those responsible for such an emphasis
in philosophy. She indicates that Wittgenstein, with his arguments against a private
language, opened up a space in which the utilitarian and Kantian could justify a
position of procedural ethics. Their arguments follow from the impossibility of a
private language to the impossibility of morality being rooted in anything but actions.
Naturally this is stimulated by a need to feel as if one is actually making a difference
in the world. Any moral theory which does not have a place for action can easily be
seen as useless posturing, even cruelly inappropriate in the face of suffering and evil.
But what the content of such theories tends to emphasise is the denial of any
reference to the good. 'As the inner life is hazy, largely absent, and any way "not part
of the mechanism", it turns out to be logically impossible to take up an idle
contemplative attitude to the good [Aristotle]. Morality must be action since mental
concepts can only be analysed genetically.'36 What this means, however, is that if we
can have no reference to the inner soul, we also can have no reference to any
metaphysical 'other' which transcends the self. Murdoch wants to argue that we must
be able to have recourse to such sources, for in our impressions—in certain concepts
of perfection and the individual—we are already living by these assumptions.
An important facet of this belief for Murdoch is the 'synthetic' a priori of the
human as fallen, sinful and imperfect. The moral agent is limited in his love and
human knowledge. This is an extremely powerful claim for Murdoch since she
argues that 'Love is knowledge of the individual', yet because of our finitude we are
37 ....
unable to carry this out fully. This is similar to what Reinhold Niebuhr has tried to
evoke in The Nature and Destiny of Man, by speaking of the tension that exists
between the tug of the transcendent and the realisation of our finitude. Within this
TO
tension we experience God, we create art, we live our moral lives.
We also need to recognise our limitations within this realm of conflict. In this
sense getting beyond ourselves is the antithesis of what Nussbaum wants to claim as
'''See Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty ofGood, p. 15.
37Ibid., p.28.
'8See Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny ofMan, 2 vols., (London: Nisbet, 1941) I: clips.7&8.
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the nature of transcendence. There is a redemptive role for the grace of the
transcendent which Nietzsche would consider to be morally abhorrent. Murdoch
asserts that,
'our picture of ourselves has become too grand, we have isolated, and
identified ourselves with, an unrealistic conception of will, we have
lost the vision of a reality separate from ourselves, and we have no
adequate conception of original sin. Kierkegaard rightly observed that
"an ethic which ignores sin is an altogether useless science," although
he also added, "but if it recognises sin it is eo ipso beyond its
sphere".'39
Picturing the good is both difficult and problematic. The idea of goodness and
virtue has largely been prescinded by the idea of what is right. Murdoch, like Taylor,
thinks this is largely due to the lack of any permanent background or articulated
moral horizon whether it be God, History, Reason, or Nature. 'The agent, thin as a
needle, appears in the quick flash of the choosing will.'40 Incorporated into
Murdoch's theory is the concept of 'attention' which she establishes from Simone
Weil. A just and loving gaze on our moral sources, she believes, is the characteristic
and proper mark of the active moral agent. This is both normative and logical for her
(and for Taylor). It is what should be the case and what must inescapably be so. This
is exactly why Taylor can argue that the utilitarian or Kantian cannot help but have
recourse to some substantive good, even if they do not want to own up to the fact.41
Murdoch describes prayer as the Christian description of this loving gaze on
our moral source. Prayer is not in its true form petition, but rather 'an attention to
God which is a form of love.' This is surely what C. S. Lewis was referring to when
he insisted that the best kinds of prayers are those which do not involve any words.
Speaking to the Christian, Lewis says, 'Prayer in the sense of petition, asking for
things, is a small part of it; confession and penitence are its threshold, adoration its
sanctuary, the presence and vision and enjoyment of God its bread and wine. In it
God shows Himself to us.'42
''See Murdoch, The Sovereignty ofGood, p.47.
40Ibid„ p.53.
4'See Chapter 3.
42See C. S. LewisM Mind Awake, ed. Clyde S. Kilby (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1968)
p. 146.
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family and all the life-goods that can be affirmed in that context in order to reach a
harmonious and prosperous community ruled by philosophers 44
This kind of transcendence, one which asks the individual to go beyond what
one normally understands as the fulfilled human life, has been seen as suffocating.
Since the Enlightenment it has been a basic form of criticism against religion.
Nietzsche, as mentioned above, has developed a polemic against the self-mutilating
potential of transcendence, and something similar can be found in the Frankfurt
School.45
Taylor, however, argues that transcendence properly conceived does not lead
to a denial of the self, rather to a fulfilment beyond the self. He insists that it can be
understood as bursting out of the limitations entailed in our ordinary life goods to a
higher realm. The true way of the Gospel is 'a possible vocation for human beings
that transcends, that goes beyond, that even breaks out of ... the self, the ordinary
way of operating as human beings ... it's a way in which we see a vocation for
ourselves, a road for ourselves, that involves breaking beyond these normal
vocations, and so it's relation to our ethical understanding is the same uneasy one
that any one of those paths proposed by either Plato or Buddha and so on, are.'46 The
constitutive character of God and the goods within which we must anchor a Christian
ethic are ones which will transcend our human goods in this way.
This is not to say that Taylor is advocating a belief in a total, objective
transcendence of the kind described by Kant in the Critique ofReason. If this were
true one could not possibly know that which is beyond in any meaningful way. There
must be some recourse to one's personal experiences, one's moral and
epistemological vantage point. The individual has a sense of the limits of human
resources and the idea of perfection as well as the power of the Good. From this we
can make what George Steiner has called a 'wager on transcendence.'47 But our
understanding of this wager in Christian ethics must be theocentric. The human agent
44See Republic, Bk.V.
4'See for example, Friedrich Nietzsche, Human alt too Human, 2 vols., trans. Helen Zimmern, ed.
Oscar Levy (London: T. N. Foulis, 1909) I:139ff., and RolfWiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, trans.
Michael Robertson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986).
46See Appendix E.
47See George Steiner, Real Presences (London: Faber and Faber, 1989) p.4.
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must play a humble role. Transcendence has to do with the decentering of the self
away from the temptations of the Nietzschean iibermensch, even away from the
notions of a good life that Nussbaum wants to articulate. One must be ready to deny
the idea of human fulfilment, even be 'ready to sacrifice it, give it up, make a leap
beyond that ... .' The concept of transcendence ' ... which you see very clearly in the
Cross, in the Christian Faith, which you see in Buddhism in another way, it can't be
fitted into ... [Nussbaum's] ... category.'48 It is something that cuts across the
frameworks of a fulfilled human life as this is normally understood. 'It's not another
bit of fulfilment which we've got to cram into the picture with everything else. It is
something that can take you quite outside and beyond that, can make a sacrifice of
that.'49
An objection to this kind of radical decentering of the self can be made on the
practical level of conflicting goods and moral reasoning. One may ask what prevents
an individual claiming a special dispensation from God which in a theocentric
morality would trump the goods of a community. One of the most tragic examples of
this in the past year has been the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. The law student,
Yigal Amir, who shot the Israeli prime minister, testified that he was acting on God's
orders. Taylor's reply to this kind of extreme and brutal theophany is to point to the
Gospel as evidence that we have not been left entirely without guidelines in judging
these kinds of matters. On the one hand the Christian ethic of transcendence is 'this
personal calling to go beyond that which comes in people's lives in totally different
ways, and which involves some development of some personal relationship with God
... .' On the other hand, we are not left without anything upon which to make
judgements:
'
... we have the example in the Gospel, a paradigm example of
transcending, of giving it all up. Of course, in doing all that, well, we
have a story that doesn't involve murder. It involves being murdered.
It doesn't involve using force. There even are specific events of the
story, episodes of temptation which involve being effective—normal,
historical ways of being effective ... and these are deliberately set
aside. The story is that these are rejected. So we're not left totally




these people out because God told me to," it doesn't square with what
one finds in history, in the Gospels.'50
Ontology and Theology
With the idea of transcendence, as Taylor understands it, a relationship is
established between the human agent and some reality beyond the self. Underlying
this relationship is the important question of ontology. The concept of being in
theology has long been considered the bedrock for establishing both the nature of
God and our relationship to Him. When asking questions about God's character,
being is already assumed. Ontology is in effect a 'pre-theology', an inquiry into the
being of those entities discussed in theology. Heidegger understood the inescapable
link between ontology and theology when he wrote that 'Theology is seeking a more
primordial interpretation (than formerly) of the being of man in relation to God,
prescribed by the meaning of faith itself and remaining within it.'51
Ontical statements must rely on some concept of being. In other words
statements about the human agent must relate in some way to the human agent
existing. This is what Heidegger's phrase Dasein is meant to invoke—humanity
understood ontologically. One difficulty with this existential focus, however,
particularly with the way Taylor views transcendence, is that it sets up an
investigation which is primarily anthropocentric. There is no reason to introduce any
variable beyond our own existence. Yet without the transcendent such an ontology
quickly slides into nihilism.
John Macquarrie has made a persuasive application of Heidegger's idea of
anxiety—the fact that we are apprehensive about our existence in the world—by
50Ibid.
"See Heidegger, Being and Time, p.10.
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relating it to the New Testament teaching of Mankind as stranger in the world. He
argues that man's being is such that 'he cannot find contentment in the world, and
even when he is lulled into a false sense of security, a fundamental uneasiness ...
arises out of the very constitution of his being, and breaks in to disclose to him that
he is not at home, that the world is uncanny (unheimlich), and can be hostile when
• 52
man surrenders himself to it.'
There are two objections which the Christian theologian must put forward to
this idea, one relatively simple, one more involved. First, it is not just a matter of the
world being hostile in the sense that we must fight against the elements the way
Hilary and Tenzing did when they conquered Mount Everest. This anxiety does not
stem from the same source that Burke and others saw as the fountain of the Sublime.
Triumphing over nature will not alleviate this angst.
Secondly, and more importantly, such an existential emphasis still has no
recourse to why it is that we feel anxious. The ontology of such a philosophy does
not extend to a thick description ofGod which relates the individual in such a way as
to define him by the transcendent, and thus explain why it is that we are foreigners in
this world (or at least partially unfulfilled). In the Christian ontology there is the
'Other beyond' which is defining us, which does not have its origin in this natural
realm. This Other must come into the equation of fulfilment by bringing us out of
this natural realm. This alone can account for why it is that here in the terra firma of
our existence we feel like metaphysical fish out ofwater.
The existentialist has no recourse to this transcendent dimension, although the
kind of existential theology Macquarrie is arguing for is not a typical articulation. He
realises that this anxiety and the recognition of this is only the first step in reaching
the New Testament doctrine. 'The disclosure does not indeed yield the explicit
knowledge of God, but directs man to God as the ground of his being ... .'53 What
Macquarrie is speaking of here is humanity's feeling of 'dependence' which points to
God. This can go a long way towards arguing for God as a moral source, and as such,
an ontologically relevant feature in our moral frameworks.
"See John Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology (London: SCM, 1955) p.67.
"ibid., p.68.
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Not all have been driven to God from this condition, however. Both Sartre
and Camus addressed this tension, but in the face of the absurd the most important
point of one's existence for them was achieving absolute freedom through self-
formulation. Camus even argued that to 'leap' to God that Kierkegaard had made was
'philosophical suicide'/4 Macquarrie describes the two possible conclusions from
recognising this anxiety in the following manner:
'when man's existence is disclosed to himself in the mood of
ontological anxiety as possibility bound up with the world, there are
two possible ways in which he can interpret his situation. He can
accept that he is thrown into an ocean of being, alien and even hostile
to himself, in which he must exist; or he can seek a ground of being,
which means simply a Creator who is author both of man's being and
of the being of nature.'55
Paul Tillich, another theologian to emphasise the importance of ontology, has
observed that 'Finitude is the possibility of losing one's ontological structure and,
with it, one's self. But this is a possibility, not a necessity. To be finite is to be
threatened. But a threat is possibility, not actuality. The anxiety of finitude is not the
despair of self-destruction. Christianity sees in the picture of Jesus as the Christ a
human life in which all forms of anxiety are present but in which all forms of despair
are absent.'56
Nihilism results when the individual refuses to venture beyond the first of
Macquarrie's two alternatives. The possibility of transcendence, however, lies in the
actual state of being itself, for 'equally original with, and implied in, the disclosure to
man in anxiety of his own being as possibility thrown into the ocean of what is, is the
disclosure of the possibility of a Being who is not thrown into the sea of what is,
because he is himself the ground of what is, being itself, beyond both the
Vorhandenheit of inanimate things and the Existenz of man, both of which are
contingent and conditioned.'57
A theocentric ontology involves not just a 'pre-theologicaf inquiry, but a pre-
ontological one as well. For as Tillich has phrased the issue: 'The being of God is
54See Albert Camus, The Myth ofSisyphus, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York: Random House, 1955).
'"See John Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, pp.70-71.
" Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1:201.
John Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, pp.71-72.
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being-itself .58 It is not simply that God exists in the same way that creatures exist,
alongside other beings. It must be the case that God is qualitatively higher than other
beings. He is infinite, omnipotent, being itself—esse ipso. In existential terminology
He is beyond the contrast of 'existence' and 'essence'. This is why for Tillich it is
wrong to speak of God as existing, just as it is wrong to see Him as the universal
essence of pantheism.59
God as being-itself has His existence in His essence, the two are identical.
'Being-itself infinitely transcends every finite being. There is no proportion or
gradation between the finite and the infinite. There is an absolute break, an infinite
"jump". On the other hand, everything finite participates in being-itself and in its
infinity.'60
The important thrust here is to understand God as the sustainer and definer of
our being. From this theocentric ontological claim we can make certain ontic
statements about the nature of the human agent. Not only is this significant for a
systematic understanding of theological questions, but what naturally flows from this
is the need to anchor our moral intuitions in some strong concept of God's being as
transcendent reality.
Various theological ethicists have honed in on specific events in the Christian
history as revealing an ontology upon which Christian ethics can be founded. Stanley
Hauerwas, for example, has concentrated on a 'kingdom' theology whereby we
understand ethical issues within the framework of the Church.61 Others, like Keith
Ward, have stressed the doctrine of creation arguing that because of the special
relationship established in the creation a Christian ethic has recourse to cosmology as
necessarily related to morality.62 Still others such as Oliver O'Donovan have sought
to reconcile this polarisation by grounding our moral order in the Resurrection of
Christ.63 In all these articulations there is an assumed primacy for the character and
58Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1:237.
"This idea has been given a new impetus in some post-modern theologies. See particularly Jean-Luc
Marion's God Without Being, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
60 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1:237.
6lSee Stanley Hauerwas, The Priestly Kingdom (Notre Dame: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1983).
62See Keith Ward, The Divine Image: thefoundations ofChristian morality (London: SPCK, 1976).
'"See Oliver O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
1994).
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nature of God, an onto logical springboard from which to leap into the realm of
Christian ethics.
Being as Perfection
One of the most cogent ontologies is that of Aquinas. His theory of moral
realism, which has had an influence on Charles Taylor's own formulations, argues
that 'being' and 'goodness' are the same in reference and differ only in sense.64
Given that goodness is what all desire, Aquinas argues that anything that is desired is
desired to the extent that it is perfect—whole, complete, free from relevant defects.
Furthermore, something is perfect of its kind to the extent that it has fully realised its
potential—it has been actualised. Therefore, a thing is perfect and thus desirable
(good of its kind) to the extent to which it is in being.63 So being and goodness both
have the same reference: the actualisation of a potentiality. Being can be understood
in one of two ways. First, there is being as mere existence, so that when I talk about
the Loch Ness Monster existing, I am talking of being (ovcna) in this sense.
Secondly, there is being as linked to value. As an individual possessing being in this
way, I am linked to goodness in so far as there is a specifying potentiality of
humanness, and when this is actualised, I am more fully a human being than I was
before. In certain respects I have more being in me than prior to this actualised state.
In this second definition of being it is inextricably linked to goodness. In terms of the
human moral agent we can say that while on one level an individual exists, on
another level reaching the potential involved in the human natural model brings one
into fuller being. This of course is associated with the Aristotelian notion of ergon,
what one is best suited for. It is the nature of human agency, according to Aristotle, to
be rational, and as such there are specific ways of being fully human which include
civic participation and divine contemplation. This kind of moral theory, which
Aquinas invokes, has first to determine what kind of being the human agent is. The
64See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, in The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas: Introductory
Readings, trans, and ed. Christopher Martin (London: Routledge, 1988) la q.5.
'"Ibid., Ia q.5.
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meta-ethic that follows on from this definition is dependent upon this ontology.
There is a natural reference to God if we understand that reaching the potential
amounts to coming closer to God, as total goodness, total actuality, total Being. God
alone is essentially goodness itself.66 Once we understand that man as defined by this
total goodness must seek this good in order to be fully human, our ethics can follow
on naturally.
Ontology and Basic Reasons
Charles Taylor's ideas about the nature of morality, as well as his
propositions concerning how a moral ontology is to be structured, can help to bring
this picture to fruition, and establish some common ground between disparate
approaches to the question of a Christian ethic. For Taylor ontology is important in
ethics in so far as he sees God as a constitutive good. A constitutive good is one
which is not only incomparably higher than other goods (hypergoods) but one which
is understood substantively. To be affected by such a good is to have a relationship
with it, to understand it as a reality, a link to which constitutes the goodness of one's
actions or motives. Theologically this means that God is that moral source which
determines what good action is. Not only this, but for Taylor a constitutive good
plays a role beyond merely defining; the love we have for God moves us to good
action. God not only ontologically fixes the limits of what the good action is, but by
loving Him we are empowered to do and be good. In such a way to see God is to see
Him as Good.
This can be discerned, for example, in the authority of God and the effect this
has on our moral disposition. We are not called to follow Divine commands
reluctantly, to see them with a resentful eye the way the oppressed would interpret the
laws of a tyrant. Rather we see them as good because we articulate the moral source
of God as constituting their goodness.
"'Ibid., la q. 2, a. 3.
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The sovereignty does not belong to God's law, but to God himself. His
character takes us far beyond the purview of obligatory action. To submit truly to
God is to love His authority. It is based on reality, on the nature of things, not on
coercion or demand. If divine authority is to command us absolutely it must be truth.
Authority in such a way presupposes the constitutive nature of God as the foundation
of Being. For there must be a strong moral source involved in order to see the good
substantively.
In this picture of God as a moral source it is important to distinguish between
grounding our moral intuitions and constituting them. Grounding is often thought of
as giving a reason for, in the foundationalist sense of the word. It includes giving the
ultimate objective basis for a particular position. Taylor admits that much of our
morality involves giving 'basic reasons' in this way. We argue that A is a better
position to take than B because it leads to the result C which can be given as a basic
reason. So, using an example from Taylor, balancing the budget is the right thing to
do because it avoids inflation, and this will improve people's economic welfare.
'There is asymmetry here, because clearly we wouldn't have any reason to balance
the budget, or fight inflation, if they didn't contribute to economic welfare, say, to the
height and equitable distribution of income.'67
Economic welfare in this example is functioning as a basic reason. This,
however, does not apply in questions about the good. We cannot, for example, argue
from a basic reason as such to conclude that economic welfare is a good. There is no
foundationalist answer to what makes such a thing good or bad. Attempts may be
made to give basic reasons for a basic reason. Such an argument would be 'You
ought to pursue economic welfare because it leads to x.' But what is presumed in this
argument is that 'x' is something that I am already committed to. The question left
begging here is 'why am I committed to 'x'?'. The utilitarian answer may be
something like economic welfare contributes to human happiness and this is what we
ought to strive for. The problem, as Taylor explains it, is that when economic welfare
67See Charles Taylor, 'Reply to Braybrooke and de Sousa', pp. 125-131
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no longer contributes to human happiness this is no longer something which should
be pursued.68
This distinction has a profound effect on how we understand Christian ethics.
When someone says, for example, that we ought not to oppress the poor because God
has commanded us to seek our neighbour's good, he is in effect giving a basic reason
for this moral action. If God no longer commanded us to seek the good of our
neighbour then we could use extortion in our dealings with others and be morally
above reproach. The problem with this view is that anything could be considered
morally the right thing to do merely by 'divine' fiat. This leads to a kind of cosmic
relativity whereby God is an objective de facto reason for morality which could at
anytime shift. He becomes an extreme dispensationalist. 'Thou shall not kill' is a rule
that we hold to at this particular time in history, but there is no arbitrating between
this moral position and others which happen to differ.
Another reason for arguing against such a view has to do with our tendency
towards hubris. Gene Outka makes the point that what he calls 'code morality' is
religiously perilous because:
'However praiseworthy specific rules and laws might be in
themselves, they may furnish a sublime opportunity for corruption on
the highest level. They may prompt a fatal shift in priorities, where the
self turns away from the God who commands in order to deliberate in
advance on what ought to happen to the loving man, what specifically
he must do. This may in turn encourage human presumption by at
least implying that man has the immanent capacity to perceive God's
command, that this perception pertains to man as such (rather than
continually accruing to him). Whenever such an implication is drawn,
the basis for confidence will have disastrously shifted.'69
Karl Barth reminds us that ethical theory 'is not meant to provide man with a
program the implementation of which would be his life's goal.' Rather, to avoid the
predicament that Outka describes, we must understand as Barth does that 'Ethics
exists to remind man of his confrontation with God, who is the light illuminating all
his actions.'70 IfChristianity is to have an ethic at all, God's constitutive transcending
r,sThis is discussed in the context of moral reasoning in Chapter 2.
69See Gene Outka, Agape: An Ethical Analysis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972) p. 231.
70See Karl Barth, The Humanity ofGod, trans. Thomas Wieser (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press,
1963) p.86.
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nature must play an important role. Taylor himself implies this when identifying
certain functions that the constitutive nature of a good can incorporate:
'The point of articulating what I have called one's "constitutive
goods" (which for the theist certainly involve God) is not
"grounding," but is usually (i) to clarify and make more vivid what is
involved in a certain goal of life good; and often (ii) to empower one
by a more potent sense of the constitutive good as a source. My
complaints about the more reductive strains of the Enlightenment
when they shy away from constitutive goods is not that they are
thereby failing to "ground" their moral stands, but ... that they are not
coming clean about their own sources.'71
This becomes slightly problematic for someone like Oliver O'Donovan who
wants to set up a 'Moral Order' in Christian ethics. For while he does admit that
knowledge must be grounded in being, he seems to over-emphasise the order of
morality as if this is some kind of neo-nominalist posturing based on the divine will
which manifests itself in the divine command.72 Such an emphasis negates the power
of the good since it concentrates on a 'thin' description of God as author of the Law
rather than incarnate Grace and Love. Phrases like 'objective ontological standing'
point to a kind of oxymoron as far as God constituting the good is concerned. Being
in terms of ontological significance implies that one is never objective. There is a
non-neutral dimension which is inescapable. One cannot see God as a constitutive
good and not both love this good and see it as good. Failing to see this means missing
the ontological point of the exercise, and slipping into an Occamite theology.
'Christianity,' declares Tillich, 'has emphasised the split between the created
goodness of things and their distorted existence. But the good is not considered an
arbitrary commandment imposed by an all-powerful existent on the other existents. It
7T
is the essential structure of reality.'
7'Taylor, 'Reply to Braybrooke and de Sousa', p. 130.
721 should qualify my polemic against O'Donovan at this point, for while he does use language
pregnant with a 'basic reason' mentality, as a whole his moral argument is rooted in the character of
God as manifested in the Bible. As such I am sympathetic to his project, but am wary about the
specific articulations of his argument.
7,See Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1:204.
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The Law and Gospel
The dichotomy between Law and Gospel brings this out even more clearly.
The Law in and of itself represents a procedural ethic, one which has no recourse to
the good. It can only condemn us (Romans 7). In modern language the Law is a 'thin'
moral description. In order for it to have any positive meaning it must be constituted
by a moral source. Christ Incarnate represents this source. He is the constitutive good
of the ontic logos made flesh. Fulfilment of the Law in Christ can be understood as
articulating the moral source of the goods represented in the Law.
It is not merely the case as O'Donovan wants to argue, that 'God has willed
that the restored creation should take form in, and in relation to, one man.'74 The
identity of Jesus Christ is beyond such a mere historical fact. There is a significant
moral dimension which inextricably joins Jesus Christ with God as our moral source.
Putting this on the level of a divine command places the entire ontological project in
jeopardy by attempting to give a basic reason for the Incarnation.
God sent his begotten son, but it was not merely because of His will that this
happened. It is not the case that if He so desired, He could have sent five sons instead
of one. Identity with the Trinity, and its ontological nature, necessitated that one of
three is represented in the Incarnation, but all are equally present. Because of the
nature of God—His sustaining Being and character as a constitutive good—the
Incarnation could only take this form. God from God, Light from Light, true God
from true God.
Jesus is not just the man God chose for the job, or even the first adopted 'son'
of God. He is God (the very difference between 'creating' and 'begetting'). In many
respects because O'Donovan's argument is committed to focusing too strongly on a
kind of moral order apart from God's Being (one set up by divine will), he is forced
to rely on a procedural ethic which negates his own underlying insistence for a strong
moral source—an ontological dimension. Taylor argues that in such cases there is a
74See Oliver O'Donovan, Resurrection andMoral Order, p. 150.
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need to articulate the moral sources which underlie our presuppositions. We must
'finally put our ontologies where our (rhetorical) mouths are.'75
The Gospel of Jesus Christ as God incarnate does not only help to define and
constitute the moral obligations dictated to us by the Law, but it offers us the
redemptive power of God as our moral source. Keeping in mind Taylor's premise
that loving such a source empowers us to achieve the good, we can see likewise that
Christ as a constitutive good (indeed as the Sumum Boniim), by his grace, enables us
to do the good. It is through the power of the Incarnate Word that we are able to
overcome the condemnation of the Law. Furthermore if we attempt to deny this
power and seek justification through the Law, we negate the redemptive grace of
God: 'I have been crucified with Christ and I no longer live, but Christ lives in me.
The life I live in the body, I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave
himself for me. I do not set aside the grace of God, for if righteousness could be
gained through the law, Christ died for nothing' (Galatians 2.20-21).
Fact and Value in Christian Ethics
One difficult knot in Christian ethics that this discussion can help to untie is
the distinction between fact and value. In theology as in philosophy individuals are
often accused of arriving at an ethical conclusion from a premise which is non-
ethical. There is a gap in our moral landscape between what we call statements of
description and statements of evaluation—what is and what ought to be.76 Enunciated
by Flume and further articulated in G. E. Moore's 'naturalistic fallacy', modern
philosophy has been faced with the problem of getting from a logical truth-statement
such as 'killing is the taking of human life' to morally charged statements such as
'killing is wrong'. As seen above with the issue of economic justice and human
welfare, it is difficult to see how one can get from the fact that balancing the budget
7'See Charles Taylor, 'Reply to Braybrooke and de Sousa', pp.130-131.
76See Chapter 2.
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makes for better human welfare to the statement 'human welfare ought to be
pursued.'
The rigid distinction between fact and value in the moral realm has left most
theological ethicists without a voice.77 For the Christian who begins his ethics with
the character of God, muddying the waters of fact and value seems almost
inescapable. After all even if one were to adhere to a divine command ethic which
focuses on certain given truth claims, one must point to some underlying reason for
obeying these commands which would invoke the nature of God, i.e., concepts of
Holiness, Sovereignty, Goodness, Faithfulness, Love and so on, which are not neutral
terms. The Christian ethic, in effect, is disqualified before it even enters the race. Of
course, within its own micro community this ethic can function as long as Christians
agree on the various value-ladened premises, but how can such an insular voice speak
to the world? It may be the case that a Christian ethic shares many of the same
conclusions that secular ethicists have such as the importance of universal rights and
the dignity of the human agent, but for the secular thinker the Christian has short-
circuited the process.
When it comes to discourse in the moral arena, to giving a reason for one's
view, the Christian must begin with the nature of reality which includes, as I have
argued, the realm of the transcendent and the nature of being. Essentially, the
Christian must hold a view which is normatively descriptive, or. in other words,
where the facts of the matter are pregnant with value.
The difficulty is actually on two levels. First, the Christian must come to see
how she or he can become an interlocutor with the secular ethicist working with this
kind of framework. Secondly, and partially related, the Christian must understand
what it means to give a reason for one's ethical view in such a framework. The two
are related by the fact that the second of these is a necessary requirement for
77One theologian to address this problem is Helen Oppenheimer. She argues in 'Christian Flourishing',
Religious Studies, 5, 1969, pp. 163-171, that there exist in our world facts that are not 'value-free'
among which are the basic claims of Christianity. 'To affirm it is clearly no platitude but involves at
least two substantial assumptions: that the basic doctrines of Christianity can indeed be called 'facts';
and that it is indeed possible for facts not to be neutral but to involve claims, for 'is' to have 'ought'
built into it.' See also her later article 'Ought and Is', Theology, 76, 1973, pp.59-73.
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engaging in the first. One must understand how to reason morally before one engages
in the exchange.
Taylor's moral ontology alleviates the tension of the fact/value distinction,
and by doing so, gives us a better understanding of what it means to give a moral
reason for something. One of the claims of his moral ontology, indeed, one of his
major ontological premises, is that moral intuitions involve claims about the nature
-7Q
and status of human beings. As such they cannot be defined in neutral descriptive
language, either socio-psychologically or mechanistically. There is a given ontology
of the human which shows up in the domain of our moral reactions. This is a part of
our reality inasmuch as it is included in our best account of the human moral
domain.79
From this premise Taylor outlines the nature of moral reasoning. He uses a
transcendental argument of the kind Kant used for example in the 'Transcendental
Analytic', whereby one starts with an undeniable part of reality and moves to a
statement which asserts that the very possibility of this part of reality existing
necessarily presupposes that something else actually exists.80 What is undeniably real
for Taylor is the fact that the human as an embodied agent in the world has a specific
ontology which includes strongly valued goods. Several things follow from this
including the fact that man is a self-interpreting animal whose existence is defined by
value. In terms of moral reasoning what this indicates is that we are all starting our
moral conversations from specific paradigms. There are no neutral stances. Moral
reasoning is moving from one moral position to another, hopefully better, position. It
is reasoning in transition, not from a disengaged standpoint whereby one can
logically calculate the pros and cons of a moral choice apart from the subjectivity of
one's own personal identity, and then leap back into the moral arena of human
agency with a foundationalist decision in hand.
Modern epistemological trends have attempted to assert the claim that one
must index any moral reasoning to the bedrock of pure instrumental reasoning or to
an indisputable foundation which can be clearly argued. With such an ideology it
78See Sources ofthe Self p.5.
"ibid., p.59.
"See Charles Taylor, 'The Validity of Transcendental Arguments', in Philosophical Arguments.
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should be possible for the moral interlocutor to take someone holding a clearly
articulated, contrary position, and bring that person through a logical process to an
undeniable premise which conflicts with his view thereby converting him in the
process.
In Christian ethics this has several implications. If we could logically prove
the existence of God in the way Aquinas wants to, then we could bring people to see
the importance of God's authority and thereby win a point for Christian moral theory.
Logic, however, will not convince anyone who is not already compelled to believe. If
this were the case there would be no work for the Holy Spirit. We could function
without mystery, relying rather on mathematics.
There is a reality outside of logic, however, and Taylor's argument gives
reign to a Christian ethic of transcendence and ontology which has been intellectually
oppressed in the 20th century. Realising that there is an undeniable human ontology
which Taylor argues has a transcendent dimension, we can go on to say that the
Christian programme of defining the human agent includes God as constituting the
good in our lives. Furthermore, as human agents within the moral domain, we can
understand transcendence not as self-mutilation, but as a freeing of the person from
the confines of ordinary life goods. God as constitutive good empowers us to live
beyond our ordinary moral obligations.
As such this programme is justified by the nature of an undeniable reality.
Taylor's moral ontology indicates that this starting point is a cogent one, that the
separation of the evaluative and the descriptive spheres is a doomed enterprise. It also
explains that we can feel confident as moral interlocutors holding this position since
it is no longer a matter of 'coming clean' about our predispositions in an attempt to
cast them off before we begin. In effect Taylor's argument gives the Christian a voice






It is left for this investigation to interpret Taylor's moral ontology in light of
one of the pivotal features of Christianity. David Tracy has called the phenomenon of
Jesus Christ and his Church the story of God's 'Pure Unbounded Love'.1 This love is
arguably the most important dimension of Christian ethics. As Oliver O'Donovan
describes it, 'Love is the overall shape of Christian ethics, the form of the human
. . . . 9 ...
participation in created order.' Whether one begins with the idea of creation, the
community, an eschatological notion of the Kingdom, or the Resurrection of Christ,
love will play a central role. It is that quality out of which community arises and
creatures are formed. Love is that which when all else has passed away, will remain.
It is evoked in both the sacrifice on the Cross and the conquering of death in the
Resurrection.
Given that it is universally espoused in Christian ethics, it is ironic that so
much confusion abounds concerning love, and particularly agape, that Christian love
of the New Testament. This may be due in part to its importance. Love in the
Christian context is seen as closely aligned with God, and thus as mysterious, as
unknowable. It is that which best describes the relationship between God and human,
yet at the same time leaves us with an impoverished definition because of the power
'See David Tracy, 'The Catholic Model of Caritas: Self-Transcendence and Transformation',
Concilium, 121, 1979, pp. 100-110.
2See O. O'Donovan, Resurrection andMoral Order, p.25.
of the actual association. Many theologians would concur with Walter Harrelson who
asserts that 'no one term can adequately express the richness of the God-man
relationship—not even agape.'3 Nevertheless, these same theologians also see the
importance of exploring this concept, not only to understand and more fully
appreciate our relationship with God, but also our relationships with others.
There are even those non-Christian philosophers like Iris Murdoch who see
the importance for love in the way we relate to each other. She insists that 'We need
a moral philosophy in which the concept of love, so rarely mentioned now by
philosophers, can once again be made central.'4 While Charles Taylor agrees with
Murdoch's viewpoint and has even been influenced by her philosophy of love, his
place for love in ethics is one which is much more theologically charged. He sees a
central and even necessary position for agape in modern moral theories if we are to
keep apace with self-imposed moral demands.
Taylor's concept of agape is intriguing given the role he thinks it must play in
secular moral theory. For on the one hand he is closely aligned to the theologian who
wants to attribute a primary focus on agape in our ethical formulations. On the other
hand, however, given the notion of moral ontology, constitutive goods, and his
arguments against procedural ethics, his theory of agape brings out a number of
remarkable features which stand against many of the popular theological articulations
of agape. This chapter will investigate the Christian understanding of agape and in
conclusion examine how Taylor's place for agape as a constitutive good can add to
the discussion of this central feature of Christian ethics.
An Etymological Diversion
Scholars agree that agape has a special place in Biblical Greek, but there is
still contention concerning its origins. Some would argue that the term's theistic
connotation is exclusive to the New Testament Koine, while others point to examples
'See Walter J. Harrelson, 'The Idea of Agape in the New Testament', Journal of Religion, 31, 1951,
pp.169-182.
4See Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty ofGood, p.46
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such as the Egyptian manuscript 'P Oxy. 1380', which describes Isis with the phrase
'agape theon', to indicate that the New Testament writers were not elevating this
term of common love to a higher plane in any unprecedented manner.5
It has been assumed that the use of agape emerged as a sacred handing down
of the term 'eros' from Classical Greek sources. The classical scholar G. Quispel,
echoing the Johannine statement, even argues provocatively that God is Eros using
texts from Boethius and Dionysius the Areopagite.6 The modern understanding of
eros, however, usually sets it against the character of agape. The most important
example of this is Anders Nygren's Agape and Eros.1 In this tome the Swedish
theologian understands eros as that love which contrary to agape, seeks its own
concern rather than the selfless regard for others.
This was not, however, the Greek understanding of the word 'eros'. There is
no denying the sexual connotations that the term has in Greek literature. While it is
often contrasted with philia, it can also designate a strong desire, or a passionate joy.
Furthermore, Eros was the proper name for the personification of love, who,
o
according to Hesiod, was the oldest of the gods. What reformed theology has taken
from the Greek concept of eros, however, is the egoistic tendencies in these
connotations such that eros becomes equated with selfishness.
Karl Barth, who was not entirely sympathetic to Nygren's agenda,
nevertheless interprets the Greek understanding of eros as fundamentally flawed in
this regard.9 What Nygren and Barth (as well as others like Bornkamm) did not
consider, however, is that the 'Greek love' of Socrates and Plato was essentially a
love that 'cared for the other's soul.'10 Proclus, the 5th century neo-Platonist and
'It must be said that in the case of the P Oxy. 1380 manuscript it is highly contested whether or not this
text was doctored to include the term to describe the Egyptian goddess. See Stephanie West, 'Alleged
pagan use of Agape in P Oxy. 1380', Journal of Theological Studies, 18, 1967, pp. 142-143, and the
opposed opinion of R. E. Witt in Journal of Theological Studies, 19, 1968, pp.209-211.
6See G. Quispel, 'Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition' in Theologie
historique, 53, in honorem Robert M. Grant, eds. W. R. Schoedel and R. L. Wilken (Paris:
Beauchesne, 1979) pp.189-205.
7See Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, trans. Philip Watson (London: SPCK, 1953).
8Plutarch quotes Parmenides as saying something similar to this in Lives, 8 vols., trans. John
Langhorne and William Langhorne (London: G.G. and J. Robinson, 1808) 756F.
9See for example, Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 1/2, trans. G. T. Thomson and Harold Knight
(Edinburgh: T.& T. Clark, 1956).
"'See Cornelia J. de Vogel, 'Greek Cosmic love and the Christian Love of God: Boethius, Dionysius
the Areopagite and the Author of the Fourth Gospel', Vigiliae Christianae, 35:1, 1981, pp.57-81.
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commentator on Plato, identifies this love as epog npovor/riKog. For Socrates and
Plato this was their empeXeia rr/g y/vxTjg, their life duty." It was a love which Plato
and Socrates demonstrated in the Academy with their care for others. Thus this eros
• 12
can be understood not only as 'concupiscence', but also 'generosite'.
Eros as a parallel to the New Testament idea of love also took on a more
cosmic meaning, both in Classical Greek and in the later neo-Platonic formulations.
In this sense it has been argued that like agape, eros is that love which springs from
the divine." While such a concept of eros does not necessarily include the negative
connotations of egoism and selfishness that some reformed theologians like Nygren
want to argue, it is nevertheless clear that this quality is distinct from the New
Testament agape.
For example, the main difference between the eros that Plotinus equates with
'the One', and the Christian love revealed by God is that the latter goes out of itself
seeking the 'other'. Its concern is for the well-being of that beyond itself. The One or
the Supreme in Plotinus' Enneads is 'self-absorbed', concerned only with its own
goodness.14 Intrinsic to this quality is a striving for perfection which cannot be for
anything inferior to itself. The love of agape, however, reaches down to the
imperfect, the sinner.
Another difference between the love that Jesus was displaying and the Greek
notion, particularly of Boethius' concept of 'amor', is that the latter, as a cosmic love,
is primarily directed towards the world as a whole, ruling it and keeping it focused as
an order. Its concern for the human agent is only secondary.15 Jesus, on the other
hand, was intensely interested in the individual. For him the love of God in both the
New and the Old Testaments was primarily directed towards the human agent. So the
Christian love of agape is unique in that it flows from perfection with a concern for
the imperfect, and it is a personal love which is directed towards human creation.
"See Plato, Apology, in The Dialogues of Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett (London: Sphere Books,
1970) 29d-30a.
l2See Cornelia de Vogel, 'Greek Cosmic love and the Christian Love ofGod', p.62.
' 'See G. Quispel, 'Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition'.
uSee Plotinus, Enneads, Vl/8,15.
"See Boethius, Consolations ofPhilosophy, Bk.II, metr.8.
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Behind the love of the New Testament is the history of Jesus Christ crucified and
risen.
There is no denying the fact that 'agape' as a term has profane origins. Koine
Greek is not a sacred language, but merely a spoken rather than prosaic Greek. As
terms of love 'agape' and 'agapan' began to replace 'phileia' by the end of the 4th
century BC, and by the 2nd century BC 'agapan' was the common word for 'loving'
both in spoken and written language.16 The New Testament writers' employment of
the term, however, was such that they broke the boundaries of the everyday concept.
They took a word that everyone was familiar with and gave it a quality that was
beyond its ordinary meaning.
A Yet More Excellent Way
One of the clearest exegeses of this is the rhetoric of I Corinthians 13, where
Paul uses agape in repetitive fashion strictly in terms of the Christian experience. It is
that which is qualitatively higher than other goods in the Christian faith. Agape in the
end remains as greater than Faith and Hope not because it outlasts them, but because
... 17'Faith and Hope are purely human ... the virtues of creatures. Love is Divine.'
Agape here is not spoken of as it is in Galatians 5.22 as one among many Fruits of
the Spirit. It is incomparably higher. Three times in the Corinthian letter Paul places
agape in a category other than faith, and twice refers to agape as being the essential
ingredient of faith in the Christian sense (vs.2,7,13).
Karl Barth's commentary on I Corinthians 13, found in his work The
Resurrection of the Dead, describes Chapters 12-14 of this letter as God's word of
love pronounced to men. Love is that which 'alone never ceases' it is 'placed in
l6See Robert Joly, Le vocabulaire chretien de I'amour est-il original? Oi/.eiv et ayanav dans le grec
antique (Brussels: Presses Universitaires de Bruxelles, 1968). It is interesting to note that agape had
become so common that Pseudo-Dionysius considered it too ordinary of a term to describe the love
one has for God. See Pseudo-Dionysius, Divine Names, cap. iv., § xii, in Pseudo-Dionysius, The
Complete Works, ed. Colm Luibheid (New York: Paulist Press, 1987) and J. Rist, 'A Note on Eros and
Agape in Pseudo-Dionysius', Vigiliae Christianae, 20, 1966, pp.235-243.
l7See A. Robertson and A. Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle ofSt.
Paul to the Corinthians (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1914) p.300.
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relation to the seeing of God face to face which will take place beyond all time, in the
10
t ....
eschatological tote, then.'' The 'way' of agape is 'the divine possibility in all human
possibilities'.19 There is a two-sided relationship developed in agape between God
and finite men and women. Love comes from the former, but works in the latter. Paul
is not advocating the view in Corinthians that agape is a virtue which the human must
strive to obtain. Rather he emphasises, particularly in I Corinthians 13, the work of
agape itself. The description is not of someone who loves. It is not that 'someone
with love' never fails, but Love itself never fails.
This is a clear distinction which should be brought to bear on how we
understand love working, particularly in relation to the Pauline view that the
Christian is one who has previously died and who now lives in Christ (or in whom
Christ now lives). Barth expresses an understanding of this when he contrasts the
pattern of behaviour characteristic of agape with that of the human condition.
• • 20Humans cannot be patient, kind, etc., but agape can. Thus it becomes impossible to
consider agape as the highest arete of humanity. It is not a human achievement, but
something beyond the human agent, even 'the deep antithesis to everything that is the
essence of natural man.'
If taken to its logical conclusion, however, this can be seen as a theology
which forgets the human agent altogether. Agape seems to emerge as an independent
person acting for men. God working through us can be interpreted negatively as
robbing us of any participation in His love. This may seem to be re-emphasised by
the fact that Paul normally speaks of our actions towards God not in terms of love,
but in terms of faith (pistis).
In both the Pauline and Johannine texts, as well as in the life of Jesus,
however, there is a clear place for men and women participating in acts of love. Paul
in verses 1-3 of I Corinthians 13 explains agape as that which makes our existence
Christian, but nevertheless something that we as new creatures can embrace. No




2'See Gunther Bornkamm, 'Der kostlichere Weg I. Kor 13', Jahrbuch der Theologischen Schule
Bethel, Vol. 8, 1937, pp. 132ff., reprinted in Das Ende dees Gesetzes, Paulusstudien, Vol. I, of
collected essays (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1961) p.101.
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deeds however splendid are Christian unless they are grounded in agape, unless they
are constituted by this good. John in his first book emphasises the inverse of this: we
cannot love with words alone, we must love in action and in truth. So there is a bi¬
polar dynamic being described in the New Testament concept of agape whereby it
finds its origin in God, indeed is equated with God, while at the same time is created
in the good works that we do towards our neighbour, and relies on correct praxis as
well as belief.
The Life and teachings of Jesus are given in stark contrast to our normal way
of conceiving love. Jesus not only proclaims that the most important commandments
are that one should 'Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your
soul and with all your mind' and 'Love your neighbour as yourself, but through the
Incarnation he fulfilled these commandments through the New Covenant. It is
significant that the two love commandments that Jesus answered the Pharisee with
were taken from the Old Testament, so that this Greek term agape is linked now to
the history of God's love for Israel.
One of the most powerful references to this love is in Hosea 1 l.lff.: 'When
Israel was a child, I loved him, and out of Egypt I called my son.' But Israel is a son
who rebels against God: 'the more I called Israel the further they went from me. They
sacrificed to the Baals and they burned incense to images.' The image of Yahweh's
love for His people is one which has compassion even when Israel is not seeking
Him: 'How can I give you up, Ephraim? How can I hand you over, Israel? How can I
treat you like Admah? How can I make you like Zeboiim? My heart is changed
within me; all my compassion is aroused. I will not carry out my fierce anger, nor
will I turn and devastate Ephraim.'
The classic reference to God's relationship with Israel is Deuteronomy 7.7-8:
'The Lord did not set His affection on you and choose you because
you were more numerous than other peoples, for you were the fewest
of all peoples. But it was because the Lord loved you and kept the oath
He swore to your forefathers that He brought you out with a mighty
hand and redeemed you from the land of slavery, from the power of
Pharaoh king ofEgypt.'
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As Jeremiah so poignantly describes this love Yahweh has for His people it is
a covenant love, one that issues forth from a jealous and holy God (31.3ff).
The distinctive difference between this love and the agape God shows in the
New Testament is the Cross. 'God commends his love for us in that while we were
yet sinners Christ died for us' (Romans 5.8). In the New Testament the purpose of
Yahweh with Israel can be seen as fulfilled in Christ. A new people of God is
created. In Christ the New Covenant is disclosed. One cannot deny that in this New
Covenant we are called to love God (Romans 8.28). This love is a love gladly and
ecstatically proclaimed, evoked by the purpose of God for His people. It is a love
'which has found its centre and fulfilment in the death and resurrection of the
Anointed One.'22
The significance of this is that agape is a fulfilling gift to a race of creatures
who cannot possibly attain what is demanded of them without it. The origin of this
love can never be forgotten. This is clear in the Old Testament source of the
command concerning neighbour love. In Leviticus 19.18, this second command to
love our neighbour as ourselves is issued as part of the Holiness Code: the Israelite is
not to hate his brother in his heart, not to avenge or hold a grudge, etc. The
conclusion of this is 'thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself; I am Yahweh'. The
fact that it is Yahweh who speaks and identifies Himself as the relevant authority of
the command reflects the importance of the divine source of this love. While in the
Old Testament Covenant more emphasis is placed on the ontic dimension of this
command (the individual is to love his neighbour as one under the same covenant,
but were he not chosen and loved by Yahweh, the command would be void), with the
Incarnation, the focus is suddenly shifted to the ontological dimension of Christ as
Agape. The sustainer and creator of love has brought a New Covenant to His people
whereby those to be included are not just the Children of Israel but all 'those who are
lost.' The neighbour is now the sinner, the poor, the lame, the blind, and the sick-
anyone who stands in need of the love of the New Covenant. In doing this Christ is
extending back beyond the Covenant made with Israel to the very act of creation.
22See Walter J. Harrelson, 'The Idea of Agape in the New Testament', p. 176.
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This love of God for His people in the New Covenant is one which Nygren
describes as spontaneous and without cause. There is no quality in the beloved which
evokes this love. God in the New Covenant does not love the sinner because he is
worthy of this love—it is a love indifferent to human merit. Nygren uses the
Johannine and Pauline texts as well as the Gospel to argue this case.
Jesus says 'I have not come to call the righteous, but sinners' (Matthew 9.13).
The Parables of the Prodigal Son and the Labourers in the Vineyard demonstrate that
the love God has for us is one which firstly, is infinitely beyond any good we
deserve, and secondly, is not reliant on any merit we may strive to obtain. 'When
God gives His love freely and for nothing, there remains nothing for man to gain by
loving God. His love for God loses the character of a deserving achievement and
becomes pure and unfeigned. It flows by inescapable necessity from the fact of his
belonging unreservedly to God; and being aware of so belonging, it devotes its whole
attention to the carrying out of God's will.'
Nygren's Understanding ofDivine Agape
Most modern theological renditions of agape rely on the New Testament, but
given this common source it is nevertheless interesting to note the distinct lack of
consensus regarding the nature of love. The divide is no longer across a
straightforward Protestant/Catholic line, though there are certain features that can be
described as primarily Protestant and others which are more in keeping with
traditional Catholic considerations. Many of the issues for modern theologians begin
in Systematics, but in investigating the normative content of agape, spill over into the
world of Christian ethics. Questions arise concerning not only the nature of God's
love, but its relation to us and our love for others and ourselves.
Barth, Tillich, Niebuhr, and Outka have all discussed Nygren's treatment of
agape as an important watershed in modern Christian ethics. Nygren lists four
features of God's love that he considers to be essential. First, it is a love that is
2 ,See Nygren, Agape and Eros, pp.94-95.
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wholly spontaneous and 'unmotivated'.24 Agape has no ulterior or exterior motive
outside itself. Secondly, God's love is completely indifferent to value. This assertion
goes beyond saying that God's love is a 'transvaluation of all values'. Rather, true
love rejects any notion of valuation whatsoever. Otherwise it would not be
• 25 • •
spontaneous and unmotivated. Thirdly, Nygren argues that God's love is 'creative',
that instead of transforming any value into a greater value, it creates value ex nihilo.
Nygren thinks that this is the most important reason for the uniqueness of agape:
'God does not love that which is already in itself worthy of love, but
on the contrary, that which in itself has no worth acquires worth just
by becoming the object of God's love. Agape has nothing to do with
the kind of love that depends on the recognition of a valuable quality
in its object; Agape does not recognise value, but creates it. Agape
loves, and imparts value by loving. The man who is loved by God has
no value in himself; what gives him value is precisely the fact that
God loves him. Agape is a value-creatingprinciple,'26
Fourthly, agape is the 'initiator of fellowship' with God. It is through God's
love that He reveals himself to us. The individual by his own efforts cannot know
Him; the relationship must be divinely instigated. Not only is it considered necessary
that our knowledge of God comes from God's love, but our love for others must
originate there as well. 'We love because he first loved us' (I John 4.19).
Agape in the sphere of human relationships has the same normative
characteristics as it does in the realm of the God-human encounter. So Karl Barth
emphasises that agape has a dimension of self-sacrifice or Hingabe, self-giving.27 'In
agape-love a man gives himself to another with no expectation of a return, in a pure
venture, even at the risk of ingratitude, of his refusal to make a response of love.'28
24Ibid„ p.75.
25Ibid„ pp.77-78.
:t'Ibid., p.78. Author's italics.






Not everyone understands the two love commandments as identified in this
way. William Frankena in his work Ethics, for example, has argued that the first
command asserts a religious obligation, while the second asserts a moral.29 Certainly
one of the most significant questions which has arisen is to what extent our love for
our neighbours reflects the love God has for us. Most, like Gene Outka, would define
neighbour love in terms which include an 'other-regarding' principle. 'Agape is a
regard for the neighbour which in crucial respects is independent and unalterable.'30
Regard for others, like God's love for us, has in it the idea of independence. It
implies that our love for the neighbour is to be unconditional. It is irrespective of
persons in both its universality and in specific cases. Nor does it arise from, or is
proportional to, any quality of the neighbour, including the neighbour's actions
towards us. In this way there is neither favouritism nor prejudice in agape.
It also involves permanent stability: it is not wavering. Regardless of what the
other does, agape will remain. This may mean that forgiveness will be a price to pay
in some situations where the neighbour injures the one who loves.
Nygren thinks that agape is 'a lost love' (eine verloren Liebe) that does not
consider 'success in the end'. It does not cease even with impending betrayal or
31 •failure. As such agape can be seen as contrasted with extreme instrumental reason
which sees the other as objects to be manipulated for one's gain. Breaking out of this
mind-set means seeing the other as irreducibly valuable, both as a person (rather than
as a kind of person) and as one whose well-being is as important as my own.
O'Donovan incorporates this into his understanding of the love-command:
'True neighbourliness requires the recognition of the supreme good
simply in order that we may see the neighbour for what he is. But that
means that our pursuit of the neighbour's welfare has to take seriously
29See William Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963). I would argue that
Frankena is typical in treating the 'moral' too narrowly here. Unquestionable are the many connections
between the religious and the moral spheres, and these commandments surely are two of the most
significant examples if we are to treat morality not merely as the realm concerned with right actions,
but also the significant goods in our lives.
'"See Gene Outka, Agape, p.9. I am indebted to Outka's thorough analysis of the Agape literature for
this chapter.
""See Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, pp.731-733.
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the thought that he, like ourselves, is a being whose end is in God. To
"love" him without respecting this fundamental truth about him would
be an exercise in fantasy. Saint Augustine used to say that our first
duty to the neighbour was to "seize him for God". This does not mean,
as some critics would pretend to warn us, that every gesture or act of
love towards the neighbour will have a religious goal as an "ulterior
motive". It means simply that there is, in our love for the neighbour, a
recognition of his high calling and destiny to fellowship with God and
a desire to further that destiny in the context of concern for his
welfare.'32
One of the ways that Taylor can be brought alongside the theologian at this
stage is by examining what he calls a 'disencapsulated respect' for the human being.
By attempting to understand how it is that we should engage in moral reasoning with
seemingly incommensurable viewpoints, he argues that one point of common ground
may be the importance of the human being in a culture:
'In many cultures, this sense of the special importance of the human
being is encapsulated in religious and cosmological outlooks, and
connected views of human social life, which turn it in directions
antithetical to modern rights doctrine ... The rights doctrine presents
human importance in a radical form, one that is hard to gainsay. This
affirmation can be taken on several levels. ... One that seems
plausible to me goes something like this: recurrently in history, new
doctrines have been propounded which called on their adherents to
move toward a relatively greater respect for human beings, one by
one, at the expense of previously recognised forms of social
encapsulation. This has been generally true of what people refer to as
the higher religion. ... Disencapsulated respect for the human seems
to say something to us humans.'
The doctrine of universal rights can be interpreted as a good which is
essentially linked with agape as other-regard. One is called to put value in a person
qua human being, loving her as a significant other, affirming her authenticity in our
love. The importance for a disencapsulated agape in Taylor's mind is that it allows
one to see his or her own view as one among many possibilities. When this happens
one is free to affirm the authenticity of various human life forms in different cultures
and ways. By doing this one understands them sympathetically (while not necessarily
'2Resurrection and Moral Order, p.229.
"See Taylor, 'Explanation and Practical Reason', pp.56-57
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empathetically) and therefore has a better grasp of the human condition. Through this
understanding one can love more fully.
One criticism, however, is that by disencapsulating in this way, one is still in
the realm of encapsulation. Absolute disencapsulation is analogous to attempting an
epistemological view from nowhere. Because we are defined culturally, spiritually,
and psychologically in certain terms, we are bound to some form of encapsulation.
Our attention, therefore, must be focused on encapsulation as conceived in terms of
agape. What is called for is not necessarily a disencapsulation, but a transcendent
encapsulation which stems from God. Seeing the other as valuable goes beyond
human dignity to what O'Donovan describes as seeing the other as 'a being whose
end is in God,' as cited above. As such agape is that source encompassing the
character of God's love for us. Taylor, himself, agrees with this idea of Christian
love. He recognises that the aim of agape ' ... is to associate oneself with, to become
in a sense a channel of, God's love for men, which is seen as having the power to
heal the divisions among men and take them beyond what they usually recognise as
the limits to their love for one another.'34
'Who is My Neighbour?'
Seeing who the 'other' might be is not always clear. The term 'neighbour' has
been given a wide-range of interpretations from those in our immediate vicinity to
anyone in the global community in need of love. Karl Barth in places argues for an
exclusivist understanding of agape. It is that which is practised in the community of
• • • . TS
Christian believers, and does not include the feature of universality. Our neighbours
therefore are our brothers and sisters in Christ. Kierkegaard on the other hand says
that love is 'a characteristic by which or in virtue of which you exist for others.'36 By
this he means it is unalterable, unchanging, that it does not depend upon the features
'4'The Diversity of Goods', in Philosophy and the Human Sciences, p.234.
"See Gene Outka's discussion of Barth in Agape, pp.210ff.
'''See Soren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, trans. Howard and Edna Hong (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1962) p.211.
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of the other. Clearly for this to be so, there is an ontological precedent which
identifies the neighbour for us. For Kierkegaard, the designation of the person as
human agent existing in our world is the criterion for him or her being our neighbour.
In this no distinction is allowed:
'The category neighbour is just like the category human being. Every
one of us is a human being and at the same time the heterogeneous
individual which he is by particularity; but being a human being is the
fundamental qualification .... No one should be preoccupied with the
differences so that he cowardly or presumptuously forgets that he is a
human being; no man is an exception to being a human being by
virtue of his particularising differences. He is rather a human being
• T7
and then a particular human being.'
It is not only this distinction of person qua human being that Kierkegaard
finds important to identifying the neighbour. In addition to this, indeed preceding
this, is the person qua individual relating to God. My neighbour is my neighbour by
mere fact that we both stand in equal relationship to God. Thus, 'your neighbour is
every man, for in the basis of distinction he is not your neighbour, nor on the basis of
likeness to you as being different from other men. He is your neighbour on the basis
of equality with you before God: but this equality absolutely every man has, and he
has it absolutely.'38
Donald Evans makes the point that in such recognition ofmy neighbour there
is a degree of poesis, of constituting the other as my neighbour, as the object of love.
Making the decision that someone is my brother is also making the decision to look
on someone as my brother. It is both attitudinal and intentional in nature. It is also
• • • TQ
oriented towards someone rather than a quality which inheres in the agent.
Clearly there are two concepts here that Taylor is extremely sympathetic
towards. First, Kierkegaard's universalising of the category of neighbour is in
complete accordance with Taylor's politics of recognition which seeks to affirm the
other's humanity and authenticity in a spirit of universal respect.40 Secondly, Evans'
notion that seeing the other as my neighbour constitutes him as such aligns itself with
"ibid., p. 142.
38Ibid., p.72.
39See Donald Evans, The Logic ofSelf-Involvement (London: SCM Press, 1963) p.129.
40See Chapter 5.
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Taylor's idea of constitutive goods and the expressivist nature of articulation.41
According to Taylor agape empowers us to see the other as good in a way that is
parallel to the genesis account of God seeing creation as good. 'Agape is inseparable
from such a "seeing-good",' and as such substantiates the other as neighbour.42
Almost all theologians would agree with the Johannine texts (e.g., I John
4.20) which emphasise that part of what it means to love God is loving one's
neighbour. Disagreements arise, however, as to how much of the love for God is
substantiated by our love for each other. Some would argue that neighbour-love is all
the content that Tove for God' entails. They reason that this is sufficient for
normative ethics since 'Agape as an other-regarding principle has only the neighbour
for its object, but not God in a way substantively applicable to the making of moral
judgements. On occasion it is even held that little more need be said about religious
belief itself.'43
Outka distinguishes love for God and love for our neighbour by pointing to
the fact that we are forbidden to love the latter to the point of worship. Thus there
must be some qualitative difference between the love we are expected to have for
God and the love we have for our neighbours. Loving our neighbours to distraction in
this way, however, can be seen as a transgression of degree rather than of kind. If I
love my beloved more than God, it is not necessarily that I love her too much, but
only in relation to God. The sin is in loving the creator of this love incompletely,
loving God too little. The question must be asked whether an excess of love can ever
be love at all. Nevertheless, it must be recognised, as Outka does, that 'The material
continuity is far greater between divine love and neighbour-love than between love
for God and neighbour-love.'44
4'See Chapter 1.
42Sources ofthe Self p.516.




Because of the difficulty of aligning these two loves Nygren proposes that in
place of love for God we substitute faith. 'Faith includes in itself the whole devotion
of love, while emphasising that it has the character of response, that it is reciprocated
love. Faith is love towards God, but a love of which the keynote is receptivity, not
spontaneity.'45
This argument of Nygren's is a linguistic one which takes everything
involved in the love for God and places it under the umbrella of Faith. The problem
with this view, however, is that by definition neighbour-love would then exhaust the
content of agape. What surfaces here is a question surrounding receptivity and
spontaneity. Nygren is suspicious of any human spontaneity in relation to God. Fie
develops a distinction between an ethic of 'causality' and an ethic of 'teleology',
whereby only the latter can accommodate any kind of anthropocentric spontaneity.46
Flis view on the other hand is one which only allows for receptivity: 'God's love
invades the human sphere, but never in such fashion that there is any gradual
accretion of power at the agent's own disposal, proper to him as such.'47 This
'causal' scheme has sometimes been interpreted as a kind of 'irresistible grace'
which leaves the creature in a state of utter passivity. It has been a feature of
Nygren's ethics which has been highly criticised—defining the human agent as a
kind of 'tube ... through which God's love flows.'
Outka, commenting on Nygren's view, recognises that arguing for God's love
as a source of man's love 'may simply mean that the basis is outside man's own
power of initiation and sustenance; it can also mean that the subject is actually God
in all genuine neighbour-love. Nygren appears to mean both.'49 What Outka rightly
argues for in contrast to this view is the inability to make such a distinction as
4>See Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, p. 127.
46See for example, ibid., p.737.
47See Gene Outka, Agape, pp.49-50.
48See Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, p.735.
49Gene Outka, Agape, p.50.
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receptivity and spontaneity."0 An active response to God shares with neighbour love
the idea of self-giving and this certainly is part of loving God. There are two ways
that Outka sees God entering into our moral realm. First, in affecting the content of
our love for others itself, and second in discrete attitudes and actions 'whose very
intelligibility (to the believer at least) depends on their not being reducible to
neighbour-love.'51
Concerning our love for God, Barth is uneasy with Nygren equating love for
God with faith and takes a view more in line with Catholic thinking. For Barth there
is a 'distinctive creaturely freedom in relation to God' which the individual can use in
the act of giving himself to God, of being disposed in this way. Love for God is in no
way completely absorbed by our love for our neighbour:
'Though a man cannot for a moment withdraw from his obligation to
his neighbour by fleeing to a special religious sphere, and though there
exist neither general human undertakings nor particular pious
practices by which he could and should gain, augment or preserve the
divine good-pleasure, yet only on the basis of a very strained exegesis
of Mk. 12:29f., and its parallels could we say that the commandment
to love our neighbour in some sense absorbs that to love God and
takes away its independent quality. The truth is rather that the double
command to love points us to two spheres of activity which are
relatively—no more, but very clearly so—distinct.'
Agape and Self-Sacrifice
In an attempt to make some distinction between divine and human love,
Nygren sets up the dichotomy of agape and eros essentially following Luther's
contrast of amor dei/amor hominis. Nygren sees agape and eros as fundamentally
different forms of love, opposed and incohabitable. Eros begins with the sense of
need; it is based upon a recognition of value. As such it is thoroughly egocentric. In




52See Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/4, trans. A. T. MacKay, et al. (Edinburgh: T.& T. Clark,
1961) pp.48-49.
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expressed in Christ and his Cross, awakens in man gratitude and self-giving.'53
According to Nygren it was only with Luther that the true distinction of agape and
eros began to break through after having been corrupted, particularly by Augustine's
notion of caritas.
Kierkegaard too is extremely pejorative in discussing what Nygren identifies
as eros. Preferential relationships of the kind found in erotic love or friendship are
flawed in the perspective of agape. They are steeped in suspicion, concern for one's
own welfare, and vulnerability. 'In this suspicion ... lies hidden the anxiety which
makes erotic love and friendship dependent upon their objects, the anxiety which can
kindle jealousy, the anxiety which can bring one to despair.'54 This kind of love
which seeks reciprocity Kierkegaard sees as incompatible with Christian love.55
Christian love involves self-sacrifice, not expectations from the beloved.
Niebuhr has taken up the link between agape and self-sacrifice in his
Christian 'realism'. In his view pride and self-love seem interchangeable at times so
that we must sacrifice the latter in order to avoid the sin of the former. To this extent
Niebuhr argues for a justification of agape as self-sacrifice: the ideal content of agape
for him is frictionless harmony, but in this world of power-struggles and egoism, the
purest expression of love becomes self-denial. This, however, is not necessarily the
correct response to this situation:
'The perfect disinterestedness of the divine love can have a
counterpart in history only in a life which ends tragically, because it
refuses to participate in the claims and counter-claims of historical
existence. It portrays a love "which seeketh not its own." But a love
which seeketh not its own is not able to maintain itself in historical
society. Not only may it fall victim to excessive forms of the self-
assertion of other; but even the most perfectly balanced system of
justice in history is a balance of competing wills and interests, and
must therefore worst anyone who does not participate in the
balance.'56
53See Richard Harries, 'Review of Anders Nygren's Agape and Eros', King's Theological Review, 7,
1984, pp.23-24.
54See Soren Kierkegaard, Works ofLove, p.78.
55See ibid., p.59.
56See Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny ofMan, 11:72.
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For Niebuhr the ideal love is at the opposite end of the spectrum from the
57'conflict of life with life.' The picture that Niebuhr evokes is almost one where pure
love is powerless in a world dominated by power. It brings to mind the words of
George Herbert describing in the persona of Jesus his attempt through love alone to
move the accusing crowd ready to crucify him:
7 answer nothing, but with patience prove
Ifstonie hearts will melt with gentle love.
But who does hawk at eagles with a dove?
CO
Was ever grieflike mine?'
What Niebuhr's realism claims is that ideal love because it is ideal cannot be
applied to the world of contesting interests and self-centredness and still remain ideal
love. It must be tempered with other virtues, particularly justice, in order for us to
engage in this arena. As Robin Gill has commented, relating this back to Luther's
theology, the problem with insisting on an ethic based solely on agape is that
Christian businessmen for example, 'are not working in a society composed solely of
sincere Christians and, if they were to follow the injunctions of the Sermon on the
Mount literally, their business would probably collapse ... '.59
Niebuhr sees a need to re-adjust our sights in a way that prevents us from
attempting to achieve heaven here on earth. 'I have never criticised a statesman for
responsibly seeking to maintain a tolerable peace or establish a tolerable justice,' he
claims, while going on to add, 'I have criticised the Christian perfectionists who
either claimed that these tasks could be accomplished more perfectly by the "love
method" or who have sought to prove that their love was "perfect", even if they had
to disavow responsibilities to preserve its perfection.' He further concludes:
'I have never insisted on a sharp distinction between sacrificial and
mutual love, that is, between the love which is, and which is not,
reciprocated and historically justified. I have only criticised the
tendency to identify these two facets of love completely, so that the
New Testament ethic is reduced to the limits of a prudential ethics,
according to which we are counselled to forgive our foe because he
will then cease to be our foe; and are promised that if suffering love
''See Harry R. Davis and Robert C. Good, eds., ReinholdNiebuhr on Politics (New York: Scribner's,
1960) p. 136.
'sSee George Herbert, Poems Selected by W.H. Auden (Middlesex: Penguin, 1973) p.38.
59See Robin Gill, A Textbook ofChristian Ethics (Edinburgh: T.& T. Clark, 1985) p.222.
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becomes sufficiently general it will cease to be "suffering" and change
society into a harmony of life in which no one need suffer.'60
Niebuhr's idea that agape lies in the realm of the other-worldly, of the
eschatologically ideal, includes a notion of the selfwhich has a final longing for God.
It is a dimension within the human person which longs for this transcendent
fulfilment. The role agape can play in this arena is one which tempers our natural
inclinations to egoistic self-interestedness. We need to see beyond the self, to be
aware of the needs of others, to identify with them and so acknowledge their just
claims. There is a sense in which, according to Niebuhr's account, we cannot obtain
anything like agape, but can still get glimpses which encourage us to love. Agape is a
good, yet one which is impossible to realise in this world. Its existence is real, but
beyond our grasp.
One of the greatest problems in approaching agape is assuming a stance
whereby we set up 'disinterestedness' or 'other-regard' or 'unconditionality' or 'self-
denial' as criteria in an attempt to establish a formula for success. The tendency is to
think that if one achieves 'disinterestedness' or absolute 'self-abnegation' one will
have grasped true agape. We cannot, however, deny the self, as a recipe for love. The
difficulty with this is that it assumes that ifwe can only possess some of the trappings
of agape we will have achieved this love itself. What someone like Niebuhr helps us
to understand is that agape breaks out of any kind of criteria-based definition in this
way.
Taylor would agree with Niebuhr in claiming that there is no simple
procedural ethic involved. Any attempt at one will end in self-abnegation, but of a
kind which is diametrically opposed to the good of agape. The power of such a love
is that it fulfils one's self, creates meaning with others as with God. If it is truly
understood there should be no danger of self-mutilation.61 For this very reason one
cannot side with those who see any notion of self-fulfilment as anti-love.
60See Reinhold Niebuhr, 'Reply to Interpretation and Criticism,' in Reinhold Niebuhr, eds. Charles




Recognising this has led some to advocate a theory of agape based on
mutuality. Stephen Post sees reciprocity as sustaining agape. Christian love for him is
conceived as 'mutuality between God, self, and neighbour, primarily situated within
the fellowship of believers and deeply informed by tradition.'62 Martin Buber is
perhaps one of this century's most profound voices on this theme. For him one's own
integrity is vitally important in a loving relationship. The self must be self-affirming
or friendship of any kind is impossible.63 A relationship should involve mutual action
and respect. Neither side is consuming or abnegating or alternatively worshipping or
aggrandising the other.
Some consider mutuality not merely a possible state of affairs, but a necessary
one. Robert Johann, for example, using the language of Buber, thinks that one must
have the possibility of response from the other in order to love that other, for only
then can that person be a thou which, he argues, is a prerequisite for this kind of
personal relationship.64 It is understandable that one would want to argue for such a
possibility. Unrequited love leads to feelings of rejection, and humans need to feel
valued by others. On another level entirely, one can see in this picture another Thou
who shows this responsiveness in pure actualisation. He is the One whose love for us
is perfectly realised. What is entailed in the Christian belief is the love of one who is
Love, and who responds without failure.
Mutuality as an alternative theory to the Nygren/Kierkegaard approach is
discussed by Outka both in terms of personal relations and social interaction.fi? Love
in these situations refers to something between two persons which establishes or
enhances some sort of exchange between the parties. Some would argue that an
agape which considers mutuality important is an ideal basis for community. But
62See Stephen Post, A Theory ofAgape: On the Meaning ofChristian Love (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell
University Press, 1990) p.10.
6'See Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Kegan Paul, 1947)
pp.29-30.
MSee Robert Johann, The Meaning ofLove (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1955) pp.65-66.
'"See Gene Outka, Agape, pp.36ff.
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problems arise with the concept ofmutuality since it involves self-interest, something
that has been opposed by traditional understandings of agape.
The problem of self-love and agape is perhaps one of the most divisive in
modern Christian ethics. Traditional statements regarding our love for God have run
along the lines of the French Theologian Fenelon who thought that perfect love for
God would desire nothing for its own sake except God's will be done.66 On the other
hand, there have been classic Christian pronouncements on the subject which have
accepted a place for self-love. According to Bernard of Clairvaux there are four
stages of love: first we love ourselves, then come to love God for what He can do for
us, afterwards we love God for His own sake, and finally in heaven we come to love
• f\1
even ourselves for His sake as perfection of love.
Outka, in an attempt to argue against letting the other completely dominate
you in the name of agape, finds that one needs a proper sense of self-love in order for
agape to be realised. 'Love your neighbour as yourself implies not only a command
to love the neighbour, but one to love the self as well.68 Not all self-love is
justifiable, however, and Outka distinguishes between four distinct kinds. First there
is the self-love as wholly nefarious, the type of love that Niebuhr condemns as being
linked to pride and sin—a culpable selfishness. This is the love Nygren has identified
with an entire 'Eros-religion' and '.Eros-ethics' which is governed by self-seeking.69
'When ... Paul sets self-love and neighbourly love in opposition to one another, he is
not condemning merely a "lower self-love," or the natural propensity to self-
assertion, but all self-love whatsoever, even in its most highly spiritual forms.'70
Secondly, there is self-love as prudent and normal. This view is one which
sees people as naturally inclined to love themselves, but in a way that is amoral. It
does not even concern the individual. Bultmann remarks that 'It is ... stupid to say ...
''''See for example, Frangois de Salignac de la Mothe-Fenelon, Explication des maximes des saints sur
la vie interieure (Paris: Aubouin, Emery, et Clousier, 1697), and Oeuvres de Fenelon, Arch eveque de
Cambrai, precedees d'etudes sur sa vie, par M. Aime-Martin. Tome 11 (Paris: Firmin Didot Freres,
1838).
67See, Bernard of Clairvaux, L'amour de Dieu: La grace et le livre arbitre, eds. Frangoise Callerot
et al. (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1993), and Love without measure: extracts from the writings of St.
Bernard ofClairvaux, ed. Paul Diemer (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1990).
''8See Gene Outka, Agape, pp.21-23.
wSee Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, pp.208-210.
70Ibid., p. 131.
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that a justifiable self-love, a necessary standard of self-respect, must precede love of
neighbour, since the command runs "love your neighbour as yourself" Self love is
thus presupposed, ... but not as something which man needs to learn, which must be
expressly required of him.'71
Thirdly, self-love may be a paradigm which indicates how other love should
be. Paul Ramsey thinks that self-love is an index to the proper regard for others:
'How exactly do you love yourself? Answer this question and you will
know how a Christian should love his neighbour. You naturally love
yourself for your own sake. You wish your own good, and you do so
even when you may have a certain distaste for the kind of person you
are. Liking yourself or thinking yourself very nice, or not, has
fundamentally nothing to do with the matter. After a failure of some
sort, the will-to-live soon returns and you always lay hold expectantly
on another possibility of attaining some good for yourself. You love
yourself more than you love any good qualities or worth you may
possess. Unsubdued by bad qualities, not elicited by good ones, self-
love does not wait on worth. In fact it is the other way around: self-
love makes you desire worth for yourself. Regardless of fluctuations
in feeling, you love yourself on one day about as much as on any
other. And regardless of differences in temperament or capacity for
deep emotion, one person probably wishes his own good about as
79
much as another person wishes for his.'
Finally, self-love may be a kind of blessing or fruition of the self which
benefits 'other-regard'. Blessing of the self in this way must be unintended or
epiphenomenal in order for it not to be rapacious. Niebuhr mentions this kind of
paradox in seeking after love in this way: 'consistent self-seeking is bound to be self-
defeating; on the other hand, self-giving is bound to contribute ultimately to self-
• • 7T
realisation.'
Self-love is justified by some as a derivative of love for others in this way.
Some would argue that even if it cannot be considered praiseworthy in itself it needs
to be considered as far as the agent's own welfare is concerned, providing that it can
be procured from a love for one's neighbour. Thus Ramsey argues that 'Some
7lSee Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus and the Word, trans. Louise Pettibone Smith and Erminie Huntress
Lantero (New York: Scribner's, 1958) p.l 16.
72See Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics (London: SCM Press, 1953) pp.99-100.
7'See Reinhold Niebuhr, Man's Nature and His Communities (New York: Scribner's, 1965)
pp. 106-107. See also his Faith and History (London: Nisbet, 1949) pp. 176-179.
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definition of legitimate concern for the self must be given, even if only as a
secondary and derivative part of Christian ethics. For certainly as a part of vocational
service grounded in Christian love for neighbour, an individual has great
responsibility for the development and use of all his natural capacities, or else he
takes responsibility for rashly throwing them away.'74
Others, however, are not satisfied with seeing self-love as a spin-off of other-
regard. D'Arcy, for example, thinks that agape is just as corruptible as self-regarding
love and argues for a balance of the two: 'Selfishness is only a vice if it means an
undue regard for self; unselfishness is only a virtue if it is countered by self-respect.
The two loves, therefore, so far from being opposites appear to require the presence
of each other.'75
For Robert Johann, there is an obligation, or almost an inescapability to self-
love. I cannot love the other in addition to loving myself, but rather in loving the
other I am fully myself. 'The commandment to love universally is not something
imposed on us from outside; it is simply a formulation of the very exigencies of our
beings as persons.'76
This comes close to the way Taylor understands self-love particularly in his
view that fulfilment and self-authenticating experiences are intricately linked to those
77around us. We depend on our neighbours for the fullness of love.
Love in a Different Voice
No one collective group has had more to say in recent years about self-love
and its place in agape than the feminist movement in theology. Feminism criticises as
too exclusive most of the major theories of agape in the 20th century which stress
74See Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics, p. 159.
73See M. C. D' Arcy, Mind and Heart ofLove (London: Faber and Faber, 1955) p.308.
76See Robert Johann, 'Love and Justice' in Ethics and Society, ed. Richard T. de George (Garden City,
NY: Doubleday, 1966) p.40.
770f course one other way to understand self love is as a celebration of creation as well as an act which
brings our response to creation into line with God's own attitude towards it. If God loves us as
creatures, then refusing any part in self-love amounts to denying the good which has been created. If
we do not love what God loves we will not be loving God.
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other-regard to the point of self-sacrifice. It argues that a better understanding of
agape is mutuality. In doing so feminist theologians are much more sympathetic to
Catholic thinkers like D'Arcy as opposed to their Protestant counterparts such as
Nygren and Niebuhr.78
Not only do they consider mutuality to be a better way of describing agape,
but they see it as healthier for women. The argue that agape as traditionally
understood (as self-denial) reflects a largely male experience. As early as 1960
Valerie Saiving Goldstein asserted this claim: 'Contemporary theological doctrines
of love have, I believe, been constructed primarily upon the basis of masculine
experience and thus view the human condition from the male standpoint.
Consequently, these doctrines do not provide an adequate interpretation of the
situation of women—nor for that matter, of men ... '.79 According to Goldstein the
basis for this argument lies in the psychological differences between men and women
which develop as they are nurtured. Men are born from and nurtured by women, but
do not share the biological identity of those who are nurturing them and so cannot
freely adopt the mother as a role model. This creates anxiety which Goldstein argues
men respond to with self-love and pride. For women, however, there is no anxiety
since they can completely identify with the role of biological mother. 'Such passive
acceptance of biological destiny does not engender anxiety, rather it fosters a sloth
which causes women to neglect their own development as persons. Hence the sins to
which women as women are prone are faults such as distractibility, sentimentality,
violation of privacy, excessive dependence, and "lack of an organising centre".'80
Because women have a tendency to give themselves over to the other, they
lose their own identity more easily, or, alternatively, that identity is much more
strongly rooted in other people. From this it is argued that 'the virtues which
theologians should be urging upon women as women are autonomy and self-
realisation.'81 Whether through nature or cultural conditioning, it is true that women
71iSee for example, Barbara Hilkert Andolsen, 'Agape in Feminist Ethics', Journal ofReligious Ethics,
9, 1981, pp.69-83.
7ySee Valerie Saiving Goldstein, 'The Human situation: a feminine view,' reprinted in Carol P. Christ
and Judith Plasko, eds., Womanspirit Rising (New York: Harper and Row, 1980) p.27.




are more prone to destructive self-abnegation. The widow, for example, often feels
her identity is lost when she no longer has a husband to do things for, to give herself
to. The widower may too feel the same loss, but for different reasons.
Feminists in the 19th century such as the suffragette Elizabeth Cady Stanton
realised that excessive selflessness in women (imposed by men) was one of the
primary engines driving their own oppression. 'Men think that self-sacrifice is the
most charming of all the cardinal virtues for women ... and in order to keep it in
healthy working order they make opportunities for its illustration as often as
89
possible.' Mary Daly, one of the most articulate voices in the feminist movement in
the 1970's, remarked that 'there has been a theoretical one-sided emphasis upon
charity, meekness, obedience, humility, self-abnegation, sacrifice, service. Part of the
problem with this moral ideology is that it became accepted not by men, but by
women, who hardly have been helped by an ethic which reinforces the abject female
situation.'83
Rosemary Radford Ruether, among others, has argued that damage has been
done by the bifurcation of human experience to man's world and woman's place.
Niebuhr's division of public and private space whereby the agape of self-sacrifice is
assigned to the realm of the latter has contributed to the detriment of women simply
because traditionally this is the arena in which women have been confined—the
home.84 Ruether adds that 'This split between the public realm of work as the sphere
of material relations and functional rationality and the "home" as the feminine sphere
of morality and sentiment had a devastating effect on both women and the quality of
public culture.'85
The majority of feminist thinkers do not want to deny the importance of self-
sacrifice. Rather, what is to be challenged is the assumption that men have the power
over women to shape an ethic for women. What is called for is the affirmation of a
pluralism of goods in a Christian ethic of love, one which does not necessarily
82See Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al., The Woman's Bible, 2 vols. (New York: European Publishing
Company, 1895) 1:84.
s1Scc Mary Daly, Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women's Liberation (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1973) p.100.
84See Rosemary Radford Ruether and Eugene Bianchi, From Machismo to Mutuality: Woman—Man
Liberation (New York: Paulist Press, 1976) pp.49-50.
S5See ibid., pp.49-50.
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exclude other-regard. The feminist reminds us that the voice of the woman must be
included in articulating the goods which surround the concept of love. It is wrong for
men to presume to speak for them and to refuse to learn from their discourse. Anna
Howard Shaw, the Methodist minister turned suffragette at the end of the last
century, saw this as a positive step towards embracing many goods alongside love
• 86
including honesty, courage, and self-assertion.
Thus feminine Christian ethics is gravitating towards a concept of agape
which deals much more with mutuality. This is typified in the work of Margaret
t on
Farley who defines agape as full mutuality marked by equality between the sexes.
Farley thinks that theologians, particularly of the Reformed tradition, have assumed
that God is totally active and the Christian totally passive in their relationship, and
following on from this that the Christian is totally active and the neighbour totally
passive in the love relationship. This imbalance must be addressed by insisting that
both parties in a love relationship are active, and that theologians must understand
that 'receiving and giving are but two sides of one reality which is other-centered
love.'88
Agape and Rule Following
Taylor's own view of the situation can be understood alongside the feminist
concept of agape in contrast to traditional Protestant theories of agape in so far as he
sees the need to embrace a wide-variety of goods from a large number of
backgrounds in our culture. I would argue, however, that his main bone of contention
with most traditional theories of agape would challenge the method of their entire
moral theory. From Taylor's vantage point, as one who sees an important role for the
good in ethics, certain concepts of agape in modern theories have the problem of
86See Anna Howard Shaw, The Speeches of Anna Howard Shaw, 2 vols., ed. Wilmer A. Linkugel
(Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1960) 11:63-64.
87See Margaret Farley, 'New pattern of relationship: beginnings of a moral revolution,' in Woman:
New Dimensions, ed. Walter Burkhardt (New York: Paulist Press, 1975).
88Ibid., p.63.
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being too one-dimensional—they have become too procedurally orientated, even in
Christian circles.
Taylor's basic understanding of what agape entails, as well as its etymological
source, agrees with most traditional accounts. He sees agape as a word which had a
minor role in ordinary Greek language, but was then given new meaning 'where ...
the ultimate understanding of what is involved in it is the love of God for us, which
can be somehow taken up by us, and therefore we can participate in ... ,'89 Unlike the
feminist emphasis on self-reference and the importance of self-affirmation in agape,
however, Taylor pictures agape as that which transcends the self, which somehow
breaks us out of ourselves. He pictures it as 'a kind of love that goes beyond any of
these other human sources of love we understand, which in a sense always involve a
degree of self-reference and self-fulfilment ... .'90
With this picture in mind, Taylor can hardly find a place for agape being
equated with any standardised set of regulations. Although most Christian ethicists
would not equate agape with a specific moral code, there are those who would argue
that agape leads to following certain ways of living. Paul Ramsey in Deeds and Rules
sees two kind of general legislation: 'the meaning of essential humanity' and the set
of conditions for the best possible social existence. 91 Strictly speaking the first of
these is not a rule at all. It is an ontological statement about the nature of humanity
given both religious and rational understandings of the human condition.
The second, however, can be seen as a spin-off from Rawl's 'rules of
practice' such as promise-keeping and truth-telling. In this Ramsey seems to stray
from the path of the good: 'If there are any Christian moral or social practices, there
cannot be exceptions that depart from them by direct general appeals to agape
overriding the rules in particular cases in which the agent does not take the weighty
responsibility of criticising the practice as a whole and attempting to replace it with
• 92another. Agape justifies no exception to the practice.'
89See Appendix E.
90Ibid.
"See Paul Ramsey, Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics (New York: Scribner's, 1967).
92Ibid., p. 137.
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This argument, however, contradicts what Taylor and others have recognised
about moral reasoning, namely that it is a transitional action. We cannot agree with
Ramsey that certain Christian beliefs or practices have captured the truth in terms of
getting it absolutely right, for there may be ways of being Christian that we cannot
even imagine. Take, for example, St. Francis and his idea of starting, within the
tradition of monastic orders, a new ministry devoted to agape in the lay-community,
rather than a vow of obedience in contemplation. Here was a traditional mendicant
friar, but one who had regard for the community of the poor and the sick over and
• • • QT
above the normal way of regarding one's Christianity as a devoted follower.
For Taylor, the captivating power of agape is that it can offer these radically
new ways of being a Christian in serving God. It breaks down any preconceived
stereotypes of what Christianity means, and thus offers us the uniqueness of God's
love. This for him is what makes the saints so completely distinct. They are working
under the power of agape rather than within the boundaries of our everyday
conceptions of human experience. Breaking free of these parameters includes a
radical transformation in this way. Agape is a 'kind of power that transcends and
goes beyond the way we normally feel ourselves limited, and so I see the place of this
in human life as being another one of those places (or in terms of the Christian faith I
suppose the key place) where we see a possible vocation for human beings that
transcends, that goes beyond, that even breaks out of in a sense, the self, the ordinary
way of operating as human beings.'94
Agape, given this feature of breaking through, and beyond to something
higher for us, cannot possibly be limited to a set of moral rules for Taylor. More
importantly, it cannot be restricted to right action, which is what most Christian
theories of agape tend to emphasise. Just how deeply ingrained the procedural
assumptions of our modern ethics are can be seen in William Frankena's polarity in
Ethics: should we construe morality as primarily a following of certain principles or
as primarily a cultivation of certain dispositions and traits?9"9 Both of these are action-
based moral theories. They assume that as long as one goes about ethics the right way
93I owe this example to Charles Taylor.
94See Appendix E.
95See William Frankena, Ethics.
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with the proper rules one will get the correct answer. They do not stop to take into
consideration the teleological ramifications of morality. Even those such as Joseph
Fletcher who embrace what Frankena has called pure act-agapism, are guilty of such
an over-emphasis. Fletcher wants to argue that love is the standard which trumps all
other moral obligations. This, however, is still too thin a description of agape. It does
not suggest to us the power of the good, only the procedure of the right. Agape in this
context is merely that way of acting which is better than other ways of acting.96
Many modern theologians have been seduced by the all-pervasive appeal of
utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. The distinction made between act-agapism and
rule-agapism is a clear example of the theories of agape depending on utilitarian
examples.97 The primary focus in these theories of Christian ethics, like the primary
focus in modern secular philosophy, is what it is right to do, which misses out of its
conception of ethics a wide-range of issues involving the good, the significant, and
the meaningful in our lives. Gene Outka reveals this hidden agenda in modern
Christian ethics at the beginning of his work on agape by indicating that his is an
investigation 'into love as a normative ethical principle or standard ... ,'98 What is
presupposed in this is a framework of ethics as actions.
Even when Outka attempts to explore an 'agapeistic frame of mind'—shifting
from Tightness to goodness, doing to being, rule to virtue—he does not escape his
initial preconceptions of procedural ethics.99 He discusses agape in terms of feelings
and attitudes, intentions and motives, and it soon becomes clear that what Outka in
fact means by goodness and virtue is the internalising rather than the ontologising of
the issue. The only shift that Outka has made is a Cartesian one which grounds the
acts of agape in feelings and the will. The certainty about what love is must come
from what is internal to our self. The state of agape itself, however, has not been
altered. This is still assuming that agape is a 'normative ethical principle,' and not a
life good, not something which is substantive. In doing so Outka demonstrates that
96See for example, Joseph Fletcher, 'What's in a Rule?: A Situationist's View,' in Norm and Context
in Christian Ethics, ed. Gene Outka and Paul Ramsey (New York: Scribner's, 1968).
97See ibid., p.332, for example: 'Let's say plainly that agape is utility; love is well-being; the Christian
who does not individualise or sentimentalise lovers a utilitarian.'
"See Outka, Agape, p.3.
"See ibid, 123ff.
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his theory of agape is one which is based on the Kantian ideal of universalising the
particular maxim of agape. 'Finally, the doctrine that love is the form of the virtues
need require no more than an insistence that love predominates ... in every decision
made.'100
The difficulty with this is it does not get behind the claim of this doctrine.
What is needed in order to put this into practice is a reason why love should
dominate, and this cannot merely be assumed.
De-theologising Agape
One way of approaching this dilemma in Christian ethics is to see how closely
modern Christian theories of agape have been aligned with secular notions of
beneficence or altruism. Philosophers have taken on board quite comfortably the
theological notion of agape as altruistic action since it does not require any particular
preconceptions of the divine or the transcendent. Furthermore, some theologians have
even argued that agape as a theory of ethics can be justifiably read in the secular
moral realm. To see agape as right action means that one will naturally be able to
transfer it to a non-Christian universal beneficence or a kind of Millsian, utilitarian
regard for others.
The criticism that Taylor has for the secular theorist who wants to take on
board agape in some de-theologised form is one which is distinctly not relevant to the
Christian ethicist who sees agape as primarily action orientated. For the secular
philosopher can be reproved for not coming clean about certain goods which he is
assuming in establishing the groundwork for an ethic of altruism. There are moral
sources involved, Taylor argues, which he must admit to if he is to be at all consistent
in his thinking.
For the Christian ethicist, however, another polemic must ensue. Clearly it is
not a matter of the Christian working with assumptions he is not comfortable in
admitting forthright. For presumably there would be no difficulty in pointing to God
l00Ibid., p. 142.
223
as a moral source when one asks the Christian ethicist for a reason why we should act
with love towards others. There is still the problem, however, which is common to
the secular philosopher, that this source remains largely unarticulated in the agape
theory.
It is true that the New Testament account is taken as understood, and our
notions of acting in love are founded on the belief that because God is who he is we
should love one another. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the emphasis in
Christian ethics is on the right way of acting. While it assumes certain moral sources,
it focuses not on this underlying ontology, but rather on correct procedure. Thus it is
not surprising that Practical Theology has more in common with Sociology than
Metaphysics.
If the Christian who is formulating a moral theory, when asked about these
sources, will admit to this metaphysical dimension, the question can be raised,
'where then lies the problem?' In this instance it is not a matter of contradiction. The
Christian is not saying one thing and really believing another. He knows that
ultimately his ethics go back to God and thus ontological concepts of the good, so
what is the difficulty?
Articulating Agape
The difficulty is assuming that such a moral source can be expected to play an
important role in Christian ethics and yet remain tacitly in the background. Agape as
a constitutive good exists in a space which needs articulating. For one thing this is
precisely how we go about moral reasoning. Investigating the character of agape in
community, between moral interlocutors, helps us understand not only the divine
character of the good, but also the specific instances of agape in our everyday life.
Secondly, in terms of the expressive nature of language, articulating agape is in some
sense creating this good in our community. As far as expression is a constitutional
part of what agape is eventually identified as for us, it is important to get clear in our
'webs of interlocution' exactly what is entailed in this good. In the same way that
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belief in God is only a possibility for us because we can talk about him and talk to
him through prayer, so agape understood as a moral source must exist for us in the
conversations of a community. Thirdly, agape in ontological terms can be seen as a
constitutive good. It is important to recognise agape as a moral source since it
empowers us to do good through this articulation. Articulating agape brings us closer
to the good of agape, and by doing so acts as a catalyst towards accomplishing the
good in our lives.
This role for agape is crucial if we understand the concept as one which goes
beyond the normative principles of an anthropocentric ethic. Agape for Taylor is in
some respects a vocation,
'that involves breaking beyond these normal [human] vocations ... on
the one hand we have ethical codes and principles that in a certain way
domesticate, that are meant to be applicable and liveable by ordinary
people in ordinary circumstances. You can ask of them only so much.
On the other hand it [agape] opens a way which seems to burst the
bounds of any of these ethical codes.'101
So in one sense the Christian theory of agape which concentrates on action is
missing an important part of its assumed foundation. It does not fully understand
what it means to have a theocentric conception of agape, one where 'you open the
sky in one of these directions of self-transcendence ... .'102 In another sense such a
Christian ethic is not opening itself to the empowering love which it needs to drive
these actions.
Taylor's theological import sees moral action in terms of being empowered
by the good. He challenges the strength and motivation behind modern hypergoods
such as justice, freedom, and universal beneficence by asking about moral perception
and motivation basic to our moral commitments. Here Taylor questions whether such
moral commitments can be adhered to without some idea of God. The 'seeing-good'
that he holds basic to our commitment to justice and benevolence is inseparable from
agape, a love that endorses the claim in Genesis I that "God saw that it was good".
This is not, however, merely relying on some basic reason to see the other as good in
""See Appendix E.
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terms of dignity or respect, etc. As mentioned above, Taylor sees this as far too
dangerous and incapable of encouraging us to good works. The agape that Taylor
wants to affirm, that he sees as necessary in any moral ontology, is one which is
constitutive in its gaze: 'The original Christian notion of agape is a love that God has
for humans which is connected with their goodness as creatures (though we don't
have to decide whether they are loved because good or good because loved). Human
beings participate through grace in this love. There is a divine affirmation of the
creature, which is captured in the repeated phrase in Genesis I about each stage of the
creation, "and God saw that it was good". Agape is inseparable from such a "seeing-
good".'103
What the Christian ethic can take from this is a lesson in the importance of
agape as a moral source which gives us the power of seeing as good. Such a way of
approaching altruism is essential if Taylor's polemic against Enlightenment naturalist
standards ofmoral behaviour is to be accepted. Taylor points to the way Dostoyevsky
has explored the idea that high moral standards need strong sources, particularly in a
post-Enlightenment age. 'Dostoyevsky's Devils,'' he argues, 'is one of the great
documents of modern times, because it lays bare the way in which an ideology of
universal love and freedom can mask a burning hatred, directed outward onto an
unregenerate world and generating destruction and despotism.'104
He goes on to ask 'whether we are not living beyond our moral means in
continuing allegiance to our standards of justice and benevolence.'105 The answer for
the Christian can be 'no', but this must also be qualified, for we must come to realise
the importance of articulating this strong moral source if we are to have any place for
it in our lives. In one sense the Christian ethicist must be honest about another
assumption that is made, and that is the loyalty to utilitarian/Kantian procedural
ethics that is often assumed, one which aligns itself too easily with secular moral
theory.
Great as the temptation is to see our ethics in terms of right actions,
incomparably greater potential lies in a theistic programme which seeks to articulate




the strong moral sources underlying our moral intuitions. Many theologians recognise
this fact. Oliver O'Donovan clearly understands the truth that Dostoyevsky has
pronounced concerning an ethic of beneficence stripped of theological import:
'Many times in the history of thought respect for fellow men, divorced
from its theological context of love for the highest good, has collapsed
into one of two corruptions: the attempt to tyrannise over the fellow-
man by taking the responsibility for his welfare out of his hands, and
the enslavement of the self to the fellow-man who becomes an object
of desire and need. The first corruption, however benignly inspired,
can lead only to the sort of totalitarian mastery ofman by man such as
is constantly threatened by modern projects of managerial
philanthropy. The second, which is the characteristic relation of
society to its heroes, provides the opportunity for tyranny by
absolutising the erotic subordination of the weak and impressionable
to the natural authority of the beautiful and the strong. Take away love
for God, and the ontological parity which makes true neighbour-love
possible is upset; one human being takes the place of God and confers
value and significance upon the other. Anders Nygren's famous
opposition of Agape and Eros presumed to tell us, in effect, that no
other form of love was possible: in love we must master or be
mastered.'106




Articulating a Christian Ethic
It is not my intention to suggest that Christian ethics is completely given over
to secular utilitarianism or neo-Kantian formulations. The important ontological
dimension of Agape, as a constituting good, can clearly be recognised as a theme in
many theologians. Nygren's concept of Agape, for example, finally relies not on a
way ofdoing, but of being. It is dependent upon a relationship to the reality ofGod.
Taylor would agree with Barth in so far as the latter understands that it is only
with the supernatural state of affairs that we are empowered to love. This is clearly
invoked in recognising that' ... a man whom God takes into fellowship with Himself
... is given a determination which is not only new, but so radically and totally new
that the change can be described only as a new creation of new birth ... It is not that
he should love but that he may and willA
Moltmann's theology of hope which says that 'Love does not snatch us from
the pain of time, but takes the pain of the temporal upon itself,' can be expressed in
terms which sees this hope as constituted by God as a moral source.
Concepts like 'the ideal of love', 'the law of love', and 'agape' are
ontological concepts for Niebuhr. Love is maintaining a basic reality. It is something
which we relate to in terms of the way things are, rather than doing what is right. It
depends finally on the character of God.
'See Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV72:777.
"See Jiirgen Moltmann, Theology ofHope, trans. James Leitch (New York: Harper and Row, 1967)
P-31.
■ ■
Clearly a complete revision of Christian ethics is not called for here. Rather,
what I would suggest in conclusion is a more positive way of incorporating the
lessons from Taylor's moral theory. His arguments against various forms of
naturalism can collectively be interpreted as a kind of apologetic. Subjectivism,
mechanistic explanations, and projectionism have been dominating the moral arena
for so long that any argument such as those incorporated in Christian ethics which
contradicts and challenges the fundamental premises of these interpretations is ipso
facto an argument in the minority and as such must bear the burden of proof. The
theologian and Christian ethicist who has felt intellectually oppressed by these
naturalist theories can look to Taylor's arguments against naturalism as a
philosophically cogent way of addressing the inconsistencies secular modernity
attempts to ignore.
In one sense the first part of Sources of the Self can be read as a natural
theology. Taylor is arguing from what can be observed and reasoned within our
human moral experiences to the conclusion of a moral ontology which includes the
transcendent. He himself believes that this is the Christian God. A space for God in
Taylor's moral theory essentially amounts to a space for Christian ethics in the moral
arena. The domination of secularism is challenged on its own grounds and found to
be insufficient for explaining how we live our lives and what makes sense to us as
moral agents. Thus we can look to the Christian formulation of ethics to make better
sense of the moral domain. As such Taylor's arguments creates a space of discourse
for the Christian worldview.
More positively, the various reasons Taylor gives for articulating the good in
moral interlocution are all relevant to the practice of Christian ethics. Moral
discourse as creating the good can find both a theological and pastoral point of
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application. Talking about God, for example, in community and talking to Him in
prayer are ways of creating meaning about God in our lives and our situations.
Theologically this has a great deal to say about the importance the speech-act
has for the real. Not only is articulation essential in placing God in our lives in a
meaningful way, but this is also true with respect to the Scriptures, the Gospel, and
our personal faith. Talking about our beliefs substantiates them for us, grounds them
in our horizons ofmeaning. Articulation in this sense also emphasises the importance
of community, since it is in the expressive creating of the self with and through
others that this interlocution occurs.
M H ■
Articulating also involves empowering. God as a moral source gives us the
strength to do good. This can be seen as a form of Grace which is accessed in moral
discourse. Articulating the constitutive good in this way amounts to loving the good.
Subsequently, the love of this good empowers us to do good works. One way that the
ramifications of this can be understood is in the dichotomy of the substantive and the
procedural.
Christian ethics tends to be 'applied' in so far as it seeks to address specific
issues relevant to the social and political domain. It addresses ethical problems
primarily in terms of policy. The positive aspect of this is that Christianity can be
directly relevant to the kinds of issues that individuals and communities are grappling
with in our modern situation. The negative aspect, however, is that Christian ethics
can easily slide into a strict procedural formulation which neglects the good in our
lives. There is even the danger of Christian ethics equating itself with an obligationist
stance. Such a proceduralist emphasis, however, will ultimately either fail to
convince us of the good of right action, or must evolve into a substantive claim. If
Christian ethics concentrates too heavily on right actions it will ignore the important
moral sources of its policy formulations, but, as Taylor has shown, such sources need
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to be articulated in order for us to be empowered to live up to our own high moral
standards.
Taylor's moral ontology can remind the theologian and Christian ethicist that
essential to any moral policy is getting clear about the goods assumed in such a
policy. Clarifying assumptions is one of the important functions of articulation. In
moral reasoning much of what is involved entails relieving the tension between
certain goods, such as individualism and accountability.
The argument that Taylor employs sets out from the beginning to bring
together the ethical and the 'good life'. Questions of ethics in Christianity need to
address not only public policy and right action, but questions about what it is good to
be and the nature of the Christian life. Not only are these questions legitimate in and
of themselves, but they are questions about qualitative distinctions which underlie
many of our formal policies and doctrines. So that by articulating these assumptions
there is the possibility of reconciliation between goods in a Christian environment
which confesses a commitment to embracing the good. A compelling example for
Taylor of this kind of reconciliation is Augustine's formulation of inwardness. The
paradox of inwardness and transcendence is truly reconciled in the understanding that
the move within entails for the moral agent a move beyond to God the sustainer of
our being.
■ m m
Certainly one of the most important lessons to learn from Taylor is the need
to undergird our Christian ethics with an articulated theology. Getting clear about the
nature of things is tantamount to understanding the way things have meaning for us
in our lives and what makes certain ideas compelling. In theology, as in Christian
ethics questions, about meaning are fundamentally linked to ideas of epistemology
and metaphysics.
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Understanding Taylor's moral ontology as anchored in a specific formulation
of knowledge means that he has a tremendous amount of insight to bring to the way
the Christian ethicist approaches moral reasoning. Essentially his argument for ad
hominem reasoning, like his challenge to naturalism, can be interpreted as an
apologetic for the Christian position.
The Christian understanding of the human agent as created by God and
sustained in love by this creator brings to the ethical discourse certain assumed value
judgements about the moral agent. The ontological make-up of the individual
includes these premises which are pregnant with evaluative meaning. While this goes
against every foundationalist creed which insists on segregating the 'is' from the
'ought' in ethics, Taylor's epistemological challenge to this form of apodictic moral
reasoning exposes it as an illusion. Thus the Christian understanding of ethics is
vindicated in terms of moral reasoning as a non-foundational transitional process
which dissolves the boundary between fact and value.
In Systematics there is a parallel application in the realm of hermeneutics. For
with Taylor's understanding ofmoral reasoning and his 'Best Account' principle, we
can give an important role in Christian ethics to the hermeneutical task ofmaking the
best sense of our epistemological positions. Such a hermeneutic must be balanced,
however, by acknowledging that intrinsic to the transitional nature of moral
reasoning is the conditionality of any position which one arrives at. There can never
be any claim to possessing an absolutely right answer.
Clearly faith has an important role to play in Taylor's moral process. Reason
and epistemology can be taken only to a certain point beyond which a belief 'in what
is hoped for' must be relied on. Furthermore, faith for Taylor is essential if we are to
understand a theocentric ethic as something that may transcend our own ethical
beliefs, and break the boundaries of our anthropocentric moral realm. The good may
be something that we cannot even imagine at this point. In this respect Taylor is
advocating a kind of negative theology which states that God is such that we can
never fully understand His processes. Truth in such circumstances is always
approached as a lived experience.
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What naturally follows from this is that knowing God through faith is
tantamount to articulating Him in moral reasoning (ad hominem). Thus the emphasis
again comes back to the role of articulation in our lives. Furthermore, this relates to
the importance of pluralism in the Church and in the world. With our faith in God as
articulated in a Christian ethic and in Systematic Theology we understand Him as
valuable, but we understand the other interlocutors as valuable as well. Agape in
community means seeing the other as good, and as such there is a wager involved on
the value of their belief and moral framework. We can understand this as the engine
which drives our willingness to engage in moral reasoning with the significant others
in our lives, articulating in webs of interlocution the meaning and value of a Christian
experience.
Coming to the fore in such dialogues will be various ways of experiencing God as
well as various formulations of the good for Christian ethics. While this can be
applied to the way Christian ethics can gain from other theological disciplines such
as Systematics, Biblical Studies, or Ecclesiology, it can also strive to converse with
individual voices of quite contrary beliefs in the philosophical and sociological
spheres. Most immediately, it can be applied to issues in Christian ethics which need
strong moral sources. As such Taylor helps us to recognise that an important part of
our Christian moral existence lies in articulating the good and what this means for the
Christian life in community.
n n n
Clearly Taylor's philosophical system has much to bring to Christian ethics.
Particularly relevant is the significance of articulating the tacit goods of our
communities as a theological endeavour. There are other avenues within moral
theology, however, where a critique of Taylor's philosophy will bear important fruit
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in the future. Taylor himself has recognised a legitimate demand to develop his
argument as it was left at the end of Sources of the Self and plunge into the deeper
issues of theology. Such a work would no doubt be a rich enunciation, one which
may help to clarify some of Taylor's own theological positions and mitigate some as
yet implicit difficulties in his own Christian belief.
One such issue is his ambivalence towards any natural law theory. On the one
hand Taylor gains much from Aristotle and obviously sympathises with Aquinas
concerning the nature of the moral agent. There is an explicit teleological dimension
undergirding his entire ontological project which seems very sympathetic towards
some 'objective' understanding of a natural law theory directing the human good—
one issuing forth from God the creator.
On the other hand, however, Taylor is very wary of affirming an absolute
order for several reasons. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, he does not believe that given
enough 'wisdom' we will be able to determine exactly what the purpose of the human
agent should be. This for Taylor is too restricting in the sense that it does not allow
for those ways of being human which may transcend our normal understanding of the
anthropological realm. For example, it does not take into consideration the fact that
God may be calling someone to love in a way that radically move beyond the normal
boundaries of experience:
'
... on the one hand there are these images of order ... showing up
different in history is what the ordered life is, and lots of them ought
to be taken very seriously up to a point. A lot of wisdom and insight of
human life is attached to them. But the right call of humanity itself,
the ultimate vocation of human beings, passes beyond what we can
find in all of those because the shift from the anthropocentric to the
theocentric is such a tremendous shift.'3
There is another reason that human limits may work against any natural law
theory for Taylor. Not only would such a theory be too confining, but given our own
limited rationale, wisdom, and understanding, Taylor may argue that such a moral
order—if it exists—could never fully be known:
'
... the idea that we can give it all in a formula now through man's
eyes which can be coherently laid out, mapped with a vertical and a
'See Appendix C.
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horizontal, seems to me to be wrong. There is a principle of great
disturbance always entering into human life, our best constructed
analysis always has this principle of disturbance, and therefore there is
an act of faith involved. So I neither want to just sweep all these
notions of order aside—I think you can't even get clear about where
you are if we try and do that, all philosophy that tries to do that is a
failure—but nor do I think we can take one as being what the total
answer to human nature is about.'4
There is a tension in Taylor's theory underlying his philosophical
anthropology. My suspicion is that this is partly due to a haziness or uncertainty
Taylor has concerning the limits of sin and how that affects the moral agent's
knowledge and understanding of the good. Articulating more clearly how it is that the
human agent can come to understand God in a condition that Taylor apparently sees
as unfulfilled and debilitating may help to shed light on his own attitude to God's
nature and our relationship towards Him.
While it is misleading to talk of the theory of natural law since there are
various forms, the principle in common has traditionally been expressed as morals
and legislation being, in some sense or other, objective, accessible to reason and
based on human nature. To the extent that we understand natural law as objective,
however, it runs up against Taylor's own understanding of human experience. On the
other hand it must be said that Taylor seems to be working with some variation of
natural law in constructing a moral theory based upon certain fundamental,
ontological assumptions of human personhood. He also hints at a natural law when
he says that there are 'images of order' which show up in history and which are
extremely compelling for him.5 Furthermore, he claims that there are strong
intuitions 'of what it is to be a human being, of human life: friendship is better than
enmity, the unexamined life isn't worth living, etc.,' which lend weight to a theory of
natural law.6
There are certainly traces of a Thomistic/Aristotelian understanding of the
moral agent in this view, viz., an important place for teleology in our character so





descriptive and prescriptive law is merged by emphasising the ontological nature of
the moral agent. If I describe a human as rational, for example, prescriptively this
dictates what will fulfil the human being. But Taylor needs to articulate further how
it is that this can be true and yet at the same time allow a plurality ofways to be a
good human being.
It would be helpful if he could articulate his idea of natural law further, even
if, as I suspect, it is a shifting paradigm similar to the view of John Courtney Murray.
Murray sees natural law as not necessarily based on an ultimate metaphysical
principle, but as grounded within the history of the human race and therefore as ever-
changing.7 Indeed much of the recent literature on natural law theory has tended to
redress the impartial emphasis on an 'absolute', disengaged reasoning by reinforcing
the totality of the human's being as the focus of our understanding. As Richard
McCormick has expressed in a review of recent natural law literature, 'Traditional
theology, at least in its popularisations, has too often left the impression that when
one deals with the natural law he is simply unpacking basic principles which, when
shined up a bit, will reflect a rather comprehensive kaleidoscope of norms.'8 It is
clear that within philosophy and theology in the move away from any objective,
'rational' standpoint in empirical formulations, such thinkers as Taylor will begin to
play an important role in our understanding of natural law theory and how we come
to understand its role in the moral domain.
Coming alongside the question of natural law there are issues in the area of
hermeneutics which are also important for Taylor. For if there is always going to be
some kind of 'disturbance' in the human sphere when it comes to seeking
understanding, how are we to approach textual interpretation? What prevents us from
sliding into an extreme relativism?
Such questions are not so much difficulties and confusions within Taylor's
own philosophical system as areas of application for his epistemology. Hermeneutics,
like moral development, rests on a bedrock of epistemological transitions. We
7See John Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths (London: Sheed and Ward, 1960).
8See Richard A. McCormick, 'The Natural Law: Recent Literature', inReadings in Moral Theology,
No. 7: Natural Law and Theology, Charles E. Curran and Richard A McCormick, eds. (New York:
Paulist Press, 1991) pp. 181-182.
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understand the development of hermeneutical positions as attempting to come to
grips with the difficulties of meaning in culturally specific texts with culturally
specific interpreters. Even the variety of methods from Bultmann's demythologising
to Gadamer's 'fusion of horizons' and the 'New Hermeneutics' can be regarded as an
analogue to the way Taylor understands moral positions.
At certain points hypergoods may prescind other goods by virtue of their
epistemological gain. Rather than seeing this as grist for the relativist mill, we can
argue that the transition explains a way of getting closer to the truth—things work
better from the new position, there are less inconsistencies, more details are
explained, etc. So it is with hermeneutics. Taylor's moral reasoning applied to textual
interpretation means that one is concerned with getting the best account of the text
including the author's intent, the compelling nature of the message, and the cultural
restrictions of the truth claims.
This is by no means to be considered an 'absolute' reading of the text, but it
may be a better interpretation than previously offered. While it can be argued that
such an absence of any finality in hermeneutics naturally lends itself to the idea of
extreme, subjectivist plurality whereby any interpretation no matter how bizarre is as
good as the next, Taylor's epistemology quickly diffuses this situation by giving clear
and concise arguments for a more critical approach. One interpretation would be
considered a better one because it comes closer to the truth of the text. It deals with
more of the facts, it gives us a clearer explanation of the text or it alleviates some
inconsistency in the other hermeneutical stance. What could be taken even further is
the application of the idea of moral reasoning (as interpretation) in the realm of
hermeneutics. Both the work of Taylor and Alasdair Maclntyre have much to bring to
this discussion in terms of how we as human agents come to understand and hold
particular critical positions whether they be moral or otherwise.
Indeed, the comparisons between Taylor and Maclntyre have often been
noted. Both philosophers are Catholics thinkers heavily influenced by Aristotle. They
are also both critical of the modern notion of individuality, and wish rather to
emphasise the importance of defining the self in community. There are, however,
some profound differences between the two thinkers, such as their reading of
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Aquinas. Taylor, in contrast to Maclntyre, draws a sharp distinction between the
Augustinian and Thomist traditions on God and the self. In this one could argue that
Taylor and Maclntyre start from two opposite ends of the spectrum when
approaching the issues of the good in the human domain. In an investigation into the
theological significance of Taylor, James Buckely has noted this important
difference:
'
... even when Taylor finds Thomas helpful (as in the axiom that
"grace perfects nature"), he finds him more akin to Erasmian
Catholicism than hyper-Augustinian Lutheranism (p. 246 of Source of
the Self). There are also more substantive contrasts with Maclntyre.
For example, on pp.51-52 [of Sources of the Self Taylor says: "One
could [and, I would say, Maclntyre does] put it this way: because we
cannot but orient ourselves to the good, and thus determine our place
relative to it and hence determine the direction of our lives, we must
inescapably understand our live in narrative form, as a 'quest'. But
one could [and, I would say, Taylor by and large does] start from
another point: because we have to determine our place in relation to
the good, therefore we cannot be without an orientation to it, and
hence must see our lives in a story" (51-52).9
Buckely goes on to say that 'Understanding (if not settling) such differences
between these two Catholic philosophers will be essential to Catholic theology over
the next decade.'10 There are certainly other distinctions to 'understand' which will
further the discipline of Christian ethics. Two particular issues which have arisen in
exchange between the philosophers are the problem of conflicting goods and the
tension between individualism and community. In effect these two issues can be
addressed concurrently insofar as Maclntyre understands the irresolvable conflicts of
goods and goals as a dilemma which subverts 'the Thomistic Aristotelianism which
he envisages as the only way out of the liberal-individualist ethics ofmodernity.'11
Maclntyre's most probing critique of Taylor's work is that Taylor allows for a
conflict of goods in his moral system and does not give an account of how one goes
about reconciling various goods which seem to meet at an impasse. With a plurality
9See James J. Buckely, 'A Return to the Subject: The Theological Significance of Charles Taylor's
Sources ofthe Self, The Thomist, 55, 1991, pp.497-509; p.501, fn.5.
I0lbid.
"See Fergus Kerr, 'Moral Theology after Maclntyre: Modern Ethics, Tragedy and Thorn ismStudies
in Christian Ethics, 8:1, 1995, pp.33-44; p.36.
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of goods, Maclntyre fears that Taylor is sliding into a form of soft relativism—that
we choose between goods as a matter of mere personal preference.12 The
ramifications of this view are evident: if one's moral position is merely a matter of
emotivism, then the primacy in the human domain is given to the individual
deliberator. Communities are no longer valued as foci of moral identity. Taylor
denies any such position, insisting rather that one does not need to hold to such an
extreme anti-realism in order to claim a plurality of goods. Nor does he claim that a
plurality of goods necessarily leads to extreme individualism.
He has, however, admitted that this is a difficulty which needs to be taken
seriously. Maclntyre's polemic brings up the important question of truth in Christian
ethics and the tension between wanting to affirm an ecumenical stance towards the
various goods in modernity and not wanting to cave in to demands for absolute
relativism. Just how Taylor can come to reconcile these two positions and how
Maclntyre and Taylor both engage with the difficult issue of plurality and the modern
identity will come to play an important role for the future of moral theology.
Finally, there is a great deal of anticipation for Taylor to dialogue more
directly with theology. While his work in philosophical anthropology and his
engagements with Maclntyre can bear rich fruit in the discipline, explicit theological
formulations will be mutually beneficial. Not only will Taylor directly contribute to
theology, but I suspect he will come to find more sympathetic views than he initially
would have imagined. The similarities between those theologians that he has read at
an early age like Congar and de Lubac and his own ideas about multiculturalism in
the global order are substantial. There are, however, equally profound parallels
between his mature philosophical system and other theologians that Taylor would
find compelling.
One quite straightforward example is the transcendental Thomism of Karl
Rahner. As a Catholic student of Kant, Rahner has developed a system of theology
which pays particular attention to the subjective viewpoint of the knower in the
world. His appreciation of Marechal and Heidegger has created an atmosphere in
l2See Alasdair Maclntyre, 'Critical Remarks on Sources ofthe Selfby Charles Taylor', Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 54:1, 1994, pp. 187-190. See also Maclntyre's comments on
Taylor's contribution to After Maclntyre.
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modern Catholic theology which is conducive to a phenomenological approach to
being in the world and as such it is a view that Taylor would find extremely valuable.
The main point of dialogue for Taylor would be understanding our
epistemological questions in the human domain. Rahner, like Taylor, does not see the
world in terms of objects making lifeless impressions on the tabula rasa of the mind.
There is rather a contact theory of knowledge involved much akin to the kind Taylor
holds to. Rahner's Spirit in the World, which brings Marechal's interpretation of
Aquinas into a critical dialogue with Kant and Heidegger, argues that the knower
must be in real contact with the absolute of being in order to have true knowledge of
oneself.13
Essentially Rahner's move beyond the agnosticism of Kant and Heidegger on
the question of God is a re-formulation of Augustine's epistemological stance which,
as we have seen, has many compelling parallels with Taylor's contact theory of
knowledge. With Rahner as with Augustine, the intimacy of the union with God
undergirds our knowledge of the world and of our self. His interiorising of
knowledge is similar to the radically reflexive stance that Taylor attributes to
Augustine.
Clearly there is a rich source of dialogue in this tradition for Taylor. As a
philosopher who himself recognises a debt owed to Heidegger and the 'Continental'
tradition, his voice would be an important annotative source for modern Catholic
thought influenced by Rahner, Marechal, and Rousselot. Further theological
investigations not only with the transcendental Thomists, but with a whole swatch of
theological positions will also help give a voice to Taylor's own implicit identity as a
significant Christian thinker. This in turn will give him the theological space to
confront some of the questions addressed in this thesis concerning his understanding
of natural law, conflicting goods, the shifting hermeneutical standpoint, and the
individual in community. Furthermore, we can anticipate that such a contribution by
Taylor will greatly enrich our understanding ofGod in the world—His revelation and
grace and how we come into contact with this reality in the human domain.





MH: As far as Christianity and Philosophy of Religion goes I see a lot of
bedevilling by the Cartesian slant, and I was wondering if you saw the same
things. I'm thinking particularly of the way Philosophers of Religion spend
their time on arguments for the existence of God.
CT: I haven't read a lot of that, but from a distance I get some of that impression.
MH: It seems that there is a case for transferring what you've talked about as far as
Philosophy of Mind is concerned onto things like that. You even mentioned
Aquinas when we were talking on e-mail. He tries to prove the existence
through the five-ways.
CT: Yeah, sure.
MH: As far as epistemology goes, when you're talking about Cartesian versus
Contact Theory, I was wondering if you could give some sort of explanation
of how that would work in a metaphysical belief such as the existence of God.
CT: Well, one of the ways of looking at it is that Contact Theory isn't answering
the same questions. So if you want to know how to take somebody from a
standing start, in this case someone with no concept of God, to what you want
to prove—the existence of God, or a relation to God, then the answer might
be, 'it can't be done'. There's no argument against the belief that it can't be
done. Because why? Well because the thing about a Contact Theory is when
you're there you know it, but when you're not there you don't necessarily
know it. So take the example I'm using of waking up. The thing is that when
you've woken up you know that you've been dreaming, but formerly you
didn't, and it's not necessarily the case that you could play back what you
know now to the situation then. So the issue is, do you trust this kind of
knowledge? The whole point of Contact Theory, or another way of looking at
it, is that in Contact Theory you trust that whole diachronic sense which
brings you here now. So the way in which this plays out in relation to God is
not in a view of how you can take someone from a standing start, but in a
view of what it is to know God as God. This may be understood in a totally
non-foundationalist way where it is not finding the criteria and breaking it
down, but on the contrary there is a way of reading where you come from and
what you become in such a way that you see this grasping your whole
surrounding as getting a firmer grip on reality than what you had before. And
you get in the Confessions of Augustine the story of error-overcoming and
that story has built into it the understanding that these transitions were what I
call 'error-reducing' transitions. The style of argument is something I try to
talk about in 'Explanation and Practical Reason'—I don't know if you've
seen that.
MH: Yes.
CT: There's a lot more to be said on that, and it should be done again and again
until I get it right, but that's the basic idea, that it's a way of understanding
how you argue for where you are, where you can appreciate where you are.
The other view would be that in order to trust that sense of 'we've overcome
this error and got there', you would have to break down that sense into the
foundationalist argument in which there were certain indices for its being
reality, which in turn you could argue were trustworthy, which would then be
isolated as the ones that were here and not there. And you could argue with
the person that in virtue of these indexes this is trustworthy, and I have this
defence. But you have to have a foundationalist argument which takes the
subject that is being argued with and takes it out of time, out of the diachronic
sense, into no time or any time or instant. Knowledge should be
reconstructable in the instant, atemporality is one of the requirements of the
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Cartesian theory. You don't trust the diachronic self-understanding which
itself assumes some kind of contact—we are in touch with reality and that's
why when we break down an error we feel ourselves confirmed in reality. We
don't trust that we want another kind of argument, and it has to be
reconstructed in the instant.
MH: I think I'm getting the picture, but is there room for faith in this?
CT: Of course, it is central to this because there is this idea of... at a certain point
there is a very strong sense of, 'yeah that's got to be it', and prior to that
point, as you're moving through all these transitions, you have hunches that
you very strongly have to go with.
MH: I see a way of interpreting Aquinas' Five-ways in that sense. In the way that
he leaps from what we see in the world to 'this is what we all call God'.
Would that be a misrepresentation?
CT: No, I think that there are lots of ways of interpreting it which would make
sense of it just as an articulation of the reality sense that people had in those
days. But an anachronistic way of taking that today is that you can take
anybody from anywhere, from wherever they are starting, and lead them by
undeniable, unarguable, systematic steps to God. It plainly doesn't do that.
MH: On the other hand, I can see that someone could argue that in the case of
mankind, as Plato thought, everyone has this commonality of wanting the
good, so that in that way we could take anyone from anywhere on the basis of
human nature and argue from that standpoint.
CT: Yeah, but then argued from that, again not looking at it from Plato's way of
looking at it but the way I'm trying to look at it now, what does that mean?
Well, that means having acquired a considerably reliable reality sense, if you
want to articulate it in this sense ... yeah you might come out with something
like the Five Ways or you might come up with something like the
Augustinian type. The Five Ways of Aquinas all pass through the cosmos,
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whereas as you know, the argument of Augustine passes through the sense of
perfection. I mean, the experience of perfection is not coming from me and
therefore something higher exists. That in a way is clearer to me as an
articulation of this very strong sense of God, and you articulate that and show
why it is so blazingly evident having got there. Why it is so blazingly evident
that there is a God. But once more it doesn't speak across the gulf to people
who are not there, and it's not an argument useful in that way, but it is an
argument useful in articulating having got there. I think that Aquinas' Five-
Ways is another articulation of having gone somewhere in the sense of the
cosmos. But it just doesn't say anything across the gap of a completely
different cultural experience. That's been problematised—many people just
don't sense the cosmos in that way at all. Even those who do feel
problematised: so the whole way in which these proofs can function ceases to
be possible.
MH: Do you then think that there is any room in this sort of Contact Theory for
proofs for the existence ofGod?
CT: I guess I just talked myself into such a role. This has been very helpful, thank
you. I mean that, yeah, there could be especially articulations of where one
has got and they could be very valuable for others who are searching their
way along. To other people searching their way along and maybe moving in
that direction, yeah, that may be something worth exploring.
MH: Yes, I see what you mean.
CT: But, and maybe that's how we have to understand it at the time, the thing is I
suppose we have to say that there isn't a non-anachronistic answer to the
question of our understanding of God. Because at the time the kind of
distinction we can make today between articulating that reality sense and
speaking to anyone anywhere, and leading them by strict argument—that kind
of distinction, that kind of either/or—wasn't an option until after Aquinas.
There is no trouble in seeing that today.
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MH: Let me move into something that you've touched on and that is the disparate
nature of the way Aquinas saw the world and the way we as post-Galilean
modernists are seeing the world. In your theory you are obviously arguing that
we can't see human nature in terms of mechanisms in social theory, etc.. At
the same time we surely can't go back to the cosmology of Aristotle. But I'm
wondering in resurrecting something resembling what Aristotle sees as the
human good and ideas like that, do we also resurrect some of the muthos of
the cosmology? This is a big question in the theologian's mind because at the
one moment they are ready to jump with you into this moral pool and fight
social theorists, and at the same moment they want to affirm ideas like the
doctrine of creation that would tend to emphasise that.
CT: Emphasise what, what does that mean, the whole cosmology of it all?
MH: The idea of the human good being God and there being a design ... the whole
notion of teleology. I'm wondering is there any room for that, given the way
modern science has stripped everything?
CT: Yeah, I think, there are two pieces of the answer I want to give at the same
time. One piece of the answer is 'yes', of course the whole doctrine of
creation—creation by God, a good God, a loving God—involves some idea of
that kind. It's very being made is a gift and a gift to things that are made and
particular to us as made. But no, the bursting out of, the breaking the bounds
of the very notions of the cosmos, in particular, the even more degenerate
versions of that which arose in the transition—the 'degenerate versions' is
perhaps too strong—but the Leibnitzian Providence attacked by Voltaire, this
has been a very positive thing. We can't understand in just human terms the
kinds of things we grapple at as human beings. In these terms providence
can't be understood, and will always subvert if you think that it's there to
produce a harmonious happy world in that sense; and we are struggling very
much to understand that providence, and the condition to understanding it is
such a transition from being absolutely anthropocentric to being 'theocentric',
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to use this expression. We have trouble until this is totally achieved. So
there's where there's a big leap of faith, a big element of faith. So in one very
important sense that view of the cosmos which preceded the 18th century
views, even that has to be completely blown apart. But that's not just by
Galilean science. The Holocaust, everything that you want to think about in
the modern experience, in modern history, has blown that apart, and to the
extent that people are still hanging onto those older views, to that extent there
is a tremendous inclination to unbelief, to despair, to turning off the whole





MH: I've just been reading this interesting dialogue between you and Quentin
Skinner. What I wanted to ask first of all was how you personally react to all
these theologians and non-theologians 'theologising' your philosophy,
particularly in Sources of the Self. Would you consider it legitimate or is that
way out on a limb?
CT: Well, I mean I think to someone like Quentin—and there are a number of
people like that—they just don't understand what depends on what, and what
is meant to depend on what in the argument. And of course they could be
right and I could be wrong ... but I don't see how they could be right on that.
In other words, there is an argument there where I am trying to use the
resources that I would imagine are available in principle to anyone regardless
of their ultimate metaphysical and theological view. In the first part of
Sources what I'm actually trying to say is the way we actually reason is this
that and the other, and so some of these theories like the projectionist theories
just can't be sustained ... and I'm justified in asking for the agreement of
people whatever their views. And the suspicion somehow is that in order to
hold the position I'm holding I have to already have had a theological
premise. It is derived from that, and [they feel] that somehow I'm playing my
cards very close to my chest and not revealing this theological premise which
it actually depends on, and they want to blow the whistle and show that's the
case. I mean it's one of these cases where it is true I hold a theological view,
it's also true I'm holding this view at the end of the book. It's not true that the
order of argument is the one that they impute. And I think it is a very
important philosophical enterprise: speaking to everybody regardless, across
the gap of these basic differences on matters that you think can be argued
where we can reach agreement across these differences. And so I set the
argument up that way, and I still think the argument is valid.
MH: Quentin Skinner is on this side, but on the other side you've got various
theologians who sort of say 'yippee' when you show these theological
tendencies. What about this side? They in a way are taking the same kind of
step.
CT: Well, there is a complex relationship of another kind where we could see
some people saying 'yippee' about it. That is, it is certainly true that a
completely projectionist, naturalist position leaves no room for the issues for
which theological doctrines depend, so it is perfectly clear that what I'm
saying there opens the road or moves an obstacle. So to the extent that an
incredible amount of modern thinking has been caught by this
epistemological mind cramp, so that we get this effect of people tearing down
their own ontology in order to fit with the pre-shrunk epistemological view of
what you could genuinely talk about ... and projectivism is an
epistemologically driven theory of morality; it is nothing we could be talking
about that we could have grounds to know of virtues out there (the crude way
John Mackie puts it) and therefore they must be projected. So a lot of my
work, including the beginning of Sources, has been to try and show that this
epistemological emperor has no clothes. Now you might say that if this
argument works it opens the way for all sorts of people. It opens the way for
Nietzsche, and post-moderns, and tons of people run through this gap
including different groups in theology. So you could imagine that people who
felt somewhat intellectually oppressed by this climate would feel 'yeah
terrific' if somebody scores a point, and that's perfectly legitimate. Indeed the
error again in these people like Quentin is that they think that their
epistemological elements are so solid that the only reason anyone would be
foolish enough to disagree with them would be if they had an antecedent
prejudice of one of these kinds, and since my prejudice is theological, that's
what commands my whole project. My argument is that ... I mean it may be
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one of my motives to make this in the first place, but that's not the same as
basing the argument on this. I don't need this to make the point.
MH: While I'm on this topic, I think it's fascinating that you have people like
Skinner on the one hand and you have various theologians reading the same
work and criticising you for something completely opposite. One is criticising
you for being too explicitly Christian in your agenda, and the theologians are
criticising you for not fleshing out the undertones of Christianity in Sources,
and so it's almost like you're sitting on a fence between these two camps.
Have you felt that?
CT: No, I mean if it's that other criticism that you mentioned [reading theology
into my agenda], it's the same error. Certainly there is a legitimate demand
that I go on and write another book or somebody write another book which
develops this whole Christian dimension, that's true. But in the logic and
argument of that book it's the same mistake on both sides. That is, to think
that it would somehow be a clearer argument on my part if I'd started from a
theological premise. The argument of the book is that we can ... starting from
what we all have to accept whatever our theological position, these
connections between the good and modernity, and the evolution of the
self... you can see certain of these powerful themes, aligned to the
understanding of the self which also at the same time is aligned to the good
because the two are connected, developing over history, and it has an
important Christian input. I think all these things are ideally what everybody
regardless of their position could accept. And this is not entirely indefensible,
there are people that are miles away from me in their theological and
metaphysical outlook who have big problems with the book. Quentin has big
problems with a lot of the thrust of the argument too, and so that has probably
partly influenced him thinking I've got it wrong, but there are lots of people
who have no theological interests at all who have been sympathetic. So it
seems to me to be a mistake, or it may be that some people don't think that
there is a place you can stand—you have to start either with a theological
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premise, and that shoots into the whole thing, or a non-theological premise.
And that is perfectly one possibility of setting up their whole thought, but
there is another possible process where we can reason with each other without
referring to that, and take other people to the point where then these issues
can be posed, and posed I think more fruitfully than they are when we're
stuck in one of these cracks where we can't see.
MH: I can see dialogues across the gap being very important here. I know this is
not what you mean when you are talking about not coming from a certain
viewpoint, but we still can reason with each other. Surely part of your whole
outlook is that we do come from a viewpoint, there is no such thing as a
disengaged person, a self-positing being with no assumptions. But the
assumptions that you want to make, are they more fundamentally empirical?
CT: No, empirical is not the issue. It is much more like what I call
'Transcendental Arguments'. That is, what I try and do in the first part of
Sources is drawing on people's sense of what it is they are doing when they
are reasoning, try to draw out from that that certain pictures of the whole
moral outlook just are not credible ... and this is taking out inescapable
human factors, dimension of consciousness, and you try to show that implicit
in the matters of understanding of things which they are on another level
negating, and so this other level is in serious doubt. The challenge is why hold
to that which doesn't fit with the only experience that could justify it? What
you're doing is not empirical in the sense that the deliverances that are rock
bottom here are observations. It's really arguments to the effect that it
couldn't be anything else but this. For instance, a very important part of the
argument in Sources is that when we deliberate we don't treat the goods that
we are making referential reference points in deliberation as projections.
That's the combination in which they just couldn't be projections, because if
they are projections then they can't be reference points anymore, and then the
question is 'do I want to go on projecting them?' So you just can't treat them
as projections, and it's an appeal to this experience. It's analogous to
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Chomskian appeals to grammaticality. Grammaticality, intuition is the
same... the speakers of the language have to agree. It's not just an
observation, it's a normative—you have to say this—you have to say 'I'm not
now' and not 'I be not' or 'I not'. It's like those kinds of intuitions that people
have as speakers of the language, or, in this case, people have as deliberators.
And then the argument goes on, what grounds can you have for holding a
projectionist view that will overwhelm the area of human experience in which
these things, namely values and goods etc., figure? In that area of experience
you can't understand them in that way, and yet you want to wheel in this
metaphysical view completely unconnected with that, indeed running against
the logic of that. Why do you think this metaphysical view can trump that?
The answer really is because they bought some epistemologically influenced
story. That's really what it is, so what I'm trying to say is, 'OK, let's look at
those stories, where do they pan out?' Do they pan out in the best
understanding of human life motivation? No, they don't do that either
because, well it's a long story, but they certainly don't make any sense in the
actual way in which these things figure in your life. So why the hell should
we listen? And to me that's still a very very powerful argument. What I'm
trying to point out is that the reason why we should listen is that we've
bought some massive story that it can't be anything else but that, because of
the deep lying epistemological story. It's not because either our best
explanation in science and human life are projectionist, because they aren't,
and my point is that the domain which I call the 'best account principle'—the
things which make the best account of what ought to be the reference point
experience of all these things we believe ... well, if the reference point
experiences here explain and operate in a way in ourselves which points away
from theory A, what's the reason to believe in theory A? It's part and parcel
of the whole upsetting the metaphysical apple cart that we are so deeply
embedded in. They believe whatever is generated by their last impression.
This whole account is holding them captive, and the argument is meant to
say, 'why are you, why do you feel constrained?'
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MH: Let me try and switch tracks here if that's all right. Do you consider any
thinkers, particularly theologians, as formative in your own thought
processes? Are there any strong affinities?
CT: I haven't read lots of them, but the people that I've read and are deeply
interested in are de Lubac, Henri de Lubac, and Congar. They are people of a
previous generation. I read them a number of years ago, and they had a very
deep influence on me. And I guess that through them I'm plugged into a sort
of tradition of French Catholicism of one strand, the strand of anti-Jansenists
of the 17th century and on. I would love to have read more, and intend to read
much more in theology. In my whole take on this I certainly have a great
affinity to these people.
MH: What particularly in their theology do you find compelling? The way they
were wrestling with Aquinas?
CT: Well, it wasn't so much their wrestling with Aquinas as the way that they
seem to me to be wrestling with modern thought... their conceptions of
history, the Church in history, of the conceptions of the Church, of what
Christian Church was as a corporate body in history of a mystical body. And I
suppose one way of looking at it is de Lubac's work Catholicism, which is a
marvellous work. I think of Catholicism as the wholeness ... that as what
gathers together all human experience in history and is therefore always
incomplete. And so the take on modernity which I have, I could have written
that from another standpoint—this theological standpoint about not seeing
modernity just either as the boosters or the knockers, and neither simply on its
own terms nor simply as the decline of the previous outlook which was
Christian. The stance of the Church to it ought to be the stance of the Jesuits
entering China, which was, 'we really don't understand this, but there is
something remarkable here ... let's find out what it is, and then try and say
what the Gospel is in relation to that.' That also ought to be the stance to
modernity, except that's ridiculous because so much of it ushers from
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Christianity and beyond. But what I mean to say is that it is not just a shotgun
judgement, that whatever involves deviation from the previous foundations of
Christian faith has to be somehow a falling-off, and this proposes that we roll
it back to the previous age. The affinity I felt for that kind of view of Congar
and de Lubac is one of the very important things. And they get it from this
whole tradition of Saint Francis of Sales, and that whole tradition which
therefore included the French Jesuits and therefore was very strongly attacked
by the Jansenists who thought they were selling the past to unbelief, etc. I feel
a great allegiance to that intellectual and spiritual tradition as it has gone
down through the ages with different changes.
MH: That's a fascinating dichotomy. The idea of dogma versus some kind of
multicultural understanding is relevant here. You come out in your work as
promoting this dialectical intercourse of flushing out and articulating
hypergoods, one hypergood succeeding another hypergood and cancelling it
out, etc. Now within the Christian tradition as you just mentioned there is this
idea of holding onto the past and holding onto the goods of the past, and a lot
of these are set up as dogma. And I'm wondering where the balance in your
mind comes, when at the same time as affirming these goods we are denying
other goods.
CT: I think that again the criteria is catholicity in the way I understand it.
Catholicity is the attempt towards a church in which the whole range of
Christian spiritualities—those that we now imagine, those that we have not
yet imagined—can coexist. And therefore we both maximally concentrate our
understanding on what's at stake here, and maximally try to reframe the
issues so that they aren't put into opposition to each other as either/or. An
example of how not to do it is my definition of heresy. Heresy means choice.
What's wrong with the choice is the kind of choice that says that these two
are incompatible and this is the right one and we have to choose it. In a way I
think the reformers, Luther, Calvin and so on (this may sound sectarian) are
paradigm examples of heretics, because they had something very valid, a
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certain spirituality of the Bible for instance which is tremendously valid. But
they felt they had to present that in a way that put a torch to the monastic
vocations, understanding of the Mass, The Sacraments. They sort of torched
the house down in order to have this room, and they are not by any means
alone in this kind of error. The Catholic Church itself tends to do the same
thing the other way around. It tends to torch out the Biblical spirituality in
order to preserve its other stuff, and the goal of catholicity is the goal of
continually understanding how these things properly really are. This takes a
great deal of spiritual maturity, of growth and prayer, and not just trusting
one's first-off logic. Being able to see the work of the Spirit there, and then
see how it can coexist ... and in the actual Catholic Church there are
extraordinarily different things which manage to coexist ... which are good
examples ... and then other things are included which oughtn't to be. So
dogma is important wherever. What dogma does is keep the doors open in
that there are Catholic dogmas like the Sacrament of the Mass which is very
important if the issue is closing that chapter by simply taking an extreme
Calvinist as some kind of commemorative rite. Making that point so that you
can go on underpinning that spirituality is very important. It's very hard to
make a judgement here, but if the aim is to close off possibilities then it is
very negative in its consequences, so the Church has to go on protecting
certain definitions in order to keep the whole gamut of spiritualities alive, and
that also must be very careful about not foreclosing on others.
MH: Yes, obviously I think there is a trickiness in policy versus spirituality. We
have the vantage point of history in that we can see events like the heresy
whereby they are not irreconcilable with the truth of catholicity; what about in
modern times, when we don't have this objective advantage of reflection?
CT: We can have that, that's why it's a very good thing to travel to some extent
spiritually, maybe in time maybe in space, and begin to acquaint ourselves
with the whole or anyway a large swatch of Christian spiritualities. Then
outside of our very parochial view we get a better take on, get a better feel for,
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these spiritualities. The more you have a feel for a larger number of these
spiritualities the more you can recognise new ones or not fail to recognise
them, or misrecognise them, or just shut them out. And the more we narrow
ourselves into a certain set, that we develop in our particular bit of the
Church, the more we are likely to take the shotgun and just shoot from the hip
at whatever comes along and looks even mildly different, and shoot it out of
the water. And I think that we in the modern age see one of the advantages
along with the so-called disadvantage of all this diversity around us, and all
these things we have at our finger tips. We can get at anything by just pushing
a few keys. Well the advantage of that is that you can do this kind of
travelling, we can open up different spiritualities to ourselves, we are not
stuck in some small community where nothing can be taught except X, Y, Z.
So we have recourse to do this. There are certain problems to this in that we
could lose our bearings, but there are also resources to overcome this. And
lots of people are following this, our spiritualities arise which involve this
kind of exploring.
MH: Do you think that would tend to wash out your spirituality in some instances?
I can see a lot of people who find the idea of a very strict, small pocket of a
community with black and white guidelines very attractive because they know
where they are. They know where they stand, they are not exploring and they
can see the advantage of that.
CT: Sure, that's where I think the kind of church order in people who feel they
want to do this, and who recognise that it's their way and not other people's
way, would be ideal. On a slightly different level, certain monastic orders do
that. You get the Trappist order—they're not saying there isn't anything good
in talking, but there are certain temptations and certain difficulties and certain
distractions for their spiritual path that they need to cut out. So they accept
this very rigid discipline in which these things are cut out. And that is how it
should be. I do not think ... it's not like the reformer's attitude, because it's
not my way ... I do not think that one would knock that aside. At the same
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time what's interesting and what's good is that they're not saying that it
would be unchristian not to do this, and if you don't do this you're a heretic.
They're saying this is a very important way and it's really important for us
and if anyone wants to join us fine; but it's not for everybody and we will
pray for and offer our spiritual guidance for anyone who wants to follow
another path. It's that kind of coexistence which I think is real catholicity,
where one can recognise that this is a way but not necessarily the way ... and
there is a sense of the Gospel that is not narrowed into that form, and when
that happens disaster strikes and both sides get edgy.
MH: That seems to be the most rewarding kind of ecumenical exercise.
CT: Yeah, but it has to be a two way street. There are people outside these
particular groups who themselves bring these judgements on these people,
saying they're neurotic, etc.. Take the way that certain kinds of very strict
Born Again Protestantism in the States has developed this very unfortunate
adversarial relationship to everybody else including the mainline churches.
Here the narrowness is very much on both sides because these people are
saying 'Everyone else is going to rot in hell,' and so on; but these other
people are saying 'These other people are just neurotics, they can't face the
modern world.' But it could be looked at as a certain spiritual battle involving
discipline, and why not? It's not my way, but why not? Well it has to be both
sides that would move on this. This side would accept the legitimacy of this,
and the other side accept the legitimacy of the other side. The dynamic of the
feeling is that their Christian faith is being attacked so of course they are
going to defend the Christian faith. So it becomes the faith and their dynamic
produces a situation where neither side can really make the 'catholic' gesture
in this way of understanding catholicity. You can see how the dynamic can
drive a wedge here.
MH: That's interesting because I grew up in that exact environment of rigidity of
the us/them gap.
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CT: Yeah, it's not so much produced by the mainline churches as unbelieving
liberal east coast ... I've got all these words that are the worst concepts of
progress ... but it's true that the picture presented of these people in the New
York Times is a terrible caricature. So you can understand how this thing gets
set up and it's very hard to talk across the gap. I try and explain to my
American liberal friends: 'See how you're engaged in (De Tocqueville used
this expression) "cultural civil war", but it's on both sides?' [but they say],
'What do you mean it's on both sides!!? We're being attacked all the time
and people are shooting abortion clinic doctors, etc.' [And I say], 'Yeah, but
at the same time look at the way you caricature these people all the time. You
can see how it's provoking them.' And they can't see that. And I suppose if I
sat down with some of the hard-liners from the other side they wouldn't see it
either. So they get in this position and they just can't see that it's a total





MH: I thought it would be interesting to continue with what we were talking about
last week, and that was the idea of dogma and Catholicism. Last week we
were getting into the area of best accounts, and I was wondering if you
thought that in order to live in a community like Catholicism, does one need
to have a shared best account with others?
CT: Well it's very hard to say what the answer to that would be. At one level
'yes', at another level 'no'. There are all these different interpretations which
are in contest with each other. On the other hand they have common reference
points, they have common texts, the Bible, all sorts of tradition they are trying
to interpret and argue with each other. But in philosophical terms of the best
account, there are certainly really big differences. There are people that feel
that any allowance for a hermenuetical dimension in revelation is some kind
of cop-out. You have to smash through, to puncture the hermeneutical
activity, or it isn't revelation. But possibly there aren't terribly many of those
in the Catholic Church, though there have been. And so on this score you
have a big difference, but nevertheless, what ties them together is that there
are certain key elements of tradition that both accept.
MH: So they both have a similar best account?
CT: Yeah.
MH: Now going from that sort of model into a more global idea, de Lubac talks
about false religions and the idea of conversion. Do you follow in that vein,
are there false religions in your mind? Is there a case for dialoguing with
them, is there a need for conversion?
CT: Well, I think there certainly are false religions. I don't see how anyone could
deny that. But the issue is 'is anything that is not the Christian religion just
ipso facto a false religion?'. And there I think one has to be spiritually
empirical, just note whether some other traditions nourish a certain kind of
spiritual fullness. It seems to me unquestionably that some do. And I think
we've talked about this before, where you go from here is not entirely clear. I
don't think we should necessarily expect it to be entirely clear. We shouldn't
say 'If we can't solve this problem we've made a terrible mistake.' It's not
clear exactly what God's doing. He's not relating it to us, but maybe we are
not expected to understand it. So a great deal of respect is necessary, and I
think there is something very important in trying to understand them [other
religions], but also learn some things from them that we can live out. But
thirdly, even where it's very clear that there are differences that we have to
recognise that oppose each other where we can't learn, where we have to
cease to follow the same spiritual path, even there, we gain a great deal from
recognising that there is something spiritually great there that isn't our way.
And what we learn is that ... let me put it this way, there's a lot of very facile
affirmation of one's own tradition which is based simply on negative
judgements about others. So for years people who believed in God thought
that people who didn't must be somehow morally questionable, and
Christians thought that Jews were just simply fixated on the Law, and that
Buddhist and Hindus were just totally 'other-worldly'. We all have these
stories whereby our own faith, our own position, is shored out by what turns
out in examination to be ludicrously uncomplementary. And when you
liberate yourself from those crutches, then the way to carry on with one's own
faith is for it to be a live one for itself, as against one of these contrasting
moves. So I think it's a very important enlivening and liberating move to
liberate ourselves from these denigrating stories that we've told about others.
But of course there are false religions, others like Jones at Jonestown. I mean
why go to extreme cases which are obviously really terrible? So it's not a
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position of principle. It's very much one where you have to be open to
spiritual depth and greatness where it exists and also its opposite.
MH: So would you say that there is a need for conversion, but not in the strict
sense of converting to what de Lubac would call the 'holy ark of salvation',
but more a conversion to a spiritual integrity maybe?
CT: Yeah, or it's more complicated than that because I think the Gospel has to be
preached everywhere. People's path everywhere might be different, and we
can't presume that it isn't from the beginning. And naturally as a Christian I
want to share that kind of corporate view of de Lubac and others, but there's
something absolutely indispensable being done in God's name by the
Buddhist. But it would appear there are other elements of that that I don't
understand, and I would just respect without believing that I have to
understand them all. So therefore it has to be all this, because it's the only
thing I can understand, and the others would just be swept up and done away
with. We need an agnosticism at this point, and I think honestly, in spiritual
humility, we have to accept and articulate that that's where we are.
MH: last week you mentioned the analogy of approaching modernity somewhat in
the same way that the Jesuits went into China. That is, we don't understand
what's going on here, but we will try and become Chinese, etc. De Lubac
talks about Christianity in its early form absorbing the culture of Antiquity, so
that we can't talk about Paul's Epistles without the ideas of what was going
on in Tarsus and Rome at the time. Do you see Christianity today as doing the
same kind of thing, as absorbing modernity? You qualified that last week by
saying it's funny in a way because there is so much of historical Christianity
inbred in modernity.
CT: Yeah, that's right, so it's a very different situation from going to China or
going from the totally Jewish background to the Hellenistic background. It's
very different because a lot of it is a spin-off, so that makes it very much
harder of a certain mindset, because to the extent that it's a spin-off it
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involves some negation of the Christian faith. But my view is that,
paradoxical as it may seem, and as mind bending as it may seem, part of the
consequence of it spinning off and no longer being totally congruent with the
Christian Church message Gospel and so on, has been the development of
certain potentialities—things like the political culture of human rights and
universality of rights which was rather difficult to combine with the historical
Church of late—and that has managed to develop to some extent outside
these elite springs, and now in some sense ought to be recognised by people
who are still in the Church. Pope John Paul has done this as well. This is what
we ought to have been saying all along, but let's not pretend that we were
saying it all along. It's something that's partly alien. So we have to go to
school to a certain degree with this alien element even as the Jesuits did, but
with this difference. It's harder to accept that because it's a question of all this
pride and priority.
MH: So do you think a lot of these things like universality, benevolence—some of
these modern virtues—are foreign to the original Christian ideals?
CT: No, retrospectively they seem to be developing.
MH: It's just that they weren't fully articulated through the Early Church?
CT: Yes, and they were kept put away, they were hedged in by other features of
those earlier societies that had something to be said for them but nevertheless
also needed to be broken open for these things fully to develop. The churches
as they developed historically have got such a degree of symbiosis with them
that it was very difficult for them to break out. You get this kind of move in
history. It's very clear that the very early churches did things in the social
realm which none of the other associations did, such as homes for widows
and orphans ... kind of an early welfare state. Charitable organisations and so
on started to exist on a level that they had never existed before in the early
Christian churches, and in a way you could see some of the campaigns today
for universal beneficence, Amnesty International etc., being some kind of
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continuation of that, with all the problems involved with that... and
sometimes the questionable aspects of that, I'm not denying that. But I think
that that is an important step forward, but that kind of universal activism
presupposed something which grew up in the modern break-up of Christianity
and that is—a questionable thing too—the very high degree of confidence in
our own power of remaking things. The limits of what had to be taken of the
way things are have been pushed way aside, in these massive attempts to
change the whole ecological communal development of common interest.
They just go in there and turn it around. There's faults with this, and there are
problems with this which are directly involved with, what we could argue
from a Christian point of view, its negation of the Christian sense of limit. At
the same time, to the extent that the sense of limit was founded just on a lack
of imagination, conservative structures and so on, getting rid of that is
something very important. So what we need is not just this culture exactly as
it is, nor do the Jesuits say 'We'll take China exactly as it is.' They wanted to
make a change, but to this culture as well as positively developing a
recuperating within the Church in the sense that de Lubac says. Could you
have the sense that on one level everything is possible that involved structural
organisational barriers—what we all think of as limits to our thinking and
how to deal with them—and at the same time not have this idea that human
beings are terminally masters of their history, that our own spiritual
development is irrelevant to this ... because if you really want to know the
best organisation, the best game plan, then you work out whether our
motivations are good or bad, and they're factored out ... all these catastrophic
errors (hubris I guess) ... can that be negated and bottled while at the same
time [we] benefit from the way in which the barriers to our thinking actually
work out?
MH: I want to ask you about Natural Law and bring in the idea of Plato. Something
that triggered this off is reading de Lubac and his idea of Catholicism as an all
inclusive idea: 'religion itself. He says 'Catholicism is that which humanity
must put on in order finally to be itself, and it reminded me of your lectures
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on Plato. In the beginning we had to keep in mind that for Plato the human is
someone who has a concept of the Good and has a yearning for the Good so
that the bad person intellectually has an inconsistency within his person, and
Socrates as the gadfly tries to bring this out. Immediately it brought to mind
the way you do philosophy—bringing to the fore what is implicit in the
statements we make and the way we live. Plato is working with a very
specific idea of natural order, with a telos and reflected Ideas. I was
wondering if you are working with the same kind of assumptions when doing
philosophy.
CT: Well sort of, but not quite. See I think that both Plato and Aristotle have a
picture of human nature which is in itself perfect order prescribed,
harmonious and there doesn't seem to be any strain to tendencies which we
can't, if we have the proper wisdom, see how to work itself out. I think that's
not the human condition. I think that on the one hand there are these images
of order ... showing up different in history is what the ordered life is, and lots
of them ought to be taken very seriously up to a point. A lot of wisdom and
insight of human life is attached to them. But the right call of humanity itself,
the ultimate vocation of human beings, passes beyond what we can find in all
of those because the shift from the anthropocentric to the theocentric is such a
tremendous shift. Or if it doesn't it involves living those orders in a
completely different fashion than we can imagine now. So the idea that we
can give it all in a formula now through man's eyes which can be coherently
laid out, mapped with a vertical and a horizontal, seems to me to be wrong.
There is a principle of great disturbance always entering into human life, our
best constructed analysis always has this principle of disturbance, and
therefore there is an act of faith involved. So I neither want to just sweep all
these notions of order aside—I think you can't even get clear about where you
are if we try and do that, all philosophy that tries to do that is a failure—but
nor do I think we can take one as being what the total answer to human nature
is about.
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MH: So would you say that there is order in the ideal human state, but it's
unknowable? It's not caught up in the realm ofmere mortals?
CT: Yeah, that may be it, I'm not sure which is the best way of putting that about
which I think our understanding is so limited. So I'm hesitant, because
perhaps you could put it as there is an ultimate order which we don't
understand now which all the orders we do understand are partial distortions
of, or maybe it's that ultimately being with God transcends all order. I'm not
quite sure how to put it. There are these strong intuitions of what it is to be a
human being, of human life: friendship is better than enmity, the unexamined
life isn't worth living, etc., etc. There are certain virtues which it is good to
develop, fulfilling your potential is a terribly important demand, and these are
notions of the good life that are very persuasive, but as soon as they begin to
present themselves as self-sufficient—that there is no demand beyond that,
that there might be in the renunciation of my fulfilment as against simply an
inexplicable self-pleasure or that in the failure to fulfil myself something
might come about bringing myself and my humanity closer to God in the very
act of failure, or suffering—something very important might be happening,
which just gets beyond your horizon if you think that that's all there is to say
in your conception of the human life. The shutting out of those is not only
wrong and erroneous, not only losing sight of something, but also can be
terribly destructive. So the belief that we've got it all worked out kind of
makes me very nervous.
MH: Do you see parallels between the way you do philosophy—for instance the
way you dialogue with people like Richard Rorty and say 'Wait, what you just
said, if you bring that to fruition, will have your whole argument unravelling
before you'—and the way Plato jabs at his opponents with their own
inconsistencies? I think it is quite a remarkable characteristic in the way you
do your philosophy. You don't just say 'You're wrong' and put them off to
one side. There is this engaging in an attempt to flesh out the truth in a way
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which has tremendous faith in this principle of inconsistency which will
eventually arise.
CT: Yeah, I think we all have experiences which negate these two partial views. It
is a matter of trying to bring them out. Experiences are shared, so if we bring
them out we can ideally convince them that there is something missing. There
I agree with Plato, we all have this tendency in us and it's a matter of finding
the forms it takes, and that's another reason to be tremendously open to this
variety of human ways of being. Any situation has built into it a negation so
you can get inside it and say 'well what's this doing here?'
MH: That's one place where I see difficulty in the analogy between the way the
early Christian Church absorbed its culture and the way we as modernists are
meant to absorb ours. In the Early Church positing a divine being wasn't a





MH: I wanted to talk a little bit about the affirmation of everyday life. Basically it's
been a very pervasive idea in politics particularly very recently with both the
right and the left side, people like Newt Gingrich and Tony Blair coming
from opposite extremes. It's also been very heavily secularised as you know,
and I was wondering if in your own mind that matters as far as affirming it, or
do you still hold onto the trappings of its origin, and if so to what extent?
CT: Yeah, I think there is an impoverishment that takes place when it's taken out
of that context... an impoverishment as there always is when something is
taken out of that context. But there is another side to this argument. We've
talked about this before ... sometimes some of these moral visions or moral
points can be also carried further because the context of Christian belief in
fact went along with (and its hard to see how it could avoid going along with
in its context) .... Well I guess another way of putting it is the idea of
Christendom as a society that is totally Christian—and there is always
something dangerously restrictive and one-sided about any idea of
Christendom—and that the idea of Christendom involves the use of force. So
patently I would argue that the case of the human rights universality and
unconditionality of rights, the existence of breaking open Christendom, the
existence of pluralism in the original context, meant that the rejection of
religion allowed the development of certain understandings of human rights
as universal and unconditional way beyond what they ever could have
achieved in the context of Christendom. So in wrenching them out there are
gains and there are losses. There's gains because the idea went through a
development that we have to approve of, that we have to consider plausible.
On the other hand, in taking it out of that context, you lose a whole vision of
why it's so important, and nothing I think as good has been substituted since.
So there are gains and there are losses. Similarly, the affirmation of ordinary
life, the idea of the relief of suffering again unconditionally and universally,
which is very much an idee philosophie, a powerful idea in the 20th
century ... which is why world campaigns for famine and Somalia and that
kind of thing can get mobilised ... obviously we need modern
communication, modern television and modern planes and so on in order to
make that a real option. Nevertheless, we have to understand culturally and
morally why this option really is taken up in certain parts of the world and not
yet in others, and that's because we have developed certain notions of the
value of ordinary life, one facet of which is the relief of suffering the
preservation of life, just life as such, the relief of suffering. And yeah, maybe
this too is more unconditional and more universal as it has broken out of
Christendom, but there is an impoverishment of the spiritual understanding of
this. We've had gains and we've had losses. You can't just look at it in one of
these lights.
MH: So how sympathetic would you be to some of the immediate Reformers,
someone like Luther who was seeing man as a homo religiosus, affirming the
everyday life in the context of the created order, the ontic logos.
CT: I think I have exactly the same thing to say about that with different
examples, that there are gains and there are losses. There was this tremendous
gain of seeing ordinary life in that way. It was there already in a way, but it
was given much more play. In other words it was in relation to some of the
earlier insights in the idea of orare est laborare and so on—it was in relation
to them, you might say, as universal rights of the human today are to the more
timid movements in Christendom which were conditional on being part of the
majority religion etc., etc. So there was a sort of breaking forth. At the same
time there were also very destructive elements, an impoverishment, because
the whole range of celibate vocations was just put in the trash can. Now, if
you like, the range of different spiritualities in the Church was radically
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reduced—that was the loss. The gain was a focus on the narrow range, things
about it, an intensity and so on which were never brought out before. So it
seems that we have this repeated set of events in history and what sense to
take on it. But at that moment, if you're Erasmus or someone, and trying to
keep the whole thing together, then you lose out. But in the long run it's
possible to have a more fully Catholic Church as a result of this, if you can
find a way back from these developments and reincorporate them in a broader
understanding of what the spirituality of the Church is ... get over the
adversarial relationship which got set up where nobody could at one and the
same time, it would appear, appreciate the good in the celibate vocations, and
appreciate the spirituality in the other. It seems to be not possible in the end.
But it could be, if we stand back from all this and get ourselves out of the
purely adversarialy partisan relationship (and the same thing to Christians in
relation to secular modernity, the same point can be made) ... we can
reappropriate all this.
MH: I'm wondering if we really can in terms of secular modernity do the same
thing. I can see it easily happening in the Christian community because they
are sharing this model of the world, but can we look at thinkers in the secular
arena today who are affirming everyday life, or the good in and of itself
without any restriction or points of reference, and say 'that's all right'?
CT: No, never, obviously there has to be some amendment to it to put it back in its
context. We just have to have the honesty, veracity or clear-sightedness, or
the humility, or all of the above and more, to face the fact that although we
have amendments to make now, it's lucky that we didn't prevail—I mean we
as representatives of Christendom, we didn't prevail. Something has emerged
out of our not prevailing earlier, and being able to put it then in a context we
understood because that would have kept it from flowering, in other words
yielding all its fruit. Now it's yielded a lot of lousy fruit along with the good
fruit, and that's still mixed up in it, so we have to make a criticism of it, try
and put it in another context. But if this is done in a triumphalist spirit where
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we say 'The whole escape from our tradition, the first step, was a mistake and
now all the bad things are a result of that'—if we kind of peel it back like
that—we are not really being truthful with ourselves or the situation, and it
will make it harder to convince people. They are just seeing it as a roll back.
There is already constantly this reaction among secularly-minded people that
any attempt to put it in this Christian context amounts to your rolling back to
the middle ages, the Inquisition. These hyper-heated rhetorics pick this as
their reference point.
MH: I'm wondering if we can see the affirmation of everyday life as a good with a
reference point in the way that they [secularists] do. I can't really see how to
marry the two. There are people on one side who want to say 'this is all
baggage we need to get rid of it. Universal beneficence is good in itself, and
we can work on that.' And on the other hand, you can strongly argue that if
you don't have certain limitations or certain ideas behind universal
beneficence, that it falls apart, and can even become a monster, a vehicle for
destruction. So these people over here [Christians] are working with an
assumed order of some kind. How can we convince these people over here
[secularists], not necessarily that their idea is not going to work, but that there
needs to be some kind of order, if not the kind that was set up before,
something along the same lines as before.
CT: Yeah, but is that what we really want to say? Your point is bringing out
something very interesting, and I hadn't thought of it quite in these terms.
There are two kinds of things people could say. There is a criticism of the
certain type of very polemical secular understanding of beneficence. One of
them is the point about limitations and a certain kind of order, enframed in a
certain way. And I see a point about that, for instance if you focus on the wild
grab of wanting to control it all. We say, 'Hey, wait a minute we have to
accept certain limitations, there are other things as well you have to think of:
you're riding roughshod over a whole bunch of other goods.' Though here
I'm not even sure a certain order is necessary. It's just necessary to make
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people sensitive to these other goods, make people sensitive to human
limitations, make people sensitive to what monsters they become when they
ignore these. You could have just said to Lenin, 'Look, human beings need to
be able to come to some of these great new forms of society with some degree
of free and spontaneous growth, and what you've done is totally foreclose
that. Everything is totally controlled. You're going to produce monsters. You
are going to produce a situation in which the people in power are monsters,
and the other people are just terrified. Just don't think of the goal and how
great it is and the fastest way to get there instrumentally.' So there is a
discourse that could use the notion of order, but this drive of conflicts of other
goals and human limitations and so on is another criticism which is very
meaningful to me, which is the one I find in Dostoyevsky—which I talk about
in the end of Sources—which gets to the very heart of beneficence. What is
the motor which allows you to go on and on putting demands on yourself to
help others, either in the situation of a social worker, doctor, or if you're
spending a lot of time raising money for Oxfam and so on? And the issue is,
what people often run on is a certain sense their own human dignity, and
maybe a certain sense of human dignity in general, where they wouldn't feel
good about themselves if they weren't, they would be ashamed of themselves
if they weren't, but they feel good about themselves because they are. And it's
very much focused on their own sense of the self. That is one of the very
powerful motivations which is mobilised by all the secular ideology of this
kind and there are severe limitations to that, severe limitations to how far that
can carry you. And here we get to the real crunch of the difference of view, I
guess. The vision of Dostoyevsky, as I see it, putting it in my terms, is what
you need in order to carry through on this is an acute sense of human beings
as objects of love, objects of God's love that you can participate in. That
empowers you in a way that the ordinary human secular sources cannot,
because at a certain point ... the sense of your own dignity has certain
limits ... and how far it can carry you. A sense of general human dignity is an
extremely dangerous double edged thing, because you've also got to take into
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account why people never live up to that. So if you're moved by the sense of
human beings having a wonderfully great potential, faced with actual human
material we keep dealing with—that has over and over again flipped over into
a sense of anger and contempt for these actual human beings which links up
to the other thing we were talking about—that is part of what motivates us to
take over and get it done, control it, treat these people like human raw
material. So what this rambling discourse is trying to get at is there's another
issue of what's missing in the secular age which is not limits, but what allows
you to go beyond certain kinds of limits. What allows Mother Theresa ... in
this film they asked her, 'How do you do it, when you see these people lying
in the gutter, how do you manage to bring yourself to this?' And she said,
'Well, they're the image of God.' Now that's a very banal answer, but the
difference is she really felt that. I could have said that, you could have said
that, but she really meant that, she really felt that. Now what is it to feel that?
This is something that takes us beyond motivations available to the secular
human being. So the whole issue is 'Does human beneficence with the goal it
sets itself really meet their requirements? Is it always going to be turning into
something too limited or dangerously controlling if it just runs on the fumes,
as it were?' And this is a subject that is incredibly difficult to raise. I raised
this problem at the end of Sources, and I've had I don't know how many
secular-minded people in this discussion of what I call moral sources—in 99
cases out of a 100, they don't know what I'm talking about. Because they just
don't raise this issue. They think it slides back into criteria: 'Why does he
want us to believe in God, and does that give us a criteria?' ... No it doesn't
give you a criteria. If you recognise something, if you recognise a certain
human movement that comes out, you don't need God for that. I suppose they
think that the only issue is how do we train people to interiorise certain
standards ... how do we find the right standards—we need Immanuel Kant or
something—and then how do we interiorise the standards? And that's a
matter of people getting it built into their own sense of self, and if we do that
all right then it's fine. And Dostoyevsky to me has a vision of the tremendous
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dangers involved in this. Nietzsche also has a sense of how surface
benevolence can be powered by all sorts of things which aren't benevolence,
and this issue of what empowers you to do that is where a tremendously
important part of the criticism comes from and that has nothing to do with
bringing it back into some order. See, in bringing it back into some
order... we think that Christendom had a kind of order and everything fit in
to a place, and now these things have burst out, and they're all over the place
and that's the problem. That's part of the problem, but another part of the
problem is they haven't burst out enough. There are these images in the Bible,
the tongues of fire at Pentecost, that just burst the limits and that's part of the
movement of God too. And what we have here is something much more
aware of how it's limiting it, and damping things down. Though the other is
also true.
MH: When I was talking of limits I was thinking on this side of the self-
determining freedom that has risen up from this whole movement. Suddenly
we've got this mechanistic universe and everything is internalised, all our
sentiments, and it's very important to realise our own potential, and be free to
fulfil our goals. But I can see on the flip-side that yours is a very crucial point.
CT: I'm confused because I can see very good criticism in both directions, but
they seem to be opposite. That point of everyone being themselves and so on,
shorn of some sense of being plugged into something greater ... what one
notices about that is that all the people who are being themselves look terribly
similar, and saints aren't similar to each other because there is something
working in their lives which is much bigger than they are. And when you
have everyone trying to be themselves in this very narrow ideological
cage ... yeah, from one point of view they are not respecting certain demands
on themselves, certain limits. From another point of view they sink to a kind
of conformity, and the two are not entirely unrelated. The world goes dead if
you only believe in individual freedom, because the important differences
between doing X and doing Y—even when they are suppose to be valuing
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doing X or doing Y—the important differences just disappear. The example
that always comes to mind is when people argue about homosexuality, for
instance, when they argue the case for non-discrimination against
homosexuals (which I'm entirely in favour of as a principle). But the way it is
argued is—and the very words used to turn sexual orientation into another
kind of indifferent way of going one way or another like some people like
blondes and some like brunettes—it's indifferent. Whereas in the actual
experience at least of heterosexual love, human beings can be linked-here
we're back to ordinary life-can be linked to the locus of a great spiritual
development, so you can't look at it as just one way of doing things. This is
not to say that seeing the spiritual value of this requires that you dump on
homosexuality as being evil and perverted and so on. I'm a little bit at a loss
as to what to say about that and people who are turned that way. But it does
mean that making a home for even-handedness by this flattening out, this
indifferentising of these things, involves a terrible price. And interesting
enough there is on the homosexual side the so-called 'queers' as opposed to
the so-called 'gays'. Some of the 'queers' theorists are people who want to
hang onto the idea that there is something special to this, that it shouldn't be
levelled down. They don't want to be just domesticated as another kind of
marriage. It's very interesting that they themselves fight against this
flattening. But when heterosexuals do, they very often either get attacked for
it or get caught up on the side of extremely repressive people who want to just
lead a large discourse of evil perversion and pugnality; and somehow in this
situation we've lost the space where we can have a sense of saying 'No, you
can't justify a civilised legal relation here on the basis of indifference, you've
got to find another way of doing it.' A similar thing can be said about
culturalism—'If it ends up just being run by a Muslim tradition it doesn't
matter, it's a thing of your choice.' That's why a lot of Muslims and very
strongly believing Christians resent the whole language of public secular
space because it seems to be predicated on making the whole thing 'some
people are into chess, some people are into beer drinking, other people are
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into Christianity', and it's just this kind of flattening that is what is involved.
And what that links up with is a certain ideology of freedom above all which
is won at the expense of flattening out the things that freedom chooses
between, which ends up with people whose lives are just not interestingly
different from other lives because anything that might have made them
different has been switched off and devalued. So both directions of criticism
seem to be possible here. On the one hand accept certain limitations, on the
other hand, open yourselves to a much more exciting and different, and
terrifying, and awe-inspiring place the universe is. We need to burst through.
The free subject is entirely encased in this armour, and nothing breaks
through or phases it, and that's an incredibly cramped way to be. That's what
strikes me strongly about modem unbelief. If you've read the Brothers
Karamazov, it's Ivan whose the one who is tragically caught in the move that
flattens the universe.
MH: Let me bring you back to something we were talking about—the possibility of
Protestants affirming the monastic life. There being a destruction of this
hierarchy in one sense but also an affirmation of all goods in this way reminds
me of something that I read recently. It was a criticism of this affirmation by
Stanley Hauerwas. Let me just read this from Dispatches From the Front.
This is a chapter called 'Killing Compassion' where he brings up this point,
and quotes you about the affirmation of everyday life leading to this
uncontrolled beneficence which he says is quite dangerous. There's an
excerpt here from Sources: 'Once the notion of order becomes paramount it
makes no more sense to give them a crucial status in religious life. It becomes
an embarrassment to religion that should be bound to belief in particular
events which divide one group from another and/or in any case open to cavil.
The great truths of religion are all universal. Reason extracts these from the
general course of things. A gap separates these realities of universal import on
the particulate facts of history. These latter cannot support the former.'
(,Sources of the Self, p.273) And then he says, 'What is extraordinary about
Taylor's analysis is how it helps us see why any Christian account of love
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necessarily suffers a loss of a Christological centre, not because of science,
but because of the moral presuppositions commensurate to the valuation of
everyday life.' (Dispatches from the Front, p. 173) Do you see where he's
going there?
CT: I don't see where he's going at all. I'm talking about something quite
different. Is that a quote from me about the universal and the particular?
MH: Yes.
CT: Yes, I was talking about something else. I was talking about the 18th century
Deism, and blessing and so on.
MH: Getting into a sort of external order of God?
CT: Yeah, the Deistic view of God, which certainly has a complex linkage with
the affirmation of everyday life in its advance as it moves into the
Enlightenment.
MH: Let me read a bit more: 'If we are to create compassionate societies in which
the value of each individual is thought to be equal to other individuals, then
we must devalue the extraordinary.' Which is basically what we were just
talking about.
CT: Uh, huh, that is Nietzsche too.
MH: 'The extraordinary ... comes in the form of extraordinary people as well as
events.' So what he's getting at is ifwe affirm the everyday life to the point of
compassion or universal benevolence there's this danger of cancelling out
great figures, particular the figure in the centre of Christianity. So ... I am not
really sure how he hooks that up with love ... but do you see that as a danger?
CT: Yeah, I think that what he is hitting at I would agree with. I think what he is
hitting at is this secular reduction of benevolence to a set of goals of relieving
suffering, say, and then we see how to get this done as effectively as possible.
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In effect, once we get the goals then instrumental reason kicks in and we see
how to do this as effectively as possible; and what it runs on in the way of
human motivation is our sense of ourselves, value of ourselves, as people
who want to do this. Then you have something which has flattened out a lot
of the universe in the course of getting to this goal. Now this is one of the
things that eventually is from the affirmation of everyday life, but that is a
much richer and multifaceted notion than this. So I think he has just used an
unfortunate word in terms of what I was trying to say, but I see there is
something, a target that he's hitting there. The answers aren't reduced by
unbelieving enlightenment to a set of goals of relieving suffering universally
so that instrumental kicks in and nothing else is allowed into this set of goals.
That does devalue the extraordinary.
MH: Jean Bethke Elshtain brings out a similar point in her essay in Philosophy in
an Age ofPluralism, but she mentions it all along the lines of the sovereign
state. I have one more question which has to do more with the way you flesh
this out in The Ethics of Authenticity. The idea of affirming everyday life
which comes into self-fulfilment in production and labour etc. ... how do we
marry that with the central focus of loving God with all your heart and loving
your neighbour as yourself?
CT: Well what the Gospel seems to reveal is that one of the things that comes
from being really decentred and theocentred is that you have a love for the
world, other people, such that no human being's ever dreamt of such a
powerful love. So that means that once you have that intuition of course you
can also feel bound to do certain things for other people that go beyond what
you would normally. It's part of what's motivating you to do this, it's what
you're moving towards, and exactly how much you do that and how much
you try and change yourself. It's one of these judgements about spiritual paths
that I think we can't give totally general prescriptions about. But at the end of
all this, how can there be a conflict if we think that this man reveals to us
what God is and there is this revelation of the incredible act of giving, this
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kenosis? So I don't see how the two can be pitted against each other in the
light of that.
MH: I think they have been in the generations Alan Bloom raged against. The 'me'
generation, and 'the kids these days are just out to get what they can'-their
own goods, their own rights. So what you're saying is if we really understood
what authenticity means it would be nothing but to understand it in these
terms.
CT: I also think it isn't entirely true or fair to this generation to level against it a
'me' orientation that is totally unconcerned. There is an idea of 'flower
power' relations which are devoid of power. But there are a lot of people out
there, that are the same people into being themselves and doing their own
thing, who have the idea that when you get away from some of these
structures you will have this wonderful beneficence, unhung-up, un-hateful
relationship. So the original idea was marching on in more and more distorted
variants, but it is the original idea that coming to yourself and being what you
are as a human being, working in the family and so on, is also linked
immediately in the original Protestant congregations with good, and
something of this link is still there with cheaper and cheaper—or if you like,
more and more extreme—variants. So the problem is in a lot of cases that you
are unhooking some affirmation with some idea that you are doing good to
the world, but what is needed is a reality check. Just what good are you doing
to the world and what would require really to open yourself to others? And
then this advances your benchmark immediately. It is clear that a lot has been
shut down here. Sensitivity has been lost. The potential of being moved by it
has been lost. And that's what's wrong with it. Once again I'm not trying to
say this is the only way of coming at it, but I think you've got to complement
coming at it with the 'hey, you're not recognising limits' direction with the





MH: When I was first thinking about writing a Ph.D. I felt that agape was a very
important central concept in Christian Ethics, and one of the first places I
came across it was in the conclusion ofSources. I was wondering if you could
expound your own views on agape, where it fits into moral theory.
CT: Well, it's not easy. I don't feel myself very theologically competent to talk
about this, but I feel that what gets revealed in the Gospel, agape in the life of
Christ .... As you know this was a word that had a minor role in Greek
ordinary language, the kind of love and concern that means you take care of
something. People talk about 'agapan' your wealth or your property and so
on. This is in Classical and in ordinary Koine before the Gospels. So this
word is taken and given this new slot where I suppose the ultimate
understanding of what is involved in it is the love of God for us, which can be
somehow taken up by us, and therefore we can participate in, therefore also
have for others. And it is a kind of love that goes beyond any of these other
human sources of love we understand, which in a sense always involve a
degree of self-reference and self-fulfilment and so on. This seems to go
beyond that all together. So it's this kind of power that transcends and goes
beyond the way we normally feel ourselves limited, and so I see the place of
this in human life as being another one of those places (or in terms of the
Christian faith I suppose the key place) where we see a possible vocation for
human beings that transcends, that goes beyond, that even breaks out of in a
sense, the self, the ordinary way of operating as human beings. So it's a way
in which we see a vocation for ourselves, a road for ourselves, that involves
breaking beyond these normal vocations, and so its relation to our ethical
understanding is the same uneasy one that any one of those paths proposed by
either Plato or Buddha and so on, are. That is, on the one hand we have
ethical codes and principles that in a certain way domesticate that, are meant
to be applicable and liveable by ordinary people in ordinary circumstances.
You can ask of them only so much. On the other hand it opens a way which
seems to burst the bounds of any of these ethical codes. So there's an unease
about that which we are meant to be coping with—either sometimes trying to
codify the supererogatory, and what goes beyond, which leads to either
nonsense or absurdly high principles applied to ordinary people in ordinary
circumstances. Or we run a two tiered idea in a way like the Reformers
objecting in Christendom to the steerage class and the first class. Or—there's
no easy way of dealing with this—we uneasily accept it. We're operating on
these two levels all the time. It does prevent our having a perfectly self-
imposed idea of human life, the perfect human life, which if properly lived
would never run into contradictions, would never find itself at odds with
something else which is good and valuable and important. Whereas in fact
once you open the sky in one of these directions of self-transcendence, you're
always running into these kinds of contradictions and tensions. To perfect our
life according to the way things are morally in our society nevertheless can be
morally very problematic because it can be a way of closing off this good life,
being satisfied with that. In the New Testament there is always this volley
attack on the Pharisees, but I don't think the Pharisees are in essence bad
people, that the Pharisaic set of disciplines were in essence bad. On the
contrary I sense they were good people, in a sense that's the message we're
suppose to get: they were good people, and the publicans were better. But the
paradox is that just being a very good person can be an ultimate trap. It closes
off this window, this skylight.
MH: You mention somewhere towards the end of Sources the point that in having
such high moral standards we need to have strong sources like agape. Divine
affirmation is playing a big part in agape and yet you hint at secularised
successions to agape, and I'm wondering if you have any particular ones in
mind.
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CT: Yeah, there's an ideal a model of benevolence as developed—
benevolence/beneficence, that has developed since the 18th century—which
is definitely post-theistic. That is it puts up in exactly the same way as in
relation to the earlier honour ethic. Christian faith had this idea of infinite
giving, not being concerned with honour. So the Enlightenment piggy-backed
that, piggy-backed its criticism of the honour ethic and so on, and said that
what really matters is beneficence, benevolence. Indeed, you even have with
Bacon exactly this kind of opposition. Whereas you have an older ethos with
this older notion of science which is based on pride, and 'whoopee! We've
got the whole picture ... right aren't we great!' You have another kind of
science which is based on believing in the condition of mankind. It's much
more humble, an under-labourer kind of thing. Locke talked about this, the
under-labourer would go around and do small things which actually improved
the condition of mankind. And there precisely the motivation is charity—
charity is the translation of agape, right? So you have this idea that the
properly enlightened—this is one extraordinary inventions of our culture—the
properly enlightened person is moved by benevolence, because having got
over all the various kinds of fruits of darkness, of unenlightenment, trying to
get ahead in order to get a narrow advantage for oneself and so on, fears and
superstition ... get rid of all that, and what is there waiting to bubble up,
waiting to flow out, is a kind of natural benevolence. And this is a kind of
imitation of, transposition of, a second version of agape. But it's meant to be
entirely naturalised, there's no reference to the divine, no idea that to follow
this right the way through involves breaking open the ordinary self-contained
manner of existence of human life, we just follow, as it were, our best
instincts to get to this enlightenment.
MH: This doesn't seem to me a version of agape at all. It seems to me that they are
taking the fruits of agape.
CT: Yeah, sure, but it's definitely an indication of it. It is very powerfully affected
by it, downstream of it. It couldn't be conceivable to enter the culture without
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drawing on love. So in that sense you might say it's a caricature of it, but it
relates to it very much in some such way, an imitation, or caricature, second
version of.
MH: That seems to me to be the best modern example of something that's
following up agape. Are there others besides universal beneficence? Dignity
and respect perhaps?
CT: Well, no, the idea of dignity and respect, it follows other features of the
Christian outlook: each human being is chosen by God and has a special
dignity, and as chosen by God the ultimate judgement is not in our hands, it's
in God's hands, and so on. So there are other features of the whole outlook
which are reflected in other features of modern culture like dignity, rights, but
the specific feature which reflects agape is this idea that there is waiting to be
released in us this great benevolence. If you only get rid of all the questions,
the superstition, fear, and so on, the river then flows.
MH: Moving on but in quite a similar vein, you just mentioned transcendence and
I've just been reading a little of your dialogue with Martha Nussbaum in this
regard. I was wondering how your interpretation of transcendence would
differ from hers, particularly as she expounds it in Love's Knowledge, where
she is directly confronting your review of Fragility of Goodness. It seems to
me that when we talk about transcendence in terms of transcending the self,
getting a moral source which is beyond the self, that this is something very
different and something fundamentally important.
CT: Yeah, I'm talking about this radical de-centring of the self, to use that
expression I used before, theocentrism, the expression of people in the 17th
century. So it's not possible to draw your ethic entirely from what you
consider to be the natural human norm. By that I mean what can be seen to be
the best self-fulfilment of the human being by human beings. So you can go a
long way with that. You can get people like John Stuart Mill who point out
that you're happier if you give yourself some cause involving other people
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than if you simply remain inured in self-regarding actions. But the idea is still
that that kind of more altruistic behaviour normally fits and should normally
fit within a human life where the goal of the whole thing is a fulfilled life. My
living a fulfilled life, I would have an even more fulfilled life if it includes
things like helping my fellow human being. So it all fits within that overall
framework which we see as human fulfilment and happiness. That's another
way of naturalising benevolence.
MH: And would you consider that a kind of transcendence?
CT: Well it's a kind of transcendence, I mean the word transcendence may be the
wrong word. I forgot if I used it, maybe I did use it in my review of her
Fragility ofGoodness.
MH: Just as a brief passing thought in the end which she picks up on in Love's
Knowledge quite significantly in her last essay which is called 'Human
Transcendence' or something like that.
CT: OK, so maybe I did, maybe I didn't use the word transcendence, but it's not
necessarily the best word.
MH: She seems to be picking up the idea that transcendence means becoming god¬
like. But she also says there are other kinds of transcendence like, for
instance, she talks about Aristotle's mean, and the fact that there are a lot of
different ways of getting it wrong, and only one way of getting it right, and
transcending in that regard would be living the virtuous life, the good life as a
virtuous person. Getting it right by transcending all these human, all too
human, ways of being. But it seems to me that there's a completely different
kind of transcendence when you're talking about moral sources and sources
as theocentric sources.
CT: Well, what I was talking about in that article ... you see I was thinking of
Plato and you don't really understand Plato very well unless you see in some
way his asking you to believe in or go beyond the notion of the fulfilled
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human life. One way of reading Plato is in terms of this radically de-centring
of what one considers a normal fulfilled human life of nature. So if I used the
word transcendence that's what I was trying to use it for, it's nothing to do
with the kind of superman, a Nietzschean superman, or becoming like God—
the idea of which is that I make part of my human fulfilment that I would
have the powers of God. No, it's to do with de-centring out of that, even
being ready to sacrifice it, give it up, make a leap beyond that. And that which
you see very clearly in the Cross, in the Christian Faith, which you see in
Buddhism in another way, it can't be fitted into Martha's category. The thing
is that she has a very interesting attempt in a lot of her work to devise this
ethic, this human ethic based a bit on Aristotle, looking at different aspects of
life, and you see what the proper way to behave is and you usually give them
a name, and these are the virtues and this is what we ought to aim at. And it's
an up to date Aristotle in that it has a number of excellences, albeit 20th
century excellences, that he wouldn't have understood, but it's still an attempt
to get the view of ethics all within one framework, the framework of a
fulfilled human life. Then these demands enter across, come across that
target, where they can't be fitted within it. It's not another bit of fulfilment
which we've got to cram into the picture with everything else. It is something
that can take you quite outside and beyond that, can make a sacrifice of that.
And you can't put rules down for that, it's got to be lived out in your life.
There isn't a criterion.
MH: Would you consider that agape is a transcendent good in this way, the way
it's been conceived and Christianity being theocentric?
CT: That's right, if transcendent has this meaning now that we've given it, then
that is, yes, that's a call to transcendence in exactly that sense.
MH: In terms of conflicting goods and the way we assess what's right and wrong,
ifwe're looking to bring into this picture this kind of transcendent morality, a
theocentric morality, what prevents us from allowing some radical moral
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interpretation, say something from the Old Testament like Abraham
sacrificing Isaac, or something like this past weekend, the assassination of
Yitzhak Rabin because the murderer says he was acting on divine revelation?
T was told to do this' ... and it's sort of a trump from this supposed
theocentric morality. How do we fit that into our moral reasoning?
CT: Well it's not something that you can provide ultimate criteria for or even
point to it. Why do I feel that—whatever, I forgot his name—why don't I feel
this is the hand of God? Well because it's murder. And I don't feel that I'm
totally without guidelines as to what God wants of us. But on the other hand
there is an element of personal calling, being right is in some sense all that.
There are some general things we can say about what we ought to do. Then
there is this personal calling to go beyond that which comes in people's lives
in totally different ways, and which involves some development of some
personal relationship with God. But we do have some general guidelines, and
it strains altogether my view of them to think this is a genuine call when it
totally calls you to scrap those guidelines and commit something horrible.
MH: So there has to, in some sense, be a fit with the way we understand morality
and these theocentric demands.
CT: Yes, but not just morality but the theocentric demands as they are understood.
I mean we're not left without anything because we have the example in the
Gospel, a paradigm example of transcending, of giving it all up. Of course, in
doing all that, well we have a story that doesn't involve murder. It involves
being murdered. It doesn't involve using force. There even are specific events
of the story, episodes of temptation which involve being effective—normal,
historical ways of being effective. Wow! Big splash! And people are using the
power of the state ... and these are deliberately set aside. The story is that
these are rejected. So we're not left totally without guidelines. If somebody
comes along and says 'We'll wipe all these people out because God told me
to,' it doesn't square with what one finds in history, in the Gospels.
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MH: I find a lot of that in the Old Testament.
CT: Yeah, in the Old Testament there is a lot of that.
MH: But is that any different? I mean there's a theocracy there where they're
committing genocide.
CT: Yes, I don't know how we can ultimately respond to that. Whether we want to
say that those were earlier understandings or cruder understandings. But from
that point of view, the New Testament simply supersedes that.
MH: Yes, that's something that I'm not really sure how to respond to either.
CT: I'm not quite sure how to word my answer or justify the detail of my answer,
but I don't have any doubt that something like that is the answer. I mean that
this story here in the New Testament is the one that is normative. Where they
differ, it is the one to go with. So to me we're not left without guidelines, but
you can't reduce it to some exact type of criteria. There are going to be new
kinds of calling all the time, which may sound in some ways strange in
relation to the previous system. So the idea of mendicant friars of St. Francis,
nobody had quite thought of that before. There were monks, there were lay
people and there were clergy. And now we had this completely new way of
operating which didn't have any precedence, except that it fit very well with





MH: I wanted to talk about something we were talking about last week which was
agape, but let me start with something else. One of the things I picked up on
in your work was the way you argue against the fact/value distinction so that
when we're reasoning morally we are reasoning from a standpoint, we're not
reasoning as disengaged 'punctual selves'. We've got a view from somewhere
and we're also reasoning with other human agents who also have certain
dispositions. OK, let me take that and put it here to one side for a moment,
and pick up the idea of agape. What we were talking about last week was
agape as an empowering way of being seen as good. God creates us as good,
and by this we are empowered to love, by this moral source. Now with this
idea of agape then, before we even begin to interact with each other we have
this sort of background of being loved or being seen as good by God. So what
I'm wondering is does this have any effect on, or does this play any role in,
the way we have this inability to approach moral reasoning from a neutral
standpoint?
CT: Yeah, well, the inability to approach moral reasoning from a neutral
standpoint is really that without some first-off, what people call intuitions,
you don't get moral reasoning going at all. That is some very strong sense that
yeah, this is higher than that or this is great or this is good or this is noble or
something like that. And reason takes the form of critically examining that,
and raising issues about 'Am I just going with the feeling of the moment, or is
this the result of this distortion?', and so on, rather than taking a form where
it would start from a completely neutral condition without leading anywhere,
and then build up from that reasons leading somewhere. You don't build up
reasons to lead somewhere. You at best let them in and let them become
evident to us. Now that I think is the situation in which human moral reason
always takes place, and the contrary assumption is one of these
epistemologically generated illusions that get in the way of seeing what's
going on. Now for someone with the theological bent that I have and that you
have, the reality that you can let in is this one that you described—about
being loved by God. To allow that in and to see, and to have a sense of what
that is, and to see things in that light, is to see that some things are obviously
good, right, and should be strived for, and so on. That is the basis of moral
reasoning.
MH: So is that simply labelling something that is already there, how does this work
with the whole—I've just been reading some of your dialogue with Rorty—
idea of different schemes, how does that all fit with the distinction and
wanting to keep up with different schemes.
CT: Well, I'm not linking it very well, I mean my point is that you can't do away
with something like the scheme/content distinction, because people as a
matter of fact culturally do come from very different places, and they in
certain important respects fail to understand each other, talk past each other,
can't grasp the central concept. So the concept agape, if you like, is totally off
the map of lots of people that I know who just don't have a place for that.
MH: Is that because of cultural differences?
CT: Well, it can be because of what people call cultural differences, or you can
just redefine cultural differences to mean these kinds of things, but it can also
be because of what people right away call cultural differences ... because
within something like the same culture in the modern west there are people
who have burrowed themselves into an outlook that is so far away from, let's
say, this 'theological dimension', that for them the thing barely exists. Or
even more dangerously than this concept—coming from the set of seeds
where you know right off that you're not going to understand it—they think
they know about love, and God, so in a sense the misunderstanding is even
288
greater, because it's concealed beneath a belief in one's own understanding. It
is sealed by the presumption on their part that coming from this culture, 'Of
course I know about Christian love,' and so on. So maybe I'm answering your
question in a rather round about way, there are misunderstandings that are
within a single culture, which in some ways are even more pernicious or
dangerous or difficult to get at. Because all sides think 'we all know what
we're talking about, we just disagree.' It's very clear that there are certain
features of the whole way of looking at things that the Christian has that are
just off the map.
MH: Now if I as a Christian am thinking that God is relating to me in this
particular way, this transcendent being, as being loved, and that empowers
me, I'm not quite sure how I can distinguish that, and leave it there without
saying 'Yes, but ifwe leave behind these notions of agape and try and get into
this universal beneficence and all these other ideas of what it is right to do,
we're not going to be empowered to do this.' So it's seems like in one way
you are trying to say well this is just the Christian take on things, but in
another way you're saying without these strong goods which emerge from
Christianity or from Judeo-Christian ideas, we're not going to be able to get
anywhere, in fact we're going to be caught in this death spiral down into—
CT: Yeah, but those are overlapping, but different takes. You see I think I put it
more dramatically. I think I said a Nietzschean could agree on that take, or
some version of that. Namely that you can't dedicate yourself this much to the
good without some kind of severe self-denial, self-destruction, and so on. But
you could draw from that the conclusion that we ought to dump this great
emphasis on benevolence. So it's not simply a comment that arises from a
Christian perspective. From a Christian perspective you might say
that ... well let me put it this way, if that point is true (and I think it is true) it
can saliently come to your attention either because you have some model of
real sanctity and you see how far you fall short of that—you see the demands
as demands that make sense in the light of that so there's a problem from that
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standpoint—or you can be an enemy of the kind of self-denial involved in
this, see it as standing in the way of some kind of self-affirmation of the
Nietzschean kind, and therefore this maybe be a view from which this point
flips up to you and you see it. Even though your liberally committed,
benevolent neighbour may on the whole have a better, or anyway less
destructive, view than you do, he is incapable of seeing it. There are different
standpoints from which this thing can flip up. If we want to treat it as a truth
that you either see or don't see which is the way I think of it, the way I like to
argue, then there are different standpoints from which it can become evident
to us.
MH: The connection that I see, and it is a hunch, I'm not sure quite how to argue
this, is that these moral intuitions, ones that see things as right and wrong, are
in some way affected by the fact that we are in this relationship with God, we
have this source empowering us to do good. And it's something that I think
the argument against the fact/value distinction contributes to in opening up to
allow the fact that we're not starting from nowhere. Even in our initial
articulations and stumblings around we still have this relationship, not only
with God, but with other goods that are empowering us unwittingly or not as
far as we're concerned. Does that make any sense?
CT: Yeah, I think I see what you're getting at. Is the connection with the
fact/value distinction that what we're describing here are these empowering
sources, these, if you like, facts which by their very nature can't be thought to
be neutral, they only can be understood if you take them as read? Yeah, I
think that's right. These are facts that are themselves not neutral facts. You
can't grasp them if you see them as just purely neutral. And that's one of the
great issues you see between the ... I mean this fact/value dichotomy stuff is
another throw-off from the epistemological representational position. I mean,
why should it always be the case that one can get a neutral description-
whatever value is put forward you can carve off a neutral description? Well
this epistemological reconstruction underlies the feeling that we always can
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do that, but if you drop that as your a priori and allow yourself just to look at
how we actually function, and what it is to know the world and so on, it
becomes not at all evident that it is the case.
MH: Yes, there's a striking parallel there between the moral world and the
epistemological world.
CT: Yes, more than that this view of morality is generated by the basic
epistemological premise.
MH: Now I see there's a lot ofmileage to be gotten out of the Contact Theory here
in terms of having a criterionless relationship with God in a way. That you
start with God as just is. This relationship with the human agent just is the
way it is, and there is no sort of foundation to build upon here, you don't step
outside that and calculate A plus B and get agape, there is something intrinsic
there and this is what shows up.





MH: What is your opinion of the Church today?
CT: I am very much opposed to the Church trying to get back to Christendom, like
what I see happening in Eastern Poland or Northern Ireland. I don't agree
with the idea of controlling everybody or trying to get everyone to conform
under the authority of the Church. What I find good are the ways of
manifesting the Gospel, not just on the great levels such as Mother Theresa of
Calcutta, but on the brother and sister level. On the level of the everyday. We
are 'catholic' in that we are whole. The etymology of the Greek word is
important here.
MH: Is there anything in the Catholic Church that you just don't agree with?
CT: Yes, I think this idea of hierarchy of power which sees the papacy as bringing
everyone into line is wrong. It's very much along same lines as the
Christendom idea. That the Pope is this extreme authority—although John
XXIII was not that bad in this respect—and that we must come under his
authority.
MH: Can you see a case for incorporating ideas you have formulated in the
moral/political arena in the Christian community?
CT: Well, if we see the Church as catholic, as universal, then we can see what I
am trying to do in terms of politics, in terms of embracing diversity etc., as a
way of looking at the Catholic Church. Not as a church setting up boundaries
like early heresy dominations and so on, but as one tearing down boundaries,
as a community of diversity. Then things from moral and political theory can
ring true in this context. Also the need for articulation becomes all the more
relevant in such a situation—the idea of living the vision of the gospels. This
is tremendously powerful. Everything that attempts to do this is really against
this grabbing at power which is going back to the role of the Church in
Christendom. I like a lot of the things the Reformation did, bringing back the
importance of the Bible, holiness in everyday, etc., but I don't like them doing
away with things like the monastic life, etc. There are too many barriers here
too.
MH: Where does Congar fit into your influence?
CT: He has this whole idea of layman, of taking the boundary between bishop and
layman away but then defining bishop and church officer in new way ... this
importance of destroying a lot of the boundaries. A lot of what eventually
came to be the Vatican II paper was designed by de Lubac and Congar, but I
read them before the Vatican II council.
MH: Your identity as Christian and as philosopher, how do they merge?
CT: Well, one can see that in philosophy we are not starting with any given belief,
but we try and argue towards a particular view. In Christianity we begin with
a viewpoint. I don't do philosophy from the viewpoint of any assumption. A
lot of people like Quentin Skinner accuse me, are constantly attacking me, for
doing this, for coming from the theological assumption. But I say, 'Hey look
at it right there, read it on the paper, if you have an objection to the argument
let's hear it', etc. If we begin with assumptions in philosophy I do not think
that is philosophy. That doesn't mean that my assumptions won't lead me to
see certain things that the atheist, for example, may be blind to. Take all the
points I make in the beginning of Sources about implicit moral goods—
Platonic/Aristotelian viewpoint. But then a Nietzschean could point out to us
who are not used to seeing it, all the vicious ways of religious actions, and we
could wake up to them—it doesn't mean they do not exist because of his
motivation or genealogy.
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MH: A great number of people have naturally compared you to Alasdair Maclntyre
as a Catholic, and as one influenced by Aristotle and so on. Are there any
profound differences in your beliefs?
CT: Two, which may in fact be one difference. They may meet somewhere higher
up. First he is much more pessimistic about the state ofmodernity than I am. I
have not picked Alasdair up on this specifically because he has not addressed
this in any length, but there is a hint of it as a theme running throughout his
writing. I see certain goods in modernity, like ethics of authenticity, etc.
While modernity is not without criticism from me, Alasdair thinks that after
Aquinas we have been spiralling downwards. Secondly, politically, he used to
be way to the left of me, in his Trotskyite days, but now he has completely
given up on any hope of political improvement. He has become politically
pessimistic. He thinks that the state of the political arena in modern
democracy is hopeless, and that there is only value in the smaller
communities. I certainly don't agree with this.
MH: Shifting gears completely, how would you balance the belief of Natural Law
and the Stoics with the need for personal relationships?
CT: Well yes, I'm not really quite clear on this because I'm not clear about where
the Stoics are, but it seems to me that there is something fundamentally
different between the Stoics and the Gospel. In the Gospel you have the idea
of Providence and this higher good, but you also have the idea of agape, the
love of others, and I think that the two are the same—in being higher you are
involved in agape. If you are in this higher order, you naturally love in this
way when you are like this. In this sense agape trumps out the Stoic notion of
apathes. We are allowed the passions of agape, so we interact with one
another in this way while embracing, and by embracing this higher order or
Providence. The idea of'Tikkun', of'healing the world' ... the Jewish phrase
is also in the Christian theology, and here there is a dissimilarity as well. The
Stoics have the order of the world and nothing is wrong with it. The
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Christians see agape as getting right again. These acts of beneficence are acts
of healing. This is a big difference between Stoics and Christians.
MH: What is your view on the Scripture, is it the same as other sacred texts, or the
same as Eliot's Four Quartets, for example?
CT: No, it is not the same as an artist's writing because we have a whole history
of the first people, Jews and then Christians, in special relationship with God,
and it is both the history describing it and the actual relationship itself in the
text and there is just something categorically different about that. We have the
rich history of the people and we have communication from God in this very
particular way. As far as other texts, I suppose the Koran is the closest thing
to this although that is very different and distinct. I don't think we can
compare them, I don't think that we can stand outside of this and try and
adjudicate between the various texts. I think that as far as our western
Christian tradition there is a fundamental difference between scriptures and
artists' writing. As far as what makes up the cannon I don't know, I think we
have to trust the decisions of the Church and the role it plays here.
MH: One final area I want to ask you about is epiphanic art. How do you recognise
it? Intuition?
CT: Yes, it is intuition, with a clause added to this. I mean we get it through
intuition, but we get it after training, shaping, careful thought, reflection. That
is what educated intuition is all about.
MH: What does this art communicate, does it need to be necessarily narrative?
CT: I don't think so, no. I have yet to hear a good argument that says it has to be
narrative. Look at music, we are moved by music ...
MH: So is it just being moved, is there a moral import here?
CT: Yes, it gives us insight into the possibilities of transcendence.
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MH: But how is there a connection between being moved and this moral insight?
What about in something that is abstract such as Jackson Pollock's Blue
Poles'?
CT: Well we see things in Beethoven's last quartets which are tremendously
powerful, which communicate and create a language. There is a kind of
language theory involved here. Like the expressivist theory. That in
communicating these kinds of expressions they are also creating them.
MH: So we can translate this to Pollock and say that he is communicating in a
language that is at the same time being created, even if we cannot translate
that language into our verbal grammar?
CT: Yes, that's right.
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Appendix H
Explanation of Contact and Representation
Theories of Knowledge
by Charles Taylor for McGill University Seminar 1995
Theories of Knowledge: Contact v. Representation
I
A representational theory (R-theory) is one where: a content description of the
knower's awareness can be always given without any commitment concerning the
object (allegedly) known.
For a contact theory (C-theory), this condition doesn't hold.
II
C-theories construe knowledge in terms of contact with reality, variously
conceived. This contact is seen as self-authenticating.
R-theories mistrust 'self-authentication'. They demand some proof of
'contact'. They look for a 'criterion'.
This means that we construe our epistemic predicament not as one of
contact/noncontact with reality, but as our having representations bearing on reality.
This requires a stance of disengagement.
Knowledge comes from examining representations. We need a procedure to
generate certainty.
The role of argument differs: for C-theories, it may help us to recover contact;




a) of representations from their objects
('transcendental disengagement')
b) of thinking from embodiment
c) ofmy thinking from community/authority
2) careful scrutiny of our representations:
a) distinguishing their elements,
b) examining their articulations,
c) assembling their elements by a reliable procedure.
Let 1) and 2) be called the 'procedural demands'
These go along with a spiritual outlook of disengagement: a peculiar sense of
power, and certain moral demands and ideals, such as: A) self-given certainty, self-
mastery; B) monological self-responsibility; C) the heroism of disenchantment.
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